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**COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT**

**Impact Assessment Report**

*Accompanying the document*

**Guidelines on certain State aid measures in the context of Greenhouse Gas Emission  
Allowance Trading Scheme**

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***Disclaimer***

*This report commits only the Commission's services involved in its preparation and does not prejudge the final form of any decision to be taken by the Commission*

## **1. THE CONSULTATION WITH INTERESTED PARTIES**

### **1.1. Background**

The European Emissions Trading (ETS) Directive ("**ETS Directive**")<sup>1</sup> envisages the possibility for Member States to provide State aid to compensate for higher electricity costs due to the ETS ("indirect CO2 costs")<sup>2</sup>.

On 11 March 2011 the Commission launched the public consultation on a new set of State aid rules in the context of the EU ETS ("**ETS Guidelines**" or "**ETS State aid Guidelines**"). The first consultation ended on 11 May 2011. The Report also takes account of the consultation on a draft version of the ETS Guidelines (opened on 21 December 2011 and closed on 31 January 2012), as well as a meeting with the Member States on 20 January 2012.

This Report is confined to State aid for "carbon leakage" due to indirect CO2 costs<sup>3</sup>. Carbon leakage occurs where costs imposed on EU firms by the ETS cause shifts of production, investments not to be undertaken or even relocation from the EU to third countries without comparable CO2 constraints in a way that results in a global increase in CO2 emissions<sup>4</sup>.

### **1.2. The outcome of the consultation and its organisation**

Some 140 stakeholders responded to the Questionnaire which focused on the issues of sector eligibility, the aid intensity and the CO2 emission factor of electricity production. Most responses emanated from the industry (individual companies, European industry federations as well as wider industry bodies representing EU industry and energy-intensive undertakings). Most Member States responded. Several electricity producers and their European federation also provided submissions. A number of submissions were also received from employee federations, academic bodies and non-governmental organisations. Around 160 stakeholders replied to the consultation on the draft ETS Guidelines. The submissions made in that context largely confirmed those made during the consultation in the spring (see Annex 2 and 3).

A number of replies (including most of industry) argue in favour of wide sector eligibility and a high maximum aid ceiling with the primary aim of preventing carbon leakage. Second, many replies (including most Member States) also emphasise that carbon leakage must be

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<sup>1</sup> Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC; OJ L 275, 25.10.2003, p. 32, as subsequently amended.

<sup>2</sup> Recital 27 of Directive 2009/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme of the community, OJ L 140, 05.06.2009, p. 63, and Article 10a(6) of the ETS Directive, as amended.

<sup>3</sup> The ETS Guidelines will also define the compatibility criteria for other measures in the ETS Directive that involve as follows: (i) investment aid to new high efficient power plants, including those that are CCS-ready; (ii) transitional free allowances to power generators for the modernisation of electricity generation in EU-10 and (iii) exclusion of small emitters from the EU ETS subject to equivalent measures.

<sup>4</sup> The ETS Directive has been extended to the EEA, through the mechanisms of the EEA Agreement. Thus references to EU also encompass the EEA.

prevented in a way that minimises the distortions of the ETS and competition in the internal market. The wide range of stakeholder views is reflected in the options and option packages (see section 4).

Several meetings were held with stakeholders (mainly the European federations representing specific sectors and Member States). There was close cooperation with other Commission services in the context of an impact assessment steering group, in particular with DG CLIMA, DG ENTR and DG ENER.

The consultants Ecofys and Fraunhofer were enlisted by the DG CLIMA to provide technical support in respect of a specific issue (electricity efficiency benchmarks)<sup>5</sup>.

### **1.3. Response to the Opinion of the Impact Assessment Board**

The impact assessment was presented to the Impact Assessment Board on 9 November 2011. The Board issued its Opinion on 11 November. On 20 April 2012 the Board issued its second Opinion on the resubmitted Report.

The revised Report presents a robust and fully fledged Baseline Scenario. The problem definition has been substantially strengthened. The incidence of carbon leakage is addressed. Sensitivity tests involving different CO<sub>2</sub> price assumptions have been added, including the application of a price assumption based on CO<sub>2</sub> price significantly above the current levels (€40).

To facilitate the comparison of options, four Option Packages (which reflect a wide range of stakeholder views) have been developed. The assessment also places greater emphasis on possible distortions in the internal market not only within but also between sectors.

The specific sections of the Report which implement the recommendations of the two Opinions are set out in Annex 4.

## **2. THE PROBLEM**

### **2.1. The problem: carbon leakage due to indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs and related uncertainties**

#### *2.1.1. The root of the problem: indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs resulting from ETS 3*

The ETS Directive set up the ETS with effect from 1 January 2005. ETS 1 was in force 2005-2007 and ETS 2 will last four years (2008-2012). ETS 3 will last for eight years (2013-2020).

The rationale of the ETS is to generate a price signal – the CO<sub>2</sub> price – strong enough to drive production and investment decisions towards a low-carbon economy<sup>6</sup>. The carbon price should feed through to the economy so that CO<sub>2</sub> reductions are at least cost to society<sup>7</sup>.

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<sup>5</sup> In particular regarding the issue of product benchmark values which is one of the factors that will determine the maximum aid amount per eligible installation (see Annex 12). At the time of drafting, the work on the benchmark values is ongoing.

The ETS Directive<sup>8</sup> provides for protection EU sectors and subsectors "at significant risk of carbon leakage" due to CO2 costs resulting from the ETS.

The first mechanism cushions the impact of ETS-induced costs linked to the firms' own production ("direct CO2 costs") in the form of free EU allowances to emit CO2 ("EUAs")<sup>9</sup>.

Direct CO2 costs are caused by the combustion of fuels (e.g. coal, gas and oil). Each tonne of CO2 emitted by an industrial installations covered by the ETS must be paid for by submitting one free allowance (EUA). The EUAs are submitted annually in April (in respect of the installation's CO2 emission in the previous year).

That mechanism was put into effect, first, through the Commission Decision 2010/2/EU ("2010 Carbon Leakage Decision"), listing the eligible sectors and subsectors. The second Decision (2011/278/EU) ("2011 Benchmarking Decision") explains how to calculate the number of free EUAs each installation within eligible sectors and subsectors shall receive.

Concretely, if an installation is active within one of the 151 eligible sectors or 13 subsectors under the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision, it will receive free EUAs for the entire terms of ETS 3 (i.e. 2013-2020). The 2011 Benchmarking Decisions defines the method to calculate the number of free EUAs per installation. The method is designed to preserve the incentives created by the ETS CO2 price signal as far as possible (see 5.3.3).

This Report concerns the second mechanism in the ETS Directive aimed at protecting certain sectors against carbon leakage. That mechanism provides for compensation for extra electricity costs caused by the ETS (indirect CO2 costs). Those costs are 'indirect' in the sense that the costs are first incurred upstream by electricity producers (through the combustion of fossil fuels notably coal and gas) and passed on by those producers.

The second mechanism introduced into the ETS Directive is at the core of the problem addressed in this Report. The Directive explicitly envisages that Member States may decide to grant State aid to firms within sectors and subsectors at significant risk of carbon leakage due to the higher CO2 costs (it being assumed that these costs are passed on by electricity producers in their prices) ("**indirect CO2 costs**"). The specific provisions (recital 27 of Directive 2009/29/EC and Article 10a(6) of the ETS Directive and the Commission's Statement in that connection) are explained in more detail in Annex 6. EU industry as a whole consumes electricity for roughly €100bn a year<sup>10</sup>. For an illustration of the impact of indirect CO2 costs on electricity prices set the following graph:

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<sup>6</sup> Stern (2009).


<sup>7</sup> See e.g. Neuhoff (2008); Stern (2009); European Commission (SEC(2008) 85 VOL. II), pp. 13-14.

<sup>8</sup> ETS Directive, p.63.

<sup>9</sup> While the free permits to emit CO2 involves a transfer of resources from the Member States to the sectors concerned, it does not constitute State aid as the free allocation is fully harmonized by the ETS Directive (leaving no discretion to the Member States).

<sup>10</sup> Based on Eurostat data fro 2007 when total electricity consumption in the EU mining and manufacturing industry amounted to 1218 TWh. An electricity price of 10 cents/KWh has been assumed (which may overstate the price paid by large industrial customers).

Figure 6. Estimated contribution of CO<sub>2</sub> price to rise in German industrial power costs




Data : Bluenext, EUROSTAT, own calculation

Note: electricity prices refer to average annual industrial consumer prices in €/MWh incl. tax. The industrial consumption price quoted refers to large industrial consumers consuming 70-150 000MWh/yr. Prices exclude VAT. CO<sub>2</sub> cost component assumes a pass-through of 90% of EUA price for coal-fired power and 0.9 tCO<sub>2</sub> emitted per MWh.

To illustrate the distinction between direct and indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs and to highlight some of the industrial sectors which are particularly concerned by the problem, two figures relating to two Member States are set out below. A third figure illustrates the impact on indirect costs resulting from the ETS over time in one Member State.

**Figure: Direct and indirect CO2 costs as a share of sector value added and GDP in Germany**

Figure 1 Value at stake relative to GDP – area in light blue represent indirect costs, areas in red reflect direct costs



Source: Graichen, Mattes et al (2009)

**Figure: Direct and indirect CO2 costs as a share of sector gross value added and GDP in the UK**




Figure 1 CO<sub>2</sub> cost screen: Subsectors potentially exposed under unilateral CO<sub>2</sub> pricing

Source: Hourcade et al (2007)

The compensation mechanisms are distinct. For direct CO<sub>2</sub> costs EUAs are handed out for the free for the whole period (2013-2020). The EUAs can then be freely traded. The rationale of the ETS (and cap and trade systems in general) is that such a decentralised system will enable the market to continually search for the cheapest possibilities to abate CO<sub>2</sub>. The cheapest abatement possibilities can be expected to be exploited first by the sectors covered by the ETS (i.e. electricity producers as well as the manufacturing and mining industries). The abating firms will then be able to sell their EUAs.

Compensation for indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs in the form of State aid can be expected to be paid more frequently by the Member State (e.g. annually).

### *2.1.2. The nature of the problem: production leakage, investment leakage and relocation*

The consultation yielded valuable information on the **nature of the problem** of carbon leakage. Stakeholders agreed with the literature that carbon leakage occurs in stages.

Typically, the effects would first be felt in the form 'production leakage'. This means that the 'asymmetric' cost impacting EU firms would entail losses of market share to non-EU competitors. That effect could first be felt in EU firms' export markets and later in the domestic markets (within the EU)<sup>11</sup>. 'Investment leakage' would ensue later as it would no longer be deemed profitable to invest in the EU, compared to non-CO<sub>2</sub> constrained jurisdictions. Before that an EU firm may decide to utilise capacity in its non-EU jurisdictions or not carry out maintenance work within the EU<sup>12</sup>. The most extreme forms of investment leakage could involve plant closures or even relocation of activities to countries without comparable CO<sub>2</sub> constraints. Stakeholders largely agree that this scenario (in particular relocation) is the most unlikely impact of carbon leakage, a position consistent with the findings of the literature on carbon leakage<sup>13</sup>.

### *2.1.3. The scope of the problem*

In recent years a growing body of literature on carbon leakage has emerged<sup>14</sup>. The sometimes highly divergent results as to carbon leakage risks in specific sectors have nevertheless led some commentators to urge caution about placing too much reliance on simulations<sup>15</sup>. The carbon leakage literature does not find empirical proof of carbon leakage<sup>16</sup> (although some industry stakeholders take a different view: see e.g. the survey-based figures 18-19 in Annex 8). The literature finds that it is often difficult to distinguish the real drivers behind business decisions on production, investment and location and that it is therefore fraught with difficulty

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<sup>11</sup> See replies to questionnaire by e.g. the European Aluminium Association.

<sup>12</sup> See replies to questionnaire by e.g. the Confederation of European Paper Industries (CEPI), EuroChlor and the European Aluminium Association.

<sup>13</sup> See replies to questionnaire by e.g. Eurofer, the Confederation of European Paper Industries (CEPI), EuroChlor and the European Aluminium Association.

<sup>14</sup> A non-exhaustive list includes among others Ecofys, Cambridge Econometrics, Ökoinstitut, Delft, Entec, Fraunhofer, Carbon Trust, Climate Strategies. Most studies and reports deal with risks of carbon leakage (and possible remedies) resulting from direct CO<sub>2</sub> costs or direct CO<sub>2</sub> costs together with indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs. For some summaries of parts of the literature see e.g. Cambridge Econometrics (2010) at pp. 5-17. For another summary of carbon leakage literature see Dröge (2009), p. 19.

<sup>15</sup> See Peretz (2009) at p. 10 who refers to other authorities (including Reinaud) who share this view.

<sup>16</sup> See e.g. Cambridge Econometrics (2010).

to attempt to disentangle decisions which could specifically be attributed to direct and/or indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs<sup>17</sup>. **The absence of concrete evidence of carbon leakage** adds to the difficulty of defining criteria to identify risks<sup>18</sup>.

Given the relatively short time span of EU ETS policies the results from analyses undertaken so far should however be treated with care<sup>19</sup>. The lack of empirical evidence of carbon leakage does not mean that there may not be any effects over the longer term, especially given the greater stringency of the ETS during 2013-2020.

Even with empirical evidence covering many years it may be very difficult to isolate the effect of carbon prices on investment, production and location decisions in Europe<sup>20</sup>. Identifying the triggering event would for example require disentangling the effects from carbon leakage from the effects of a slow-down in a commodity boom in the form of plant closures<sup>21</sup>.

Several studies looking at the competitiveness impact of ETS conclude that for most manufacturing sectors, the evolution of cost differentials due to exchange rate variations, costs of labour, costs of capital and costs of other inputs far outweigh the importance of cost differentials induced by the effects of carbon pricing, and in particular its effects on electricity prices<sup>22</sup>.

The findings on the incidence of carbon leakage in the literature should be distinguished from the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision which – in the context of compensation for direct CO<sub>2</sub> costs - finds that a number of sectors are at risk of carbon leakage within the meaning of the criteria in the ETS Directive.

#### *2.1.4. Challenges in quantifying the problem*

The carbon leakage literature also draws attention to a severe lack of data sources at both EU and national level that would be needed to better assess risks of carbon leakage<sup>23</sup>. One key area characterised by such paucity of data sources concerns information on electricity consumption by sectors and subsectors at a level of disaggregation relevant to the core problem addressed in this Report (see section 2.1.1). Eurostat only produces figures on electricity by sectors at a high level of aggregation, making it considerably more difficult to assess EU-wide cost impacts of electricity price increases at a more disaggregated level<sup>24</sup>.

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<sup>17</sup> Cambridge Econometrics (2010); Reinaud (2008).

<sup>18</sup> Sartor (2012); Cambridge Econometrics (2010), p. 48.

<sup>19</sup> See Reinaud (2008), p. 6.

<sup>20</sup> Reinaud (2008).

<sup>21</sup> See Reinaud (2008), p. 69 (who recommends that countries concerned themselves step up ex-ante and ex-post studies).

<sup>22</sup> Grubb et al (2009), p. 20. For example, iron ore constitutes 40% of the costs of steelmaking in the EU. Access to wood is said to be the competitiveness issue for the EU paper sector (See the 2011 Competitiveness report; see also Reinaud (2008)).

<sup>23</sup> Recent carbon leakage literature (Cambridge Econometrics (2010)) has strongly recommended "that both Member States and EU statistical agencies improve the quality and richness of the data required to make assessments of carbon leakage. In some cases key economic data are found to be severely lacking".

<sup>24</sup> The 2011 Benchmarking Decision also drew attention to the lack of data on electricity consumption (see recital 11).

Second, even at more aggregated level, there is no sector-specific comparable EU-wide data of electricity generated by the industrial installations themselves (auto-generation) as opposed to electricity purchased from the electricity grid.

For the definition of sectors eligible for compensation of their direct CO<sub>2</sub> costs under Commission's 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision and the related impact assessment, the Commission services collected and refined a large amount of key data on the direct and indirect CO<sub>2</sub> cost impact expected to result from ETS 3 (2013-2020) on the relevant sectors as well as on their trade intensity. This data is a fundamental data source underlying this Report<sup>25</sup>.

Another factor adding to the precariousness of assessing risks of carbon leakage for particular sectors and subsectors is the lack of estimates of the price elasticity of demand in the context of trade between the EU and non-EU countries covering the sectors and subsectors potentially concerned by carbon leakage (see section 4.7.2.2 and Annex 16, table 20 and 25 on such so-called '*Armington elasticities*'). Where available and relevant, this Report will refer to existing studies.

#### 2.1.5. *The means to address the problem: the ETS Guidelines*

**To address the problem of carbon leakage due to indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs** the ETS Guidelines will need to: a) define and apply criteria to determine eligible **sectors and subsectors** and b) define criteria to fix **the maximum amount of aid** a Member State may grant in respect of any particular installation.

The requirement in Article 10a(6) that aid by Member States must comply with the "state aid rules applicable" means that they must respect the specific legal basis of the envisaged Guidelines, namely Article 107(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)<sup>26</sup>.

State aid for indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs is not linked to a new investment but constitutes **operating aid**. Operating aid relieves undertakings of day-to-day costs that they would normally have to bear. Unlike investment aid operating aid does not require a counterpart such as an investment that would not have been undertaken without the aid. When the Commission – exceptionally - authorises operating aid it normally requires that the aid be degressive over time and does not

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<sup>25</sup> As a general rule, trade data for 2005-2007 and CO<sub>2</sub> cost data for 2005-2006. See impact assessment relating to the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision (European Commission (SEC(2009) 1710). p. 9). The responsible Commission services at the time had to engage in an extensive data collection exercise to determine the share of a particular sector's electricity consumption of that sector's gross value added at EU level. The data was collected from the Member States and further processed by Eurostat. The results are annexed to that impact assessment. Specifically, the Member States reported industrial electricity consumption data at sector (NACE 4) level in volume terms (MWh/year). The indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs were then calculated by multiplying the reported electricity consumption with the average CO<sub>2</sub> emission factor (0.465tCO<sub>2</sub>/MWh) and the €30 CO<sub>2</sub> price assumption (taken from the impact assessment accompanying the energy and climate change package). Electricity data was requested and reported by the Member States as net electricity purchase. The electricity consumption did therefore not include auto-generation. All Member States did not report their industrial electricity consumption.

<sup>26</sup> This is consistent with recital 49 of Directive 2009/29/EC which provides that measures adopted under that Directive shall be without prejudice to State aid rules.

cover all the costs<sup>27</sup>. A special State aid framework governing the payment of aid for part of the beneficiaries' operating expenses is thus needed. The free allocation of EUA as compensation for direct CO<sub>2</sub> costs does not constitute State aid as the modalities of that allocation are harmonised across the EU.

## 2.2. Pass on of CO<sub>2</sub> costs

### 2.2.1. Pass on of CO<sub>2</sub> costs in electricity prices by the electricity producers to the sectors concerned

Electricity producers will incur costs due to ETS 3. A driver of carbon leakage risks is the likelihood that electricity producers will pass on these costs in full or in part<sup>28</sup>. Indeed, electricity producers were able to pass on most of those costs during ETS 1 (2005-2007) and so far during ETS 2 (2008-2012). They are widely expected to do so again during ETS 3 (2013-2020)<sup>29</sup>.

Empirical evidence of pass on rates suggests that, while significant<sup>30</sup> it is often below 100%. The 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision on leakage risks due to direct CO<sub>2</sub> costs assumed a pass-on rate of 100%. This Report makes the same assumption<sup>31</sup>. Under this assumption the size of the pass on equals the **CO<sub>2</sub> price**. The CO<sub>2</sub> price is the market price for one allowance (“EUA”) to emit one tonne of CO<sub>2</sub>. The CO<sub>2</sub> price arises from the scarcity of EUAs created by a “cap” on CO<sub>2</sub> emissions laid down by the ETS Directive for each ETS period. EUAs are issued each year up to the exact amount of the cap. The around 12 000 “installations” covered by the ETS cannot emit more than the cap. These installations mostly belong to the electricity, manufacturing or mining sectors.

The ETS 1 and ETS 2 caps were stable over time. **ETS 3 is more stringent**, since its cap falls by 1.74% each year (see figure below).

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<sup>27</sup> Case C-459/10 P, *Freistaat Sachsen und Sachsen-Anhalt v Commission*, para 34; Case C-113/00, *Spain v Commission*, para 70; Case C-156/98, *Germany v Commission*, para 30; Case C-86/89, *Italy v Commission* para 18; Case T-396/08, *Freistaat Sachsen und Land Sachsen-Anhalt v Commission*, paras 46-48 and Case T-459/93, *Siemens SA v Commission*, para 48.


<sup>28</sup> See e.g. de Bruyn et al (2010a); de Bruyn et al (2010b).

<sup>29</sup> The pass-on assumption is built into the 2011 Benchmarking Decision (see recitals 31-32).

<sup>30</sup> Sijm et al (2006) at p. 21 estimate that the CO<sub>2</sub> cost pass through for Germany and the Netherlands vary between 60% and 100%. See replies to questionnaire by e.g. the VCI referring to a pass-on rate of 75% and the Swedish Confederation of Enterprise (pass-on rate claimed to be 80%).

<sup>31</sup> See e.g. Hobbs et al (2010).

Figure: CO2 caps during ETS 1, ETS 2 and ETS 3



Source: Schafhausen, Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit (2009)

This means that the price for one EUA - the CO2 price – is expected to increase (all other things being equal). The CO2 price has been volatile since the launch of ETS in 2005. This continues to be the case. In July 2011 market expectations placed the expected average CO2 price during ETS 3 in the region 25-30€EUA<sup>32</sup>. At the time of writing the price expectations for the 2013-2020 period is roughly in the €15/EUA range<sup>33</sup>.

The considerable uncertainties as to the future CO2 price justify recourse to sensitivity tests using price assumptions covering a wide span. Assumptions of €10, €20 and €40 are applied when assessing the impacts of options and Option Packages. That outer range ((€10 to €40) incidentally corresponds to one of the scenarios in a recent impact assessment by the UK Department of Energy and Climate Change<sup>34</sup>.

### 2.2.2. Pass on of CO2 costs in electricity prices by the sectors concerned to their customers

Even assuming that all indirect CO2 costs (i.e. the CO2 price) are passed on by electricity producers a significant carbon leakage risk – as defined by the ETS Directive – is only deemed to exist to the extent that the EU sector cannot pass on those indirect CO2 costs to downstream clients or customers without losing significant market share to third country competitors. In reality, the ability or inability of sectors to pass on costs is likely to be a question of degree. Studies have found that several sectors were able to pass on some of their CO2 costs<sup>35</sup>.

<sup>32</sup> See e.g. forecast by Barclays Capital that the price will average €30 over 2013-2020 (Point Carbon of 1 July 2011).

<sup>33</sup> The CO2 spot and future price can be monitored at the website of ECX (where by far the largest share of trading in EUAs takes place).

<sup>34</sup> Carbon Market Daily of 25 October 2011.


<sup>35</sup> de Bruyn et al (2010a); de Bruyn et al (2010b).

### 2.3. The future CO2 content of electricity

A projection of particular relevance to the problem is that **the CO2 content of electricity production is expected to decrease in the coming years and decades** (see figure below)<sup>36</sup>. The extent of the expected decarbonisation is subject to uncertainty: see e.g. Annex 16, figure 7). Decarbonisation is contingent on considerable investments being undertaken, principally by the private sector.

Further decarbonisation is also intimately linked to the speed and nature of technological development<sup>37</sup>. Some commentators suggest that the degree of technological development in this area was underestimated when preparing for ETS 1 and ETS 2<sup>38</sup>.

For one illustration of a possible technological scenario see the figure below which outlines three 'waves' of development relevant to decarbonisation.



Source: European Commission (SEC(2009) 1297)

The continued integration of EU electricity markets is likely to put further downward pressure on electricity prices (but not necessarily on the CO2 cost component which is embedded in electricity prices).

### 2.4. CO2 constraints on non-EU competitors

A key determinant in assessing significant risks of carbon leakage is **the extent to which comparable CO2 constraints are imposed on non-EU firms**. An international agreement binding on the EU's main trading partners imposing CO2 constraints similar to those of the

<sup>36</sup> IFIEC (2008) contains a scenario (based on the EU meeting its 20% CO2 reduction target by 2020) whereby the CO2 factor would be 0.44 by 2020 (see Annex 16, table 21).  
<sup>37</sup> See Energy Strategy 2050 Roadmap at p. 13 (“much depends on technological development”). See also European Commission (SEC(2009) 1297).  
<sup>38</sup> Grubb et al (2009), p. 20.

ETS<sup>39</sup> would make the envisaged ETS Guidelines, the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision and the 2011 Benchmarking Decision superfluous. Compensation for direct and indirect CO2 costs is thus a second-best option. At the Durban conference developed and developing countries agreed to negotiate a new regime (“a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force”) by 2015 and to bring it into effect by 2020.

The ETS Directive and the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision however also recognise that the risk of carbon leakage would diminish to the extent that major trading partners **unilaterally** reduced the CO2 intensity of their production<sup>40</sup>. The full extent to which such unilateral measures are taken by third countries is not known given the lack of reliable and comparable data<sup>41</sup>. While the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision only recognised Norway, Switzerland and Iceland as countries which at the time were deemed to be subject to comparable CO2 constraints to those of the ETS, the reality of the constantly evolving CO2 constraint landscape is more complex. The examples below are not intended to be exhaustive.

Some cap and trade systems (similar although not as ambitious as the ETS) already exist in New Zealand and in parts of the United States (20 States)<sup>42</sup>.

In 2011 Australia adopted a CO2 tax to be imposed by mid-2012, being replaced by a CO2 emissions trading and carbon scheme in 2015<sup>43</sup>. A cap and trade scheme in California will be launched in 2013<sup>44</sup>.

Through its recently adopted 12th Five-Year Plan China (the world's largest CO2 emitter) committed itself for the first time to reduce the CO2 intensity of its economy<sup>45</sup>. China has gradually introduced pilot cap and trade systems in several provinces with a view to a possible later introduction of a more comprehensive federal trading system<sup>46</sup>. South Korea is

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<sup>39</sup> See recital 24 of the ETS Directive and the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision at recitals 2 and 24 (“This list applies for the years 2013-2014, subject to the outcome of the international negotiations.”).

<sup>40</sup> Article 10a(18) of the ETS Directive.

<sup>41</sup> Recital 22 of the 2010 Carbon Leakage confirms the lack of data as regards CO2 efficiency of installations in third countries representing a decisive share of global production of products in sectors and subsectors deemed to be at risk of carbon leakage. According to the ETS Directive (point b of Article 10a(18) this factor should be taken into account for the purpose of determining the exposed EU sectors and subsectors.

<sup>42</sup> The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative encompassing a number of western US states. The market price for emission permits under the RGGI is considerably below the EU price due to actual emissions falling well below the cap (Financial Times 22 August 2011). See also Carbon Market Daily of 14 November 2011.

<sup>43</sup> The scheme involves enforcement of compliance of CO2 targets for 500 companies (with together emit some 400 million tonnes of CO2 per year). Carbon Market Daily, 14 November 2011 (USD/euro exchange rate as at 22 November 2011).

<sup>44</sup> The Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006. The California law that sets up the first enforceable state-wide program in the US to cap all greenhouse gas emissions from major industries. The law requires that by 2020 the state's greenhouse gas emissions be reduced to 1990 levels. Carbon Market Daily, 14 November 2011.


<sup>45</sup> See reply to questionnaire by Client Earth. Annual Review of Low-Carbon Development in China (2011-2012) November 2011.

<sup>46</sup> The pilot schemes concerned seven providences as reported by Carbon Market Daily, 14 November 2011.

reportedly following a similar path. Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine and Vietnam have stated their intention to launch CO2 trading schemes<sup>47</sup>.

There is uncertainty as to the extent that comparable constraints may be put in place until 2020, for example the extent to which in particular developing countries will deliver on their pledges under the Copenhagen Accord (see figure below for the result of one survey)<sup>48</sup>. Some projections foresee a convergence of global CO2 prices over the longer term (Annex 16, figure 23). According to another estimate one third of global emissions could be capped and traded by the end of the decade compared to the current level of 6%<sup>49</sup>.

Carbon leakage only arises if CO2 is emitted in such trading partners. Some third countries are characterised by CO2-free industrial production<sup>50</sup>.



Source: Carbon 2011

In sum, the risk of carbon leakage is particularly present in relation to those third countries with which the EU engages in trade to a significant extent in the sectors concerned. The risk of carbon leakage is reduced to the extent that such countries impose or can be expected to impose carbon constraints<sup>51</sup>.

## 2.5. The wider EU policy context

The core EU policy context consists of the **EU's Climate and Energy Package** adopted by the European Council in March 2007. The ETS Directive (as amended in 2009) is a central

<sup>47</sup> Carbon Market Daily, 14 November 2011.

<sup>48</sup> So called 'non-Annex I countries' (i.e. countries without binding targets under the Kyoto Protocol). The IEA World Energy Outlook 2010 estimates the total uncertainty to amount to the equivalent 3.9Gt CO2 emissions. De Bruyn et al (2010) at pp. 5, 29-30 argue that trade intensities should be corrected to the extent that the EU's trading partners become subject to CO2 constraints.

<sup>49</sup> Carbon Market Daily of 14 November 2011.

<sup>50</sup> See for example reply to questionnaire by Elkem referring to relocation of activity (within sector NACE 2710) to Iceland where industrial production (such as aluminium) is largely CO2-free.

<sup>51</sup> De Bruyn et al (2010).

component of that policy which lays down two binding targets to be achieved by 2020<sup>52</sup>: first, a reduction of CO2 emissions by 20% from the emissions level in 1990 and, second, increasing the share of renewable energy sources in the EU to 20% of overall energy consumption (over the same time span). At the same time the European Council established a (non-binding) target to increase energy efficiency by 20% by 2020<sup>53</sup>.

The 20% reduction target remains valid, although the EU is committed to moving to a legally binding 30% reduction commitment depending on international action. The EU's objective is to reduce CO2 emissions by 80-95% by 2050. For more detail on the EU's Climate and Energy Package and its follow up as well as other dimensions of the wider policy context (notably the Europe 2020 Strategy, see Annex 5).

In 2011, to ensure coherence between the ETS sectors and non-ETS sectors, the Commission made a proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2003/96/EC restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity. That proposal will also be considered part of the core policy framework.

### 3. THE OBJECTIVES

#### 3.1. General objective

The general objective is for the Commission to adopt, under the State aid provisions of the TFEU (Article 107(3)(c)), Guidelines for the assessment of State aid for indirect CO2 costs arising in the context of ETS 3.

#### 3.2. Specific objectives

The first specific objective is to **prevent carbon leakage**<sup>54</sup> Carbon leakage means that even if the 20% reduction target (through the binding cap) of the EU ETS is met, that effect may be impaired, neutralised or even outweighed by an increase in CO2 emissions outside the ETS due to lower production, lower investment and relocation by EU firms in ETS sectors due to the higher costs imposed by the EU ETS. The ETS Directive acknowledges that State aid may be required to minimise the risk of carbon leakage due to higher indirect CO2 costs as of 2013.

The second specific objective is to **maintain the efficiency of the ETS**; in other words, carbon leakage should be prevented at least cost to the economy and society<sup>55</sup>. The literature on carbon frequently distinguishes between the "efficiency" or "cost-effectiveness" of the ETS on the one hand and the "effectiveness" of the ETS on the other hand<sup>56</sup>.

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<sup>52</sup> Council document 7224/1/07 Rev 1.

<sup>53</sup> Compared to a business as usual scenario baseline.

<sup>54</sup> Article 10a(6) of the ETS Directive, recitals 24 and 27 of Directive 2009/29/EC and the Commission Statement; see also Commission Statement at Annex 6.

<sup>55</sup> See e.g. Recitals 1 and 15 of the ETS Directive. The need for necessary and proportionate aid and the need to maintain the efficiency of the ETS is explicitly enshrined in recital 27 of Directive 2009/29/EC, criteria which are also reflected in the Commission Statement at paragraphs 4, 10 (see Annex 6).

<sup>56</sup> Graichen, Matthes et al (2009); Neuhoff (2008).

The ETS State aid Guidelines can affect the efficiency of the ETS, both at the level of buyers of electricity and the power producers (within the ETS). They can have impacts outside the ETS (e.g. services and households).

The third specific objective is to **minimise distortions on the internal market**<sup>57</sup>. All State aid distorts competition on the internal market to a lesser or greater extent. Such distortions cannot be eliminated, only minimised.

Intra-sector distortions would arise if only one or some Member States decide to support installations within eligible sectors. Distortions within a sector could also arise if a sector receives compensation for direct CO<sub>2</sub> costs in the form of free EUAs but no aid is paid for indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs within that sector (i.e. non-alignment in the treatment of direct and indirect costs).

Inter-sector distortions could arise in situations where there is prima facie substitutability between materials and products manufactured by different sectors, one or some of which are eligible under the Guidelines. Inter-sector distortions in a wider sense could also arise in the sense that the sectors excluded from aid under the ETS State aid Guidelines would have to “work harder” for the EU to achieve its 20% ETS reduction target<sup>58</sup>. The legally binding CO<sub>2</sub> reduction cap under ETS 3 must be met even if some sectors are insulated through State aid or by other means.

Stakeholder input is divided on whether minimising internal market distortions should be an objective. Several stakeholders consider that prevention of carbon leakage is the sole objective. Conversely, several stakeholders (not least several Member States) emphasise the importance of reducing internal market distortions and the need to avoid subsidy races<sup>59</sup>.

This Report uses the term 'distortion' in relation to competition within the internal market (i.e. the term used by the Treaty provisions on State aid) and 'competitiveness' in relation to competition between EU firms and non-EU firms in view of the specific definition of carbon leakage in Directive 2009/29/EC<sup>60</sup>. The Guidelines thus need to factor in both distortions of competition in the internal market caused by operating aid (which is normally prohibited by EU State aid rules) and the competitive situation of EU sectors vis-à-vis third country firms operating in the same sectors.

### **3.3. Operational objective**

The immediate operational objective is to adopt before 2013 a set of ETS State aid Guidelines allowing Member States to notify – should they choose to do so – aid in favour of

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<sup>57</sup> The legal basis of the Guidelines is Article 107(3)(c) TFEU. See also Recitals 8, 19, 23 of Directive 2009/29/EC amending the ETS Directive. See also European Commission (SEC(2008) 85 VOL. II) as regards carbon leakage risks due to direct CO<sub>2</sub> costs which refers to distortions of competition between the Member States' trading sectors as well as distortions within sectors.

<sup>58</sup> Grubb (2010).

<sup>59</sup> See replies to questionnaire by e.g. University of Groningen, UK and Sweden.

<sup>60</sup> See in particular Recital 24 and the reference to EU sectors subject to international competition that may be put "at an economic disadvantage".

installations covered by the list of sectors at significant risk of carbon leakage due to indirect CO2 emission costs incurred after 1 January 2013.

The ETS Guidelines are not self-executing. The Member States are enabled but not obliged to address carbon leakage in their respective jurisdictions.

The monitoring arrangements that will accompany the ETS Guidelines make it possible to assess achievement of one of the three specific objectives set out in section 3.2. The reporting and review mechanisms as well as their scope are outlined in see section 7 on monitoring and evaluation.

### 3.4. Baseline Scenario

The ETS Directive accepts that the Member States may grant **operating aid**. Operating aid relieves beneficiaries of costs that form part of their day-to-day operations (wages, energy, taxes etc.) without any counterpart such as an investment. As operating aid does not involve incentive effects it is normally prohibited under State aid rules<sup>61</sup>. Absent the envisaged ETS Guidelines, Member States would be barred from granting the aid foreseen by the ETS Directive (save for compensation up to the *de minimis* threshold - i.e. €200,000 per undertaking per three-year period - laid down by EU State aid rules for that type of aid)<sup>62</sup>.

The Baseline Scenario is a "zero aid" scenario considering that so far no Member State is or has so far been granting aid to reduce carbon leakage in view of the State aid rules currently in force. In November 2010 the European Commission opened an in-depth investigation into a scheme intending to relieve German producers of non-ferrous metals of part of their electricity costs. Germany intended to grant operating aid totalling €40 million for the second half of 2009. In that context, the Commission also stated that it does not encourage electricity price-subsidisation schemes for targeted industrial sectors as such support tends to go against the climate change and electricity market liberalisation policies and may trigger subsidy races between Member States<sup>63</sup>. Potential impacts linked to the "zero aid" Baseline Scenario are assessed in section 5.

## 4. OPTIONS

### 4.1. Eligibility and the maximum aid amount

A first set of options (Options A1, A2, A3 and A4) contains criteria to define **eligible sectors or subsectors**. The criteria are proxies to assess significant risks of carbon leakage due to indirect CO2 costs: i.e. whether the sectors or subsectors are able to pass on the CO2 cost

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<sup>61</sup> See e.g. Case C-86/89, *Italy v Commission* [1990] ECR I-3891, para 18; Case C-288/96, *Germany v Commission*, paras 77-78; Case C-459/10 P, *Freistaat Sachsen und Sachsen-Anhalt v Commission*, para 34; case C-113/00, *Spain v Commission*, para. 70; C-156/98, *Germany v Commission*, para. 30.

<sup>62</sup> Commission Regulation (EC) No 1998/2006 of 15 December 2006 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty to de minimis aid, OJ L 379 of 28.12.2006, p. 5.

<sup>63</sup> See IP/10/1520, "State aid: Commission opens in-depth investigation into subsidies for producers of non-ferrous metals in Germany", Brussels, 17th November 2010.

component in electricity prices without significant loss of market share to third country competitors.

Three further sets of options (Options B1-B4, C1-C3, D1 and D2) concern the determination of **the maximum amount of State aid** that a Member State may grant in favour of an installation which is active in one of the eligible sectors or subsectors.

The 13 options (four A, four B, three C and two D Options) are presented below.

## 4.2. Option Packages

Any combination of the four A, four B, three C and two D options is possible. To enhance the transparency of the Report and facilitate the comparison of the options only a limited number of combinations (“**Option Packages**”) will be examined.

In designing the Option Packages the key specific objectives – minimising carbon leakage risk, maintaining the efficiency of the ETS and minimising distortions across the internal market – served as a point of departure. The rationales underlying the Packages are set out in more detail in 4.21. The Packages are illustrative and intended to cover a range of options. They are without prejudice to other combinations of Options.

## 4.3. Sector and subsector eligibility

In its Statement in 2008 relating to the ETS Directive (Annex 6) the Commission took the position that when defining sectors and subsectors deemed to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage it “would use **the method** that is being developed in the context of direct emissions, **but adapt this to take into account cost increases related to indirect emissions**” (emphasis added) (see Annex 6).

The “method” used to determine the sectors and subsectors entitled to receive free EUAs for their direct CO<sub>2</sub> costs is enshrined in Articles 10a(15-17) the ETS Directive.

That method was further refined when implemented through the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision (see Annex 7 for details). It mainly involved using two sets of quantitative data. First, **each sector's combined direct and indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs were related to the sector's gross value added (GVA)**. The method to determine the indirect CO<sub>2</sub>s was based on net purchases from the electricity grid (but not auto-generated electricity: see 2.1.4). The GVA is made up of the sector's sales minus its intermediate consumption. Second, **each sector's trade intensity** was used to determine eligibility. By trade intensity is meant the sector's non-EU imports and non-EU exports as a share of the sector's total EU turnover plus non-EU exports and imports.

If a sector's direct and indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs exceeded 5% of its GVA *and* its trade intensity exceeded 10% the sector qualified. A sector also qualified if its CO<sub>2</sub> costs exceeded 30% of its GVA. A sector with trade intensity above 30% was also deemed eligible. In addition, a sector could qualify based on a purely qualitative assessment.

The ETS Directive does not define the eligibility criteria to be applied in the ETS Guidelines. The Commission only committed itself to use the “method” developed in the context of compensation for direct CO<sub>2</sub> costs and to “adapt” that method “to take into account cost

increases related to indirect emissions”. There is no “magic” eligibility criterion that must be used in the context of State aid for indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs. The potential range of eligibility options is wide.

Options A1 to A4 are consequently based on the key elements in the “method” used for direct CO<sub>2</sub> cost compensation. Three of the four options (A1, A2 and A4) rely on the two key forms of quantitative data referred to above, relating them to CO<sub>2</sub> cost and trade intensity thresholds. The threshold values used are mainly those laid down in the ETS Directive, adapted to the context of this Report and the ETS Guidelines (aid for indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs). One of the four options (Option A3) is – again in line with the method applied to compensation for direct costs – qualitative in nature. As prescribed by the Impact Assessment Guidelines account has been taken of the stakeholder consultation and the requirement that the options retained should encompass a sufficiently wide “range”.


#### **4.4. The CO<sub>2</sub> price assumption used to determine eligibility**

The CO<sub>2</sub> price is a function of supply and demand for allowances to emit CO<sub>2</sub> (one allowance – EUA – corresponds to one tonne of CO<sub>2</sub>). The number of EUAs in circulation equals the ETS 3 cap. The CO<sub>2</sub> price is crucial in determining sector eligibility. This is so as the CO<sub>2</sub> price is one of the three variables required to calculate a sector's direct and indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs. The other variables are the sector's electricity consumption and the CO<sub>2</sub> content of that consumption.

A CO<sub>2</sub> price assumption of €30 was used to determine sector eligibility in the context of compensation for direct CO<sub>2</sub> costs. At the time of the adoption of the ETS Directive 2009 €30 per EUA was the CO<sub>2</sub> price expected apply on average during ETS 3. That price assumption was built into the ETS Directive in 2009. It was also applied as the basic premise for eligibility in the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision as well as in the updating of that Decision in 2011. **A CO<sub>2</sub> price of 30€ is taken as the basic starting point in Report. To that extent, equal treatment between direct CO<sub>2</sub> costs and indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs is ensured**<sup>64</sup>. Similar to energy commodity markets, CO<sub>2</sub> prices are inherently uncertain and have also in general tended towards volatility (see figure below illustrating e.g. how the CO<sub>2</sub> price has halved since June 2011).

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<sup>64</sup> In respect of direct CO<sub>2</sub> costs the €30 price assumption was used in Commission Decision (2011/754/EU) of 11 November 2011, adding to the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision eligibility list under the annual updating procedure set out in Article 10a(13) of the ETS Directive.



The historically volatile and inherently uncertain nature of the CO<sub>2</sub> price calls for a **precautionary approach** when assessing the impact of the different eligibility options. To that end, sensitivity tests are carried out. Those tests use CO<sub>2</sub> prices which are both lower (€10 and €20) and higher (€40) than the primary price assumption of €30. A precautionary approach is further justified given that, given its greater stringency, ETS 3 can – all things being equal – be expected to increase the carbon leakage risks.

In the course of the second public consultation several Member States and some other stakeholders advocated a "floor price" They supported a floor price in the region of €15-20<sup>65</sup>. By floor price is meant at CO<sub>2</sub> price below which no installation would be eligible for any aid. They would receive compensation only for the price above that floor. One Member State proposed a floor price of 50€<sup>66</sup>. Another stakeholder supported a floor price of €30<sup>67</sup>. A third Member State argued that the price at the time of its submission (€7) - was in any case sufficient to justify eligibility for State aid<sup>68</sup>. Some stakeholders argued that such a mechanism did not appear consistent with the method used in the context of direct CO<sub>2</sub> costs.

While the Report does not consider an outright "floor price" option, the Baseline Scenario set out in section 5.2 effectively addresses the consequences of the requests for a "floor price" of €15 and above. It does so as the CO<sub>2</sub> price projections at the time of writing for the ETS 3 period are below €15 and because the Baseline Scenario is a "zero aid" scenario (i.e. no State aid to any firm in any sector in the EU).

<sup>65</sup> One Member State advocated a floor price of €50.  
<sup>66</sup> See reply to questionnaire by Denmark.  
<sup>67</sup> See reply to questionnaire by Eurelectric.  
<sup>68</sup> See reply to questionnaire by Germany.

#### 4.5. Option A1: The same sector and subsector eligibility as in the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision

Option A1 is fully based on the “method” used in the context of compensation for direct CO2 costs (the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision) resulting in **151 eligible sectors and 13 eligible subsectors** (see Annex 7 for details on how these sectors and subsectors qualified). That list would be expanded as part of the annual updating<sup>69</sup>. Many stakeholders (notably industry) advocated eligibility in line with Option A1.

#### 4.6. Option A2: Eligibility of sectors with indirect CO2 costs of at least 5% of the sector's GVA and a trade intensity of the sector of at least 10%

Sector eligibility under Option A2 requires indirect CO2 costs of at least 5% of the sector's gross value added and a trade intensity of the sector of at least 10%.

Option A2 is an adaptation of one of three sets of purely quantitative criteria used in the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision<sup>70</sup>. The adaptation consists in replacing the 5% threshold comprising both direct and indirect CO2 costs with a 5% threshold comprising indirect CO2 costs only. Such an adaptation is explicitly envisaged in the Commission Statement (see Annex 6) and was supported by some Member States in the consultation, although one Member States proposed that the indirect CO2 threshold be set at 3%<sup>71</sup>.

Option A2 results in the following **five sectors** being eligible: **Mining of chemicals and fertiliser minerals** (NACE 1430); **Manufacture of leather clothes** (NACE 1810); **Manufacture of other inorganic chemicals** (NACE 2413); **Aluminium production** (NACE 2742) and **Lead, zinc and tin production** (NACE 2743) (for more detail see 5.4.1).

#### 4.7. Option A3: Eligibility of sectors and subsectors based on a qualitative assessment

Options A1 and A2 rely on purely quantitative criteria to determine eligibility. The 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision also used – to a limited extent – a qualitative approach. Five sectors were added to the 146 sectors which had qualified under purely quantitative thresholds (see Annex 7 for details). Option A3 thus makes it possible to add sectors and subsectors.

Under Option A3, a sector or subsector must overcome two hurdles (as in the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision). The first obstacle is to qualify for a qualitative assessment in the first place. Second, the sector or subsector must pass the substantive eligibility test. Based on those tests, Option A3 results in **14 eligible sectors and two sets of eligible subsectors**. The 14 eligible sectors automatically include the five sectors eligible under the Minimalist Package: **Mining of chemicals and fertiliser minerals** (NACE 1430); **Manufacture of leather**

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<sup>69</sup> Two sectors – salt (1440) and bricks, tiles and construction products in baked clay (2640) and three subsectors cocoa past, butter and power – were added to the original list by Commission Decision 2011/754/EU of 11 November 2011, adding to the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision eligibility list under the annual updating procedure set out in Article 10a(13) of the ETS Directive.

<sup>70</sup> See Article 15 of the ETS Directive.

<sup>71</sup> Belgium and the Netherlands are broadly in favour of this Option. France is in favour of the 10% trade intensity but argues for a more generous indirect CO2 costs criterion (3%).

**clothes** (NACE 1810); **Manufacture of other inorganic basic chemicals** (NACE 2413); **Aluminium production** (NACE 2742) and **Lead, zinc and tin production** (NACE 2743). The additional nine sectors include: **Mining of iron ores** (NACE 1310); **Preparation and spinning of cotton-type fibres** (NACE 1711); **Manufacture of fertilizers and nitrogen compounds** (NACE 2415); **Manufacture of paper and paperboard** (NACE 2112); **Manufacture of basic iron and steel** (NACE 2710); **Copper production** (NACE 2744) and **Manufacture of other organic basic chemicals** (NACE 2414); **Manufacture of industrial gases** (NACE 2411); **Manufacture of man-made fibres** (NACE 2470). The two sets of subsectors are **seamless steel pipes within Manufacture of stainless steel pipes** (NACE 2722) as well as **a limited number of commodity polymers within Plastics in primary forms** (NACE 2416) (see 5.5.1 and Annex 10 for more detail)

#### *4.7.1. The first test under Option A3: criteria to be fulfilled in order to undergo a qualitative assessment*

By analogy with the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision, the qualitative assessment is confined to sectors or subsectors where industry representatives or Member States made a **sufficiently plausible and substantiated** case in favour of eligibility. No such sufficiently plausible and substantiated claims were made for some sectors despite high trade intensity and indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs including coke oven (NACE 2310), malt (NACE 1597) and mining of clays and kaolin (NACE 1422).

By analogy with the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision a sector or subsector would have to fall within one or more of the following scenarios to be qualitatively assessed.

First, borderline sectors can be assessed. Borderline sectors – for the purposes of this Report – are defined as NACE 4 sectors with indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs in the 3-5% range *and* a trade intensity of at least 10%. Five sectors were deemed to be border: Preparation and spinning of cotton-type fibres (NACE 1711), paper and paperboard (NACE 2112), Mineral fertilisers and nitrogen compounds (NACE 2415), Manufacture of basic iron, steel and ferroalloys (NACE 2710) and copper (NACE 2744). Six sectors could have qualified as 'borderline' sectors but sufficiently plausible and substantiated claims were not made on their behalf by Member States or industry associations<sup>72</sup>.

Second, sectors and subsectors can also qualify for an assessment in case official data are missing or are of poor quality (always assuming sufficiently plausible and substantiated requests were made in support of eligibility). The sectors deemed to pass into a qualitative assessment via the second entry point (i.e. missing data) include Mining of iron ore (NACE 1310); pulp (NACE 2111) and Manufacture of synthetic rubber in primary forms (NACE 2417).

Third, sectors and subsectors can also qualify for an assessment in case they can be considered to have been insufficiently represented by the quantitative assessment (even if they do not constitute borderline cases and even if there are no data deficiencies) Most other

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<sup>72</sup> Cold Drawing (NACE 2731); Manufacture of other non-distilled fermented beverages (NACE 1595); Manufacture of malt (NACE 1597); Manufacture of coke oven products (NACE 2310).

sectors in Annex 10 qualified under this third generally worded criterion (which was broadly construed for the purposes of this Report).

Sectors with less than 1% indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs have not been considered (with the exceptional of the special situation of a subsector within NACE 2722: see 4.7.3.5). The qualitative assessment must in principle take place at the EU level. Some submissions listed large numbers of sectors without specifically linking the arguments to a specific sector. Sometimes the submissions referred not to indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs (i.e. electricity costs) but to "energy" costs or "energy intensity". The 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision limited its qualitative assessment to a relatively small number of sectors due to data and resource constraints<sup>73</sup> an approach which finds support in the ETS Directive<sup>74</sup>. As appears above and from Annex 10 a more generous approach in terms of number of sectors assessed is pursued for the purposes of this Report.

#### 4.7.2. *The second test under Option A3: substantive eligibility criteria*

The ETS Directive considers that sectors which are unable to pass on the CO<sub>2</sub> cost element in electricity prices to their customers without losing significant market share to third country competitors are at significant risk of carbon leakage and therefore eligible for compensation for direct and indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs. While a very large number of factors could have a bearing on the pass-on ability, the carbon leakage literature<sup>75</sup> finds that most factors can be subsumed under one of two broad headings. First, '**cost-related proxies**' (e.g. the indirect CO<sub>2</sub> cost/GVA criterion used in Options A1-A2 above). Second, '**market-related proxies**' (such as the trade intensity criterion used in Options A1-A2 above).

##### 4.7.2.1. Cost-related proxies: the size of the indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs

The starting point for the substantive eligibility assessment is the size of the asymmetric indirect CO<sub>2</sub> cost impact as a share of the sector's gross value added. This criterion has the advantage of transparency and comparability.

The asymmetric cost impact must be sufficiently large to entail a significant risk of carbon leakage due to indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs. Thus, indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs of more than 2.5% will be taken into account for this criterion. Given that the ETS Directive uses 5% as a CO<sub>2</sub> cost threshold, lowering the bar by more than half is not considered justified.

##### 4.7.2.2. Market related proxies: evidence that the sector is a price-taker and cannot pass on its indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs without losing significant market share to third country competitors

An asymmetric indirect CO<sub>2</sub> cost impact only gives rise of carbon leakage risk to the extent that the sector is unable to pass on the costs in its product prices to its clients without losing

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<sup>73</sup> See Recital 16 on "time constraints" in the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision and the related impact assessment (European Commission (SEC(2009) 1710) on "time constraints and limited resources" at p. 18.

<sup>74</sup> See Article 10a(17).

<sup>75</sup> See e.g. the trawl of carbon literature by Cambridge Econometrics (2010) yielding close to one hundred factors that have been used to assess carbon leakage risks.

significant market share to its third country competitors, i.e. because downstream clients can switch to competing products or suppliers.

Whether such switching or substitution is possible ultimately depends on factual circumstances specific to each sector and may vary over time. These factors include the degree of competition in the sector concerned and the degree to which the products are differentiated or homogeneous. The greater the extent to which the EU sector is sheltered from competitive pressure and the greater the degree of product differentiation the greater the ability to pass on asymmetric costs is likely to be. This ability to pass on costs may also be affected by high transport costs in relation to the product value that would have to be borne by non-EU competitors.

To this end, a robust proxy for the cost pass on ability would ideally take the form of elasticities of demand, i.e. precise quantified estimates of the degree to which a price increase by an EU sector would induce clients to switch suppliers or switch to substitute products. International demand elasticities measuring the degree of substitution between domestic and imported goods (so-called “*Armington elasticities*”) would be required<sup>76</sup>. The higher the Armington elasticity the higher the impact of a domestic price increase on domestic production and international trade for varying estimates of Armington elasticities in respect of specific industry sectors). The carbon leakage literature draws attention to the lack of reliable and relevant Armington elasticities<sup>77</sup>.

In the absence of such elasticities an objective proxy should be introduced into the qualitative assessment to act as a preliminary filter. As an objective proxy exists in terms of sector-specific trade intensity data, it is proposed to use a trade intensity of 25% as a screening device. Raising the trade intensity is considered justified as the indirect CO<sub>2</sub> threshold is lowered to 2.5% (from the 5% quantitative threshold used by the ETS Directive)

Second, given that the assessment is qualitative in nature, sufficient evidence is required to support the conclusion that the sector or subsector is unable to pass on its indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs without significant loss of market share. Notably, **substantiated information that indicate the EU sectors concerned are on the whole likely to be price-takers is required**; for example, in the form of price correlation across regions for the products concerned or because the prices are *de facto* set at international commodity exchanges) (see Annex 10). Typically, commodity-type products would tend to be price-takers and, typically, the more expensive the product per tonne the less likely transport products are likely to be constitute a hindrance to trade. The assessment is focused on the sector (as defined by NACE) and not on input goods used by the sector. Thus while sector providing inputs into the NACE sector assessed may be at the risk of carbon leakage that cannot be decisive.

A sector which is a price-taker is subject to competitive constraints emanating from third countries. The Commission's previous assessments in merger cases concerning the sectors concerned have thus been drawn on were available. The geographic market definition in such cases is of particular importance as it demonstrates the geographic extent of possible significant competitive constraints faced by the products in question. Thus if such decisions

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<sup>76</sup> For a detailed analysis see in particular Bergman et al (2007), pp. 89-92.

<sup>77</sup> See Bergman et al (2007), p. 53.

find that the geographic market is at least EEA or EU wide it indicates that it cannot be excluded that the EU sector in question is unable to pass on costs without a significant loss of market share to non-EU competitors. The Commission's merger decisions have a rather short time horizon, assessing the scope of the markets one or two years ahead.

The international demand and supply situation may affect to the pass-on ability. EU sectors may be more exposed to loss of market share in the case of overcapacity or new capacity coming on stream in neighbouring regions. EU decisions on the use of trade defence instruments (such as antidumping proceedings) may inform the assessment of the trade dynamics characterising specific sectors. Information on profit margins, estimations as to the ability of a sector to further abate CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and other factors relevant to indirect CO<sub>2</sub> cost pass on ability may also inform the sector assessment to the extent such information is available.

The issue as to whether a particular production process is electricity-intensive does not by itself make it possible to compare sectors according the principal method prescribed by the ETS Directive, namely relating the indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs to the GVA of the sector as a whole. The issue of the electricity-intensive nature of specific production processes is central to the issue of defining the electricity benchmarks (an issue related not to sector eligibility but to the maximum aid amount). The key basis for comparing sectors according to the logic of the ETS Directive is indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs as a percentage of the GVA. Thus all comparable electricity costs are taken into account, whether attributable to specific electro-intensive processes or not. The data on indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs which constitutes the fundamental basis of this Report did not include auto-generated electricity. Auto-generated electricity has accordingly not been taken into account for the purposes of the eligibility assessment.

Many factors are relevant to the assessment of *impacts* (section 5) without constituting elements of the eligibility assessment. The fact that a sector is listed in the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision is not deemed to have a sufficient bearing on pass on ability relating to indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs. Likewise, the fact that two categories of products may be in competition with each is not treated as an eligibility criterion. Nor can the size of a sector in principle be considered relevant to eligibility. The fact that a sector is part of a value chain may – depending on the circumstances – both make a sector more exposed and resilient against carbon leakage.

Submissions that merely refer to the situation in one or a few Member States are much weaker as an element to assess eligibility.

#### 4.7.2.3. Fuel and electricity substitutability according to the 2011 Benchmarking Decision

The “method” developed in the context of direct CO<sub>2</sub> emissions also comprises the 2011 Benchmarking Decision which defines the size and modalities of the free allocations of EUAs to the sectors eligible under the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision.

The Benchmarking Decision establishes that in respect of some production processes (among those eligible under the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision) there is – at least to a certain extent – substitutability between fuel and electricity. Installations however only receive free EUAs for their fuel consumption and not for their electricity consumption. Installations using fuels

would be favoured over installations using electricity. This may contribute to a greater risk of carbon leakage on the part of the electricity-intensive undertaking. The 2011 Benchmarking Decision therefore refers to the possibility to grant State aid in respect of electricity consumption set out in the ETS Directive<sup>78</sup>. Annex I.2 of the 2011 Commission Benchmarking Decision which lists a number of products where such fuel substitutability has been deemed to exist at least to a certain extent<sup>79</sup> (see Annex 9)<sup>80</sup>.

#### 4.7.2.4. A first set of sectors deemed eligible under Option A3

By analogy with the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision eligibility under Option A3 for the purposes of this Report and in order to make the assessment as objective as possible the following test is set out.

First, sectors with less than 2% are not eligible at this stage as the asymmetric cost impact is not considered sufficiently large to entail significant carbon leakage risks (see 4.7.2.1 above).

In addition, two of the following three criteria must be fulfilled:

First criterion: indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs of at least 2.5%/GVA.

Second criterion: Assuming a sector or subsector has a trade intensity of at least 25%, sufficient evidence that the sector or subsector is unlikely to be able to pass on the indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs (see Annex 10).

Third criterion: Fuel and electricity substitutability established by the 2010 Benchmarking Decision at least in respect of part of the NACE 4 sector concerned.

**Mineral fertilisers and nitrogen compounds** (NACE 2415) and **Manufacture of basic iron, steel and ferroalloys** (NACE 2710) fulfil all three criteria.

**Preparation and spinning of cotton-type fibres** (NACE 1711); **Mining of iron ores** (NACE 1310)<sup>81</sup>; **Paper and paperboard** (NACE 2112); **Man-made fibres** (NACE 2470) and **copper** (NACE 2744) fulfil the 2.5% and inability to pass on cost criteria.

**Basic organic chemicals** (NACE 2414) and **Manufacture of industrial gases** (NACE 2411) fulfil the inability to pass on costs and the fuel and electricity substitutability criteria<sup>82</sup>.

In addition, **a set of subsectors within Plastics in primary forms** (NACE 2416) is deemed eligible given indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs data in relation to GVA provided at the subsector level<sup>83</sup>.

A special situation also applies in respect of **Manufacture of stainless steel pipes** (NACE 2722). For historical reasons, steel pipes were not included in the basic steel code (NACE

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<sup>78</sup> Referring to Article 10a(6) of the ETS Directive (see Recital 31 of the 2011 Benchmarking Decision).

<sup>79</sup> Recital 7 of the 2011 Benchmarking Decision.

<sup>80</sup> Recital 31 of the 2011 Benchmarking Decision.

<sup>81</sup> Data provided by the sector is undergoing verification.

<sup>82</sup> See Annex 10 on the relevance to this sector of the special provision in the ETS Directive (recital 23).

<sup>83</sup> Data provided by the sector is undergoing verification.

2710) (see Annex 10 for details), unlike comparable sectors such as aluminium and copper where pipes made out those materials are included in the basic NACE codes (2742 and 2744). At the time only products covered by the (now expired) European Coal and Steel Community were included into the basic steel code. In view of the special situation it could be considered to subsume the NACE 2722 code under the basic steel code (NACE 2710). Limiting the eligibility to a part of NACE 2722 could be considered, as seamless steel pipes appear to be the segment most concerned.

The sector-specific findings above were based on the evidence and data that it was possible to gather during this exercise<sup>84</sup>. That body of information is summarised in Annex 10.

Under Option A3, five additional sectors are automatically eligible: **Manufacture of leather clothes** (NACE 1810); **Aluminium production** (NACE 2742); **Mining of chemical and fertilizer minerals** (NACE 1430); **Manufacture of other inorganic chemicals** (NACE 2413) and **Lead, zinc and tin** (NACE 2743). As these sectors qualify automatically under Option A3 they are not qualitatively assessed in Annex 10.

#### **4.8. Option A4: Eligibility based on indirect and direct CO2 costs of at least 5% of the sector's GVA**

Under Option A4, sectors are eligible based on a purely quantitative criterion directly based on one of the elements in the "method" applied in the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision, namely that the sector must bear combined direct and indirect CO2 costs as a share of the sector's gross value added of at least 5%. That approach places more emphasis on aligning the treatment of sectors with high direct CO2 costs with those bearing high indirect CO2 costs. To that extent, the approach follows the logic of the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision on compensation for direct CO2 costs.

Option A4 thus "adapts" (as envisaged in the Commission Statement: see Annex 6) one of the sets of quantitative criteria in the ETS Directive by fully retaining the first leg (combined indirect and direct CO2 costs of at least 5%) but discarding the other leg (trade intensity of at least 10%). That approach is favourable to sectors with very high CO2 costs but with low trade intensity. Many industry stakeholders emphasised that indirect CO2 costs should be viewed in conjunction with the indirect CO2 cost impact.

Option A4 results in the following **35 sectors** being eligible: **Manufacture of lime** (NACE 2652); **Manufacture of cement** (NACE 2651); **Manufacture of coke oven products** (NACE 2310); **Manufacture of fertilizers and nitrogen compounds** (NACE 2415); **Aluminium production** (NACE 2742); **Manufacture of other inorganic basic chemicals** (NACE 2413); **Manufacture of refined petroleum products** (NACE 2320); **Manufacture of paper and paperboard** (NACE 2112); **Manufacture of basic iron and steel** (NACE 2710); **Manufacture of flat glass** (NACE 2611); **Lead, zinc and tin production** (NACE 2743); **Manufacture of hollow glass** (NACE 2613); **Manufacture of starches and starch products** (NACE 1562); **Manufacture of malt** (NACE 1597); **Production of ethyl alcohol from fermented materials** (NACE 1592); **Copper production** (NACE 2744); **Manufacture of other organic basic chemicals** (NACE 2414); **Manufacture of sugar** (NACE 1583); **Preparation and spinning of cotton-type fibres** (NACE 1711); **Mining and agglomeration**

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<sup>84</sup> See recital 16 of Decision 2010/2/EU.

of hard coal (NACE 1010); Mining of chemicals and fertilizer minerals (NACE 1430); Manufacture of leather clothes (NACE 1810); Manufacture of synthetic rubber in primary forms (NACE 2417); Cold drawing (NACE 2731); Other non-ferrous metal production (NACE 2745); Manufacture of agricultural tractors (NACE 2931); Manufacture of other non-distilled fermented beverages (NACE 1595); Manufacture of ceramic tiles and flags (NACE 2630); Manufacture of cast iron tubes (NACE 2721); Manufacture of bricks, tiles and construction products, in baked clay (NACE 2640); Manufacture of industrial gases (NACE 2411); Mining and agglomeration of lignite (NACE 1020); Quarrying of limestone, gypsum and chalk (NACE 1412); Manufacture of plasters (NACE 2653) and Casting of iron (NACE 2751) (see section 5.6.1 for more details).

#### **4.9. Five variables determine the maximum aid amount per installation**

The second dimension of the problem addressed in this Report concerns options to define certain of the (five) variables which make up the formula to determine the maximum amount of aid that an installation may receive (provided it belongs to an eligible sector or subsector).

The maximum aid amount would thus be determined by multiplying the following five variables: the **CO<sub>2</sub> price**; the product-specific electricity efficiency **benchmarks**; the installation's **production level**; the **aid intensity** and the **CO<sub>2</sub> factor**. This formula is set out in detail in the Commission Statement (see Annex 6).

The CO<sub>2</sub> price variable related to the maximum aid amount should be distinguished from the CO<sub>2</sub> price used to calculate sector gross value added and thereby sector eligibility (for the latter eligibility-related CO<sub>2</sub> price see section 4.6 above).

In fixing the CO<sub>2</sub> price relevant to the aid amount (but not to sector eligibility), it could be considered to calculate the average of all (future) CO<sub>2</sub> prices observed during a reference period relating to period over which the aid is to be granted. One advantage of that approach would be that the future prices would be known *ex ante*. Second, the CO<sub>2</sub> price used would be based on the type of price information business normally take into account in this context (e.g. decisions on investment); in other words, the future CO<sub>2</sub> price can be assumed to reflect companies' planning horizon better than the spot price. Future prices are also on the whole less volatile than spot markets (making them less susceptible to actions by any individual market participant).

The value of the CO<sub>2</sub> price and electricity benchmark variables is to a lesser or greater degree predetermined as they depend on the future CO<sub>2</sub> price level and the most efficient production techniques. No options are outlined for these two variables. Instead options are set out for the three variables where the degree of discretion is greater: the aid intensity, the CO<sub>2</sub> factor and the installation's production level.

#### **4.10. Option B1: 100% and stable aid intensity**

Under Option B1, the aid intensity would be set at 100% over the whole period 2013-2020.

One rationale for Option B1 is found in the ETS Directive which refers to compensation for the “costs” passed on in the electricity (Article 10a(6) of the ETS Directive), which could be interpreted as covering all indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs.

A variant of 1 could be to accept 100% aid intensity on the condition that a certain percentage (e.g. 10%, 15%, 20% or 25%) is re-invested in electricity efficient technologies. That would make the option similar to Option B3 (for which reason it is not considered necessary to assess a fifth B Option).

#### **4.11. Option B2: 100% and degressive aid intensity**

Under Option B2, the aid intensity would be set at 100% at the start of period 2013-2020 and would fall either each year or after each two or three year period.

Degressivity would be in line with the Treaty rules on State aid as interpreted by the Court (see 2.1.5). It would be consistent with the temporary nature of the rules<sup>85</sup>.

#### **4.12. Option B3: Less than 100% and stable aid intensity**

Under Option B3, the aid intensity would initially be set at less than 100% (e.g. 80% or 85%) after which it would remain stable.

Stakeholders advocating such an option argue that partial compensation would provide a continued incentive to energy users to increase their energy efficiency going beyond the product benchmarks.

#### **4.13. Option B4: Less than 100% and degressive aid intensity**

Under Option B4, the aid intensity would be set at less than 100% at the start of the 2013-2020 period after which it would fall either each year or after each two or three year period.

#### **4.14. The CO2 factor**

The CO2 emission factor ("CO2 factor") refers to the amount of CO2 (in tonnes) used to produce one MWh of electricity. The CO2 factor varies from zero in the case of CO2-free electricity production (including hydropower, nuclear power and renewable electricity production such as solar and wind power), to more than one tonne of CO2 (per MWh) in the case of brown coal (also called "lignite")<sup>86</sup>. The average CO2 factor for all electricity production in the EU, based on installed capacity (figure for 2007) was 0.465 tonnes of CO2 per MWh of electricity. The CO2 factor differs considerably between Member States.

##### *4.14.1. Non-availability of EU-wide modelling to determine the impact of the ETS on electricity prices.*

Ideally, the options relating to the CO2 factor (of electricity production) which affect the maximum aid amount should try to approximate the impact of ETS on electricity prices compared to a counterfactual scenario without the ETS. Again, ideally, to avoid

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<sup>85</sup> Article 10a of the ETS Directive, which includes the legal base for the aid for the indirect costs of emissions is entitled "Transitional Community-wide rules for harmonised free allocation".

<sup>86</sup> See Annex 16., figure 6 on the use of different proportions of hard and brown coal in the electricity mixes of selected Member States.

overcompensation, State aid should thus at most equal the additional cost resulting from the ETS compared to a situation without the ETS.

An additional challenge is that the difference an ETS scenario and a non-ETS scenario would have to be set at EU level; it would not suffice to estimate the difference at national level only. Article 10a(6) requires that the CO<sub>2</sub> factor correspond to "the CO<sub>2</sub> emissions of the relevant *European* electricity mix"<sup>87</sup>. Estimating the extra costs resulting from the ETS would require recourse to simulation models at EU level covering the entirety of the EU<sup>88</sup>. Such EU-wide modelling is not available.

#### 4.14.2. *Alternative methods to assess the impact of the ETS on electricity prices*

Even so, meaningful options regarding the CO<sub>2</sub> factor can be set out. A higher rather a lower CO<sub>2</sub> factor will mean a higher maximum aid amount. Thus a factor based on the marginal production will tend to be higher than the average CO<sub>2</sub> emissions of electricity in the EU. It would reflect to a greater extent the price formation mechanism in EU electricity markets.

Several alternatives to define – as required by the ETS Directive – the "relevant" CO<sub>2</sub> factor were addressed and proposed in the context of the public consultation. They fall into three broad categories: a) defining the CO<sub>2</sub> factor installation by installation; b) using regional CO<sub>2</sub> factors as proxies of the marginal production in those areas and c) applying a uniform CO<sub>2</sub> factor across the whole of the EU.

The first category concerns the question whether it is possible to determine the CO<sub>2</sub> factor for individual installations, notably through explicit references to the CO<sub>2</sub> component of the price in bilateral supply contracts or through the determination of regulated tariffs. A large number of stakeholders argue strongly against such an option, principally on the ground that it would not be possible to verify if an explicit CO<sub>2</sub> component has been artificially inflated to maximise the aid amount. No installation-specific options will therefore be considered.

Nor will any options involving any regulated tariffs for industrial customers that may remain in existence as of 1 January 2013 be considered. The logic of the compensation mechanisms of the ETS Directive for direct and indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs builds on the market price for electricity (see Article 10a(6) of that Directive). On this basis, as regards indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs, under the ETS Guidelines Member States may grant aid up to the maximum aid amounts. Member States may also decide to grant less aid than the maximum amount on the condition that the aid is granted on an objective and non-discriminatory basis.

Instead three non-installation specific options are set out. Option C1 is based on the CO<sub>2</sub> factor related to the marginal production in each relevant geographic zone whereas Options C2 and C3 involve uniform CO<sub>2</sub> factors applicable across the EU.

All three options comply with the legal requirement that the factor correspond to the "relevant European electricity mix".

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<sup>87</sup> While the Finnish and French versions uses the term "average", the clear majority of the language versions use the term "relevant".

<sup>88</sup> Advocated inter alia by the European Aluminium Association and EuroAlliages.

#### 4.15. Option C1: Regional CO2 factors

Option C1 is based on regional differentiation so as to correspond to the **current reality in terms of electricity market integration in the EU**. It involves estimating the CO2 content of the marginal production for each region. The rationale is that that the marginal production in each region can normally be expected to consist of varying proportions of fossil fuels, i.e. coal, gas or oil (*"the marginal production will always be grey"*)<sup>89</sup>.

Fossil fuel (and notably gas and coal) based electricity generation plays a key role in the formation of electricity prices. In the EU's increasingly liberalised electricity market(s) **it is the "marginal production" which sets the wholesale price** for all consumers (such as manufacturing industry) which buy electricity at that level (i.e. directly from the electricity grid) in the relevant geographic area.

The table below illustrates the large variations in fossil versus non-fossil sources of electricity production between the Member States (see figure below and Annex 16, figure 8).

Table 1 Shares of fossil and non-fossil powered electricity production in the EU (source EC, 2007a).


	EU-27	BE	BG	CZ	DK	DE	EE	IE	EL	ES	FR	IT	CY	LV
Fossil	55%	41%	47%	65%	71%	62%	99%	91%	88%	64%	11%	81%	100%	30%
non-fossil	45%	59%	53%	35%	29%	38%	1%	9%	12%	36%	89%	19%	0%	70%
	LT	LU	HU	MT	NL	AT	PL	PT	RO	SI	SK	FI	SE	UK
Fossil	24%	75%	56%	100%	87%	36%	96%	81%	57%	37%	29%	34%	2%	74%
non-fossil	76%	25%	44%	0%	13%	64%	4%	19%	43%	63%	71%	66%	98%	26%

Source: IFIEC (2008)

In many cases the 'region' is likely to coincide with the borders of a Member State. In other cases the wholesale price – through trading on exchanges – is de facto set for a wider region encompassing several Member States. See figure below which indicates that the four countries concerned belong to such a wider region.

<sup>89</sup> See Pöyry (2011). See in support of approach underlying Option C1, also a study by the Boston Consulting Group ("Assessment of the Impact of the 2013-2020 ETS Proposal on the European Cement Industry" November 2008) ("coal and natural gas are assumed to be the price fixing technologies in proportion to installed capacity").

**Figure: Developments in electricity spot prices in the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium and Austria**



Source: EEX, APX, Belpex, EXAA

Source: European Commission (SEC(2010) 1510)

Stakeholder input indicated that there may be at least three supranational regions: a) The Nordic area (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden); b) Central Western Europe (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Luxembourg); c) the Iberian Peninsula (Portugal and Spain). The remainder would be made up of individual Member States.

The CO<sub>2</sub> factors under Option C1 relate to the mix of fossil fuels used to generate electricity in the Member State or wider region in question. It does not relate to the average CO<sub>2</sub> factor generated by both fossil and non-fossil sources of electricity. One proxy for such a fossil fuel based CO<sub>2</sub> factor would be to estimate the share of fossil fuels (each of which has a different CO<sub>2</sub> factor) used in electricity production in a Member State and divide it with the relevant region's or Member State's gross electricity production.

#### **4.16. Option C2: The average CO<sub>2</sub> factor in the EU (0.465 CO<sub>2</sub>t/MWh)**

A key feature of Option C2 is that is that the CO<sub>2</sub> factor is uniform EU-wide. Second, it uses the EU average. It will therefore tend to be lower than the CO<sub>2</sub> factor under Option C1. Third, the exact figure used in Option C2 – 0.465 CO<sub>2</sub>t/MWh – corresponds to the CO<sub>2</sub> factor used in the impact assessment relating to the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision. Option C2 would thus entail equal treatment between direct and indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs. On current projections the marginal CO<sub>2</sub> factor is set to fall over the coming years and decade, making the 0.465 CO<sub>2</sub>t/MWh factor more relevant over time. The Report also needs to consider a range of factor covering different Option Packages from 'Minimalist' to 'Maximalist' (see 4.23). Option C2 is thus justified even if it is unrealistic – given the Member States' current electricity mix and the current stage technological penetration of renewables and nuclear power that such installations would act as marginal plants.

#### **4.17. Option C3: The average marginal CO2 factor in the EU (0.75 CO2t/MWh)**

Option C3 corresponds to the average CO2 factor of marginal production within the EU. Such an "average marginal" factor is higher than the average EU CO2 factor although it is expected to fall over time with the uptake of less carbon intensive or CO2-free technologies.

Industry representatives – with reference to PRIMES – have estimated the EU-wide "average marginal" CO2 factor to be around 0.75 CO2t/MWh (Annex 16, table 21). This factor was also explicitly considered in the impact assessment relating to the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision.

#### **4.18. The installation's production level (whether based on actual or historical output)**

Member States who want to grant aid based on the ETS Guidelines will need to submit data on the production level of each installation belonging to an eligible sector or subsector regardless of whether it is determined according to Option D1 (actual output) or Option D2 (historical output) (see below).

#### **4.19. Option D1: the installation's actual output**

Under Option D1, the production level would be the installation's **actual production determined *ex post***. Option D1 undoes to a significant extent the CO2 price signal embodied in electricity prices. Option D1 is thus designed to remove carbon leakage risks resulting from the CO2 price component (passed on by electricity producers). Increasing production is not financially sanctioned in that the aid will increase with increasing indirect CO2 costs passed on in electricity prices.

New entrants are not disadvantaged vis-à-vis incumbents as they would also receive State aid in proportion to their actual output.

As it follows actual production, Option D1 by definition excludes windfall profits.

In addition, Option D1 (unlike Option D2) obviates the need to fix a historical reference period.

#### **4.20. Option D2: the installation's historical output**

Under Option D2, the production level would be determined beforehand in the form of a "lump sum" based on the average historical output over a sufficiently long and representative reference period.

Such a fixed aid amount per time period is designed to maintain the full incentive to reduce emissions at installation level. Option D2 thus exposes companies to the full ETS price signal (embodied in electricity prices). A historical baseline would be in line with the method used to determine the amount of free EAU granted to each installation for direct CO2 costs<sup>90</sup>. It

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<sup>90</sup> The 2011 Benchmarking Decision used 2005-2008 or, if they were higher, 2009-2010, as reference years.

would also be consistent with the Commission Proposal of 13 April 2011 for a Council Directive amending Directive 2003/96/EC restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity<sup>91</sup>.

To somewhat mitigate the risk of windfall profits associated with Option D1, the historical baseline could be adjusted in case of significant capacity increases or substantial reductions in actual production. To this end, the method applied in the context of free EUA allocation could serve as a model<sup>92</sup>.

Accordingly, if the production capacity at an installation has increased by more than a specified threshold (e.g. 10%) over the aid granting period, the baseline output would be increased by an equivalent amount. Conversely, if average production capacity during the aid granting period were to significantly decrease, the aid would be cut<sup>93</sup>. If not, a company could collect State aid and still shift its production abroad.

For a new entrant, it could be envisaged to base the aid on the entrant's during e.g. its first three or four years of operations, thereafter increasing or decreasing the amount on the same terms as applied to incumbent firms.

The reference period used to fix the historical production in the context of compensation through free EUAs for direct CO<sub>2</sub> costs was 2005-2008 or 2009-2010, whichever was the higher. The dramatic impact of the crisis on industrial production, especially during 2009 is relevant in determining a representative historical average. For example, that exceptional year could be excluded.

Alternatively, the year with the lowest production could be excluded from the calculation of the average historical production of an installation.

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<sup>91</sup> According to the explanatory memorandum "There is a need to limit the impact of CO<sub>2</sub>-related taxation on the sectors and subsectors deemed to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage in the sense of Article 10(13) of {the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision} Accordingly, transitional measures to avoid an undue cost impact while maintaining environmental effectiveness of CO<sub>2</sub>-related taxation are needed, in a similar way as achieved with free allocation of greenhouse gas allowances under {the ETS Directive} In order to maintain the full incentive to reduce emissions, this tax credit should be based on the historic energy consumption of an installation concerned in a specific reference period ...".

<sup>92</sup> See Article 23 of the 2011 Benchmarking Decision.

<sup>93</sup> See e.g. reply to questionnaire by the Hungarian Chemical Industry.

**FIGURE I.2: Downturns and recoveries in EU-27 industrial production since 1990**



Source: EU Industrial structure (2011)

#### 4.21. Four Packages of Options ("Maximalist", "Minimalist", "First Intermediate" and "Second Intermediate")

Any combination of the (13) A, B, C and D options is theoretically possible. To facilitate the comparison of the options this Report sets out four Option Packages (all of which can be considered illustrative and relevant in view of the wide range of stakeholder input) (see Annexes 2 and 3).

First, a **Maximalist Package** is set out which is aimed at preventing carbon leakage risks to the maximum extent. Accordingly, it comprises **Options A1** (151 sectors and 13 subsectors); **B1** (100% and stable aid intensity); **C1** (regional CO<sub>2</sub> factors) and **D1** (actual output). The Package tends on the whole to address inter rather than intra-sector distortions.

The **Minimalist Package** aims at maximising the ETS efficiency objective. It comprises **Options A2** (five sectors); **B4** (less than 100% and degressive aid intensity); **C2** (CO<sub>2</sub> factor: 0.465 CO<sub>2</sub> t/MWh) and **D2** (historical output). The Package tends on the whole to address intra rather than inter-sector distortions.

Third, a **First Intermediate Package** comprises **Options A3** (14 sectors and two sets of subsectors); **B2** (100% and degressive aid intensity); **C1** (regional CO<sub>2</sub> factors) and **D2** (historical output). The Package's qualitative approach specifically attempts to target the sectors and subsectors at greatest risk of carbon leakage, while maintaining as far as possible the efficiency of the ETS. The Package is broadly neutral as far as intra and inter-sector distortions are concerned.

Fourth, a **Second Intermediate Package** comprises **Option A4** (35 sectors); **B3** (less than 100% and stable aid intensity); **C3** (CO<sub>2</sub> factor: 0.75 CO<sub>2</sub> t/MWh) and **D1** (actual output).

The Package principally focused on reducing carbon leakage risks while preserving to some extent the incentives of the ETS. It tends to address inter rather than intra-sector distortions.

#### **4.22. Subsidiarity and proportionality**

Article 5(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) provides that the principle of subsidiarity applies in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence of the European Union. Article 3(1)(b) of the TFEU provides that the EU shall have exclusive competence in the area of "the establishing of the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market". The legal basis for the Guidelines (Article 107(3)(c) TFEU) falls into this category of exclusive competence. Legally speaking, the issue of subsidiarity does not arise. In any event, the need for action at EU level is established by the ETS Directive which requires an assessment at **Union level** in order to determine sector eligibility<sup>94</sup>.

The principle of proportionality also applies to acts adopted within the EU's exclusive competences. Article 5(4) TEU states that "the content and form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties". The ETS Directive and the Commission's Statement (see Annex 6) define both the content (compensation for indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs in the context of ETS 3) and form (State aid rules to be adopted by the Commission) of the Guidelines.

## **5. IMPACTS UNDER THE BASELINE SCENARIO AND OPTION PACKAGES**

### **5.1. Identification of impacts**

#### *5.1.1. Sector eligibility (including under different price scenarios)*

The bulk of the carbon leakage literature regularly uses NACE 4 as the principal analytical level<sup>95</sup>. The same is true of most stakeholder input on the eligibility issue. This Report also uses Eurostat's NACE 4 level as the main analytical level. At that level mining, quarrying and manufacturing activities are divided into 258 sectors. Those NACE 4 sectors frequently comprise a large number of subsectors (at the eight-digit Prodcom level) (Annex 11), while other NACE 4 codes comprise one single subsector (i.e. product) at the disaggregated Prodcom level (e.g. malt). Unless otherwise stated, "sector" refers to NACE 4 and "subsector" refers to the Prodcom classification.

Relying on the NACE 4 level to determine eligible sectors inevitably means that – within a given NACE 4 code – there may be production processes which are relatively less electricity-intensive and which may 'free ride' based on other much more electricity-intensive subsectors and products within the same NACE 4 code. Conversely, some electricity-intensive subsectors and processes may be excluded from eligibility because of a lower relative level of electricity consumption in the NACE 4 code as a whole.

The CO<sub>2</sub> price assumption for 2013-2020 is another fundamental determinant of sector eligibility. The Report uses €30 as the principal price assumption. The uncertainties related to

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<sup>94</sup> Article 10a(14): "... the Commission shall assess, at Community level"). Some stakeholders have argued in favour of a Member State-specific level of assessment.

<sup>95</sup> See e.g. Cambridge Econometrics (2010).

the CO<sub>2</sub> price (see section 4.6 above) nevertheless call for the use of sensitivity tests using both lower (€10, €20) and higher price assumptions (€40).

#### 5.1.2. *Economic, social and environmental impacts (carbon leakage)*

By definition carbon leakage involves increased global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, lowering economic activity and employment in the EU. The environmental, economic and social impacts of carbon leakage are inextricably tied together. Those impacts will nevertheless be distinguished as far as possible.

#### 5.1.3. *Impacts in terms of maintaining ETS incentives*

The ETS Directive requires that the ETS Guidelines maintain the incentives for electricity savings and the shift from grey to green electricity<sup>96</sup>.

#### 5.1.4. *Internal market distortions*

The ETS Guidelines may give rise to distortions in the internal market. Potential distortions within sectors and between sectors will be assessed.

#### 5.1.5. *Significant uncertainty as to how many Member States will grant State aid as well as the aid amounts and sectoral and sub-sectoral coverage*

It is not known how many Member States and which Member States will in the end avail themselves of the possibility to grant aid during the period 2013-2020. If aid is granted the beneficiary sectors and subsectors are also unknown. In assessing the impacts the Report proceeds on the basic assumption that Member States will by and large avail themselves of the ETS Guidelines, while also considering some situations where that assumption would not hold.

Some stakeholders have expressed concerns that only some Member States may grant aid<sup>97</sup>. Some have even argued that all Member States should be obliged to grant aid on the same terms, i.e. a scenario which is legally ruled out.

The complete discretion on the part of the Member States to grant aid is a fundamental difference compared to free allocation of EUAs aimed at preventing carbon leakage due to direct CO<sub>2</sub> costs. That free allocation is harmonised at EU level, implying equal treatment of all eligible sectors and subsectors across the Member States.

## 5.2. **Baseline Scenario: no State aid**

Under the Baseline Scenario no ETS Guidelines would be adopted. No sector or subsector would be eligible for or could receive State aid. If Member States were to grant the type of aid envisaged in the ETS Directive in respect of carbon leakage, such aid would not be in line with State aid rules. Member States would only be allowed to grant up to €200,000 per undertaking per three-year period, in accordance with the State aid rules on *de minimis* aid.

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<sup>96</sup> Article 10a(6) of the ETS Directive.

<sup>97</sup> See e.g. replies to questionnaire by the Association of Swedish Miners and the Flemish Region.

### 5.2.1. Economic, social and environmental impacts (carbon leakage) under the Baseline Scenario

#### 5.2.1.1. Economic impacts under the Baseline Scenario

One simple proxy to identify the **sectors** most at risk of carbon leakage under the Baseline Scenario would be to list the in order of their indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs as a share of sector gross value added.

The following five sectors have the highest indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs as a % of their GVA (above 5%): **Manufacture of leather clothes** (5% < x < 30% indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs/GVA); **Aluminium production** (10.3%); **Manufacture of industrial gases** (7.5%); **Mining of chemicals and fertilizer minerals** (6.6%); **Manufacture of other inorganic chemicals** (6%) and **Lead, zinc and tin production** (6%).

After that comes a second group with indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs in the range of 3-5%: **Manufacture of paper and paperboard** (4.8%); **Manufacture of fertilizers and nitrogen compounds** (4.8%); **Manufacture of coke oven products** (4.6%); **Manufacture of cement** (4.4%); **Preparation and spinning of cotton-type fibres** (4.0%); **Manufacture of basic iron and steel** (3.6%); **Manufacture of malt** (3.5%) and **Copper production** (3.4%).

Next, twelve sectors have indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs in the range 2-3% and 14 sectors with indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs in the 1-2% range (see Annex 8).

Under the Baseline Scenario EU industry is fully exposed to CO<sub>2</sub> price signal arising from ETS 3. Some studies have been carried out to estimate the macroeconomic impact of direct and indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs. The 2008 impact assessment accompanying the proposal to amend the ETS Directive<sup>98</sup> estimated the aggregate cost impact (direct and indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs) at 0.58% of EU GDP<sup>99</sup>. Those estimates assumed that the CO<sub>2</sub> during ETS 3 would be €30. For all 258 sectors (at NACE 4 level) potentially concerned, the data on which the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision (and this Report) relies, indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs made up 48% of the total. On that basis, the total GDP impact resulting from indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs imposed on EU industry amounts to close to one quarter of a percentage point of EU GDP (based on a CO<sub>2</sub> price of €30).

The Commission subsequently estimated the macroeconomic impact of moving from the present ETS target of a 20% to a 30% reduction of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions by 2020<sup>100</sup>. Based on CO<sub>2</sub> prices of respectively €30 and €55 by 2020 the total additional GDP was estimated to be in the 0.22-0.31% range.

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<sup>98</sup> See European Commission (SEC(2008) 85), Impact assessment accompanying the Package of Implementation measures for the EU's objectives on climate change and renewable energy for 2020 direct energy system costs.

<sup>99</sup> Eurostat data for 2007 based on a weighting of the sectors' GVA, excluding sectors for which GVA was confidential, and using the upper bounds of cost intervals for those sectors where direct or indirect costs were only provided in intervals.

<sup>100</sup> See European Commission (SEC(2010)650/2), pp. 52-54. The findings build on a number of different models including PRIMES. This Impact Assessment was preceded by consultation of the social partners (Recital 25 of the ETS Directive).

Those modelling results are consistent with the findings in the carbon leakage literature that the potential macroeconomic effects of carbon leakage are limited<sup>101</sup>.

The gross value added of the EU manufacturing sector which would be ineligible for State aid (258 NACE 4 sectors) amounts to around €1,218bn.

It is fraught with particular difficulty to quantify the benefits of the Baseline Scenario. The starting point of that assessment would be that no industry sector is sheltered from the indirect CO<sub>2</sub> cost component in the CO<sub>2</sub> price. To that extent the Baseline Scenario would fully support the EU's decarbonisation (binding and non-binding) targets compared to scenarios involving State aid. No sector would be sheltered and the CO<sub>2</sub> price signal would apply across all ETS sectors. Neither the impact assessment in relation to the ETS done in 2008 nor the impact assessment relating to a possible increase of the EU's CO<sub>2</sub> reduction target to 30% quantifies those benefits. The Commission's Energy Roadmap 2050 refers to major positive economic and employment impacts of decarbonisation<sup>102</sup>.

An indication of the scale of benefits associated with non-exemption for energy intensive industries is found in the OECD working paper "A Framework for Assessing Green Growth Policies". It refers to analysis said to show that exempting energy-intensive industries from the application of a carbon tax or a cap and trade scheme could raise the global cost of achieving a given emission-reduction target by as much as 50%. It is argued that such exemptions would entail forgoing a range of low-cost abatement opportunities in a sector which represent a significant share of total CO<sub>2</sub> emissions<sup>103</sup>.

Given the interconnected nature of EU industry any positive developments could in any case have large multiplier effects. Of all the sectors in the economy, the manufacturing sector has the greatest multiplier effects.

#### 5.2.1.2. Employment impacts under the Baseline Scenario

A severe lack of data availability has been found to exist as regards employment effects due to carbon leakage<sup>104</sup>. The capital intensive nature of the sectors likely to be most exposed to carbon leakage under the Baseline Scenario means that relatively speaking the direct impact on employment would be more limited than their direct economic impact (Annex 16, table 15), a finding confirmed by the literature on carbon leakage<sup>105</sup>.

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<sup>101</sup> See de Bruyn et al (2008) estimating the impact of direct CO<sub>2</sub> costs on Dutch GDP to amount to 0.2% (half of which could be passed on to consumers by the sectors concerned); see also Neuhoff (2008), p. 121, Grubb (2010), p. 11 and Reinaud (2010), p. 7. The same conclusions are drawn in by the European Parliament (2010): "Carbon leakage is expected to be rather small in most studies and can be offset by technology spill-over. Employment losses due to carbon leakage will be concentrated in a few processes and facilities", p. 6.

<sup>102</sup> See European Commission (COM(2011) 885/2), p. 6.

<sup>103</sup> OECD (2010), p. 56.

<sup>104</sup> Employment Committee, Towards a greener labour market – The employment dimension of tackling environmental challenges. Final Report. 10 November 2010, p. 8.

<sup>105</sup> Reinaud (2010), p. 7 referring to studies on US suggesting that the economic effect of carbon leakage would be greater than the employment effect.

There is a wide range of uncertainty as regards the overall employment impact of the EU's energy and climate policy (including the 20% CO<sub>2</sub> reduction target). Some assessments by the Commission refer to a range of employment impacts between a negative net impact of 1% as well as positive net impact of the same magnitude<sup>106</sup>. The uncertainties as to the net employment effect (loss of employment and new "green" jobs) are due e.g. to the degree of labour market flexibility.

Keeping the uncertainties in mind, negative side effects of climate policy are more likely to materialise in the short term, while positive impacts are rather to be expected in the medium and long term<sup>107</sup>. Nevertheless, Eco-industries in the EU have already expanded rapidly in the EU, growing to become a sector equivalent to chemicals<sup>108</sup>. Annual employment growth between 1999 and 2008 has averaged around 179 000 jobs per year in this sector, over 7% growth. In 2008 it was estimated to employ 3.4 million people across the EU<sup>109</sup>.

The Member States may also decide to use their auctioning revenue (around half of all EUAs will be auctioned during ETS 3) to mitigate any social impacts that may occur due to carbon leakage<sup>110</sup>. Auctioning revenues at a carbon price of €20 per EUA would roughly yield €20bn in revenues. The Member States may also use to use the proceeds for other ends, e.g. investing in low-carbon technology and infrastructure.

Carbon leakage may also have an impact on the EU's skills base. A recent study describes the manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products, the manufacture of chemicals, chemicals product and man-made fibres as 'high skill', the manufacture of pulp and paper as 'low intermediate skill' and mining and quarrying, manufacture of food products and beverages, textiles and textile products, leather and leather products, rubber and plastic products and other non-metallic products as 'low skill'<sup>111</sup>.

### 5.2.1.3. Environmental impacts under the Baseline Scenario

The 2008 impact assessment underlying ETS 3 above modelled the potential impact on CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from energy intensive industries (i.e. covering both direct and indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs)<sup>112</sup>. The model simulations indicated that the achievement of the 20% independent CO<sub>2</sub> reduction without addressing the impacts on the energy intensive sectors could lead to a rise

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<sup>106</sup> See European Commission (SEC(2011) 288 final), Impact assessment relating to Energy Strategy 2050; see also Bruegel Working Paper 2011/08 ("Assessing the Impact of the EU ETS Using Firm Level Data") which also finds that the impact of the ETS on employment has been limited.

<sup>107</sup> Towards a greener labour market – The employment dimension of tackling environmental challenges. Final Report. 10 November 2010 (referring to findings by the OECD). See also European Commission. Employment in Europe 2009. October 2009. pp. 105-145 Chapter 3 entitled "Climate change and labour market outcomes", pp. 113-115, 119-120.

<sup>108</sup> The replies to the questionnaire submitted by the chemical industry emphasise the contribution that the chemicals industry can make towards the transition to a low-carbon economy.

<sup>109</sup> European Commission (SEC(2011) 1188)

<sup>110</sup> See p. 3 of MEMO/11/258 Brussels, 27 April 2011 relating to the Commission's Benchmarking Decision.

<sup>111</sup> European Commission (2011) EU Industrial structure 2011 Trends and Performance DG Enterprise and Industry.

<sup>112</sup> The PACE model was used. PACE is a global general equilibrium model similar to the GEM-E3 model but with more detail on electricity generation technologies. PACE was used to examine the sector specific impacts on energy-intensive industries of meeting a 30% renewable electricity target and the greenhouse gas objectives.

in emissions beyond business as usual in other world regions (i.e. carbon leakage) equal to 2.5% of EU27 emissions and hence reduce the overall effect of EU policies accordingly. This would roughly translate into an outer bound carbon leakage impact of 1.25% of all EU emissions.

Even under the Baseline Scenario it is however likely that even if there were carbon leakage the beneficial environmental effect of the ETS cap would never be fully wiped out. The carbon leakage literature suggests that the environmental impact (i.e. carbon leakage which means that CO<sub>2</sub> emissions rise in non-EU countries), in terms of increased CO<sub>2</sub> emissions outside the EU would be lower than the loss of economic activity within the EU (e.g. in the form of shifts of production). A study estimates that in the US around one quarter of the reduction of domestic industrial activity would be reflected in carbon leakage (i.e. increased CO<sub>2</sub> emissions abroad)<sup>113</sup>. This suggests that if the EU ETS leads to reduced activity within a sector that will not necessarily lead to an equivalent increase in global emissions.

To the extent that carbon leakage occurs, the reduced level of economic activity would also entail somewhat lower pressure for resources in the domestic markets. Carbon leakage could thus also indirectly weaken the ETS price signal given that the need for EUAs would be lower.

### 5.2.2. *Maintaining ETS efficiency under the Baseline Scenario*

#### *Impact on ETS sectors*

Under the Baseline Scenario all ETS sectors would be faced with the full costs of the ETS price signal, i.e. the CO<sub>2</sub> price. All ETS sectors would therefore have higher incentives to increase their electricity efficiency. The CO<sub>2</sub> abatement possibilities would be at a maximum as decentralised decision-making would enable the market and all sectors exposed fully to the CO<sub>2</sub> price to continuously search for the cheapest abatement options<sup>114</sup>. The amount of industrial electricity consumption that would not be insulated from the CO<sub>2</sub> at all amounts to around 1219 TWh<sup>115</sup>. That consumption roughly amounts to a value of €100bn at a price of 10 cents/KWh<sup>116</sup>.

By not insulating some industrial sectors within the ETS from the CO<sub>2</sub> price signal, no extra burdens in terms of meeting the reduction targets under ETS 3 would be imposed on other ETS sectors not eligible for State aid.

#### *Impact on non-ETS sectors*

In addition, as no ETS sectors are sheltered from the CO<sub>2</sub> cost in electricity prices the rest of the economy (transport, agriculture, construction, services, households etc.) would not have to bear the increase in electricity cost which would likely result in insulation of some ETS

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<sup>113</sup> Aldy and Pizer (2009); Reinaud (2010), p. 7.

<sup>114</sup> OECD (2010), pp. 20, 23; Stern (2009).

<sup>115</sup> The aggregate electricity consumption estimates in Section 5 is based in the first place on Eurostat data for 2007. If unavailable, figures from the most recent of the three previous years were used. Figures were based on the 'high end' figure (involving extrapolation from available consumption data across the EU).

<sup>116</sup> Price assumption taken from Eurostat. The figure may be inflated as large purchasers may be charged a lower KWh.

sectors from the CO2 price signal. The insulated sectors – i.e. the sectors receiving aid – can be expected to maintain their demand for electricity independently of the ETS CO2 price signal in so far as that they receive State aid.

### 5.2.3. *Distortions of the internal market under the Baseline Scenario*

#### *Intra-sector distortions*

Under the Baseline Scenario no Member State could provide the operating aid envisaged by the ETS Directive. No intra-sector internal market distortions would arise in the form aid being given to sectors by some Member States only.

Another intra-sector second distortion could however result from a scenario where a) installations in a sector use widely varying proportions of fuels (direct CO2 costs) and electricity (indirect CO2 costs) to produce the same product and b) only those incurring direct CO2 costs receive the compensation envisaged by the ETS Directive. Under the Baseline Scenario unequal treatment would mean that installations mainly using direct fuels would receive EUAs for free whereas installations mainly using electricity would not receive compensation for indirect CO2 costs (e.g. blast oxygen furnace steel versus electric arc steel and chemical pulp and paper compared to mechanical paper and pulp) (see Annex 10 for more detail on these and other sectors).

Strictly speaking such unequal treatment could not – in the short term – affect the competitive balance between fuel-reliant and electricity-reliance sectors within the same sector. This is so because a sector receiving free EUAs for direct CO2 costs still incurs opportunity costs that would leave that sector's cost structure and output decisions unaffected<sup>117</sup>. Indeed, there is a large degree of consensus in the carbon leakage literature that installations that receive EUAs for free treat these costs (in order to determine their production decisions) in the same way as installations which have had to pay for their EUAs<sup>118</sup>. Thus both paying and non-paying installations face the same CO2 costs. The difference being that the non-paying installations face opportunity costs and the paying installations face actual (or "accounting") costs. As one leading commentator formulates this central insight:

" ... whether allowances are provided for free or auctioned, the value of carbon emissions allowances should be reflected in the prices of products whose producers' emissions are capped since every unused carbon allowances has a market value (the so-called opportunity cost)"<sup>119</sup>.

But even taking into account the opportunity costs incurred by installations receiving free EUAs as compensation for their direct CO2 costs and even if the least distortive mechanisms were used to provide the aid – i.e. basing the aid on historical production as opposed to actual output – the non-insulated sectors would – in the case of non-alignment of the treatment of indirect and direct CO2 costs - be disadvantaged in terms of profitability. Even, though,

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<sup>117</sup> Given the standard assumption in microeconomics that a firm aims to maximise its profits rather than its market share.

<sup>118</sup> See e.g. Neuhoff (2008); European Commission (SEC(2008) 52 VOL. II), p. 22.

<sup>119</sup> Reinaud (2008), p. 19.

strictly speaking, the competitive position of an installations relying primarily on electricity – incurring indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs – within the same sector would however not change vis-à-vis installations having received EUAs for free, hat distributional impact is considered to be an internal market distortion for the purposes of this Report. To that extent, the Baseline Scenario results in inter-sector distortions.

### *Inter-sector distortions*

An inter-sector distortion in the internal market could arise where there is a degree of substitutability between different sectors and where only one of those sectors was eligible for aid. As mentioned above, the (ETS and non-ETS) sectors and parts of society not receiving aid (the non-insulated sectors) would be disadvantaged as they “would have to work harder” to meet the overall CO<sub>2</sub> reduction targets under ETS 3.

### **5.3. Maximalist Package: A1 (151 sectors/13 subsectors), B1 (100% and stable aid intensity), C1 (regional CO<sub>2</sub> factors) and D1 (actual output)**

#### *5.3.1. Eligibility of sectors and subsectors under the Maximalist Package (including under different CO<sub>2</sub> price assumptions)*

Under the Maximalist Package all **151 sectors and 13 subsectors** eligible under the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision<sup>120</sup> would also be eligible for State aid for indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs<sup>121</sup> (see Annex 7 for an exhaustive list of these sectors and subsectors). Broadly, more than two thirds of all EU mining and manufacturing sectors would be eligible for aid. The eligible sectors would include more than 100 sectors with no indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs or indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs of less than 1%.

Given that level of aggregation – i.e. sectors at NACE 4 level – there is also a risk that subsectors may 'free ride' on other subsectors with much higher electricity costs as a percentage of gross value added; however, that effect is an inevitable by-product of having to rely (largely) on NACE 4 as the level of analysis. The electricity benchmarks used to calculate the maximum aid amount for eligible sectors mitigate the risk inasmuch the actual amount of electricity needed to produce a tonne of the relevant product is built into each benchmark (see Annex 12).

#### *5.3.2. Economic, social and environmental impacts (carbon leakage) under the Maximalist Package*

Compared to the Baseline Scenario, the Maximalist Package would likely eliminate to a large extent the risk of carbon leakage for the 151 eligible sectors and 13 subsectors (on the basic assumption that all or most Member States would fully grant aid to those sectors within their own territories and that they would all do so up to the maximum aid amount). The gross value added represented by those 151 sectors amounts to around €900bn (roughly half of the entire GVA of EU industry).

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<sup>120</sup> Both the ETS Directive and the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision lay down an annual update procedure whereby additional sectors and subsectors can be placed on the eligibility list. At the time of writing no such additions had been made.

<sup>121</sup> A number of stakeholders support this Option (e.g. Italy and Vattenfall).

The risk of carbon leakage (and the attendant social and economic impacts) in a Member State may however increase in so far as that Member State decides to allocate aid to all sectors and subsectors, staying well below the maximum aid amount allowed. In such a scenario involving dilution of the aid, the sectors that are in reality at the greatest risk of carbon leakage may not receive sufficient aid to stave off that risk.

Other elements of the Maximalist Package would further minimise the risk of carbon leakage: the 100% aid intensity; the use of regional CO<sub>2</sub> factors (which aim capture to the greatest practical extent the actual CO<sub>2</sub> costs paid by the sectors and subsectors) and making the aid depend on actual instead of historical production.

### 5.3.3. *Maintaining ETS incentives under the Maximalist Package*

#### *Impact on ETS sectors*

The eligible 151 sectors represent 676 TWh of electricity consumption (somewhat more than half of all industrial electricity consumption in the EU). If the basic assumption holds (i.e. maximum use of State aid by the Member States) a considerable part of EU industry would thus be sheltered. The number of installations subject to the full CO<sub>2</sub> price signal would be significantly reduced. First of all, the electricity consuming industrial sector thus sheltered – the 151 sectors – would be subject to reduced incentives to reduce electricity consumption. On the other hand, the non-sheltered ETS sector electricity producers and the non-insulated part of EU industry) would face a higher CO<sub>2</sub> price signal and a proportionately greater adjustment burden (in terms of having to abate CO<sub>2</sub> emissions or buy EUAs) (see table below as well as Annex 16, figure 25, tables 9-10). This is so given that the same CO<sub>2</sub> emissions reduction must take place overall given that – the legally binding – ETS cap remains the same. In the words of one of the leading commentators in the carbon leakage field:

"Protecting energy intensive sectors inevitably requires the rest of the economy to 'work harder' to reach a given emissions target"<sup>122</sup>.

While the non-insulated ETS sectors would be subject to higher abatement incentives. it is nevertheless acknowledged that the broader the scope of a cap and trade scheme (such as the ETS) in terms of entities and jurisdictions covered, the greater the efficiency of the scheme<sup>123</sup>. By insulating more than half of all industrial electricity use in the EU, the range of abatement possibilities would be much reduced as the scope for decentralised decision-making would shrink. Cheaper CO<sub>2</sub> abatement potential within the sheltered sectors would be more likely to remain unexploited (such as abatement not requiring new investment). There is no evidence that the electricity sector is inherently more innovative than the industrial sector. The incentives for the sheltered part of EU industry would be blunted over time.

The impact on ETS efficiency of such insulation is likely to be much accentuated by the use of aid being provided for actual production (Option D1). While the use of regional CO<sub>2</sub> factors (Option C1) would make the Maximalist Package likely to somewhat weaken the incentives under the ETS for industrial sectors (compared to the EU average factors in

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<sup>122</sup> Grubb (2010).

<sup>123</sup> OECD (2010), pp. 20, 23.

Options C2 and C3)<sup>124</sup>, the use of Option D1 – increases in aid for increased production – is more significant in terms of weakening the ETS incentives<sup>125</sup>. The choice between aid for actual production (an ongoing annual subsidy for electricity consumption) or historical production (an annual fixed amount irrespective of production) is fundamental from the point of view of maintaining the ETS incentives.

#### *Impact on non-ETS sectors*

Large-scale insulation against the CO<sub>2</sub> price signal would however not only place extra burdens on the non-sheltered ETS sectors.

As insulation of 151 industrial sectors (and 13 subsectors) causes the CO<sub>2</sub> price to rise for the remaining ETS sectors, the electricity sector's costs for EUAs will rise. There is every likelihood that those extra costs will be – in significant part – passed on to all electricity consumers including those outside the ETS (including sectors such as transport, construction, agriculture, the public sector or households to the extent that the any of these do not enjoy fixed regulated electricity tariffs). Energy (including electricity costs) makes up a significant part of household income.

The fact that such effects are widely diffused across society does not mean that they – taken as an aggregate – can be discarded. Based on figures from 2005 (see Annex 16, table 17) households and services in EU27 accounted for an electricity consumption of 1554 TWh compared to 1127 TWh consumed by industrial and mining sectors (i.e. the 258 NACE 4 sectors). Some non-ETS sectors are in fact electro-intensity (such as the railway sector). A study cited by the EU rail sector estimates that pass-on of electricity cost could lead to additional annual costs for the rail sector of €0.5bn (claimed to induce a shift towards transport modes with higher CO<sub>2</sub> emissions)<sup>126</sup>.

#### *5.3.4. Internal market distortions under the Maximalist Package*

##### *Intra-sector distortions*

The Maximalist Package would – among the four Packages - reduce scope for intra-sector distortions to the greatest extent (on the basic assumption that all Member States fully provide State aid to the 151 sectors. Likewise, on that assumption, the Maximalist Package would entail the most equal treatment of fuel reliant and electricity reliance sectors in terms of distribution (i.e. profitability). In so far as the basic assumption does not hold the scope for intra-sector distortions would significantly increase.

Regional CO<sub>2</sub> factors mean that the same sector is treated equally across Member State in so far as those factors serve as best available proxies for marginal pricing across the whole EU.

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<sup>124</sup> The aid amount would be adjusted to even the areas which have the highest CO<sub>2</sub> factor, i.e. in those Member States or regions where electricity production result in prices containing the highest relative CO<sub>2</sub> component.

<sup>125</sup> OECD (2010), p.

<sup>126</sup> See study by INFRAS: Energiepolitische Rahmenbedingungen (2009) (cited by a joint International Union of Railways/CER report entitled "EU Transport Greenhouse Gases (GHG): Routes to 2050 – A Railway Perspective").

## *Inter-sector distortions*

Compared to the Baseline Scenario the Maximalist Package would considerably reduce – in so far as the Member States would actually grant aid – the risk of distortions of competition between sectors in so far as products of such sectors are in competition with each other. But – as explained - the non-insulated sectors (whether ETS or non-ETS) would have to make greater efforts to meet the ETS 3 cap. This would be so in part because the insulated sectors would not face the CO<sub>2</sub> price signal as the aid under the Maximalist Package would be based on actual – and not historical – output.

### **5.4. Minimalist Package: Option A2 (5 sectors), Option B4 (Less than 100% and degressive aid intensity), Option C2 (EU average CO<sub>2</sub> factor (0.465 CO<sub>2</sub>t/MWh)) and Option D2 (historical output)**

#### *5.4.1. Eligibility of sectors and subsectors (including under different CO<sub>2</sub> price assumptions)*

The following five NACE 4 sectors would qualify under the Minimalist Package: **Mining of chemicals and fertiliser minerals** (NACE 1430); **Manufacture of leather clothes** (NACE 1810); **Manufacture of other inorganic chemicals** (NACE 2413); **Aluminium production** (NACE 2742) and **Lead, zinc and tin production** (NACE 2743).

As mentioned, the choice of NACE 4 as the main level of analysis inevitably means that 'free-riding' subsectors may be deemed eligible even though electricity intensity of their production processes is relatively low. This 'subsector free rider' problem arises in particular in relation to sectors such as 'other inorganic chemicals' (NACE 2413) which comprises 98 subsectors (Prodcom), only a few of which possess particularly electricity intensive production processes (notably the production of chlorine via electrolysis). Likewise, the electricity intensive process linked to zinc production (via electrolysis) explains the inclusion of other non-ferrous metals such as lead (which are produced via less electricity intensive processes)<sup>127</sup>.

The Minimalist Package entails the potential problem of exclusion of subsectors in situations where electricity intensive procedures at the subsector level are embedded in sectors which do not qualify under the two cumulative quantitative criteria under the Minimalist Package.

Sensitivity tests using €10 and €20 to calculate the indirect CO<sub>2</sub> cost as a share of the sectors' GVA instead of the primary CO<sub>2</sub> price assumption of €30 (see section 4.6 above) result in only one sector becoming eligible under the Minimalist Package, namely **Aluminium production** (NACE 2742).

At a CO<sub>2</sub> price of €40 on the other hand the following four sectors qualify in addition to the five qualified based on €30: **Manufacture of paper and paperboard** (NACE 2112); **Manufacture of fertilizers and nitrogen compounds** (NACE 2415); **Manufacture of coke oven products** (NACE 2310) and **Preparation and spinning of cotton-type fibres** (NACE 1711).

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<sup>127</sup> In fact, it is generally only part of the production process which is electro-intensive. For example, primary smelting in the case of zinc (see reply to questionnaire by IZA Europe).

At 40€ the indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs of **Manufacture of cement** (NACE 2651) pass the 5% cost threshold; however, cement does not meet the 10% trade intensity threshold under the Minimalist Package. On the other hand, cement qualifies under the Maximalist and Second Intermediate Packages.

#### 5.4.2. *Economic, social and environmental impacts (carbon leakage) under the Minimalist Package*

Compared to the Baseline Scenario, the Minimalist Package would only be likely eliminate to a large extent the risk of carbon leakage for the five eligible sectors (assuming that all or most Member States would fully grant aid to those sectors within their own territories and that they would all do so up to the maximum aid amount). The gross value added represented by those five sectors amounts to €18.5bn.

The design of the Minimalist Package implies that it would entail the greatest risks in terms of carbon leakage. It is thus the Package which most closely approaches the Baseline Scenario.

Except for the five sectors included (e.g. inorganic chemicals, aluminium, zinc, lead and tin) the likely economic, social and environmental impacts can be assimilated to those outlined for the Baseline Scenario above.

Compared to the Maximalist Package (under which 151 sectors qualify), the Minimalist Package involves the exclusion of 146 sectors. At the EU level, these 146 sectors account for around 52% of total manufacturing, mining and quarrying GVA (and 8% of EU27 GDP)<sup>128</sup>. They account around 45% of total manufacturing, mining and quarrying employment.

#### 5.4.3. *Maintaining ETS incentives under the Minimalist Package*

The insulation effect would be limited to five sectors which together represent 113 Twh (close to 10% of EU industrial electricity consumption). Two production processes within two of those five sectors (aluminium electrolysis and chlorine production) alone make up around 8% of all industrial electricity use in the EU (see table below).

**Table: Summary of approximate electricity consumption (2007) from the large electricity consuming processes in the EU-27**

<b>Process</b>	<b>TWh</b>
Aluminium electrolysis	54.4
Copper electrolysis	1.13
Zinc electrolysis	6.7
Chlorine production	36.1

*Source: Ecofys and Fraunhofer*

Of the four Packages examined the Minimalist Package would be most likely to maintain incentives under ETS 3.

<sup>128</sup> Eurostat data for 2007. These figures are rough estimates. In respect some 20 sectors data is missing or exist for years other than 2007.

### *Impact on ETS-sectors*

The Minimalist Package in particular is liable to maintain the ETS incentives in that it is based on an installation's *historical* – as opposed to actual – production level (Option D2). Thus the aid does not increase with increases in production (and the attendant rise in CO2 emissions). Likewise, the fact that the historical costs are only covered in part and in that the aid falls each year means that the installation is incentivised to reduce indirect CO2 costs. That effect is buttressed by use of a uniform CO2 factor across the EU which means that an installation is only covered up to that CO2 factor (0.465 CO2t/MWh), even if the CO2 factor in the Member State or region where the installation is based is higher.

The Minimalist Package (compared to the three other Packages) would also be most likely to maintain the incentives of electricity generators to invest in low-carbon generation capacity for the longer term even if it is unlikely that this would affect the supply decisions of the electricity generators in the short term (as pointed out by many stakeholders). The principal incentives for electricity generators to invest in green technologies is that the EUAs they require will be subject to full auctioning under ETS 3 (2013-2020)<sup>129</sup>.

Industry stakeholders have on the other hand argued that aid at less than 100% aid intensity (incorporated in the Minimalist Package) would reduce the funds available for industry to undertake low-carbon investments<sup>130</sup>.

The Minimalist Package would be most consistent with the Commission's policy on a shift towards a low-carbon-intensive economy<sup>131</sup> towards which all sectors are expected to contribute<sup>132</sup>. The relevant Communication emphasises that clear and irreversible signals are needed to incentivise a shift towards a low-carbon economy<sup>133</sup>.

Of all Packages, the Minimalist Package would be most likely to enhance the cost-effectiveness of the ETS, as that Package narrows the list of eligible sectors the most. It thus comes closest to the Baseline Scenario in maximising ETS efficiency.

### *Impact on non-ETS sectors*

Of all Packages, the Minimalist Package would likely entail the lowest relative burdens in terms of higher electricity prices for other (non-ETS) parts of the economy (given that lower extra costs borne by electricity producers – and largely passed on), as that Package contains the lowest number of eligible sectors.

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<sup>129</sup> An argument made by IFIEC in its reply to the questionnaire.

<sup>130</sup> See reply to questionnaire by Eurofer.

<sup>131</sup> The Opinion of the Commission's Impact Assessment Board on the impact assessment accompanying the said Communication (European Commission (SEC(2010) 650) states that this Communication and the related impact assessment should serve as a common analytical base for other work undertaken by the Commission related to the shift to towards a low-carbon economy.

<sup>132</sup> See MEMO/11/258 Brussels, 27 April 2011 relating to the 2011 Benchmarking Decision ("... it shows that EU is pressing ahead with the implantation of its ambitious climate agenda and that it is serious in striving for a low carbon economy where all sectors will need to contribute to emission reduction" (emphasis added)).

<sup>133</sup> European Commission (COM(2011) 112) and European Commission (SEC(2011) 289); on the relevance of CO2 price for investment in the electricity sector see New Energy Finance. Carbon Markets – EU ETS Research Note. Impact of the EU ETS on power sector investments – a survey of European utilities.

#### 5.4.4. *Internal market distortions under the Minimalist Package*

##### *Intra-sector distortions*

Intra-sector distortions resulting from aid being granted by some Member States would – even if the basic assumption were not hold - only be limited to the five eligible sectors (i.e. the lowest likely degree of distortions of the four Packages). Any subsidy races between the Member States would also by definition be confined to those situations.

There would be more scope for intra-sector distortions in the form of unequal treatment in terms of impact on profitability given that fuel-reliant sectors covered by the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision (151 sectors and 13 subsectors) receive subsidies during ETS 3 in the form of free EUAs. A uniform CO<sub>2</sub> factor would also be unfavourable to installations in Member State with higher CO<sub>2</sub> intensities in their electricity generation.

##### *Inter-sector distortions*

Compared to the other three Packages there would be greater scope for inter-sector distortions between substitutable products and materials. On the other hand, unequal treatment in the form of greater burdens being imposed on non-aid receiving (“non-insulated”) sectors would likely be lower compared to the other three Packages. This would be so in part given that the aid-receiving sector would be exposed to the same CO<sub>2</sub> price signal as the aid would be based on historical (and not actual) output.

#### **5.5. First Intermediate Package: A3 (14 sectors and two sets of subsectors), B3 (less than 100% and stable aid intensity), C1 (regional CO<sub>2</sub> factors) and D2 (historical output)**

##### *5.5.1. Impact in terms of eligibility of sectors and subsectors under the First Intermediate Package*

Under the First Intermediate Package, **14 sectors and two sets of subsectors** become eligible.

The eligible sectors automatically include the five sectors eligible under the Minimalist Package: **Mining of chemicals and fertiliser minerals** (NACE 1430); **Manufacture of leather clothes** (NACE 1810); **Manufacture of other inorganic basic chemicals** (NACE 2413); **Aluminium production** (NACE 2742) and **Lead, zinc and tin production** (NACE 2743).

Second, it includes the following sectors based on the qualitative assessment criteria: **Mining of iron ores** (NACE 1310); **Preparation and spinning of cotton-type fibres** (NACE 1711); **Manufacture of fertilizers and nitrogen compounds** (NACE 2415); **Manufacture of paper and paperboard** (NACE 2112); **Manufacture of basic iron and steel** (NACE 2710); **Copper production** (NACE 2744) and **Manufacture of other organic basic chemicals** (NACE 2414); **Manufacture of industrial gases** (NACE 2411); **Manufacture of man-made fibres** (NACE 2470).


The following two sets of subsectors are also deemed eligible under the qualitative assessment: seamless steel pipes within **Manufacture of stainless steel pipes** (NACE 2722)

as well as a limited number of commodity polymers within **Plastics in primary forms** (NACE 2416) (see Annex 10).

5.5.2. *Economic, social and environmental impacts (carbon leakage) under the First Intermediate Package*

In respect of sectors eligible under the First Intermediate Package, the risk of carbon leakage and the related economic and social impacts for such sectors would be reduced compared to the Minimalist Package.

The carbon leakage related impacts under the First Intermediate Package are more similar to those under Minimalist Package than under the Maximalist Package. Nevertheless, the GVA of the eligible sectors – €160bn – is significantly higher compared to the Minimalist Package (partly as it include high value added sectors within EU manufacturing industry such as steel, organic chemicals and part of the plastics sectors). The First Intermediate Package would also capture several of the most labour intensive NACE 4 sources (notably steel and paper) (see figure below).



Source: Own calculations based on available Eurostat data.

5.5.3. *Maintaining ETS incentives under the First Intermediate Package*

The insulation effect would be limited to a number of sectors which together represents 408 TWh, around a third of EU industrial electricity consumption (to be compared to close to ten percent under the Minimalist Package and more than half under the Maximalist Package). At a price of 10 cents/KWh that consumption amounts somewhat over €30bn.

*Impact on ETS sectors*

The First Intermediate Package would be more likely to maintain incentives under ETS 3 than the Second Intermediate package and in particular the Maximalist Package.

In terms of rough orders of magnitude, based on the premise of full use of the possibility to grant State aid, it is recalled that the Minimalist Package would insulate roughly 10%, the First Intermediate Package around a third and the Maximalist Package about half of the electricity consumed by EU industry.

The ETS incentives would in particular be maintained through the use of historical output (i.e. an annual fixed aid amount compared on a subsidy linked to actual production). To some extent the use of regional CO<sub>2</sub> factors would detract from the ETS incentives.

#### *Impact on non-ETS sectors*

The potential spill-over in terms of higher electricity prices passed on into the non-ETS part of the economy in terms of would be greater compared to the Minimalist Package but smaller compared to the Maximalist Package.

#### *5.5.4. Internal market distortions under the First Intermediate Package*

##### *Intra-sector distortions*

The longer list of sectors and subsectors under the First Intermediate Package (compared to the Minimalist Package) would only increase the risk of potential intra-sector distortions of competition compared to the Minimalist Package if there were deviations from the basic assumption that the Member States comprehensively exploit the possibilities to grant aid.

##### *Inter-sector distortions*

The First Intermediate Package would also reduce possible distortions in the internal market by including products which may potentially to some extent be in competition with each other (aluminium and steel).

Given that the aid under the First Intermediate Package is based on historical output, other inter-sector distortions would be reduced (see section 5.4.4 on the Minimalist Package).

### **5.6. Second Intermediate Package: A4 (35 sectors), B2 (less than 100% and stable aid intensity), C3 (EU average marginal CO<sub>2</sub> factor (0.75 CO<sub>2</sub>t/MWh)) and D1 (actual output)**

#### *5.6.1. Eligibility of sectors and subsectors under the Second Intermediate Package*

The following **35 sectors** would be eligible under the Second Intermediate Package:

**Manufacture of lime (NACE 2652); Manufacture of cement (NACE 2651); Manufacture of coke oven products (NACE 2310); Manufacture of fertilizers and nitrogen compounds (NACE 2415); Aluminium production (NACE 2742); Manufacture of other inorganic basic chemicals (NACE 2413); Manufacture of refined petroleum products (NACE 2320); Manufacture of paper and paperboard (NACE 2112); Manufacture of basic iron and steel (NACE 2710); Manufacture of flat glass (NACE 2611); Lead, zinc and tin production (NACE 2743); Manufacture of hollow glass (NACE 2613); Manufacture of starches and starch products (NACE 1562); Manufacture of malt (NACE 1597);**

**Production of ethyl alcohol from fermented materials (NACE 1592); Copper production (NACE 2744); Manufacture of other organic basic chemicals (NACE 2414); Manufacture of sugar (NACE 1583); Preparation and spinning of cotton-type fibres (NACE 1711); Mining and agglomeration of hard coal (NACE 1010); Mining of chemicals and fertilizer minerals (NACE 1430); Manufacture of leather clothes (NACE 1810); Manufacture of synthetic rubber in primary forms (NACE 2417); Cold drawing (NACE 2731); Other non-ferrous metal production (NACE 2745); Manufacture of agricultural tractors (NACE 2931); Manufacture of other non-distilled fermented beverages (NACE 1595); Manufacture of ceramic tiles and flags (NACE 2630); Manufacture of cast iron tubes (NACE 2721); Manufacture of bricks, tiles and construction products, in baked clay (NACE 2640); Manufacture of industrial gases (NACE 2411); Mining and agglomeration of lignite (NACE 1020); Quarrying of limestone, gypsum and chalk (NACE 1412); Manufacture of plasters (NACE 2653) and Casting of iron (NACE 2751).**

A price assumption of €10 results in four eligible sectors: **Manufacture of lime (NACE 2652); Manufacture of cement (NACE 2651); Manufacture of coke oven products (NACE 2310) and Manufacture of fertilizers and nitrogen compounds (NACE 2415).**

At a price of €20 a further six sectors would be added: **Aluminium production (NACE 2742); Manufacture of other inorganic chemicals (NACE 2413); Manufacture of refined petroleum products (NACE 2320); Manufacture of paper and paperboard (NACE 2112); Manufacture of basic iron and steel (NACE 2710) and Manufacture of flat glass (NACE 2611).**

At a CO<sub>2</sub> price of €40 only one more sector - **Manufacture of man-made fibres (NACE 2470)** – would be added to the list of 35 sectors (resulting from the basic price assumption of €30).

#### *5.6.2. Economic, social and environmental impacts (carbon leakage) under the Second Intermediate Package*

The First Intermediate Package would likely eliminate to a large extent the risk of carbon leakage for the 35 eligible assuming that all Member States would fully grant aid to those sectors within their own territories and that they would all do so up to the maximum aid amount. The gross value added represented by the 35 sectors eligible amounts to €211bn.

The Second Intermediate Package would – on the said assumptions – likely reduce the risk of carbon leakage in a number of agricultural sectors (including starch and sugar) as well as in parts of the cement sector likely to be more exposed to such risks the higher the CO<sub>2</sub> price (in particular coastal regions: see Annex 16, figure 39).

Other components in the Second Intermediate Package that would likely somewhat minimise the risk of carbon leakage include the use of regional CO<sub>2</sub> factors (which aim to capture to the greatest practical extent the actual CO<sub>2</sub> costs paid by the sectors and subsectors) and – in particular - the fact the aid would depend on actual instead of historical production. The protection against carbon leakage would increase the closer to 100% the aid intensity were set, although that impact would be secondary compared to use of actual (aid rising with higher production) and not historical production (a fixed aid amount).

### 5.6.3. *Maintaining ETS incentives under the Second Intermediate Package*

#### *Impact on ETS sectors*

The Second Intermediate Package would be the less likely than the First Intermediate Package to preserve the ETS-related incentives. In particular this is so as the aid would be directly linked to the installations' actual production (including for large increases in production). This would be compounded by a sector coverage which is more than twice as large. The size of electricity consumption under the Second Intermediate Package amounts to 485 TWh compared to 408 TWh under the First Intermediate Package (of around 1219 TWh for EU industry as a whole).

To a lesser extent, the use of stable (as opposed to degressive) aid intensity would further make the Second Intermediate Package likely to weaken the incentives under the ETS (as in the case of the Maximalist Package: see section 5.3.3 above).

On the other hand the use of a uniform CO<sub>2</sub> factor would go some way towards increasing the ETS incentives.

#### *Impact on non-ETS sectors*

The burdens on the non-ETS sectors would be greater compared to the First Intermediate Package, given the greater sector coverage in conjunction with State aid based on actual output.

### 5.6.4. *Internal market distortions under the Second Intermediate Package*

#### *Intra-sector distortions*

As the number of sectors compared to the First Intermediate Package would increase by around 20 sectors the potential scope for intra-sector distortions resulting from only some Member State aid granting aid would be enlarged.

#### *Inter-sector distortions*

Compared to the First Intermediate Package, the Second Intermediate Package would reduce – in so far as the Member States would actually grant aid – the risk of distortions of competition between sectors in so far as products of such sectors are in competition with each other.

## **5.7 Additional factors in assessing the impacts**

Possible effects on employment of carbon leakage should also be considered given the upstream and downstream integration of many of the sectors concerned<sup>134</sup> as well as the wider importance of industry to the EU economy<sup>135</sup>. Some of the sectors concerned may generate

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<sup>134</sup> Numerous the chemical (organic and inorganic), plastics, steel and cement industries.  
<sup>135</sup> European Commission (COM(2010) 614).


considerable indirect employment<sup>136</sup>; for example, according to the European Commission's 2011 Competitiveness Report direct and indirect employment in the chemicals sector amounts 1.16m and 3m respectively. The EU steel industry directly employs 420 000 people with indirect employment estimated to amount to "millions".

Indeed, the web of interdependencies in the EU's industrial fabric also needs to be factored into the assessment of possible downstream effects of the Baseline Scenario and the four Option Packages. Possible economic and employment effects could reverberate along the many value chains of which EU industry is made up. For example, refinery products are often used as inputs for basic organic chemicals which in turn often after used as inputs for the production of primary plastics. While such interdependencies may increase the scale of carbon leakage through knock-on effects, they may also make the sectors included in a value chain more resilient to carbon leakage. The graphs below are an attempt to illustrate the absolute and relative economic significance of some value chains made up of a number of sectors. It appears from the graphs that the added value of the chains is almost three times that of the sectors on a stand-alone bases:

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<sup>136</sup> For example, some sectors (such as steel production) generate more employment


**Value-added of selected sectors on a stand-alone basis**



Value-added: €137 bn (6.8% of industrial production)

Source: Eurostat 2006 data

**Value added of the value chains**



Sectors on a stand-alone basis

Value-added: €137 bn (6.8% of industrial production)

Value Chains:


Value-added: €390 bn (19.5% of industrial production)

Source: Eurostat 2006 data

The graphs above and the figure below illustrate that relatively few sectors (defined at the NACE 3 below) account for a considerable part of overall GVA of the EU's energy-intensive industry. In particular the chemicals sector (which in the figure below includes inorganic and basic chemicals, fertilisers, plastics and industrial gases) tower above the other sectors. At

NACE 4 level basic organic chemicals and steel have the highest value added as a percentage of EU GDP (see Annex 15).

**Figure 3: Value added of energy-intensive industries in EU 21, 2004**




Source: Eurostat: Structural business statistics

Source: Bergman et al (2007)

Any carbon leakage impacts are likely to affect Member States and regions differently. Member States with a higher proportion of mining and manufacturing would in general be potentially more affected. Industry constitutes a relatively higher share of GDP in the Member States to the right of the figure below (see also Annex 16, figures 1 and 16 and tables 1-4; and Annex 16, table 5 as regards regional specialisation).


**FIGURE II.2: Distribution of EU countries by GDP shares of manufacturing and market services in 2009**



Source: own calculation using Eurostat data.


To further highlight potential impacts in different parts of the EU the figure below identifies in respect of one Member State (Slovakia) certain sectors which represent different shares of that Member State's GDP<sup>137</sup>. Graphs for other Member States and EEA countries for which data was available are set out in Annex 15. Those graphs are consistent with the finding above that the larger Member States (Germany, France, Italy, Spain and Poland) have a more diversified industrial structure (and that iron and steel constitutes a key pillar in that structure). The sectors concerned make up a relatively large share of GDP in a number of smaller Member States (Belgium, Bulgaria, Ireland, Lithuania, Hungary, Finland and Sweden). In those countries one or two sectors tend to represent a relatively large share: iron & steel and basic organic chemicals in Belgium; iron & steel and cement in Bulgaria; organic basic chemicals in Ireland; refined petroleum in Lithuania and Hungary and iron & steel and paper in Finland and Sweden. In some Member States the sectors concerned make up a small very small share of overall GDP (e.g. Denmark, Estonia and Latvia).

<sup>137</sup> Member State specific GVA data were available for 17 Member States and Norway. Such data were available for 27 sectors.



Finally, while carbon leakage as defined in this Report results from negative competitiveness impacts caused by indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs placing EU sectors at a disadvantage vis-à-vis their *third country* competitors, it is necessary to bear the impacts on the internal market in mind (as done throughout this report). As appears from the figure based on WTO data below intra-regional trade in Europe by far outweighs its trade with third countries. For that reason the issue of intra-sector and inter-sector distortions in the internal market has been systematically addressed in the Option Packages (see e.g. 4.7.2.3, 5.1.4, 5.2.3, 5.3.4, 5.4.4, 5.5.4 and 5.6.4).

**Figure 2.1: Europe has the world's busiest goods trade**  
(world merchandise trade, US\$ billions, 2008)



Source: World Trade Organization

## 6. COMPARISON OF THE OPTION PACKAGES

### 6.1. Effectiveness

To determine the **effectiveness** of the Option Packages it will be considered whether the four key elements in each Package (sector coverage, aid intensity, CO2 factor and whether the aid is output based or based on historical output) can be expected to contribute towards the objectives (positive impact), to produce a largely neutral impact vis-à-vis the objectives or undermine the objectives (negative impact).

*Maximalist Package: Option A1 (151 sectors/13 subsectors), Option B1 (100% and stable aid intensity), Option C1 (regional CO2 factors) and Option D1 (actual output)*

	Minimising carbon leakage	Maintaining ETS incentives	Minimising internal market distortions
<b>Sector coverage</b>	Positive	Negative	Neutral
<b>Aid intensity</b>	Positive	Negative	Neutral
<b>CO2 factor</b>	Positive	Negative	Neutral
<b>Eligible output</b>	Positive	Negative	Neutral

*Minimalist Package: Option A2 (5 sectors), Option B4 (less than 100% and degressive aid intensity), Option C2 (EU average CO2 factor (0.465 CO2t/MWh)) and Option D2 (historical output)*

	Minimising carbon leakage	Maintaining ETS incentives	Minimising internal market distortions
<b>Sector coverage</b>	Negative	Positive	Neutral
<b>Aid intensity</b>	Negative	Positive	Neutral
<b>CO2 factor</b>	Negative	Positive	Neutral
<b>Eligible Output</b>	Negative	Positive	Neutral

*First Intermediate Package: Option A3 (14 sectors and two sets of subsectors), Option B2 (100% and degressive aid intensity), Option C1 (regional CO2 factors) and Option D2 (historical output)*

	Minimising carbon leakage	Maintaining ETS incentives	Minimising internal market distortions
<b>Sector coverage</b>	Positive	Positive	Neutral

<b>Aid intensity</b>	Negative	Positive	Neutral
<b>CO2 factor</b>	Positive	Neutral	Neutral
<b>Eligible output</b>	Negative	Positive	Neutral

*Second Intermediate Package: Option A4 (35 sectors), Option B3 (less than 100% and stable aid intensity), C3 (EU average marginal CO2 factor (0.75 CO2t/MWh)) and Option D1 (actual output)*

	<b>Minimising carbon leakage</b>	<b>Maximising ETS efficiency</b>	<b>Minimising internal Market distortions</b>
<b>Sector coverage</b>	Positive	Negative	Neutral
<b>Aid intensity</b>	Neutral	Neutral	Neutral
<b>CO2 factor</b>	Neutral	Positive	Neutral
<b>Eligible output</b>	Positive	Negative	Neutral

In terms of effectiveness the Packages rank – after a first step of analysis - as follows. The First Intermediate Package obtains a net positive score of (3). The Second Intermediate Package obtains a net positive score of (1) with zero scores (0) for the other two Packages. The ranking rests on the following scoring system: a positive impact equals one net positive score and a negative impact equals one net negative score. A neutral impact equals a score of zero.

All internal market distortion scores are zero. This reflects the inevitable trade-off between minimising the risks of intra-sector distortions versus inter-sector distortions (as appears from sections 5.2.3, 5.3.4, 5.4.4, 5.5.4 and 5.6.4).

The fact that the impacts cancel each other should not be construed as a finding that no real world impact are expected to occur. The Maximalist and Minimalist Packages are thus not neutral in terms of expected carbon leakage and ETS efficiency impacts (even though the 'positives' and 'negatives' cancel each other out<sup>138</sup>).

## 6.2. Efficiency

The ideal Option Package achieves the objectives set out above (effectiveness) at lowest administrative and economic cost (efficiency). The Opinion Packages must thus be assessed in terms of their relative **efficiency**.

Efficiency is measured qualitatively in two steps in terms of the extent to which the Packages can be accepted to minimise administrative burdens and the trade-off between carbon leakage and maintaining the incentives under the ETS.

<sup>138</sup> Impact Assessment Guidelines, p. 47.

*Administrative burdens* on the Member States and the beneficiaries are considered under the efficiency heading as follows. The Packages may involve administrative burdens on Member States and aid beneficiaries in the following three (equally weighted) respects. The first burden affects Member States and aid beneficiary firms and concerns the calculation of the production level (per installation). A second burden (on Member States and aid beneficiaries) arises if the production level must potentially be determined in respect of more than 20 sectors. A third burden (on Member States and beneficiaries) arises if changes in investment capacity must be monitored. It follows that the Minimalist Package entails one of the three burdens. The other three Packages entail two burdens each.

A degree of trade-off between carbon leakage and ETS efficiency is inevitable. The most efficient Package *minimises that trade-off*. An ideal package would target as far as possible the sectors at real risk of carbon leakage due to indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs, limiting the insulation against the CO<sub>2</sub> price signal and maximising the abatement possibilities (and the cost-effectiveness) within the ETS subject to the EU's overall 20% reduction target. To that end, an ideal package needs to preserve the CO<sub>2</sub> price signal to the fullest extent feasible.

The First Intermediate Package comes closest to that ideal. It pinpoints the sectors based on a targeted and more comprehensive assessment (compared to the purely quantitative or mechanical approach used in the other three Packages).

Under the First Intermediate Package it was also possible to single out sectors at subsector level (which is not possible under the Minimalist and Second Intermediate Packages). The First Intermediate Package targets the core issue – the asymmetric indirect CO<sub>2</sub> cost impact – best in relative terms: its coverage (14 sectors and two sets of subsectors) capture 408 TWh of electricity consumption (25.5 TWh per sector<sup>139</sup>). The Second Intermediate Package (35 sectors) captures 485 TWh (13.8 TWh per sector).

The design of the First Intermediate and Minimalist Packages also preserves the CO<sub>2</sub> price signal to the greatest extent feasible compared to the other two Packages. That comparative efficiency results from the aid taking the form of a fixed amount per time period based on a historical baseline (save for significant changes in capacity). The mode of allocation of compensation – whatever the form of the subsidy – is fundamental to the efficiency of a cap and trade system.

The **efficiency** comparison thus reinforces the top ranking of the First Intermediate Package resulting from the comparisons in terms of effectiveness.

### 6.3. Coherence

The First Intermediate Package was also found to be most **coherent** with the EU's core policy framework. The ETS Directive is the pillar of the core EU policy framework. That framework also includes – in particular – two key Commission Decisions pursuant to the ETS Directive, namely the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision and the 2011 Benchmarking Decision.

The ETS Directive directly targets ETS sectors (although its effects extend beyond that circle). The greater the extent to which a Package minimises carbon leakage risks in a cost-effective way, the greater its coherence with the core EU policy framework. Indeed, the ETS Directive's very first recital defines its purpose as reduction of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in a cost-

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<sup>139</sup> Based on the full electricity consumption of the NACE 4 sectors to which the two sets of subsectors belong.

effective manner (which presupposes minimisation of significant carbon leakage risks due to indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs at lowest overall cost).

The First Intermediate Package meets that first coherence criterion to greater extent than the other three Packages. It does so – as explained above - by targeting the sectors that – based on an overall assessment – can be considered to be at greatest risk of carbon leakage.

The First Intermediate Package is also aligned to a greater extent with another cornerstone of the policy framework: the fundamental issue of the mode of allocation of the compensation. The First Intermediate Package mirrors the "sister framework" (i.e. the 2010 Carbon Leakage and 2011 Benchmarking Decisions on direct CO<sub>2</sub> costs) in that the compensation/State aid is based not on actual production but on a historical reference amount (a fixed aid amount) subject to the ability to adjust that amount in line with significant changes in production capacity. In that respect it also mirrors the closely related Commission Proposal of 13 April 2011 for a Council Directive amending Directive 2003/96/EC restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity.

The First Intermediate Package is therefore deemed to conform significantly to the EU policy framework. The others are deemed to conform to that framework to a limited extent.

#### **6.4. Overall comparison of the Option Packages**

With the highest net positive score based on an evaluation of effectiveness, reinforced by qualitative assessments of efficiency and coherence, **the First Intermediate Package performs the best of all Packages**, notably by minimising the trade-off between carbon leakage risks and the maintenance of ETS efficiency.

#### **6.5. Conclusions**

The comparisons of the four Packages reflect an inherent element of subjectivity in terms of the weighting of the three key objectives. The element of subjectivity in this type of exercise is reflected in carbon leakage literature: *"... subjectivity is inherent with (sic) the selection of threshold and weighting of different criteria – a task that therefore relates to the political priorities given to addressing carbon leakage and the acceptability of negative competitiveness effects"*<sup>140</sup>.

Second, the key objectives should not be seen as mutually exclusive. An excessive focus on ETS efficiency may result in carbon leakage which over time may undermine the CO<sub>2</sub> price signal and – in turn – the efficiency of the ETS.

At the same time, carbon leakage is ultimately about EU sectors losing competitiveness vis-à-vis third country competitors due to the extra CO<sub>2</sub> costs induced by the ETS. The degree of trade-offs between the three objectives – in particular trade-offs between minimising carbon leakage and maximising ETS efficiency – should not be exaggerated. Likewise, increases in ETS efficiency may lead to greater competitiveness, thereby reducing the risk of carbon leakage;

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<sup>140</sup> Dröge and Cooper (2010) p. 28.

Indeed, it has been observed that "More stringent environmental policies, if implemented correctly, may result in a higher level of productivity, or a new comparative advantage, which can lead to improved competitiveness"<sup>141</sup>.

## 7. MONITORING AND EVALUATION

The ETS Guidelines are adopted under the State aid rules of the Treaty. As a result, Article 21 in chapter VII ('Monitoring') of the Council Regulation No 659/1999 will apply. This means that all Member States that adopt aid schemes covered by the ETS Guidelines shall submit annual reports on such schemes to the Commission. This obligation could be defined in more precise terms in the ETS Guidelines. Member States could for example be required to keep records relating to the aid for a number of years. Some stakeholders advocate strict monitoring of the aid<sup>142</sup>.

The ETS Guidelines form part of a wider regulatory framework under which monitoring and evaluation already takes place or will take place in the near future.

Article 10(5) of the ETS Directive obliges that Commission to monitor the European carbon market and to draw up yearly reports to this end.

Under the ETS Directive, Decision 2010/2/EU must be reviewed by end-2014. To this end, much data will be collected that will be relevant in connection with a possible review of the ETS Guidelines<sup>143</sup>. Of particular relevance will be information on electricity consumption as a share of sector GVA as well as data of trade intensity. The revision of the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision will be preceded by an impact assessment which can feed into a possible review of the ETS Guidelines.

In addition, Article 10(5) of the ETS Directive obliges that Commission to monitor the European carbon market and to draw up yearly reports to this end.

That information makes it possible for the Commission to assess progress towards the specific objectives set out in section 3 of this Report. The Commission will receive precise and comprehensive reports on any aid granted in different Member States including aid amounts and the sectors to which aid has been paid. That data will inform the assessment of the extent of possible distortions in the internal market. Likewise, it will be possible to assess the impact on ETS efficiency – the second specific objective - in the form of the extent of insulation against the CO<sub>2</sub> price signal of part of the economy. This is so as the reports will enable the Commission to aggregate all aid paid under the ETS Guidelines.

By the mid-term review of the ETS Guidelines it will also be possible to assess the specific objective of reducing significant carbon leakage risks. This is so as the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision must be reviewed by end-2014. For that review key data will be collected and will inform the assessment of possible significant carbon leakage risks. Crucially, data that will be collected on indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs as a share of gross value added as well as data on trade intensity for sectors potentially concerned. The ETS Guidelines could also consider asking the Member State to report on carbon leakage (including possible actual leakage and risks) in respect of aided sectors and subsectors.

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<sup>141</sup> De Bruyn et al (2009), p. 17.

<sup>142</sup> See e.g. reply to questionnaire by CEFIC.

<sup>143</sup> See European Commission (SEC(2009) 1710), p. 21.

It could also be considered to approach Eurostat with a view to obtaining a better picture of electricity consumption per sector in relation to that sector's GVA (i.e. the principal method in the ETS Directive to determine sector eligibility). Currently such data is only collected by Eurostat on a regular basis in respect of sectors defined at the NACE 3 level. It could also be considered to review the situation as regards the confidentiality of data given that sectors for which indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs are cited in terms of a range (e.g. less than 5% of GVA) find themselves in an unfavourable position.



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Part 2

**COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT**

**Impact Assessment Report**

*Accompanying the document*

**Communication of the Commission**

**Guidelines on certain State aid measures in the context of Greenhouse Gas Emission  
Allowance Trading Scheme**

{C(2012) 3230 final}  
{SWD(2012) 131 final}

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## GLOSSARY

Term	Explanation
Aid intensity	Aid intensity is an expression of the level of compensation granted by Member States.
Allowance (EUA)	Allowance to emit one tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent during a specified period, which shall be valid only for the purposes of meeting the requirements of the ETS Directive and which are transferable in accordance with the provisions of the ETS Directive
Baseline and Baseline Scenario	The baseline represents forecasted emissions under a business-as-usual scenario, often referred to as the 'baseline scenario', i.e. expected emissions if the emission reduction activities were not implemented.
Benchmarking	An allocation method in which allowances are distributed based on output (e.g. one allowance per MWh generated) or on intensity standards in the industry, based on best-performing companies.
Carbon leakage	Carbon leakage is defined as the prospect of an increase in global greenhouse gas emissions when companies shift production outside the Union because they cannot pass on the cost increases induced by the EU ETS to their customers without significant loss of market share.
CO2 emissions factor	Amount of CO2 released per unit of energy produced, measured in tCO2/MWh.
CO2 floor price	
Direct CO2 emission costs	Costs relating to CO2 emissions due to own use of mainly gas and coal.
EU Climate and Energy Package	Integrated EU approach to climate and energy policy that aims to combat climate change and increase the EU's energy security while strengthening its competitiveness. They committed Europe to transforming itself into a highly energy-efficient, low carbon economy.
EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS)	The Trading Scheme of Emission allowances within the European Union, launched on January 1, 2005. The scheme is based on Directive 2003/87/EC, which entered into force on 25 October 2003. The scheme consists of three phases: Phase I (2005 - 2007), Phase II (2008-2012) and Phase III (2013-2020).
European Semester	A governance framework set up as a six-month cycle, for the purpose of coordinating ex ante the budgetary and economic policies of the EU and the euro zone, in line with both the Stability and Growth Pact and the Europe 2020 strategy.
Europe 2020 Flagship initiatives	Europe 2020 is the EU's growth strategy set up to turn Europe into a smart, sustainable and inclusive economy. The seven Flagship Initiatives are those projects identified as engines for the completion of the Europe 2020 goals.
Indirect CO2 emission costs	Costs relating to CO2 emissions due to the EU ETS passed on in electricity prices.
Multiannual Financial	The multiannual financial framework lays down maximum amounts for

Framework	each broad category of expenditure for a period of several years. It aims to ensure EU expenditure develops in an orderly manner, within the limit of the EU's own resources.
NACE	NACE is the statistical classification system for economic activities within the European Community established by Council Regulation No 3037/90 of 09/10/1990.
Operating aid	Operating aid relieves undertakings of day-to-day costs that they would normally bear without requiring a counterpart such as an investment that would not have been undertaken without the aid. When the Commission - exceptionally - authorises operating aid it normally requires that the aid be degressive over time and does not cover all the costs.
PRODCOM	PRODCOM is a statistical classification of products in the European Community. All products are assigned an 8-digit code. The first four digits of this code correspond with the NACE code of the economic sector to which businesses that usually produce the respective product generally belong.

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## ANNEX 2

### Summary of replies to questionnaire relating to the consultation on the impact assessment (launched on 11.3.2011 – closed on 11.5.2011)

#### Overview

Some 140 replies were received within the 2-month deadline. In terms of origin the replies were distributed as follows: Austria (5 replies); Belgium (8); Czech Republic (3); Denmark (1); Estonia (1); Finland (4); France (7); Germany (17); Hungary (2); Ireland (1); Italy (11); Latvia (1); Lithuania (1); Luxembourg (1); Netherlands (7); Norway (8); Poland (5); Slovakia (1); Spain (9); Sweden (7); UK (5) (see table below for more details).

Most of industry (close to 100 replies) and trade unions (seven replies) broadly argue in favour of wide sector eligibility and maximum aid amounts. The replies by most of the 19 EEA countries tend towards the other end of the spectrum, placing the emphasis on preserving the efficiency of the ETS and limiting distortions of competition in the internal market. The electricity producers and the NGOs (three replies) are also to be found in that camp.

All the submissions are published in DG COMP website<sup>1</sup>.


The replies by industry (more than two thirds of all replies) are characterised by high degree of coordination as evidenced by the number of references e.g. by individual firms to the positions taken by the European industry federation. This coordination goes beyond intra-sector positioning. The *leitmotifs* in this respect include:

- The argument **that electricity cost increases due to the ETS should not be seen in isolation from other costs** imposed under environmental legislation at EU and national level (e.g. Lafarge)
- The argument **that the electricity efficiency benchmarks are a sufficient incentive** (see e.g. Business Europe) to maintain ETS incentives. Generally it claimed that much in the way of energy and electricity savings has already been achieved, in particular compared to third country.
- The observation **that carbon leakage is a process which unfolds over time**, through production and investment leakage (relocation being a measure of last resort).
- The argument **that the ETS Guidelines should be kept in force until such time that a binding international agreement is reached** or that third countries otherwise become subject to similar CO2 costs.
- Claims referring to **possible knock-on effects due to linkages upstream and downstream** (e.g. EU Salt).

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<sup>1</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2011\\_questionnaire\\_emissions\\_trading/index\\_en.html](http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2011_questionnaire_emissions_trading/index_en.html)

Number of participants for each type of organisation responding



Claims that **several of the sectors concerned manufacture products needed for the EU's transition** to a competitive low-carbon economy (e.g. Aurubis referring to the need for copper for the renewables sector).

### Sector and subsector eligibility

A majority of industry is in favour of the wide eligibility option mirroring the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision (i.e. 164 sectors and subsectors). Many industry replies emphasise the need for eligibility to be defined at subsector (Prodcom) level<sup>2</sup>. Member States – with the exception of Germany<sup>3</sup> – and NGOs are in generally in favour of a more limited list (e.g. UK Ireland, France, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, the Nordic countries and the new Member States). On this narrower view, State aid risks undermining the efficiency of the ETS as well as entailing distortions risks and subsidy races (e.g. Denmark, Eurelectric, Client Earth, Groeningen University, Hungarian Chemical Industry). Some replies even advocate that the Member States be obliged to provide State aid on the same basis to avoid distortions (Europaia, ES Petroleum).

Industry in general takes the view that State aid will at most impose insignificant burdens on other sectors and other parts of society.

<sup>2</sup> Exceptionally eligibility at NACE 6 level is advocated (i.e. the level between NACE 4 and Prodcom) (e.g. EU Glass Fibres).

<sup>3</sup> Germany is the only Member State in favour of the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision (164 sectors and subsectors eligible). As an alternative Germany proposes to use a totally new criterion based on electricity intensity in the production process, which is not inspired by the ETS Directive: sectors with electricity consumption >1KWh/1€ of GVA should be eligible for aid. This corresponds to a threshold where sectors with at least 1.4% indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs as a percentage of GVA would qualify. Under a 1.4% threshold 77 NACE 4 sectors would qualify.

**Fuel and electricity substitutability** is often cited by industry to support arguments in favour of wide sector eligibility. Sometimes these arguments are limited to those sectors and products where fuel and electricity substitutability was established by the 2011 Benchmarking Decision (Annex 9) (e.g. BE Chemicals Essencia, Chemicals VNCI).

A few replies advocate a trigger CO<sub>2</sub> price below which no aid whatsoever would be paid (Denmark, Eurelectric, Norwegian electricity producers, Client Earth). Some replies propose that eligibility be subject to the recipients undertaking specific environmental measures (Eurelectric, Client Earth).

Some replies advocate clear objectives criteria to determine eligibility (e.g. Austria) whereas others advocate a much more case by case and qualitative approach (e.g. European Copper Institute).

### **Aid intensity**

**Industry and trade unions are overwhelmingly in favour of 100% aid intensity without degressivity.** Member States are divided between the three options: 100% (e.g. Germany, Poland); less than 100% without degressivity and less than 100% with degressivity.

### **The CO<sub>2</sub> factor**

**A large majority of stakeholders** (including the electricity producers) **are against basing the CO<sub>2</sub> factor on electricity supply contracts**, the risk of contract manipulation being cited as the main reason.

**A large majority** (including electricity generators such as EO.n) is also **in favour of treating auto-generated electricity on an equal footing** with electricity procured directly from the grid or under supply contracts (see Annex 10).

**A very significant majority of industry, Member States and electricity producers** argue in favour of **a CO<sub>2</sub> factor based on marginal production**, the main argument being that such an approach will reduce the risk of overcompensation and under-compensation.

Most of these stakeholders are also **in favour of regional EU CO<sub>2</sub> factors**. Different approaches are suggested on this issue. Some replies advocate the use of simulation models to determine the actual cost impact of the ETS (e.g. CEFIF), on the ground that the price-setting regions sometimes encompass more than one Member States. Other stakeholders advocate a similar more simple model based on different CO<sub>2</sub> factors for different regions (e.g. EDF, Vattenfall, Fertilisers Europe).

A uniform EU-wide CO<sub>2</sub> factors obtains support from a minority of replies average uniform least support (e.g. France, the Netherlands, NGOs and a few industry stakeholders such as the European Tyre industry)

## **Product-specific electricity efficiency benchmarks**

Industry generally argues of the model applied in the context of compensation for direct CO2 costs which – to the extent feasible – uses the average of the 10% most efficient installations producing a specific product; for example Euromines and VIK (German federation of power producers). Other replies emphasise the importance of not placing small installations at a disadvantage compared to large installations (e.g. Euromines).

Fall-back factors will be required for products where primary benchmarks are not feasible. In general industry is against any reduction factor whereas some replies advocate reduction factors.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Client Earth argues in favour of a fall-back factor of 0.5 (ie. 50%).

**Table 1: Stakeholders replies on key topics**

Category of organisation	Name	Sector and subsector eligibility			Aid intensity			CO2 factor			
		164 sectors and subsectors	PRODCOM 8	fuel substitutability	100%	<100% & flat	<100% & degressive	marginal	EU average	regional	uniform across EU
Industry and private sector, incl. their associations	A. Merati & C. Cartiera di Laveno Spa					✓		✓			
	AkzoNobel Industrial Chemicals				✓						
	Alcan Aluminium UK Ltd.		✓		✓			✓			
	ArcelorMittal & Aperam				✓			✓			
	Arkema	✓			✓						✓
	Asociación de Productores de Productos Petrolíferos (AOP)	✓									✓
	Asociación Nacional de Electroquímica (ANE, Chlor-alkali Association)		✓					✓			
	Associazione Italiana fra gli Industriali della Carta, Cartoni e Paste per Carta (ASSOCARTA)	✓						✓			
	Associazione Nazionale Industrie Metalli Non-Ferrosi (ASSOMET)		✓		✓			✓			
	Atlantic Copper S.A.U.		✓		✓			✓			
	Aurubis AG	✓	✓		✓			✓			
	Austrian Chamber of Commerce (Wirtschaftskammer)				✓						
	Borealis AG	✓		✓	✓						
	Bormioli Luigi Spa										
	Burgo Group		✓		✓			✓			
	BUSINESSEUROPE				✓						
	Carbone Savoie	✓	✓	✓	✓						✓
	Cartiere del Garda Spa	✓			✓			✓			
	Cham Paper Group				✓			✓			
	Chemelot (USG on its behalf)	✓			✓			✓			
Chemicals Association - Vereniging van de Nederlandse Chemische Industrie (VNCI)	✓			✓	✓						

Category of organisation	Name	Sector and subsector eligibility			Aid intensity			CO2 factor			
		164 sectors and subsectors	PRODCOM 8	fuel substitutability	100%	<100% & flat	<100% & degressive	marginal	EU average	regional	uniform across EU
Industry and private sector, incl. their associations (cont'd)	Chemicals Industries Association (CIA)	✓			✓			✓			
	Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales (CEOE)				✓			✓			
	Confederation of European Paper Industries (CEPI)		✓		✓			✓			
	Confederation of Netherlands Industry and Employers (VNO-NCW)							✓			
	Confederation of Swedish Enterprise							✓			
	Confederation of the German Textile and Fashion Industry (Gesamtverband der deutschen Textil- und Modeindustrie e.V.)	✓									
	Der Bundesverband Glasindustrie e.V. (BV Glas)								✓		
	Elkem	✓			✓			✓			
	Energy and Water Association - Bundesverband der Energie und Wasserwirtschaft (BDEW)										✓
	ESD-SIC B.V. - Voorheen Kollo silicon carbide B.V. (CEFIC member)	✓									
	Essenscia – Belgian federation of chemistry and life sciences	✓		✓	✓			✓			
	Euro Chlor				✓						
	EUROALLIAGES AISBL		✓		✓			✓			
	EUROFER	✓		✓	✓						
	Eurometaux, European Non-Ferrous Metals Association		✓		✓			✓			
Euromines							✓				

Category of organisation	Name	Sector and subsector eligibility			Aid intensity			CO2 factor			
		164 sectors and subsectors	PRODCOM 8	fuel substitutability	100%	<100% & flat	<100% & degressive	marginal	EU average	regional	uniform across EU
Industry and private sector, incl. their associations (cont'd)	European Aluminium Association (EAA)		✓		✓			✓			
	European Carbon Graphite Association (ECGA)	✓	✓	✓	✓					✓	
	European Cement Association (CEMBUREAU)	✓						✓			
	European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC)	✓			✓					✓	
	European Container Glass Federation (FEVE)				✓						
	European Copper Institute (ECI)		✓		✓			✓			
	European Glass Industries (CIPV)										
	European Industrial Gases Association (EIGA)	✓	✓	✓	✓						
	European Man-made Fibres Association (CIRFS)				✓						
	European Petroleum Industry Association (EUROPIA)	✓		✓	✓						✓
	European Salt Producers' Association (EuSalt)							✓			
	European Starch Industry Association (Association des Amidonniers et des Féculiers, AAF)										
	European Steel Tube Association (ESTA)	✓			✓						
	European Tyre & Rubber Manufacturers' Association (ETRma)										

Type of organisation	Name	Sector and subsector eligibility			Aid intensity			CO2 factor			
		164 sectors and subsectors	Subsectors (Prodcum)	Substitutability between fuel and electricity as ground for eligibility	100%	<100% & flat	<100% & degressive	marginal	EU average	regional	uniform across EU
Industry and private sector, incl. their associations (cont'd)	Federación Empresarial de la Industria Química Española FEIQUE (Spanish Chemical Industry Business Federation)	✓			✓						
	Federation of German Industries (Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie e. V., BDI)										
	Federation of Norwegian Industries				✓			✓			
	Fedustria				✓						
	Fertiberia	✓		✓	✓						
	Fertilizers Europe	✓		✓	✓						
	Fesil AS		✓		✓			✓			
	Finnfjord AS		✓		✓			✓			
	Glass for Europe										
	GlassFibreEurope (APFE)	✓									
	GPN SA	✓		✓	✓						
	Graftech Iberica	✓	✓	✓	✓					✓	
	Hutnictví železa, a.s. (Steel Federation, Inc.)	✓			✓						
	Hydro		✓		✓			✓			
	Industrievereinigung Chemiefaser e.V. (IVC)				✓						
	INEOS ChlorVinyls	✓			✓						
	International Paper Kwidzyn Sp.z o.o.									✓	
	International Zinc Association Europe (IZA Europe)		✓		✓			✓			
	KGHM Polska Miedź S.A.		✓		✓					✓	
	Lafarge	✓									
LKAB Group		✓		✓			✓				
Mondialcarta Spa							✓				
PEC-RHIN	✓			✓							
PlasticsEurope	✓			✓	✓				✓		
Polska Izba Przemysłu Chemicznego (Polish Chamber of Chemical Industry, PIPC)				✓					✓		

Category of organisation	Name	Sector and subsector eligibility			Aid intensity			CO2 factor			
		164 sectors and subsectors	PRODCOM 8	fuel substitutability	100%	<100% & flat	<100% & degressive	marginal	EU average	regional	uniform across EU
Industry and private sector, incl. their associations (cont'd)	SGL Carbon Graphite	✓	✓	✓	✓					✓	
	Sicem Saga	✓						✓			
	Solvay SA				✓						✓
	German Steel Federation (Wirtschaftsvereinigung Stahl, WVS)	✓						✓			
	Svaz chemického průmyslu ČR (Association of Chemical Industry of the Czech Republic)	✓			✓					✓	
	SveMin, Association of Mines, Mineral and Metal Producers in Sweden				✓			✓			
	The Dow Chemical Company (Dow Belgium)				✓						
	The Hungarian Chemical Industry Association (MAVESZ)	✓									
	UK Steel Trade Association				✓			✓			
	Union des Industries Chimiques (UIC)	✓									
	Union des Syndicats des Industries des Produits Amylacés et de leurs dérivés (USIPA)						✓				✓
	Union Nacional de Industrias del Cobre (UNICOBRE)	✓	✓		✓			✓			
	Verband der Chemischen Industrie e.V. (VCI)	✓		✓	✓			✓			
	Vestolit GmbH & Co. KG				✓			✓			
	Wacker Chemicals Norway AS Holla Metall			✓	✓			✓			
	Wirtschaftsvereinigung Metalle (WVM)	✓	✓		✓			✓			
	Xstrata Zink GmbH				✓			✓			
	ZGH Boleslaw S.A.									✓	

Category of organisation	Name	Sector and subsector eligibility			Aid intensity			CO2 factor			
		164 sectors and subsectors	PRODCOM 8	fuel substitutability	100%	<100% & flat	<100% & degressive	marginal	EU average	regional	uniform across EU
Member States or public bodies (national/regional /local)	Austria						✓				
	Belgium			✓			✓				
	Bulgaria				✓			✓			
	Denmark							✓			
	Estonia				✓					✓	
	Finland						✓	✓			
	Flemish Region (Belgium)					✓					
	France				✓						✓
	Germany	✓	✓		✓			✓			
	Hungary							✓		✓	
	Ireland										
	Italy		✓					✓			
	Latvia	✓					✓			✓	
	Lithuania										
	Lower Saxony (Germany)	✓			✓						
	Netherlands						✓			✓	✓
	Norway							✓			
	Poland				✓			✓			
	Slovakia										
Sweden							✓				
UK											

Category of organisation	Name	Sector and subsector eligibility			Aid intensity			CO2 factor			
		164 sectors and subsectors	PRODCOM 8	fuel substitutability	100%	<100% & flat	<100% & degressive	marginal	EU average	regional	uniform across EU
Electricity sector, incl. their associations	E.ON AG										✓
	EDF									✓	
	EnergyNorway										
	ENI Spa	✓			✓			✓			
	EURELECTRIC AISBL									✓	✓
	Federation of Energy and Power Industry - Verband der Industriellen Energie- und Kraftwirtschaft (VIK)	✓		✓	✓			✓		✓	
	HC Energía							✓			
	RWE AG										✓
	Svensk Energi - Swedenergy - AB							✓			
Vattenfall AB							✓				
Trade Unions	Austrian Chamber of Labour										
	European Metalworkers' Federation (EMF)	✓									
	Federation of Trade Unions Nordic-IN				✓						
	Finnish Metalworkers' Union (Metallityöväen Liitto ry)				✓						
	Industrial Union TEAM				✓						
	The Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO-N)							✓			
	Trade Unions Federation (Osterreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund)										
Non-governmental organisations	ClientEarth						✓				
	INFORSE Europe						✓				
	Inter-Environnement Wallonie										
Consumer organisations	Association of Large Energy Consumers SVSE, member of IFIEC EUROPE	✓		✓	✓			✓			
	International Federation of Industrial Energy Consumers (IFIEC Europe)	✓		✓	✓						
University / education / research	University of Groningen (Centre of Energy Law)										

**Table 2 List of stakeholders submitting responses, by country**

Country	Organisation	Name
Austria	Member State	
Austria	Association	Austrian Chamber of Commerce (Wirtschaftskammer)
Austria	Association	Austrian Chamber of Labour
Austria	Association	Trade Unions Federation (Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund)
Austria	Company	Borealis AG
Austria	Company	Salinen Austria AG
Belgium	Member State	
Belgium	Region	Flemish Region
Belgium	Association	Essenscia – Belgian federation of chemistry and life sciences
Belgium	Association	Inter-Environnement Wallonie
Belgium	Company	The Dow Chemical Company (Dow Belgium)
Belgium	Company	Fedustria
Belgium	Company	Hydro
Belgium	Company	Solvay SA
Bulgaria	Member State	
Czech Republic	Association	Association of Large Energy Consumers SVSE, member of IFIEC EUROPE
Czech Republic	Association	Hutnictví železa, a.s. (Steel Federation, Inc.)
Czech Republic	Association	Svaz chemického průmyslu ČR (Association of Chemical Industry of the Czech Republic)
Denmark	Member State	
Estonia	Member State	
EU	Association	BUSINESSEUROPE
EU	Association	ClientEarth
EU	Association	Confederation of European Paper Industries (CEPI)
EU	Association	EURELECTRIC AISBL
EU	Association	Euro Chlor
EU	Association	EUROALLIAGES AISBL
EU	Association	EUROFER
EU	Association	Eurometaux, European Non-Ferrous Metals Association
EU	Association	Euromines
EU	Association	European Aluminium Association (EAA)
EU	Association	European Carbon Graphite Association (ECGA)
EU	Association	European Cement Association (CEMBUREAU)
EU	Association	European Chemical Industry Council (CEFIC)
EU	Association	European Container Glass Federation (FEVE)
EU	Association	European Copper Institute (ECI)
EU	Association	European Glass Industries (CIPV)
EU	Association	European Industrial Gases Association (EIGA)
EU	Association	European Man-made Fibres Association (CIRFS)
EU	Association	European Metalworkers' Federation (EMF)
EU	Association	European Petroleum Industry Association (EUROPIA)
EU	Association	European Salt Producers' Association (EuSalt)
EU	Association	European Starch Industry Association (Association des Amidonniers et des Féculiers, AAF)
EU	Association	European Steel Tube Association (ESTA)
EU	Association	European Tyre & Rubber Manufacturers' Association (ETRma)
EU	Association	Fertilizers Europe

Country	Organisation	Name
EU	Association	Glass for Europe
EU	Association	GlassFibreEurope (APFE)
EU	Association	INFORSE Europe
EU	Association	International Federation of Industrial Energy Consumers (IFIIEC Europe)
EU	Association	International Zinc Association Europe (IZA Europe)
EU	Association	PlasticsEurope
Finland	Member State	
Finland	Association	Finnish Metalworkers' Union (Metallityöväen Liitto ry)
Finland	Association	Industrial Union TEAM
Finland	Company	Zinc smelter Boliden Kokkola Oy
France	Member State	
France	Association	Union des Syndicats des Industries des Produits Amylacés et de leurs dérivés (USIPA)
France	Association	Union des Industries Chimiques (UIC)
France	Company	Arkema
France	Company	Carbone Savoie
France	Company	EDF
France	Company	PEC-RHIN
France	Company	GPN SA
France	Company	Lafarge
Germany	Member State	
Germany	Region	Nieder Sachsen (Lower Saxony)
Germany	Association	Confederation of the German Textile and Fashion Industry (Gesamtverband der deutschen Textil- und Modeindustrie e.V.)
Germany	Association	Der Bundesverband Glasindustrie e.V. (BV Glas)
Germany	Association	Energy and Water Association - Bundesverband der Energie und Wasserwirtschaft (BDEW)
Germany	Association	Federation of Energy and Power Industry -Verband der Industriellen Energie- und Kraftwirtschaft (VIK)
Germany	Association	Federation of German Industries (Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie e. V., BDI)
Germany	Association	Industrievereinigung Chemiefaser e.V. (IVC)
Germany	Association	German Steel Federation (Wirtschaftsvereinigung Stahl, WVS)
Germany	Association	Verband der Chemischen Industrie e.V. (VCI)
Germany	Association	Wirtschaftsvereinigung Metalle (WVM)
Germany	Company	Aurubis AG
Germany	Company	E.ON AG
Germany	Company	RWE AG
Germany	Company	SGL Carbon Graphite
Germany	Company	Vestolit GmbH & Co. KG
Germany	Company	Xstrata Zink GmbH
Hungary	Member State	
Hungary	Association	The Hungarian Chemical Industry Association (MAVESZ)
Ireland	Member State	
Italy	Member State	
Italy	Association	Associazione Italiana fra gli Industriali della Carta, Cartoni e Paste per Carta (ASSOCARTA)
Italy	Association	Associazione Nazionale Industrie Metalli Non-Ferrosi (ASSOMET)
Italy	Company	A. Merati & C. Cartiera di Laveno Spa
Italy	Company	Bormioli Luigi Spa
Italy	Company	Burgo Group

Country	Organisation	Name
Italy	Company	Cartiere del Garda Spa
Italy	Company	Cham Paper Group
Italy	Company	ENI Spa
Italy	Company	Mondialcarta Spa
Italy	Company	Sicem Saga
Latvia	Member State	
Lithuania	Member State	
Luxembourg	Company	ArcelorMittal & Aperam
Netherlands	Member State	
Netherlands	Association	Chemicals Association - Vereniging van de Nederlandse Chemische Industrie (VNCI)
Netherlands	Association	Confederation of Netherlands Industry and Employers (VNO-NCW)
Netherlands	Company	AkzoNobel Industrial Chemicals
Netherlands	Company	Chemelot (USG on its behalf)
Netherlands	Company	ESD-SIC B.V. - Voorheen Kollo silicon carbide B.V. (CEFIC member)
Netherlands	University	University of Groningen (Centre of Energy Law)
Norway	Member State	
Norway	Association	EnergyNorway
Norway	Association	Federation of Norwegian Industries
Norway	Association	The Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO-N)
Norway	Company	Elkem
Norway	Company	Fesil AS
Norway	Company	Finnfjord AS
Norway	Company	Wacker Chemicals Norway AS Holla Metall
Poland	Member State	
Poland	Association	Polska Izba Przemysłu Chemicznego (Polish Chamber of Chemical Industry, PIPC)
Poland	Company	ZGH Bolesław S.A.
Poland	Company	KGHM Polska Miedź S.A.
Poland	Company	International Paper Kwidzyn Sp.z o.o.
Slovakia	Member State	
Spain	Association	Asociación de Productores de Productos Petroliferos (AOP)
Spain	Association	Asociación Nacional de Electroquímica (ANE, Chlor-alkali Association)
Spain	Association	Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales (CEOE)
Spain	Association	Federación Empresarial de la Industria Química Española FEIQUE (Spanish Chemical Industry Business Federation)
Spain	Association	Union Nacional de Industrias del Cobre (UNICOBRE)
Spain	Company	Atlantic Copper S.A.U.
Spain	Company	Fertiberia
Spain	Company	Graitech Iberica
Spain	Company	Hc Energía
Sweden	Member State	
Sweden	Association	Confederation of Swedish Enterprise
Sweden	Association	Federation of Trade Unions Nordic-IN
Sweden	Association	SveMin, Association of Mines, Mineral and Metal Producers in Sweden
Sweden	Association	Svensk Energi - Swedenergy - AB
Sweden	Company	LKAB Group
Sweden	Company	Vattenfall AB
UK	Member State	
UK	Association	Chemicals Industries Association (CIA)

<b>Country</b>	<b>Organisation</b>	<b>Name</b>
UK	Association	UK Steel Trade Association
UK	Company	Alcan Aluminium UK Ltd.
UK	Company	INEOS ChlorVinyls

## ANNEX 3

### Summary of replies to the consultation on the draft ETS Guidelines

(launched on 21.12. 2012 - closed on 31.1.2012)

#### Overview

Around 160 replies were received to the consultation, counting those that came in after the two-month deadline. These included submissions by Member States (21), industries (37 companies, 84 associations), NGOs (10) and several individuals (4). Most of the stakeholders that had taken part in the first consultation submitted new comments. In addition, submissions were received from many new stakeholders (see table 1 below). All the submissions are published on the DG COMP website<sup>5</sup>.

As in the case of the first public consultation, most Member States, with notable exceptions, favoured a restrictive list of sectors and predominantly emphasised the need to limit distortions. Most of the industry submissions, on the other hand, again argued in favour of wide sector eligibility and high aid maximum aid amounts.

The replies by industry were again characterised by a very high degree of coordination. Recurring themes are the need for wide sector inclusion (on the basis of the list of the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision), the need for assessment at Prodcum level, opposition to a CO2 floor price, full and non-degressive compensation, the use of actual production data as well as support for a fallback efficiency benchmark of 0.97.

#### Sectoral eligibility

Member States welcomed the methodology of selecting eligible sectors on the basis of quantitative criteria and a qualitative assessment. As in the first consultation, a clear majority of Member States favoured a restrictive list. A majority (14 Member States) explicitly asked the Commission to keep the list short in view of the competition distortions (risk of subsidy races) and the risk of weakening the ETS incentives. Some Member States argued in favour adding specific additional sectors. Two Member States advocated a longer list of sectors (around 30). Some Member States argued that the aid should not be automatically granted to all installations within the eligible sector and that they should be able to check the necessity of the aid at installation level.

Industry submissions generally advocated inclusion of their respective sectors. As in the first public consultation, many favoured wide eligibility mirroring the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision. Many industries again indicated the need for the possibility to assess eligibility at the product (Prodcum) level. In total, claims were received for the inclusion of 25 additional sectors<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2012\\_emissions\\_trading/index\\_en.html](http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2012_emissions_trading/index_en.html)

<sup>6</sup> Mining of iron ores, salt production, carbon graphite, Synthetic rubber, Plastics, other chemicals, Textile industry – textile & clothing, Man-made fibres, Steel pipes, Industrial gases, Glass industry – glass fibres,

based on alleged risks of carbon leakage. Green NGOs typically were against this type of aid or argued for as strict as possible assessment criteria.

### **Maximum aid amount**

#### **The CO2 floor price**

The introduction of a CO2 floor price (i.e. compensating only for the part of the CO2 price above the floor) had since the first consultation gained momentum among Member States, in particular in view of the current very low CO2 prices combined with budgetary constraints. At least eleven Member States strongly supported a floor price ranging between 15 and 20€, whereas one advocated a floor price of up to €50. Those Member States argued that such a threshold is necessary to avoid over-compensation when CO2 prices are low. They also referred to a large surplus of free EUAs. They also by and large underlined that there is no risk of carbon leakage at the current CO2 price (€8). In their view the political agreement on the energy and climate package in 2008 was based on a CO2 price assumption of €30.

One Member state, together with the majority of the industry associations, opposed any floor price. That camp argued that that carbon leakage occurs at any CO2 price and that it would be contrary to equal treatment with installations compensated for direct CO2 costs. They also contended that the floor price issue had not been properly addressed in the course of the consultation and that such a system would alter the very basis of the system.

### **Aid intensity**

Eight Member States favoured partial and degressive compensation, although some of them argued for a less steep reduction. Six Member States were in favour of 100% compensation without any reduction. Two out of the eleven Member States which were in favour of a floor price indicated that they would accept 100% compensation on the condition that a CO2 floor price was applied. Two Member States considered that the aid intensity should not exceed 50%.

As in the previous public consultation, industry argued for 100% compensation without degressivity. They claimed inter alia that the compensation should reflect the real costs, that degressivity would not increase efficiency incentives as consumers were unable to influence the energy mix and that the ETS Directive was based on a full compensation logic.

### **Actual or historic output**

12 Member States asked the Commission to review its position and to use actual as opposed to historic production data. They argued that actual production would avoid the risk of under- and over- compensation. They also criticised the 40% variation threshold (i.e. account only being taken of capacity increases of at least 40%) as arbitrary, too stringent or as insufficiently rewarding new investments. Two Member States supported the Commission proposal of using a historical baseline.

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Tyres and rubber, wood based panels, Pulp, Ceramics, Foundries, Cement, refineries, wool, ferro-silicon, starch, nickel, sugar, mining.

Industry overwhelmingly favoured the use of actual production, arguing that compensation should reflect as far as possible the actual costs borne and that over and under-compensation should be avoided. New investments would be discouraged by the 40% threshold. That threshold was also perceived as arbitrary. Some companies and associations agreed with the use of historic output, albeit on the condition that the worst crisis years would be excluded or that a choice would be given between the periods 2005-2008 and 2009-2011, to so as to best reflect the normal market situations.

### **CO2 emission factor**

A clear majority of Member States (14) supported regional CO2 factors. Some Member States, however, expressed concerns about the relatively high values for a number of regions and the risk of over-compensation, requesting some flexibility allowing for the use of a lower CO2 factor. Some of them pointed out that the proposed split to Central Western Europe into two zones (CWE 1 and 2) was artificial and undesirable.

Industry views diverged somewhat on this point. While some (e.g. Confindustria) supported a uniform emission factor, considering that regional factors would penalise the best performing countries and lead to additional distortions of the internal market, most industry stakeholders supported regional differentiation as being closest to actual costs (e.g. BDEW). Several stakeholders pointed out that the CWE 1 and 2 split was artificial and undesirable (e.g. IFIEC Europe, AFEP). Many industry stakeholders also made the case for Denmark to be included in the Nordic area and some suggested a method to calculate a CO2 factor based on the actual market coupling situation for every hour of the year (e.g. Essenscia, BASF). Some submissions favoured a method to calculate the CO2 emission factor on an installation level basis (e.g. British Glass Manufacturers Association, ALFED).

### **Efficiency Benchmarks**

While most Member States, insofar as they commented on this point, were generally in favour of electricity efficiency benchmarks, some pointed to the danger of discriminating sectors without product specific benchmarks and especially those that are already comparatively efficient. Those Member States argued for as many product specific benchmarks as possible and/or the use of their average as a fallback.

Industry generally considered the fallback threshold of 0.70 as unacceptable, very arbitrary and unnecessarily punishing those sectors where a sector specific benchmark cannot be determined or sectors that have taken early action in the field of energy efficiency. Most industry stakeholders argued in favour of the approach used for direct emissions, i.e. a fallback benchmark of 0.97 fallback.

**Table: list of additional stakeholders submitting responses (who did not submit during 1<sup>st</sup> consultation), by country**

Country	Organisation	Name
Austria	Association	Osterreich E-Wirtschaft – Austrian Association of Electricity Industry
Bulgaria	Company	EVN Bulgaria
Czech Republic	Member State	
Czech Republic	NGO	Centre for Transport and Energy
Czech Republic	NGO	Environmental Law Service
Czech Republic	Individual	Vladimir Toman
Czech Republic	Individual	Jana Hays
Denmark	Company	DONG Energy
EU	Association	Cerame-Unie – European Ceramic Industry Association
EU	Association	Euratex
EU	Association	CAEF – European Foundry Association
EU	Association	Eurima – European Insulation Manufacturers Association
EU	Association	CPME – PET Manufacturers in Europe
EU	Association	Nickel Institute
EU	Association	CEFIF Sector Group Sodium Chlorates
EU	NGO	Bellona Europa
EU	NGO	E3G
EU	NGO	Climate Action Network Europe
EU	NGO	Greenpeace
Finland	Association	Confederation of Finish Industries
Finland	Association	Finish Energy Industries
Finland	Association	Finish Federation of Technology Industries
Finland	Company	Outokumpu Oyj
France	Association	UFE – Union Française de l'Electricité
France	Association	AFEP – Association française des entreprises privées
France	Association	Copacel – French Confederation of Paper, Cardboard and Cellulose
Germany	Association	IG BCE (Mining Chemical and Energy Industrial Union)
Germany	Association	IGV – German Industrial Gases Association
Germany	Association	VKS – German Association of Kali and Salt Producers
Germany	Association	VDZ – German Cement Association
Germany	Association	IVH – Industrieverband Hamburg
Germany	Association	German Association of New Energy Suppliers
Germany	Association	VKU - German Association of Municipal Undertakings
Germany	Company	SÜDSALZ
Germany	Company	Tokai Erftcarbon
Germany	Company	BASF
Germany	Company	Evonik Industries
Germany	Company	Bayer MaterialScience
Germany	Company	Graphite Cova
Germany	Company	ESCO – European Salt Company
Germany	Company	Deutsche Bahn

Germany	Company	Wintershall
Germany	Company	ThyssenKrupp
Germany	NGO	Oko-Institut – Institute for Applied Ecology
Germany	NGO	FOS – Green Budget Germany
Germany	NGO	BUND Friends of the Earth Germany
Germany	NGO	Deutsche Umwelthilfe
Germany	Individual	Dr. Jörg Geerlings
Greece	Association	Greek Cement Industry Association
Greece	Company	Public Power Corporation
Italy	Association	Confindustria – Italian General Confederation of Industries
Italy	Association	Federchimica – Italian Association of the Chemical Industry
Italy	Association	Assovetro – Italian Association of Glass Producers
Italy	Individual	Dr. Mario Andrea Valori
Lithuania	Association	Association of Lithuanian Chemical Industry Enterprises
Luxembourg	Member State	
Netherlands	Company	SABIC in Europe
Netherlands	Company	Lanxess Elastomers
Netherlands	Company	DEXPlastomers
Netherlands	Company	Dow Chemical
Norway	Association	Norwegian Ferrosilicon and Silicon Producers
Norway	Company	Norsk Hydro
Poland	Association	Polish Association of Wood-based Panels Producers
Poland	Association	FOEEiG - Polish Consumers Forum for Electricity and Gas
Romania	Member State	
Slovakia	Company	Slovalco
Spain	Member State	
Spain	Association	Acogen – Spanish Association of Cogeneration
Spain	Association	AFGIM – Spanish Association of Medical and Industrial Gases Producers
Spain	Association	UNECID – Spanish Association of Steel Producers
Spain	Company	La Farga Group
Spain	Company	Cunext
Sweden	Association	SKGS – Energy Intensive Industries Cooperation
UK	Association	British Glass Manufacturers Confederation
UK	Association	MCCG – UK Manufacturers' Climate Change Group
UK	Association	British Ceramic Confederation
UK	Association	Tees Valley Unlimited
UK	Association	CoalPro – Confederation of UK Coal Producers
UK	Association	Alfed – UK Aluminium Federation

## **ANNEX 4**

### **Implementation of the comments by the Impact Assessment Board (draft versions of 11 November 2011 and 20 April 2020)**

#### **Response to the Opinion of the Impact Assessment Board of 11 November 2011**

The impact assessment was presented to the Impact Assessment Board on 9 November 2011. The Board issued its Opinion on 11 November.

In line with that Opinion the resubmitted Report has been significantly (by around 20%) shortened (to some 40 pages excluding graphs, tables and the table of content), even allowing for the second consultation which brought the number of stakeholder submissions well over the 300 mark.

The revised presents a robust and fully fledged Baseline Scenario (including expected impacts in terms of carbon leakage, ETS efficiency and distortions), drawing on the available data.

The problem definition has been substantially strengthened. The incidence of carbon leakage is addressed. More emphasis is placed on key drivers. The relative importance of carbon leakage compared to other factors affecting international competitiveness has been more prominently highlighted. Further proxies for identifying the sectors most at risk of carbon leakage have been added. The operational objective has been reinforced and linked to progress indicators.

Sensitivity tests involving different CO<sub>2</sub> price assumptions have been added, including the application of a price assumption based on CO<sub>2</sub> price significantly above the current levels (€40).

To facilitate the comparison of options, four Option Packages (which reflect a wide range of stakeholder views) have been developed. The four new Option Packages are explicitly linked to the specific options in section 3 and their impacts are assessed accordingly. The assessment also places greater emphasis on possible distortions in the internal market not only within but also between sectors.

A new option (A4) on sector eligibility based on a threshold combining direct and indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs is – as requested by the Opinion - examined as part of one of the four Option Packages. The selection criteria of sectors that may undergo a qualitative assessment under Option A3 have been clarified.

As regards aid intensity a new Option B2 (aid falling from an initial aid intensity level of 100%) has been added and is examined as part of one Option Package. As regards Option D2 (aid to be based on the installation's historical production) more data has been added to inform decision-making as to the representative benchmark years to determine the level of production under Option D.

As recommended by the Opinion the comparison of the impacts of the Option Packages departs from expected impacts under a Baseline Scenario. The quantitative dimension of the assessment Option Packages has been strengthened. The gross value added at stake as well as the potential degree of insulation through State aid is estimated per Package. Additional data relevant to

assessing employment impacts are also integrated. Sectoral eligibility under the different Option Packages is explicitly stated.

The four Option Packages are presented in a more transparent way in the form of one Maximalist, one Minimalist and two Intermediate Packages. To identify the best performing Option Package or Packages, the selection criteria are set out more explicitly and a summary option comparing the four packages is added.

## Implementation of the comments by the Impact Assessment Board - Opinion of 11.11.2011

Recommendations by the Impact Assessment Board	The specific sections of the Report where the recommendations are implemented
The Report should present a more robust Baseline Scenario.	The recommendations regarding the Baseline Scenario are addressed in the new section 3.4 and in particular in the new section 5.2.
The Report should provide greater clarity on the precise scope of the problem. It should summarise the available evidence on the incidence of carbon leakage problems and on the drivers of this problem, in order to better indicate how the situation with regard to carbon leakage and related impacts (e.g. efficiency of the ETS/distortion of the internal market) is likely to evolve in the absence of new EU action to modify the State aid regime.	The recommendations are addressed in particular in the section 2.1 (covering inter alia the scope of the problem). Three key drivers of the problem are addressed in sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4. The issue to how carbon leakage and other key impacts may evolve in the absence of new EU action is addressed in the considerably beefed up in section 5.2 on the Baseline Scenario.
The Report should clearly identify which sectors are most at risk of carbon leakage. On that basis the Report should explicitly acknowledge the precautionary character of the proposed Guidelines, which are designed to address problems that are likely to arise, including when carbon prices would increase significantly above their current levels.	A proxy for the sectors most at risk under the Baseline Scenario is applied the under Baseline Scenario (section 5.2.1.1). Sectors deemed most at risk of carbon leakage under the eligibility criteria in respect of each Option and Option Package are clearly identified in sections 4.5 (and Annex 7), 4.6, 4.7 (in particular 4.7.2.5), 4.8, 5.4.1, 5.5.1, 5.6.1 and 5.7.1). The recommendation as regards the precautionary nature of the proposed Guidelines is addressed at section 2.2.1 as well as in section 4.4 on the CO2 price assumption.
The observation in the Report about the relative importance of carbon leakage for the competitiveness of most sectors in comparison with exchange rates and labour, capital and other input costs should be integrated in the problem definition.	The recommendation is addressed at section 2.1.3 (scope of the problem) <i>in fine</i> .
The Baseline Scenario should clarify what the current State aid regime allows Member States to do with respect to the prevention of carbon leakage.	The recommendation is addressed at sections 2.1.5, 3.2 and 3.4 (Baseline Scenario).
The Report should improve the presentation by of the options by providing a more transparent presentation of the options in politically relevant packages (with a clear identification of sectors covered) that would allow for a more concrete comparison of	The recommendation is addressed at sections 4.2, 4.21, 5 (impacts of option packages) and section 6 (comparison of the four Option Packages).

impacts.	
The various option packages should be clearly linked to the specific objectives to be achieved, such as preventing illegal operating aid, and avoiding distortions in the single market and between sectors.	The recommendation is addressed at section 4.2, section 4.21.
The Report should consider introducing an additional option using a combined threshold for direct and indirect costs, rather than proposing a 5% threshold for indirect costs alone (as is done in option A2) or provide clear arguments why such an option has been discarded.	The recommendation is addressed by introducing an additional Option A4 at section 4.10, which is presented and assessed as an integral part of one of the four Option Packages (Second Intermediate Package) (see section 4.21).
The report should also better explain the selection of sectors that would undergo a qualitative assessment under option A3.	The recommendation is addressed at section 4.7.1.
A sensitivity analysis should be conducted for carbon prices, for instance with 10, 20 and 40€/t.	The recommendation is addressed at sections 1.3, 2.2.1, 4.4, 5.1.1, 5.4.1 and 5.6.1.
It should be considered to differentiate options on the stringency of the state aid regime in function of the availability of concrete evidence of carbon leakage, or as an approximation for such evidence, of specific levels of carbon prices.	The recommendation to differentiate the option packages is principally carried out using the metric of different CO2 prices (sections 4.4, 5.1.1, 5.3.1, 5.4.1 and 5.6.1). Other proxies with a bearing on carbon leakage is carried out in the context of the qualitative assessment under Option A3 (corresponding to the First Intermediate Option Package) (see the sector specific assessments in Annex 10). The available evidence of carbon leakage and possible ramifications thereof are set out in section 2.1.3.
On the issue of aid intensity, a combined option should be considered, which would begin at 100% and subsequently decline over time to provide a stronger incentive to reduce CO2 emissions (option B1 coupled with B2b).	The recommendation is addressed at section 4.11 by the introduction of a new aid intensity option (Option B2) which is presented and assessed as an integral part of one of the four Option Packages (First Intermediate Package) (see section 4.21).
With respect to the production level used to determine the eligibility of (sub-)sectors an additional option could be considered, using the historical output and monitoring its evolution.	The recommendation is addressed at section 4.20
Where options have been discarded early on in the process, the Report should clearly state why they were no longer considered relevant.	A previously discarded option – a combined direct and indirect CO2 costs – threshold is no longer discarded. It is considered in the revised Report (as Option A4) (see section 4.8). More generally, the recommendation is

	addressed at section 4.3.
The Report should strengthen the presentation of the costs and benefits of the different options, and should address the possible consequences of non-alignment of the treatment of direct and indirect costs.	The recommendation is addressed at new and detailed section 5.2 and in particular in section 5.2.1.1 (Baseline Scenario). In respect of the Four Option Packages the broad scale of potential costs and benefits (value at stake and the degree of potential insulation of certain sectors of the economy) is considered in section 5 (in particular 5.3.2, 5.3.3, 5.4.2, 5.4.3, 5.5.3 and 5.5.4, 5.6.2 and 5.6.3). The recommendation as to the treatment of direct versus indirect CO2 costs is addressed in the context of inter-sector distortions at sections 3.2, 4.4, 5.2.2, 5.3.4, 5.4.4, 5.4.5, 5.5.5, 5.6.4 and section 6.1
The Report should complement its qualitative assessment of the most important option packages with the available quantitative evidence.	The recommendation is addressed at sections 5.2.1.1, 5.2.1.2 and 5.2.1.3, i.e. an assessment – reinforced by the available quantitative evidence - of economic, social and environmental impacts under the Baseline Scenario (section 5.2), against which the impacts under the Option Packages are compared. Throughout Section 5 the assessment of impacts in terms of carbon leakage and impacts in terms of maintaining ETS incentives have been strengthened with the available quantitative evidence (aggregate GVA of sectors at stake and aggregate amount of electricity consumption at stake).
The Report should indicate which sectors would be most likely to be included in the application of the Guidelines under different option packages.	The recommendation is addressed at sections 5.1.1, 5.3.1, 5.4.1, 5.5.1 and 5.6.1.
The Report should illustrate the broader impacts by providing an indication of the relative importance, geographical distribution, and number of people employed in these sectors.	The recommendation is addressed at sections 2.2.1, 5.2.1.1, 5.2.1.2, 5.4.2, 5.5.2 and 5.6.2. Reference is also made to information under the “Sector and production description” heading in the sector specific Annex 10 which relates to the qualitative eligibility assessment under Option A3 (which is an integral part of the First Intermediate Option Package).
The Report should explicitly address the possible creation of new market distortions within sectors as a consequence of non-alignment of the treatment of direct and indirect costs.	The recommendation is addressed in sections 3.2, 4.4, 5.2.3, 5.3.4, 5.4.4, 5.6.4 and 6.1.
It should also discuss the possible long-run	The recommendation is addressed in sections

<p>consequences of a burden shift from energy intensive sectors (aid eligible), which are capital intensive, to more labour intensive sectors.</p>	<p>5.2.1.1, 5.2.1.2, 5.2.1.3 and 5.2.2. See also Annex 5 relating to the wider policy context, in particular as regards the sectors outside the ETS covered by the so-called effort-sharing decision.</p>
<p>Against the background of the current economic difficulties, the Report should, in summing up the expected impacts, clearly assess competitiveness issues, as well as the distribution of impacts across Member States.</p>	<p>The recommendation in so far as it concerns the relevance of competitiveness of EU industry vis-à-vis third countries is addressed in sections 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.2.2, 2.4, Annex 5 on the wider policy context. The sector-specific Annex 10 (relating to Option A3/First Intermediate Option Package) takes account of available evidence on the current challenging economic conditions. The precautionary principle also takes into account competitiveness impacts resulting under different price scenarios (see section 2.2.1 as well as section 4.4. The concluding section 6.2 also takes into account possible competitiveness impacts in the future (in view of the relatively short time span relevant to the issue of carbon leakage due to the Emissions Trading System. As regards Member-State specific impacts see section 5.7</p>
<p>The Report should compare the option packages in a more transparent way, and explicitly state the criteria which should guide the selection of the preferred option. It should better explain the reasoning behind the qualifications in the partial comparison tables, and provide a summary table that explicitly compares the most relevant option packages. On this basis it should indicate which option would perform best, subject to different assumptions about the value of key variables, such as prevailing carbon prices. The report should explicitly state the criteria by which this preferred option would be selected.</p>	<p>The recommendation in so far as it concerns the option packages is addressed in sections 4.4, 4.21, section 5 and section 5.1. The recommendation in so far as it concerns the criteria guiding the selection of the options (and option packages) is addressed in section 6.</p>

**Response to the Opinion of the Impact Assessment Board of 20 April 2012**

**Implementation of the comments by the Impact Assessment Board - Opinion of 20.04.2012**

Recommendations by the Impact	The specific sections of the Report where
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<b>Assessment Board</b>	<b>the recommendations are implemented</b>
Linkage of the Option Packages to the issue of illegal operating aid	The recommendation is addressed in particular at sections 3.2 and 3.4.
Taking account of the "floor price" issue raised in the context of the second consultation.	The recommendation is addressed in particular at section 4.4
The use of the future CO2 price in connection with determining the maximum aid amount	The recommendation is addressed in section 4.9
Better use of the available quantitative data in the context of assessing the impacts	The recommendation is addressed generally in section 5.7. The estimated extent of the key impacts in terms of the share of the EU industrial electricity consumption sheltered and the amount of industrial value added concerned under each Option Package is set out in sections 5.3.2, 5.3.3, 5.4.2, 5.4.3, 5.5.2, 5.5.3, 5.6.2 and 5.6.3. The quantitative data is also reflected in section 6.2 (comparison of the Option Packages).
Mentioning the sectors and subsectors qualifying under each Option Package	The eligible sectors and subsectors under each Package have been clarified in sections 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8. The number of sectors and subsectors qualifying under the Maximalist Package makes it more appropriate to outline those sectors at Annex 4.5.
Illustration of the broader impacts (e.g. distribution of impacts across Member States).	The recommendation is in particular addressed in section 5.7
Explanation of the criteria for the selection of the preferred Option Package.	The recommendation is addressed in sections 6.1, 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4
Presentation of the Baseline Scenario within the problem definition.	The recommendation is addressed at section 3.4

Presentation of the section on subsidiarity and proportionality.	The recommendation is addressed at section 4.22
Shortening of the text	The text has been shortened in particular section 2 (problem definition).
Glossary of technical terms and abbreviations used in the Annexes.	The recommendation is addressed in the revised Glossary preceding the Annexes.

## ANNEX 5

### The wider EU policy context

#### 1. The Climate and Energy Package of 2007 and its follow-up

**The EU ETS Directive** (as amended in 2009) is a core pillar of the EU's Climate and Energy Package laid down by the European Council in March 2007. The Package has two binding targets to be achieved by 2020<sup>7</sup>:

- a) to **reduce CO2 emissions** by 20% from the emissions level in 1990;
- b) to increase, over the same time span, the share of **renewable energy** sources in the EU to 20% of overall energy consumption.

The European Council also established a (non-binding) target to increase **energy efficiency** by 20% by 2020<sup>8</sup>.

On 29-30 October 2009 the European Council agreed on the need to reduce by 2050 the global emissions by 50%, with developed countries reducing their emissions by 80-95%, as compared to 1990 levels. The European Council supported the EU objective to reduce by 80-95% by 2050 as compared to 1990 levels.<sup>9</sup>

As regards the more immediate 2020 targets, the European Council stated that the EU's intention is to increase its CO2 reduction target to 30% (from the current 20%) if other developed and developing countries make sufficient commitments to reduce or limit CO2 emissions<sup>10</sup>.

The ETS Directive (as amended in 2009)<sup>11</sup> required the Commission to carry out an assessment of the feasibility of a 30% reduction target by June 2010, including an assessment of the risk of carbon leakage.

In a Communication of May 2010 the Commission estimated the potential impacts of moving to a 30% reduction target by 2020<sup>12</sup>. The Commission concluded that the conditions for a 30% reduction target were not at hand and that the risk of carbon leakage was limited (provided that the measures already taken to prevent carbon leakage by free allocation of EUAs due to direct CO2 emissions costs remained in place)<sup>13</sup>.

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<sup>7</sup> Council document 7224/1/07 Rev 1.

<sup>8</sup> Compared to a business as usual scenario baseline.

<sup>9</sup> Presidency Conclusion 30/10/2009 Nr:15265/1/09 REV1 (paragraph 7: "... It supports an EU objective, in the context of necessary reductions according to the IPCC by developed countries as a group, to reduce emissions by 80-95% by 2050 compared to 1990 levels.")

<sup>10</sup> Ibidem, paragraph 8.

<sup>11</sup> Recital 25 and Article 10b(1).

<sup>12</sup> COM(2010) 265 final.

<sup>13</sup> COM(2010) 265 final.

In October 2010 the Council<sup>14</sup> invited the Commission to further elaborate operations for moving to a 30% reduction and to conduct analyses on the effects at Member State level. At the time of writing the Commission had not finalized that assessment.

In its conclusions of 4 February 2011 the European Council "looked forward to the elaboration of a low carbon 2050 strategy providing the framework for the longer term action in the energy and other related sectors. Reaching the EU objective, in the context of necessary reductions according to the IPCC by developed countries as a group, of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 80-95% by 2050 compared to 1990 as agreed in October 2009 would – according to the European Council - require a revolution in energy systems, which had start immediately.<sup>15</sup> The ultimate aim is for the EU to make its contribution prevent the global temperature from rising by more than 2°C above pre-industrial levels. The envisaged decarbonisation of the electricity in this Report is a fundamental part of the EU's objectives for 2050.

Responding to the European Council's call, the **Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy in 2050** was adopted in **March 2011**<sup>16</sup>. The Roadmap sets out possible cost-effective pathways towards a low-carbon economy with a view to reducing the EU's CO2 emissions by 80 to 95% by 2050 from the 1990 level.

In its conclusions of 4 February 2011, the European Council also insisted on delivery of **the 2020 20% energy efficiency target**.<sup>17</sup> To this end, the Commission adopted an Energy Efficiency Plan in March 2011<sup>18</sup> which aims at stepping up measures in this area as the EU is on course to achieve only half of the 20% objective by 2020. The proposed Energy Efficiency Directive serves the same end<sup>19</sup>.

The Commission proposal for a revised Energy Taxation Directive<sup>20</sup> seeks to address EU's climate change and energy policies highlighted above and complement the third phase of the EU ETS. Sectors covered by the ETS are not subject to the Energy Taxation Directive and vice versa.

The 20% CO2 reduction target therefore remains valid for the time being.

**The burden of achieving this reduction is shared.** First, the sectors covered by the ETS - mainly electricity generators, manufacturing industry and mining as well as (as from 2012) aviation – must reduce CO2 emissions by 21% over 2005-2020. Second, the non-ETS (“effort-sharing”) sectors must reduce their CO2 emissions by 10% over the same period (2005-2020)

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<sup>14</sup> Council of the European Union, Environmental Council conclusions, 14 October 2010 (14979/10).

<sup>15</sup> See paragraph 15 of the Conclusions (4/2/2011 Nr: EUCO 2/1/11).

<sup>16</sup> COM(2011) 112 final. See also impact assessment on "Investing in the Development of Low Carbon Technologies (SET-Plan) (SEC (2009) 1297) at p. 20 ("*The inherent high upfront learning investments in the energy sector (e.g. full-scale CCS about €1bn) combined with the long life cycles of existing plants (e.g. 40 years for coal-fired plant, 25 years for a CCG plant ... and infrastructure and network investment create a lock-in effect that favours established technologies and thus impedes innovation of new technologies in the energy sector*").

<sup>17</sup> See paragraph of 8 of European Council conclusions of 4 February 2011.


<sup>18</sup> COM(2011) 109 final.

<sup>19</sup> COM(2011)370.

<sup>20</sup> Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 2003/96/EC restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity, COM(2011) 169/3, SEC(2011) 409, SEC(2011) 410, 13 April 2011.

(see figure below). The non-ETS sectors include among others the entire transport sector, construction and agriculture<sup>21</sup>.

**Figure: The 2020 reduction target of non-ETS sectors (compared to ETS-sectors)**



Source: Schafhausen, Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherheit (2009)

As the scope and nature of the Guidelines governing State aid in the context of the ETS to be adopted may potentially impact on both the CO<sub>2</sub> price and the electricity price, the Report also considers the impact of different Options on sectors and parts of society which will not be eligible to receive State aid under the Guidelines. These categories may include ETS sectors and non-ETS sectors as well as society at large (households, services and the public sector).

### The Europe 2020 Strategy and other EU policy frameworks

In setting out the broad EU policy framework it is necessary refer to the **EU's Europe 2020 Strategy aimed at promoting smart, sustainable and inclusive growth**<sup>22</sup> Sustainable growth is understood to mean “*building a resource-efficient, sustainable and competitive economy, ... Europe's leadership in the race to develop new processes and technologies, including green technologies*”<sup>23</sup>.

The Europe 2020 Strategy is underpinned by a number of thematic Flagship Initiatives, several of which are particularly relevant to the Guidelines at issue:

<sup>21</sup> The non-ETS sectors reductions are carried out under national plans subject to the “effort-sharing” decision (Decision No 406/2009/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the effort of Member States to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to meet the Community’s greenhouse gas emission reduction commitments up to 2020), OJ L 140, 5.6.2009, p. 136–148.

<sup>22</sup> European Commission COM (2010) 2020.

<sup>23</sup> European Commission (COMP (2010) 2020), p. 14. See also 2011 Competitiveness Report at p. 187 (forthcoming): “The EU as a whole remains ahead of international comparators such as Japan and the US on the use of renewable energy, but countries such as China are also rapidly developing their technology and capacity. See also section 2.2.1 of SEC (2009) 1297 on 'Competitiveness of EU business and EU citizens are affected' (impact assessment on Investing in the Development of Low Carbon Technologies (SET-Plan) (“Should the needed investment happen, important 'first-mover advantages' could result for the EU-based industry that could have positive spill-over effects for the EU citizens”).

First, an **Integrated Industrial Policy for the Globalisation Era – Putting Competitiveness and Sustainability at Centre Stage**<sup>24</sup>: This Flagship is particularly aimed at safeguarding and strengthening the competitiveness of EU industrial sectors vis-à-vis third country competitors. At the heart of this Report is the extent to which the expected pass-on of the CO2 component in electricity costs will adversely affect the competitive position of certain EU sectors and subsectors in relation to their third country competitors, a situation explicitly envisaged in recital 24 of the ETS Directive:

"In the event that other developed countries and other major emitters of greenhouse gases do not participate in this international agreement, this could lead to an increase in greenhouse gas emissions in third countries where industry would not be subject to comparable carbon constraints (carbon leakage), and at the same time **could put certain energy-intensive sectors and subsectors in the Community which are subject to international competition at an economic disadvantage**. This could undermine the environmental integrity and benefit of actions by the Community" (emphasis added).

This key aspect of competitiveness – which includes EU firms' cost competitiveness vis-à-vis their country competitors - is thus an integral part of the issues addressed by this Report. The "competitiveness proofing" referred of the 2010 Industrial Policy Communication is thus built into the core of the problem addressed in this Report<sup>25</sup>.

**Resource-Efficient Europe (REE)**<sup>26</sup>: The REE is a Flagship initiative under EU2020, which aims to create an integrated framework for different policies (including those mentioned in relation to the EU Climate and Energy Package) to support the shift towards a low-carbon and resource-efficient economy.<sup>27</sup> The European Commission's Roadmap<sup>28</sup> for a resource-efficient Europe, a Communication adopted on 20 September 2011 reiterates, inter alia, the need for phasing out environmentally harmful subsidies notably in the field of fossil fuels.

**New Skills for New Jobs - Anticipating and matching labour market and skills needs**<sup>29</sup>: The Communication notes that the transition to a low-carbon economy offers great potential for the creation of sustainable jobs. Many studies and policy documents and reports draw attention to the job-creation potential ("green jobs") in the low-carbon and renewable energy area<sup>30</sup>.

The above pillars of the Europe 2020 Strategy mainly concern action at the *EU level*. **The national dimension of the Europe 2020 is subject to the new "European Semester" governance framework**. Based on integrated assessments of the Member States' fiscal and structural reform plans, the Commission has proposed recommendations to each Member States to be adopted by the Council before the national budgetary procedures begins in earnest in the autumn. Such recommendations (albeit not legally binding) constitute policy advice by the EU as to how a Member State should orient its budgetary resources as a matter of priority. This is also

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<sup>24</sup> European Commission (COM (2010) 614).

<sup>25</sup> European Commission (COM (2010) 614), p. 31.

<sup>26</sup> European Commission, (COM (2011) 21).

<sup>27</sup> European Commission (COM(2011) 21), p. 5.

<sup>28</sup> European Commission (COM(2011) 571), p. 10

<sup>29</sup> European Commission (COM (2010) 682, p. 9 ("Indeed, significant investments in "green" skills need to be made to ensure Europe lives up to its ambition of having 3 million green collar workers by 2020").

<sup>30</sup> According to the International Labour Organization, the global market for ecological services and products should double and reach USD 2740 billion in 2020. ILO, Green jobs Facts and figures, 2008.

relevant to the issue of large-scale State aid expenditure. A special situation applies to five of the EU's Member States which subject to particularly rigorous rules on their expenditure under so-called fiscal adjustment programmes involving EU and IMF support (“Programme Countries”).

The Annual Growth Survey 2012<sup>31</sup> – that Commission's primary input into the European Semester for that year – refers to smart recycling of both auctioning revenues and revenues from CO2 pricing by the sectors outside the ETS as a way of spurring jobs and growth while combating climate change.

The Commission's proposal for the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for 2014-2020 is fully aligned with the Europe 2020 Strategy<sup>32</sup>. The MFF's headline targets include CO2 reductions of 20% or 30% if the conditions are right. The Commission proposes increasing the share of the EU budget spent on further Europe's transition to a low carbon and climate-resilient society to at least 20%. This would take financial support for climate-related purposes to around €200 billion for 2014-2020. The Commission's proposal for the 2014-2020 cohesion policy<sup>33</sup> includes a mandatory concentration of European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) resources on energy efficiency and renewables at a level of a minimum of 20% of the national ERDF resources for transition and more developed regions and a minimum of 6% of less developed regions. At the EU level this equates at a minimum to €7.1bn.

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<sup>31</sup> COM(2011)815 final of 23 November 2011.

<sup>32</sup> COM(2011)500/I and II.

<sup>33</sup> COM(2011)615.

## ANNEX 6

### The Commission statement as regards recital 27 and Article 10a(6) of the ETS Directive

#### *Commission Statement*

#### **Commission's non-paper submitted to the European Parliament and the Council** **on 19 November 2008 (Annex 2 15713/1/08)**

#### **Emissions indirectes**

#### **PROPOSED ASSESSMENT CRITERIA FOR STATE AID TO COMPENSATE FOR ELECTRICITY COST INCREASES DUE TO PASS ON OF CO<sub>2</sub> COSTS**

1. This document presents an approach for measures to ensure that increases in electricity costs resulting from pass-through of ETS-related CO<sub>2</sub> costs can be compensated ("indirect emissions"). It proposes a method to assess the compatibility of state aid schemes with Community state aid rules.
2. It should be underlined that in the event that an international climate agreement is concluded, the need for any compensation would have to be re-evaluated.
3. Aid could be reasoned to be necessary to achieve the environmental objective of the ETS where the costs of ETS burden companies to an extent that they would leave the EU without overall emission reductions (i.e. carbon leakage). The support should in principle only offer a compensation for the part of the increase in electricity prices due to the ETS-related pass-through of CO<sub>2</sub> costs from the electricity generator. The actual pass-on of CO<sub>2</sub> costs of electricity experienced by the installations depends on conditions of supply to the particular installation or the existence of non-emitting electricity sources at industrial sites i.e. standard medium-term contracts, long-term contracts, regulated tariffs, direct supply from a dedicated, CO<sub>2</sub> free power generation unit. Therefore the definition of the aid necessary seems only possible through a case-by-case analysis at installation level.
4. In addition, companies concerned should pay a part of the increased CO<sub>2</sub> cost in order to maintain an incentive to save energy and to stimulate a shift in demand from grey to green electricity. Any support system should furthermore promote energy efficiency by linking the extent of support to energy efficiency performance.
5. A scheme might be set up as follows:

If a Member State would like to provide such aid, it would have to notify a scheme to the Commission. The Commission's assessment of the scheme would follow three steps:

*Step 1:* confirmation by the Member State that all intended beneficiaries are covered by a list of (sub)sectors identified at EU level to be subject to risk of carbon leakage due to CO<sub>2</sub> costs of indirect emissions (necessity of the aid).

*Step 2:* confirmation by the Member State that at the level of each installation, CO<sub>2</sub> costs are being passed on in electricity prices (necessity of the aid).

*Step 3:* confirmation that the Member State will use a method to determine the compensation that does not exceed the maximum allowed for each eligible installation, in order to avoid overcompensation, avoid distortion on the common market and maintain the environmental incentive of the ETS (proportionality of the aid).

***Step 1: The measure must target beneficiaries for which risk of carbon leakage exists due to increases in electricity costs***

6. The Commission would establish a list of (sub)sectors exposed to the risk of carbon leakage due to *indirect* emissions. The Commission would use the method that is being developed in the context of direct emissions, but adapt this to take into account cost increases related to indirect emissions.
7. For the assessment of a state aid scheme, Member States would have to confirm that each beneficiary is covered by the list of (sub)sectors for indirect emissions established by the Commission.

***Step 2: Within sectors identified as being at risk of carbon leakage, aid can be granted only to companies subject to pass on of CO<sub>2</sub> costs in electricity prices***

8. In the second step the Commission would assess if a Member State is able to establish that real actual electricity prices paid by potential beneficiaries are likely to include the costs of CO<sub>2</sub>, taking into account regulated tariffs, own production from non-emitting sources or long-term contracts.
9. The method to verify that beneficiaries are affected by the ETS should include the following elements:
  - 1) Verification of the basis of payment for electricity for each of the benefiting companies (contract, regulated tariff, wholesale market, and auto-generation).
  - 2) Exclusion of beneficiaries buying electricity at a price specified in a regulated tariff if tariffs do not include CO<sub>2</sub> costs of the power generator.
  - 3) Exclusion of compensation to installations buying electricity on the basis of a long term

contract signed before 1.1.2005 if it does not include CO<sub>2</sub> costs.

***Step 3: The aid granted to companies identified in step 1 and 2 must be proportional and must maintain an incentive to improve on energy efficiency/or switch to cleaner electricity***

10. In the third step the Commission would assess that compensation granted by Member States is proportional to the pass on of CO<sub>2</sub> costs and maintains an incentive to reduce electricity consumption. In order to maintain this incentive, the Commission would set out maximum aid intensities that are lower than the full potential cost increase.
11. The Commission would provide the following data, which Member States would have to use to calculate the maximum aid allowed:
  - A percentage of the CO<sub>2</sub> costs for which aid can be provided (possibly linked to the degree of risk of carbon leakage but, in any event, lower than the full CO<sub>2</sub> costs)
  - The average CO<sub>2</sub> intensity in the EU's total electricity production, which is the intensity that all Member States have to use. This figure would be revised every four years to reflect any major changes in the electricity mix.
  - The average allowance price of the preceding year[s]. This would ensure that the maximum state aid reflects the recent allowance price development.
  - Electricity use benchmarks for the concerned sectors linked to best performing technique.
12. The assessment of performance should take into account on site production of electricity. This is to ensure that good environmental performance is rewarded.
13. The Member State would have to provide independently verified historic production data for the concerned installations, by which the benchmarks and the other data above will be multiplied.
14. The Member States that provide the aid would have to provide a report to the Commission for the aid related to the previous year.

**Summary**

15. The maximum amount of aid that a Member State could provide for an installation would be:
  - a percentage (possibly linked to the degree of carbon leakage) *times*
  - the EU wide average CO<sub>2</sub> content per MWh *times*
  - the average price of CO<sub>2</sub> allowances of the preceding year[s] *times*
  - the electricity consumption that is necessary with the best performing technique *times*

- average production data in the preceding years for the installation in question.

The first four variables would be determined by the Commission.

*As a formula*

16. Maximum compensation for indirect costs increase (EUR) = X% \* EU wide CO<sub>2</sub> content of electricity (tCO<sub>2</sub>/MWh) \* average price of CO<sub>2</sub> allowances (EUR/allowance) \* benchmark for efficient electricity use for the product (MWh/t) \* historic (e.g. average preceding years) production data (t).

*Reminder*

17. This approach assumes that no free allocation of allowances is granted to power plants owned and operated by ETS participants other than power companies.



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Part 3

**COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT**

**Impact Assessment Report**

*Accompanying the document*

**Communication of the Commission**

**Guidelines on certain State aid measures in the context of Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading Scheme**

{C(2012) 3230 final}  
{SWD(2012) 131 final}

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## ANNEX 7

### Selection of sectors exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage in the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision

In selecting sectors and subsectors exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage the Commission Statement (Annex 5) provides that “[t]he Commission would use **the method that is being developed in the context of direct emissions**, but adapt this to take into account cost increases related to indirect emissions” (emphasis added).

The broad elements of this method (in the context of direct CO<sub>2</sub> costs) was laid down in Articles 10a(15-17) of the ETS Directive and implemented through the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision. The Decision defines the sectors and subsectors deemed to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage. Installations falling within the scope of that Decision will – under the 2011 Benchmarking Decision - receive free EUAs (i.e. emissions allowances) to cover their *direct* CO<sub>2</sub> emission costs (essentially their own use of gas and coal).

In order to define criteria for the selection of sectors and subsectors due **to their indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs** (i.e. the CO<sub>2</sub> price component passed on in electricity prices) it is thus necessary to set out in some detail the precise criteria in Article 10a(14-17) of the ETS Directive and their application in the form of the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision. Sector or subsector eligibility is a *sine qua non* condition for the payment of State aid in favour of any installation.

Under the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision 164 sectors and subsectors were considered to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage. Of these 151 were “sectors” and 13 “subsectors”. **159 sectors and subsectors qualified according to three sets of purely quantitative criteria** in the form of thresholds related to CO<sub>2</sub> costs as a share of the **sector's gross value added and/or the international trade exposure** of the sector or subsector. **Five sectors qualified under purely qualitative criteria**. These criteria and the sectors and subsectors which qualified under them will serve as a starting point for the analysis of the compensation for the indirect costs and are thus described in detail below.

#### 1. Qualification of the 164 sectors and subsectors (2010 Carbon Leakage Decision)

The 146 sectors entered the carbon leakage list via three sets of criteria set out in the ETS Directive (Article 10a(14), (15), (16) and (17)). The three first sets of criteria (paragraphs (15) to (16)) consist in quantitative thresholds concerning the impact on the sector/subsector of CO<sub>2</sub> costs as a percentage of the sector's/subsector's gross value added assessed at EU level and/or the degree to which the sector or subsector is exposed to trade with non-EU countries.

The fourth set of criteria in paragraph (17) allows further sectors to be added based on a qualitative assessment as to the sector's or subsector's exposure to carbon leakage.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> In accordance with the second subparagraph of article 10a(13) of the ETS Directive, the Commission may add every year a sector or a subsector to the carbon leakage list. By Commission decision (2011/745/EU)

### 1.1. The qualification of eleven sectors under paragraph 15 of Article 10a

Eleven sectors (listed in the Annex) were deemed eligible based on paragraph (15) of Article 10a of the ETS Directive, i.e. they qualified under the following first set of quantitative criteria; in other words, they passed the (direct and indirect) CO<sub>2</sub> cost threshold (5% of gross value added) and the trade intensity threshold (10%):

“(a) the sum of direct and indirect additional costs induced by the implementation of this Directive would lead to a substantial increase in production costs, calculated as a proportion of the gross value added, of at least 5%; and

(b) the intensity of trade with third countries, defined as the ratio between the total value of exports to third countries plus the value imports from third countries and the total market size for the Community (annual turnover plus total imports from third countries is above 10%”.

<b>NACE Code</b>	<b>Description</b>
1562	Manufacture of starches and starch products
1583	Manufacture of sugar
1595	Manufacture of other non-distilled fermented beverages
1592	Production of ethyl alcohol from fermented materials
2112	Manufacture of paper and paperboard
2320	Manufacture of refined petroleum products
2611	Manufacture of flat glass
2613	Manufacture of hollow glass
2630	Manufacture of ceramic tiles and flags
2721	Manufacture of cast iron tubes
2743	Lead, zinc and tin production

### 1.2. The qualification of two sectors under point (a) of paragraph 16 of Article 10a

Two further sectors (listed in the Annex) were deemed eligible based on point (a) of paragraph (16) of Article 10a of the ETS Directive, i.e. they qualified under the following quantitative criterion; in other words, they passed the standalone (direct and indirect) CO<sub>2</sub> cost threshold (30% of gross value added):

“the sum of direct and indirect additional costs induced by the implementation of this Directive would lead to a particularly high increase of production costs, calculated as a proportion of the gross value added, of at least 30% [...]”.

<b>NACE Code</b>	<b>Description</b>
2651	Manufacture of cement
2652	Manufacture of lime

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the following sectors and subsectors deemed to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage: Production of Salt (NACE 1440), Cocoa paste (prodcom code 15841100), Cocoa butter, fat and oil (prodcom code 15841200), Cocoa powder, not containing added sugar or other sweetening matter (15841300) and Manufacture of bricks, tiles and constructions products in baked clay (NACE 2640).

### 1.3. The qualification of two sectors under point (b) of paragraph 16 of Article 10a

117 sectors (listed in the Annex) were deemed eligible based on point (b) of paragraph (16) of Article 10a of the ETS Directive, i.e. they qualified under the following quantitative criterion related to trade intensity; in other words, they passed the standalone trade intensity threshold (30%).

“the intensity of trade with third countries, defined as the ratio between the total value of exports to third countries plus the value of imports from third countries and the total market size for the Community (annual turnover plus total imports from third countries), is above 30%”.

<b>NACE Code</b>	<b>Description</b>
1110	Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas
1310	Mining of iron ores
1320	Mining of non-ferrous metal ores, except uranium and thorium ores
1411	Quarrying of ornamental and building stone
1422	Mining of clays and kaolin
1450	Other mining and quarrying n.e.c.
1520	Processing and preserving of fish and fish products
1541	Manufacture of crude oils and fats
1591	Manufacture of distilled potable alcoholic beverages
1593	Manufacture of wines
1712	Preparation and spinning of woollen-type fibres
1713	Preparation and spinning of worsted-type fibres
1714	Preparation and spinning of flax-type fibres
1715	Throwing and preparation of silk, including from noils, and throwing and texturing of synthetic or artificial filament yarns
1716	Manufacture of sewing threads
1717	Preparation and spinning of other textile fibres
1721	Cotton-type weaving
1722	Woollen-type weaving
1723	Worsted-type weaving
1724	Silk-type weaving
1725	Other textile weaving
1740	Manufacture of made-up textile articles, except apparel
1751	Manufacture of carpets and rugs
1752	Manufacture of cordage, rope, twine and netting
1753	Manufacture of non-wovens and articles made from non-wovens, except apparel
1754	Manufacture of other textiles n.e.c.
1760	Manufacture of knitted and crocheted fabrics
1771	Manufacture of knitted and crocheted hosiery
1772	Manufacture of knitted and crocheted pullovers, cardigans and similar articles
1821	Manufacture of workwear

1822	Manufacture of other outerwear
1823	Manufacture of underwear
1824	Manufacture of other wearing apparel and accessories n.e.c.
1830	Dressing and dyeing of fur; manufacture of articles of fur
1910	Tanning and dressing of leather
1920	Manufacture of luggage, handbags and the like, saddlery and harness
1930	Manufacture of footwear
2010	Sawmilling and planing of wood; impregnation of wood
2052	Manufacture of articles of cork, straw and plaiting materials
2111	Manufacture of pulp
2124	Manufacture of wallpaper
2215	Other publishing
2330	Processing of nuclear fuel
2412	Manufacture of dyes and pigments
2420	Manufacture of pesticides and other agro-chemical products
2441	Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products
2442	Manufacture of pharmaceutical preparations
2452	Manufacture of perfumes and toilet preparations
2463	Manufacture of essential oils
2464	Manufacture of photographic chemical material
2465	Manufacture of prepared unrecorded media
2466	Manufacture of other chemical products n.e.c.
2470	Manufacture of man-made fibres
2511	Manufacture of rubber tyres and tubes
2615	Manufacture and processing of other glass, including technical glassware
2621	Manufacture of ceramic household and ornamental articles
2622	Manufacture of ceramic sanitary fixtures
2623	Manufacture of ceramic insulators and insulating fittings
2624	Manufacture of other technical ceramic products
2625	Manufacture of other ceramic products
2626	Manufacture of refractory ceramic products
2681	Production of abrasive products
2722	Manufacture of steel tubes
2741	Precious metals production
2861	Manufacture of cutlery
2862	Manufacture of tools
2874	Manufacture of fasteners, screw machine products, chain and springs
2875	Manufacture of other fabricated metal products n.e.c.
2911	Manufacture of engines and turbines, except aircraft, vehicle and cycle engines
2912	Manufacture of pumps and compressors
2913	Manufacture of taps and valves
2914	Manufacture of bearings, gears, gearing and driving elements
2921	Manufacture of furnaces and furnace burners
2923	Manufacture of non-domestic cooling and ventilation equipment
2924	Manufacture of other general purpose machinery n.e.c.
2932	Manufacture of other agricultural and forestry machinery

2941	Manufacture of portable hand held power tools
2942	Manufacture of other metalworking machine tools
2943	Manufacture of other machine tools n.e.c.
2951	Manufacture of machinery for metallurgy
2952	Manufacture of machinery for mining, quarrying and construction
2953	Manufacture of machinery for food, beverage and tobacco processing
2954	Manufacture of machinery for textile, apparel and leather production
2955	Manufacture of machinery for paper and paperboard production
2956	Manufacture of other special purpose machinery n.e.c.
2960	Manufacture of weapons and ammunition
2971	Manufacture of electric domestic appliances
3001	Manufacture of office machinery
3002	Manufacture of computers and other information processing equipment
3110	Manufacture of electric motors, generators and transformers
3120	Manufacture of electricity distribution and control apparatus
3130	Manufacture of insulated wire and cable
3140	Manufacture of accumulators, primary cells and primary batteries
3150	Manufacture of lighting equipment and electric lamps
3162	Manufacture of other electrical equipment n.e.c.
3210	Manufacture of electronic valves and tubes and other electronic components
3220	Manufacture of television and radio transmitters and apparatus for line telephony and line telegraphy
3230	Manufacture of television and radio receivers, sound or video recording or reproducing apparatus and associated goods
3310	Manufacture of medical and surgical equipment and orthopaedic appliances
3320	Manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring, checking, testing, navigating and other purposes, except industrial process control equipment
3340	Manufacture of optical instruments and photographic equipment
3350	Manufacture of watches and clocks
3511	Building and repairing of ships
3512	Building and repairing of pleasure and sporting boats
3530	Manufacture of aircraft and spacecraft
3541	Manufacture of motorcycles
3542	Manufacture of bicycles
3543	Manufacture of invalid carriages
3550	Manufacture of other transport equipment n.e.c.
3621	Striking of coins
3622	Manufacture of jewellery and related articles n.e.c.
3630	Manufacture of musical instruments
3640	Manufacture of sports goods
3650	Manufacture of games and toys
3661	Manufacture of imitation jewellery
3662	Manufacture of brooms and brushes
3663	Other manufacturing n.e.c.

#### 1.4. The qualification of 16 sectors based on both paragraphs (15) and (16) of Article 10a

In addition, 16 sectors (listed in the Annex) were deemed eligible based on both paragraphs (15) and (16) of Article 10a of the ETS Directive, i.e. they qualified under more than one of the three sets of quantitative criteria listed above.

<b>NACE Code</b>	<b>Description</b>
1010	Mining and agglomeration of hard coal
1430	Mining of chemical and fertilizer minerals
1597	Manufacture of malt
1711	Preparation and spinning of cotton-type fibres
1810	Manufacture of leather clothes
2310	Manufacture of coke oven products
2413	Manufacture of other inorganic basic chemicals
2414	Manufacture of other organic basic chemicals
2415	Manufacture of fertilizers and nitrogen compounds
2417	Manufacture of synthetic rubber in primary forms
2710	Manufacture of basic iron and steel and of ferro-alloys
2731	Cold drawing
2742	Aluminium production
2744	Copper production
2745	Other non-ferrous metal production
2931	Manufacture of agricultural tractors

#### 1.5. The qualification of 13 subsectors under the quantitative criteria in paragraphs 15 and 16 of Article 10a

The 13 subsectors were deemed to fulfil the quantitative criteria set in paragraphs 15 and 16 of Article 10a of the ETS Directive (“Beyond NACE-4 level based on the quantitative criteria set out in paragraphs 15 and 16 of Article 10a of Directive 2003/87/EC”).

Recital 6 of Decision 2010/2/EU adds the explanation for the selection of 13 sectors at a more detailed level than the NACE 4 level:

“Sectors and subsectors should be included in the list of sectors and subsectors using the most accurate NACE description. Some sectors not found to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage at the NACE-4 level were disaggregated and a number of corresponding sub-sectors, for which certain characteristics led to a significantly different impact from the rest of the sector, were assessed”

<b>Prodcom Code</b>	<b>Description</b>
15331427	Concentrated tomato puree and paste
155120	Milk and cream in solid forms
155153	Casein
155154	Lactose and lactose syrup
15891333	Dry bakers' yeast

24111150	Hydrogen (including the production of hydrogen in combination with syngas)
24111160	Nitrogen
24111170	Oxygen
243021	Prepared pigments, opacifiers and colours, vitrifiable enamels and glazes, engobes, liquid lustres and the like; glass frit
24621030	Gelatin and its derivatives; isinglass (excluding casein glues and bone glues)
261411	Slivers, rovings, yarn and chopped strands, of glass fibre
26821400	Artificial graphite, colloidal, semi-colloidal graphite and preparations
26821620	Exfoliated vermiculite, expanded clays, foamed slag and similar expanded mineral materials and mixtures thereof

## 2. The qualification of five sectors under the qualitative criteria in paragraph 17 of Article 10a

Five sectors qualified under a qualitative assessment under paragraph 17 of Article 10a of the ETS Directive (explained in greater detail in recitals 17-21 of Decision 2010/2/EU).

Paragraph 17 reads as follows:

"17. The list referred to in paragraph 13 may be supplemented after completion of a qualitative assessment, taking into account, where the relevant data are available, the following criteria:

(a) the extent to which it is possible for individual installations in the sector or subsector concerned to reduce emission levels or electricity consumption, including, as appropriate, the increase in production costs that the related investment may entail, for instance on the basis of the most efficient techniques;

(b) current and projected market characteristics, including when trade exposure or direct and indirect cost increase rates are close to one of the thresholds mentioned in paragraph 16;

(c) profit margins as a potential indicator of long-run investment or relocation decisions."

NACE Code	Description
1730	Finishing of textiles
2020	Manufacture of veneer sheets; manufacture of plywood, laminboard, particle board, fibre board and other panels and boards
2416	Manufacture of plastics in primary forms
2751	Casting of iron
2753	Casting of light metals

## 3. Selection mechanism in the context of indirect emissions

Even if several of the 164 sectors and subsectors qualified for inclusion on the carbon leakage list in the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision in part due to their indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs, all installations

belonging to these 164 sectors and subsectors will (according to the ETS Directive) **only receive compensation for their direct CO2 emissions costs in the form of free allocation of EUAs** (each such allowances authorising the emission of one tonne of CO2).

Compensation for indirect CO2 costs can only be granted in the form of State aid.

a) Assessment of risk to be done at Union (not Member State) level

Building on the method used in respect of compensation for direct CO2 emissions costs<sup>2</sup>, it is first of clear that **the assessment of sectors will be carried out at Union level and not at the level of Member States** (Article 10a(14): “ ... *the Commission shall assess, at Community level*”). Some stakeholders have argued in favour of a Member State-specific level of assessment.

b) The level of disaggregation of the assessment: sectors and subsectors

It is clear from the regulatory framework that **both sectors and subsectors may qualify** (see Article 10a(6)). Under the method used in the context of free allocation in respect of direct CO2 emission costs 151 “sectors” qualified (defined at the four-digit **NACE 4 level**).<sup>3</sup> In addition, 13 subsectors defined by an eight-digit “Prodcom Code” qualified. **Prodcom** defines EU manufacturing, mining and quarrying activities in terms of 'products'. The first four of the eight digits correspond to a NACE 4 code. According to the version of the NACE<sup>4</sup> classification system relevant to this Report there were **258 manufacturing, mining and quarrying NACE 4 sectors divided into around 4 500 products at Prodcom level**.

A key issue therefore concerns the **relevant level of sector aggregation**. The ETS Directive's starting point is the NACE 3 level (recital 24). In the public consultation no interested party advocated that level of assessment. **Most stakeholder replies were based on an assessment at NACE 4 level** (i.e. the essential basis of the assessment in the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision). **Several stakeholders also advocated an assessment at the more disaggregated Prodcom level** (or “subsectors” to use the terms of the ETS Directive and the implementing Decision). However, opposite views very also expressed.<sup>5</sup>

c) Compensation for indirect CO2 costs

Given that the specific legal framework, in particular Article 10a(6) and recital 27, both refer to the possibility for Member States to “adopt financial measures in favour sectors or subsectors determined to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage *due to costs relating to greenhouse gas emissions passed on in electricity prices* .. “ this Report will not consider any standalone options based on a pure trade-intensity criteria<sup>6</sup>.

While it is not legally excluded (see reference to “subsectors” in Article 10a(6)) a *stand-alone*

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<sup>2</sup> See Commission Statement (Annex 4).

<sup>3</sup> See recital 24 of the ETS Directive.

<sup>4</sup> Rev 1.1. NACE.

<sup>5</sup> See reply to questionnaire by Chemelot stating that statistical data for many subsectors are "rather unreliable" for which reasons "a huge improvement of data quality should be realized which probably would take several years".

<sup>6</sup> Corresponding to point (b) of Article 10a(16)).

*quantitative* option involving an assessment at the eight-digit Prodcom level will not be considered in this Report.<sup>7</sup>

Nevertheless, Option A1 in this Report involves “mirroring” the approach taken in 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision. To this extent “subsectors” would be included in the list of eligible sectors and subsectors in the Guidelines albeit not on a stand-alone basis. Moreover, the qualitative assessment under Option A3 in principle also allows for assessment of subsectors (including Prodcom level sectors).

It should be reiterated that the **lack of relevant statistical and comparable data is particularly acute in the context** of assessing the risk of carbon leakage for sectors and subsectors due to the CO2 price component passed on in **electricity costs**. Electricity data is not even collected by Eurostat below NACE 3 level.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> It appears from the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision that subsectors (such as those defined at Prodcom level) were assessed based on certain characteristics which “led to be significantly different impact from the rest of the [NACE 4] sector”. In this context, it should be noted that Eurostat does not produce data on electricity consumption at Prodcom level. It is thus not possible to determine if the effect of electricity prices on a particular subsector's gross value added would lead to a “significantly different impact” compared to the impact on the NACE 4 sectors to which that subsector belongs.

<sup>8</sup> See Annex I of European Commission's impact assessment (SEC(2009)1710) accompanying the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision on indirect CO2 cost data as a share of gross value added relied on in this report.

## ANNEX 8

### Ranking between sectors in terms of indirect CO2 costs and trade intensity

#### NACE 4 BY INDIRECT COSTS (ALL SECTORS ABOVE 1%)

Ranking	NACE 4	Description	Indirect costs
<b>Indirect costs of more than 3%</b>			
1	2742	Aluminium production	10.3%
2	2411	Manufacture of industrial gases	7.5%
3	1430	Mining of chemicals and fertilizer minerals	6.6%
4	2413	Manufacture of other inorganic chemicals	6%
5	2743	Lead, zinc and tin	6%
	1810	Manufacture of leather clothes	5%<x<30%
6	2112	Manufacture of paper and paperboard	4.8%
7	2310	Manufacture of coke oven products	4.6%
8	2651	Manufacture of cement	4.4%
9	1711	Preparation and spinning of cotton fibres	4.0%
10	2415	Manufacture of fertilizers and nitrogen compounds	3.7%
11	2710	Manufacture of basic iron and steel	3.6%
12	1597	Manufacture of malt	3.5%
13	2744	Copper production	3.4%
<b>Indirect costs in range 2-3%</b>			
14	2122	Manufacture of household and sanitary goods and of toilet requisites	2.9%
15	1422	Mining of clays and kaolin	2.8%
16	2470	Manufacture of man-made fibres	2.8%
17	2613	Manufacture of hollow glass	2.6%
18	1713	Preparation and spinning of worsted-type fibres	2.6%
19	2020	Manufacture of veneer sheets; manufacture of plywood, laminboard, particle board, fibre board and other panels and boards	2.6%
20	1715	Throwing and preparation of silk, including from noils, and throwing and texturing of synthetic or artificial filament yarns	2.4%
21	1450	Other mining and quarrying n.e.c.	2.3%
22	1722	Woollen-type weaving	2.3%
23	2414	Manufacture of other organic basic chemicals	2.2%
24	2614	Manufacture of glass fibres	2.1%
25	2745	Other non-ferrous metal production	2%

Ranking	NACE 4	Description	Indirect costs
<b>Indirect costs in range 1-2%</b>			
26	1562	Manufacture of starches and starch products	1.9%
27	1724	Silk-type weaving	1.9%
28	2522	Manufacture of plastic packing goods	1.9%
29	2611	Manufacture of flat glass	1.8%
30	2416	Manufacture of plastics in primary forms	1.7%
31	2615	Manufacture and processing of other glass, including technical glassware	1.6%
32	1320	Mining of non-ferrous metal ores, except uranium and thorium ores	1.5%
33	2630	Manufacture of ceramic tiles and flags	1.5%
34	2412	Manufacture of dyes and pigments	1.4%
35	2734	Wire drawing	1.4%
36	3140	Manufacture of accumulators, primary cells and primary batteries	1.4%
37	2721	Manufacture of cast iron tubes	1.3%
38	1411	Quarrying of ornamental and building stone	1.2%
39	2320	Manufacture of refined petroleum products	1.2%
40	2682	Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products n.e.c.	1.2%
	2417	Manufacture of synthetic rubber in primary forms	<5%
	2731	Cold Drawing	<5%
	1595	Manufacture of other non-distilled fermented beverages	<5%
	1310	Mining of iron ores	<5%
	2111	Manufacture of pulp	<5%

#### NACE 4 BY TRADE INTENSITY (ALL SECTORS)

Ranking	NACE 4	Description	Trade Intensity
1	1450	Other mining and quarrying n.e.c.	181.96
2	3350	Manufacture of watches and clocks	107.41
3	2465	Manufacture of prepared unrecorded media	105.07
4	3622	Manufacture of jewellery and related articles n.e.c.	102.61
5	1830	Dressing and dyeing of fur; manufacture of articles of fur	101.89
6	1824	Manufacture of other wearing apparel and accessories n.e.c.	99.37
7	3661	Manufacture of imitation jewellery	88.18
8	3001	Manufacture of office machinery	87.75
9	1920	Manufacture of luggage, handbags and the like, saddler	87.48
10	1320	Mining of non-ferrous metal ores, except uranium and thorium ores	86.23
11	2441	Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products	85.82
12	1310	Mining of iron ores	84.92
13	3002	Manufacture of computers and other information processing equipment	83.53
14	3210	Manufacture of electronic valves and tubes and other electronic components	81.39
15	3530	Manufacture of aircraft and spacecraft	79.65
16	3630	Manufacture of musical instruments	78.19
17	2463	Manufacture of essential oils	76.97

18	3220	Manufacture of television and radio transmitters and apparatus for line telephony and line telegraphy	76.79
19	3650	Manufacture of games and toys	76.09
20	1823	Manufacture of underwear	75.56
21	2741	Precious metals production	73.87
22	2745	Other non-ferrous metal production	73.81
23	2941	Manufacture of portable hand held power tools	73.43
24	3310	Manufacture of medical and surgical equipment and orthopaedic appliances	72.73
25	2954	Manufacture of machinery for textile, apparel and leather production	71.70
26	1822	Manufacture of other outerwear	70.63
27	3230	Manufacture of television and radio receivers, sound or video recording or reproducing apparatus and associated goods	70.54
28	3511	Building and repairing of ships	69.64
29	3640	Manufacture of sports goods	66.55
30	3340	Manufacture of optical instruments and photographic equipment	66.10
31	2464	Manufacture of photographic chemical material	65.68
32	2861	Manufacture of cutlery	64.62
33	1772	Manufacture of knitted and crocheted pullovers, cardigans and similar articles	63.87
34	2952	Manufacture of machinery for mining, quarrying and construction	62.97
35	3512	Building and repairing of pleasure and sporting boats	62.04
36	1430	Mining of chemicals and fertilizer minerals	61.09
37	3663	Other manufacturing n.e.c.	60.38
38	1110	Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas	60.22
39	1930	Manufacture of footwear	59.74
40	3320	Manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring, checking, testing, navigating and other purposes, except industrial process control equipment	59.62
41	2442	Manufacture of pharmaceutical preparations	58.64
42	1723	Worsted-type weaving	58.27
43	1722	Woollen-type weaving	58.27
44	1724	Silk-type weaving	58.27
45	1725	Other textile weaving	58.27

Ranking	NACE 4	Description	Trade Intensity
46	1721	Cotton-type weaving	58.27
47	2621	Manufacture of ceramic household and ornamental articles	56.98
48	2921	Manufacture of furnaces and furnace burners	56.75
49	2624	Manufacture of other technical ceramic products	54.57
50	3140	Manufacture of accumulators, primary cells and primary batteries	54.34
51	1591	Manufacture of distilled potable alcoholic beverages	53.62
52	1010	Mining and agglomeration of hard coal	53.44
53	3541	Manufacture of motorcycles	52.67
54	1810	Manufacture of leather clothes	52.07
55	2911	Manufacture of engines and turbines, except aircraft, vehicle and cycle engines	51.03
56	3542	Manufacture of bicycles	50.41
57	1520	Processing and preserving of fish and fish products	49.65
58	2466	Manufacture of other chemical products n.e.c.	49.56
59	1541	Manufacture of crude oils and fats	49.42
60	3621	Striking of coins	49.35
61	2625	Manufacture of other ceramic products	49.12
62	2615	Manufacture and processing of other glass, including technical glassware	49.06
63	1422	Mining of clays and kaolin	49.02
64	2956	Manufacture of other special purpose machinery n.e.c.	48.70
65	2942	Manufacture of other metalworking machine tools	48.53
66	2943	Manufacture of other machine tools n.e.c.	48.09
67	1760	Manufacture of knitted and crocheted fabrics	47.69
68	1910	Tanning and dressing of leather	47.52
69	2912	Manufacture of pumps and compressors	47.42
70	2913	Manufacture of taps and valves	47.17
71	1740	Manufacture of made-up textile articles, except apparel	46.69
72	2955	Manufacture of machinery for paper and paperboard production	46.55
73	2924	Manufacture of other general purpose machinery n.e.c.	46.35
74	2414	Manufacture of other organic basic chemicals	46.26
75	2111	Manufacture of pulp	46.12
76	2452	Manufacture of perfumes and toilet preparations	45.32
77	2722	Manufacture of steel tubes	45.17
78	3162	Manufacture of other electrical equipment n.e.c.	44.77
79	1821	Manufacture of workwear	44.65
80	2330	Processing of nuclear fuel	44.30
81	1411	Quarrying of ornamental and building stone	44.18
82	2953	Manufacture of machinery for food, beverage and tobacco processing	43.63
83	3110	Manufacture of electric motors, generators and transformers	43.52
84	3662	Manufacture of brooms and brushes	43.27
85	2412	Manufacture of dyes and pigments	43.10
86	2862	Manufacture of tools	42.54
87	2951	Manufacture of machinery for metallurgy	42.08
88	3150	Manufacture of lighting equipment and electric lamps	41.31
89	2420	Manufacture of pesticides and other agro-chemical products	41.06
90	2971	Manufacture of electric domestic appliances	40.68
91	1711	Preparation and spinning of cotton fibres	40.50
92	1713	Preparation and spinning of worsted-type fibres	40.50

Ranking	NACE 4	Description	Trade Intensity
93	1715	Throwing and preparation of silk, including from noils, and throwing and texturing of synthetic or artificial filament yarns	40.50
94	1712	Preparation and spinning of woollen-type fibres	40.50
95	1714	Preparation and spinning of flax-type fibres	40.50
96	1716	Manufacture of sewing threads	40.50
97	1717	Preparation and spinning of other textile fibres	40.50
98	2681	Production of abrasive products	40.49
99	1771	Manufacture of knitted and crocheted hosiery	39.28
100	3120	Manufacture of electricity distribution and control apparatus	39.28
101	2914	Manufacture of bearings, gears, gearing and driving elements	39.00
102	2124	Manufacture of wallpaper	38.65
103	2417	Manufacture of synthetic rubber in primary forms	38.08
104	1754	Manufacture of other textiles n.e.c.	37.39
105	2626	Manufacture of refractory ceramic products	37.17
106	2215	Other publishing	37.16
107	2875	Manufacture of other fabricated metal products n.e.c.	37.12
108	2511	Manufacture of rubber tyres and tubes	37.05
109	3550	Manufacture of other transport equipment n.e.c.	36.60
110	2052	Manufacture of articles of cork, straw and plaiting materials	36.50
111	2874	Manufacture of fasteners, screw machine products, chain and springs	36.16
112	2742	Aluminium production	35.90
113	3543	Manufacture of invalid carriages	34.98
114	2744	Copper production	34.59
115	2623	Manufacture of ceramic insulators and insulating fittings	34.53
116	2923	Manufacture of non-domestic cooling and ventilation equipment	34.52
117	1752	Manufacture of cordage, rope, twine and netting	34.07
118	2960	Manufacture of weapons and ammunition	33.61
119	2470	Manufacture of man-made fibres	32.78
120	2731	Cold Drawing	32.67
121	3130	Manufacture of insulated wire and cable	32.63
122	2710	Manufacture of basic iron and steel	32.31
123	2413	Manufacture of other inorganic chemicals	31.67
124	1593	Manufacture of wines	31.45
125	1751	Manufacture of carpets and rugs	31.21
126	2931	Manufacture of agricultural tractors	31.12
127	2932	Manufacture of other agricultural and forestry machinery	31.06
128	1597	Manufacture of malt	30.89
129	1753	Manufacture of non-wovens and articles made from non-woven	30.86
130	2010	Sawmilling and planing of wood; impregnation of wood	30.77
131	2622	Manufacture of ceramic sanitary fixtures	30.21
132	2863	Manufacture of locks and hinges	29.76
133	3410	Manufacture of motor vehicles	28.91
134	2630	Manufacture of ceramic tiles and flags	28.58
135	3614	Manufacture of other furniture	28.52
136	2972	Manufacture of non-electric domestic appliances	28.18
137	2721	Manufacture of cast iron tubes	27.96
138	2670	Cutting, shaping and finishing of ornamental and building stone	27.57
139	2415	Manufacture of fertilizers and nitrogen compounds	27.36

Ranking	NACE 4	Description	Trade Intensity
140	2416	Manufacture of plastics in primary forms	27.14
141	2743	Lead, zinc and tin	26.83
142	2922	Manufacture of lifting and handling equipment	26.56
143	2513	Manufacture of other rubber products	26.52
144	2051	Manufacture of other products of wood	25.96
145	2462	Manufacture of glues and gelatines	25.88
146	2112	Manufacture of paper and paperboard	25.72
147	1595	Manufacture of other non-distilled fermented beverages	25.35
148	1588	Manufacture of homogenized food preparations and dietetic food	25.13
149	3430	Manufacture of parts and accessories for motor vehicles and their engines	24.75
150	2613	Manufacture of hollow glass	24.32
151	2214	Publishing of sound recordings	24.30
152	2020	Manufacture of veneer sheets; manufacture of plywood, laminboard, particle board, fibre board and other panels and boards	23.82
153	2614	Manufacture of glass fibres	23.40
154	2451	Manufacture of soap and detergents, cleaning and polishing preparations	23.09
155	1589	Manufacture of other food products n.e.c.	22.22
156	2734	Wire drawing	21.87
157	1533	Processing and preserving of fruit and vegetables n.e.c.	21.58
158	3161	Manufacture of electrical equipment for engines and vehicles n.e.c.	21.16
159	2873	Manufacture of wire products	21.03
160	2611	Manufacture of flat glass	21.01
161	2430	Manufacture of paints, varnishes and similar coatings, printing ink and mastics	20.75
162	3611	Manufacture of chairs and seats	20.40
163	2521	Manufacture of plastic plates, sheets, tubes and profiles	20.35
164	2524	Manufacture of other plastic products	20.00
165	2732	Cold rolling of narrow strip	19.66
166	1583	Manufacture of sugar	19.54
167	1542	Manufacture of refined oils and fats	19.38
168	1532	Manufacture of fruit and vegetable juice	18.99
169	2682	Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products n.e.c.	17.91
170	2871	Manufacture of steel drums and similar containers	17.78
171	2666	Manufacture of other articles of concrete, plaster and cement	17.66
172	2211	Publishing of books	17.42
173	1592	Production of ethyl alcohol from fermented materials	17.01
174	3520	Manufacture of railway and tramway locomotives and rolling stock	16.44
175	2320	Manufacture of refined petroleum products	16.13
176	2461	Manufacture of explosives	15.91
177	2822	Manufacture of central heating radiators and boilers	15.34
178	1562	Manufacture of starches and starch products	14.53
179	2821	Manufacture of tanks, reservoirs and containers of metal	14.52
180	2522	Manufacture of plastic packing goods	13.99
181	2125	Manufacture of other articles of paper and paperboard n.e.c.	13.59
182	2612	Shaping and processing of flat glass	13.48
183	2122	Manufacture of household and sanitary goods and of toilet requisites	12.81
184	2830	Manufacture of steam generators, except central heating hot water boilers	12.60
185	1440	Production of salt	12.52
186	1584	Manufacture of cocoa; chocolate and sugar confectionery	12.46
187	1586	Processing of tea and coffee	12.39

Ranking	NACE 4	Description	Trade Intensity
188	1600	Manufacture of tobacco products	12.03
189	2872	Manufacture of light metal packaging	11.06
190	1511	Production and preserving of meat	11.05
191	1585	Manufacture of macaroni, noodles, couscous and similar farinaceous products	10.63
192	3612	Manufacture of other office and shop furniture	10.57
193	3420	Manufacture of bodies (coachwork) for motor vehicles; manufacture of trailers and semi-trailers	10.28
	1030	Extraction and agglomeration of peat	<10%
194	1587	Manufacture of condiments and seasonings	9.95
195	1572	Manufacture of prepared pet foods	9.94
196	2523	Manufacture of builders' ware of plastic	9.39
197	2123	Manufacture of paper stationery	9.37
198	2030	Manufacture of builders' carpentry and joinery	9.02
199	2811	Manufacture of metal structures and parts of structures	8.43
200	3615	Manufacture of mattresses	8.29
201	1561	Manufacture of grain mill products	7.92
202	1543	Manufacture of margarine and similar edible fats	7.77
203	2665	Manufacture of fibre cement	7.72
204	1551	Operation of dairies and cheese making	7.63
205	2040	Manufacture of wooden containers	7.38
206	3613	Manufacture of other kitchen furniture	7.27
207	1596	Manufacture of beer	7.15
208	2512	Retreading and rebuilding of rubber tyres	7.11
209	2651	Manufacture of cement	6.75
210	2653	Manufacture of plaster	6.49
211	2224	Pre-press activities	6.44
212	1413	Quarrying of slate	6.42
213	1512	Production and preserving of poultrymeat	6.31
214	1598	Production of mineral waters and soft drinks	6.28
215	1582	Manufacture of rusks and biscuits; manufacture of preserved pastry goods and cakes	6.10
216	1531	Processing and preserving of potatoes	5.94
217	2662	Manufacture of plaster products for construction purposes	5.69
218	2121	Manufacture of corrugated paper and paperboard and of containers of paper and paperboard	5.16
	1120	Service activities incidental to oil and gas extraction, excluding surveying	<5%
	1200	Mining of uranium and thorium ores	<5%
219	2733	Cold forming or folding	4.94
220	1412	Quarrying of limestone, gypsum and chalk	4.36
221	2411	Manufacture of industrial gases	4.17
222	1421	Operation of gravel and sand pits	3.74
223	2222	Printing n.e.c.	3.71
224	1594	Manufacture of cider and other fruit wines	3.63
225	2812	Manufacture of builders' carpentry and joinery of metal	3.34
226	1513	Production of meat and poultrymeat products	3.31

Ranking	NACE 4	Description	Trade Intensity
227	2221	Printing of newspapers	3.29
228	2223	Bookbinding	3.29
229	2225	Ancillary activities related to printing	3.29
230	2213	Publishing of journals and periodicals	2.90
231	1552	Manufacture of ice cream	2.83
232	1571	Manufacture of prepared feeds for farm animals	2.79
233	2640	Manufacture of bricks, tiles and construction products, in baked clay	2.69
234	2652	Manufacture of lime	2.56
235	2664	Manufacture of mortars	2.09
236	1730	Finishing of textiles	1.5
237	2661	Manufacture of concrete products for construction purposes	1.47
238	1581	Manufacture of bread; manufacture of fresh pastry goods and cakes	0.91
239	1020	Mining and agglomeration of lignite	0.87
240	2212	Publishing of newspapers	0.24
241	2663	Manufacture of ready-mixed concrete	0.05
	2231	Reproduction of sound recording	n.a.
	2232	Reproduction of video recording	n.a.
	2233	Reproduction of computer media	n.a.
	2751	Casting of iron	n.a.
	2752	Casting of steel	n.a.
	2753	Casting of light metals	n.a.
	2754	Casting of other non-ferrous metals	n.a.
	2840	Forging, pressing, stamping and roll forming of metal; powder metallurgy	n.a.
	2851	Treatment and coating of metals	n.a.
	2852	General mechanical engineering	n.a.
	3330	Manufacture of industrial process control equipment	n.a.
	3710	Recycling of metal waste and scrap	n.a.
	3720	Recycling of non-metal waste and scrap	n.a.

## ANNEX 9

### Exchangeability of fuel and electricity (2011 Benchmarking Decision)

2. Definition of product benchmarks and system boundaries with consideration of exchangeability of fuel and electricity

Product benchmark	Definition of products covered	Definition of processes and emissions covered (system boundaries)	Carbon leakage exposure as determined by Decision 2010/2/EU for the years 2013 and 2014	Benchmark value (allowances/t)
Refinery products	Mix of refinery products with more than 40 % light products (motor spirit (gasoline) including aviation spirit, spirit type (gasoline type) jet fuel, other light petroleum oils/light preparations, kerosene including kerosene type jet fuel, gas oils) expressed as CO <sub>2</sub> weighted tonne (CWT)	All processes of a refinery matching the definition of one of the CWT process units as well as ancillary non-process facilities operating inside the refinery fence-line such as tankage, blending, effluent treatment, etc. are included.  For the determination of indirect emissions, the total electricity consumption within the system boundaries shall be considered	yes	0,0295
EAF carbon steel	Steel containing less than 8 % metallic alloying elements and tramp elements to such levels limiting the use to those applications where no high surface quality and processability is required	All processes directly or indirectly linked to the process units electric arc furnace, secondary metallurgy, casting and cutting, post-combustion unit, dedusting unit, vessels heating stands, casting ingots preheating stands, scrap drying and scrap preheating are included.  For the determination of indirect emissions, the total electricity consumption within the system boundaries shall be considered	yes	0,283

Product benchmark	Definition of products covered	Definition of processes and emissions covered (system boundaries)	Carbon leakage exposure as determined by Decision 2010/2/EU for the years 2013 and 2014	Benchmark value (allowances/t)
EAF high alloy steel	Steel containing 8 % or more metallic alloying elements or where high surface quality and processability is required	All processes directly or indirectly linked to the process units electric arc furnace, secondary metallurgy, casting and cutting, post-combustion unit, dedusting unit, vessels heating stands, casting ingots preheating stands, slow cooling pit, scrap drying and scrap preheating are included. The process units FeCr converter and cryogenic storage of industrial gases are not included.  For the determination of indirect emissions, the total electricity consumption within the system boundaries shall be considered	yes	0,352
Iron casting	Casted iron expressed as tons of liquid iron ready alloyed, skinned, and ready for casting	All processes directly or indirectly linked to the process steps melting shop, casting shop, core shop and finishing are included.  For the determination of indirect emissions, only the electricity consumption of melting processes within the system boundaries shall be considered	yes	0,325
Mineral wool	Mineral wool insulation products for thermal, acoustic and fire applications manufactured using glass, rock or slag	All processes directly or indirectly linked to the production steps melting, fibreglassing and injection of binders, curing and drying and forming are included.  For the determination of indirect emissions, the total electricity consumption within the system boundaries shall be considered	no	0,682
Plasterboard	The benchmark covers boards, sheets, panels, tiles, similar articles of plaster/compositions based on plaster, (not) faced/reinforced with paper/paperboard only, excluding articles agglomerated with plaster, ornamented (in tonnes of stucco).  High-density gypsum fibreboards not covered by this product benchmark	All processes directly or indirectly linked to the production steps milling, drying, calcining and board drying are included.  For the determination of indirect emissions, only the electricity consumption of heat pumps applied in the drying stage shall be considered	no	0,131

Product benchmark	Definition of products covered	Definition of processes and emissions covered (system boundaries)	Carbon leakage exposure as determined by Decision 2010/2/EU for the years 2013 and 2014	Benchmark value (allowances/t)
Carbon black	Furnace carbon black. Gas- and lamp black products are not covered by this benchmark	All processes directly or indirectly linked to the production of furnace carbon black as well as finishing, packaging and flaring are included.  For the determination of indirect emissions, the total electricity consumption within the system boundaries shall be considered	yes	1,954
Ammonia	Ammonia (NH <sub>3</sub> ), to be recorded in tons produced	All processes directly or indirectly linked to the production of the ammonia and the intermediate product hydrogen are included.  For the determination of indirect emissions, the total electricity consumption within the system boundaries shall be considered	yes	1,619
Steam cracking	Mix of high value chemicals (HVC) expressed as total mass of acetylene, ethylene, propylene, butadiene, benzene and hydrogen excluding HVC from supplemental feed (hydrogen, ethylene, other HVC) with an ethylene content in the total product mix of at least 30 mass-percent and a content of HVC, fuel gas, butenes and liquid hydrocarbons of together at least 50 mass-percent of the total product mix	All processes directly or indirectly linked to the production of high value chemicals as purified product or intermediate product with concentrated content of the respective HVC in the lowest tradable form (raw C4, unhydrogenated pygas) are included except C4 extraction (butadiene plant), C4-hydrogenation, hydrotreating of pyrolysis gasoline and aromatics extraction and logistics/storage for daily operation.  For the determination of indirect emissions, the total electricity consumption within the system boundaries shall be considered	yes	0,702
Aromatics	Mix of aromatics expressed as CO <sub>2</sub> weighted tonne (CWT)	All processes directly or indirectly linked to the aromatics sub-units pygas hydro-treater, benzene/toluene/xylene (BTX) extraction, TDP, HDA, xylene isomerisation, P-xylene units, cumene production and Cyclo-hexane production are included.  For the determination of indirect emissions, the total electricity consumption within the system boundaries shall be considered	yes	0,0295

Product benchmark	Definition of products covered	Definition of processes and emissions covered (system boundaries)	Carbon leakage exposure as determined by Decision 2010/2/EU for the years 2013 and 2014	Benchmark value (allowances/t)
Styrene	Styrene monomer (vinyl benzene, CAS number: 100-42-5)	All processes directly or indirectly linked to the production of styrene as well as the intermediate product ethylbenzene (with the amount used as feed for the styrene production) are included.  For the determination of indirect emissions, the total electricity consumption within the system boundaries shall be considered	yes	0,527
Hydrogen	Pure hydrogen and mixtures of hydrogen and carbon monoxide having a hydrogen content $\geq 60$ % mole fraction of total contained hydrogen plus carbon monoxide based on the aggregation of all hydrogen- and carbon-monoxide-containing product streams exported from the sub-installation concerned expressed as 100 % hydrogen	All relevant process elements directly or indirectly linked to the production of hydrogen and the separation of hydrogen and carbon monoxide are included. These elements lie between: (a) the point(s) of entry of hydrocarbon feedstock(s) and, if separate, fuel(s); (b) the points of exit of all product streams containing hydrogen and/or carbon monoxide; (c) the point(s) of entry or exit of import or export heat.  For the determination of indirect emissions, the total electricity consumption within the system boundaries shall be considered	yes	8,85
Synthesis gas	Mixtures of hydrogen and carbon monoxide having a hydrogen content $< 60$ % mole fraction of total contained hydrogen plus carbon monoxide based on the aggregation of all hydrogen- and carbon-monoxide-containing product streams exported from the sub-installation concerned referred to 47 volume-percent hydrogen	All relevant process elements directly or indirectly linked to the production of syngas and the separation of hydrogen and carbon monoxide are included. These elements lie between: (a) the point(s) of entry of hydrocarbon feedstock(s) and, if separate, fuel(s); (b) the points of exit of all product streams containing hydrogen and/or carbon monoxide; (c) the point(s) of entry or exit of import or export heat.  For the determination of indirect emissions, the total electricity consumption within the system boundaries shall be considered	yes	0,242

Product benchmark	Definition of products covered	Definition of processes and emissions covered (system boundaries)	Carbon leakage exposure as determined by Decision 2010/2/EU for the years 2013 and 2014	Benchmark value (allowances/t)
Ethylene oxide/ethylene glycols	<p>The ethylene oxide/ethylene glycol benchmark covers the products ethylene oxide (EO, high purity), monoethylene glycol (MEG, standard grade + fibre grade (high purity)), diethylene glycol (DEG), triethylene glycol (TEG).</p> <p>The total amount of products is expressed in terms of EO-equivalents (EOE), which are defined as the amount of EO (in mass) that is embedded in one mass unit of the specific glycol</p>	<p>All processes directly or indirectly linked to the process units EO production, EO purification and glycol section are included.</p> <p>The total electricity consumption (and the related indirect emissions) within the system boundaries is covered by this product benchmark</p>	yes	0,512

## ANNEX 10

### Sector assessments within the framework of Option A3

#### Mining of iron ore (NACE 1310)

##### Sector and product description

Iron ore is mainly produced outside Europe. The market is highly consolidated, dominated by three major producers in Brazil and Australia (Vale, Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton), accounting for 35 % of world production in 2010. LKAB produces around 90 % of all iron ore in the EU<sup>9</sup>. Its share of world seaborne trade is around 2 %. and its world market share is around 1 %.

The first production step involves mining. Only the second step – the grinding of iron into pellets and fines – causes CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. The two mines operated by LKAB are said to account for 2% of Sweden's electricity production.

The NACE 1310 code is split into two subsectors (see Annex 11).

GVA in 2008 was €13bn in 2008, €4bn in 2009 and €15bn<sup>10</sup>.

##### Industry and other submissions in support of eligibility

Substitutability between fuel and electricity is cited as a ground for eligibility.

While emphasising the high quality of LKAB's iron ore pellets, the sector claims that this product is nevertheless a commodity with global benchmark prices set through quarterly negotiations between the three major iron ore producers. The Asian spot price for standard grade Fe (iron)-content pellets are said to serve as the benchmark. According to the sector data for monthly, quarterly and index prices are published in Platts, The Steel Industry or Metal Bulletin.

Furthermore the sector argues that there are only small price variations for the quality add-on relating to the products manufactured by the Swedish group.

A real carbon leakage risk, according to the sector, exists at a CO<sub>2</sub> price of €17. The risk is said to take the form of slow and sustained erosion of market shares. In the sector's view the pelletisation part of the operation could easily relocate.

##### Elements of assessment

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<sup>9</sup> All iron ore production in the ETS is attributable to LKAB.

<sup>10</sup> Information by LKAB. The fall in demand in 2009 is claimed to have been a direct result of the financial crisis.

The indirect costs amount to <5% of GVA (which does not make it feasible to rank the sector in terms of indirect CO2 costs) (Annex 8).

According to data provided by LKAB (which makes up virtually all EU iron ore production) the NACE 1310 sector had indirect CO2 costs/GVA of between 2.5-2.7% during 2005-2007. The data was – like the fundamental indirect CO2 costs data relied on by this Report - based a CO2 price assumption of €30 and a CO2 factor of 0.465 Cot/MWh<sup>11</sup>.

Given the concentrated nature of the market and the reference pricing resulting from the contracts negotiated by the major players<sup>12</sup> in worldwide markets the contention that EU producers are price-takers is plausible.

Iron ore is a highly traded product<sup>13</sup> as reflected by the very high trade intensity at 85% (ranking as No 12 in terms of trade intensity) (Annex 8). As to the broad trading patterns, see figure 38 in Annex 16).

There is strong competition from large-scale, high grade overseas operations capable of producing metalliferous ores under low-cost conditions, inducing the EU extractive industry to compete by e.g. supplying quality materials and diversifying its products<sup>14</sup>.

According to a decision in the merger control area the geographic scope of the iron ore markets for inter alia pellets comprises all seaborne customer areas; in other words, all regions fully or partly dependent on seaborne supplies<sup>15</sup>. In that decision the Commission also found that no further distinction should be made between seaborne areas, particularly between Western Europe and East Asia. The Commission found that that benchmark price levels and contractual conditions were effectively based on overall market conditions in the seaborne market, and were not significantly determined by local factors<sup>16</sup>.

The 2011 Benchmarking Decision does not establish fuel and electricity substitutability in respect of products falling within this NACE 4 sector (Annex 9)

## **Production of salt (NACE 1440)**

### Sector and production description

Salt (NaCl) can be produced by different processes and technologies. Evaporated salt production from brine through so-called Mechanical Vapour Recompression (MVR) is relatively more electro-intensive (with electricity as the main energy input).

The sector's GVA at factor cost in 2007 was €49.5m and employment was 179 200 (Annex 14).

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<sup>11</sup> Based on the definitions of gross value added used by the Swedish statistical office and the OECD.

<sup>12</sup> See the 2011 Competitiveness Report.

<sup>13</sup> It would appear the most of such trade takes place by sea as land transport tends to be expensive (European Commission (SEC (2009) 1111 final), p. 134).

<sup>14</sup> European Commission (SEC (2009) 1111 final), p. 139.

<sup>15</sup> See paragraph 17 of Commission Decision of 18 July 2003 in Case No COMP/M.3161.

<sup>16</sup> See paragraph 19 of Commission Decision of 18 July 2003.

### Submissions by and in support of industry

The industry submits that the vast majority of salt produced is used as a primary source material in the production of many chemical industrial applications, notably chlorine and soda ash (within NACE 2413). In the industry's view, the location of salt at the beginning of an extensive value chain, additional burdens on the salt sector would likely have a substantial economical impact on the downstream sectors.

The salt sector claims that salt is a commodity subject to competitive pricing.

### Elements of assessment

The indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs amount to 1.7% of the sector's GVA (Annex 8).

The trade intensity amounts to 12.5% (ranking as No 185 in terms of trade intensity) (Annex 8).

A consultancy study found that the subsector in question – i.e. salt produced through the MVR process – had a weighted average trade intensity of 11.7% during 2006-2007. It also found that the indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs for the subsector as a share of the GVA amounted to an average of 14.2% during 2005-2007. However, the data related only to half of the subsector. Moreover, the calculation was based on CO<sub>2</sub> emission factors ranging from 0.61 to 1.12 CO<sub>2</sub>t/MWh.

The 2011 Benchmarking Decision does not establish substitutability between fuel and electricity in respect of salt (Annex 9).

## **Manufacture of starch and starch products (NACE 1562)**

### Sector and product description

The starch industry extracts starch from cereal grains and potatoes and processes it into several hundreds products, from native starches to physically or chemically modified starches as well as into liquid and solid sugars. Starch products are used as ingredients and functional supplements in food, non-food and feed applications. It also generates co-products in the form of animal feed (e.g. wheat proteins, corn gluten feed) and food (e.g. wheat gluten).

Starch and starch products can be very simple or – as the products are transformed along the value chain – very complex.

The sector's GVA in 2007 was €2bn. It employed 18 400 persons (Annex 14).

### Submissions by or in support of industry

The starch industry claims that the sector produces more than half the electricity it uses on site, for self-consumption (auto-generation). Using both electricity purchased on the grid and auto-generated electricity would – the industry argues – bring the indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs per GVA over

5%. The equivalent figure for France is claimed to be 6.2%. The French data are considered representative by the sector as France accounts for 30% of EU production.

The sector specifies that the auto-generation takes the form of cogeneration, a process which captures both the electricity and heat/steam produced. In the sector's view purchases from the grid would be less environmentally friendly.

The industry asserts that the EU starch production faces competition from perfectly substitutable products that can and are in fact imported from the US, the BRIC countries and Thailand.

According to the industry's estimates some relocation would take place at a CO<sub>2</sub> price of €30 and that growth would stagnate at €15.

The indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs cannot, in the industry's opinion, be passed on due to strong international competition and substitutable nature of starch and starch products. Sugar can replace glucose and tapioca starches can replace maize, barley, rice or potato starches). The industry considers that the paper sector, a key customer, is at risk of carbon leakage.

Imports of tapioca starches are said to have risen six-fold from 1997 to 2007. The industry mentions that the fact that tapioca starch is not produced in the EU means, according to the industry, that it is not included in the trade intensity calculations which are based on the NACE codes.

The trend in the starch sector is to increase the value added through further stages of transformation. According to the industry, CO<sub>2</sub> emissions rise with each level of transformation (regardless of the use of heat/steam or electricity).

In the industry's opinion the starch sector may be disadvantaged compared to other sectors producing competing materials (such as the chemicals sector), notably in the area of non-food products where starch-based products compete with fossil fuel based products. Both the starch and chemicals sectors produce, for example, paper coatings, plastics, adhesives (glues), detergents and solvents.

### Elements of assessment

The indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs amount to 1.9% of the sector's GVA (ranking as No 26 in terms of indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs) (Annex 8).

The trade intensity amounts to 14.5% (ranking as No 178 in terms of trade intensity) (Annex 8).

Data relating to France suggest that indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs in that country amounts to 1.34% of EU starch industry turnover (based on a CO<sub>2</sub> price of 30€/t CO<sub>2</sub> and an emission ratio of 0,465 tCO<sub>2</sub>/MWh).

As regards the lack of comparable data on auto-generation see sections 2.14 and 4.5.

Tapioca starch is covered by the Prodcom code 15622300 (see Annex 11).

The 2011 Benchmarking Decision does not establish fuel and electricity substitutability in respect of products falling within this NACE 4 sector (Annex 9).

## **Preparation and spinning of cotton-type fibres (NACE 1711)**

### Sector and product description

Cotton fibres are produced from raw cotton are the most used natural fibre in the world. The fibres are transformed into yarns through cotton spinning. The ring spinning process is particularly electro-intensive<sup>17</sup>.

The sector's GVA at factor cost in 2007 was €680m and employment was 29 900 (Annex 14). The sector mainly comprises medium sized firms, some of which are vertically integrated with fabric production and and in some cases with finishing.

Cotton spinning forms part of the textiles and clothing production value chain. Spinners of cotton-type fibres supply cotton yarns to textiles producers who in turn supply clothing manufacturers.

The WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing expired at the end of 2004. Since then increased production by and competition from Asian firms have been a main driver behind a substantial restructuring of the European textiles and clothing sector. China, India, Pakistan and Uzbekistan are the largest producers of cotton yarns. Asia accounts for 27m tonnes, the US for 1.5m tonnes and the EU for 1m tonnes.

### Industry and other submissions in support of eligibility

Sudden increases in the global price for raw cotton are said to have taken place in recent years. Export restrictions by e.g. India and Pakistan reportedly caused the price rises. Raw cotton is claimed to make up 45% of yarn production costs.

Relying on ITMF<sup>18</sup> data, the industry claims that electricity costs in the EU - in particular in Italy (the EU's largest producer) - increased by 80% between 2006 and 2010. Electricity prices have, according to the industry, remained stable for key non-EU competitors such as India. stable.

The WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing in 2004 and the financial crisis have, according the industry, adversely affected the cotton-fibre sector.

The industry claims that the value of spinning activities in the EU has halved over the past decade.

Demand mainly from China - is said to have risen significantly over the past 18 months. Cotton yarn production costs in Asia are claimed to be 30-35% lower than in EU (even taking into account yarn quality).

The industry argues that many of the EU's competitors have introduced special incentives in

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<sup>17</sup> Study on the Application of Value Criteria for Textile Products in Preferential Rules of Origin by Prof Michiel Scheffer, 2006

<sup>18</sup> International Trade Manufacturers Federation.

favour of their textile industries as well as imposed export restrictions on raw materials.

In most of the EU cotton spinning companies the profit margins are, in the industry's estimation, relatively low as a consequence of intense international competition. Average operating profit margins are claimed to be in the range 6-8%, while net margins are said to vary between 1 to 2%.

The industry contends that the concentration of production capacities in Asia and the EU's position as a marginal producer of raw cotton places make the EU industry a price-taker. In support of that claim the industry refers to low profit margins and the relatively small size of downstream sectors in the EU using cotton yarn for weaving and knitting (10-15% of global installed capacity).

The industry refers to closures, subcontracting or relocation by cotton spinning companies in the EU which could not compete with low Asian prices. According Effects along the textiles and clothing value chain were said to have resulted in the halving of employment over 2000-2010.

Significant capacity increases after 2001 at the global level are claimed to have occurred. The clear bulk of these investments are said to have taken place in Asia and Oceania. Currently 86% of the installed capacity is said to be located in those regions (compared to only 65% 10 years ago).

#### Elements of assessment

The indirect CO2 costs amount to 4% of the sector's GVA (ranking as No 9 in terms of indirect CO2 costs) (Annex 8).

The trade intensity amounts to 40.5% (ranking as No 91 in terms of trade intensity) (Annex 8).

Cotton type fibres are internationally priced based on a conversion rate between raw cotton and fibres, an indication of the commodity nature of cotton fibres<sup>19</sup>. A long standing cotton/cotton fibre price index ('*Cotlook A Index*') reflects price offers on the international raw cotton market<sup>20</sup>. Recent reports on the international cotton market points to global price movements<sup>21</sup>.

Spot and future trading also indicate that the next step in the value chain - cotton yarn - is also a commodity subject to global pricing<sup>22</sup> While prices of cotton yarns depend on the quality and the characteristics of the yarn, electronic price quotes are increasingly available for specific types of yarn<sup>23</sup>.

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<sup>19</sup> See website of Cotton Outlook on the evolution from 2002 to 2012 of Cotton Index A Liverpool. Cotton Outlook has been publishing CIF prices for the principal growths of raw cotton for close to fifty years. In 1966, the forerunner of what is now the Cotlook A Index was introduced. The initial published value was 31.05 cents per lb


<sup>20</sup> See infra. The price is based on an average of the cheapest five quotations from a selection (at present numbering nineteen) of the principal upland cottons traded internationally.

<sup>21</sup> See The Economist, 10 March 2012.

<sup>22</sup> See e.g. <http://www.commodityonline.com/commodities/fibers/cottonyarn.php> and <http://www.emergingtextiles.com/?q=pre&s=international-spun-yarn-price-sample-table&t=html&u=sam&r=price-database-international-yarn-daily>

<sup>23</sup> [http://www.cottonyarnmarket.net/login2/current\\_yarn\\_rate.html](http://www.cottonyarnmarket.net/login2/current_yarn_rate.html)

The EU's share of world cotton production has progressively fallen over the past two decades<sup>24</sup>:



The 2011 Benchmarking Decision does not establish fuel and electricity substitutability in respect of products falling within this NACE 4 sector (Annex 9).

## Manufacture of pulp – NACE 2111

### Sector and product description

EU production is split equally between pulp from virgin raw materials (notably wood) or pulp based on recycled paper<sup>25</sup>. Access to wood is a key issue for the pulp industry.

Pulp can be produced mechanically or chemically. Mechanical production is most electro-intensive (Annex 16, table 11)<sup>26</sup>. Some pulp plants produce electricity on site (autogeneration).

Mechanical pulping<sup>27</sup> is often integrated with paper production which is not always the case for chemical pulping.

According to one study chemical pulping accounts for over 30% of European pulp production, mechanical pulping for 6% and thermo-mechanical pulping for 12% (Annex 16, figure 17)<sup>28</sup>.

Most pulp mills are integrated with paper and cardboard production. Non-integrated pulp production is called 'market pulp'. In 2008 market pulp production<sup>1</sup> was 13.3 million tonnes, of which 12 453 million tonnes was made up of chemical pulp and 869 000 tonnes of mechanical market pulp.

<sup>24</sup> Source: UNCTAD Secretariat (based ICAC statistics)

<sup>25</sup> The recycling rate in the EU is 72% (2011 Competitiveness Report) (forthcoming).

<sup>26</sup> The Paper and Pulp BREF (draft of April 2010) shows energy consumption of 2350 kWh/t in the pulp part of a integrated thermo-mechanical mill compared to 1800-3600 kWh/t in a non-integrated pulp mill (Tables 5.10 and 5.11). Link: [http://eippcb.jrc.es/reference/BREF/PP\\_D1\\_0410.pdf](http://eippcb.jrc.es/reference/BREF/PP_D1_0410.pdf)

<sup>27</sup> Of the 13 subsectors in NACE 2111, two refer to mechanical pulp ("Thermo-mechanical wood" and "Mechanical wood pulp (excluding thermo-mechanical wood pulp)").

<sup>28</sup> McKinsey (2006), pp. 29-30.

The sector consists of 13 subsectors<sup>29</sup> (Annex 11).

The sector's GVA at factor cost in 2007 was €2.181bn (Annex 14). Employment is estimated to be around 20 000.

### Industry and other submissions in support of eligibility

The industry submissions focus on mechanical pulp mills<sup>30</sup>. It is argued that eligibility should be assessed not at sector or subsector but at installation level. It is argued that installations whose electricity purchases amount to more than 3% of total production costs should be eligible<sup>31</sup>.

It is claimed that for mechanical pulp mills electricity makes up, on average, 18% of total production costs in Europe.

In the view of the industry federation indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs/GVA for mechanical pulp mills (i.e. a subsector of NACE 2111) would exceed 10%.

Fuel and electricity substitutability is claimed as a basis for eligibility with reference to the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision including pulp among sectors receiving competition for direct CO<sub>2</sub> costs.

The industry claims that the EU pulp sector is a price-taker given that prices are said to be set globally. To this end, reference is made to findings in a report from 2008<sup>32</sup>. Prices are said to be identical across regions if account is taken of the impact of exchange rates and transaction costs. The industry is of the view that the EU pulp sector cannot set prices without taking into account prices set in US and Asia.

Almost 60% of the pulp investment of the world's top 100 firms in the period 2006-2010 will according to the industry be carried out in Asia during 2006-2010. Investment leakage risks are said to relate to Asia (in particular China), Russia and South America.

While the industry is still dominated by North American and European firms, South American, Asian and African firms are said to be gaining ground.

The industry draws attention to what it calls latent mechanical pulp production capacity.

### Elements of assessment

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<sup>29</sup> Of the 13 subsectors in NACE 2111, two refer to mechanical pulp ("Thermo-mechanical wood" and "Mechanical wood pulp" (excluding "thermo-mechanical wood pulp").

<sup>30</sup> A large share of the submissions are based on information from RISI, a consultancy.

<sup>31</sup> Relying on the definition of electro-intensive undertakings in the Council Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity.

<sup>32</sup> Pellervo Economic Research Institute Reports 207 ('The Effects of a Revision of the Emission Trading Directive for the period starting 2013 on the European Pulp and Paper Industry') Helsinki 2008. The report refers to the need for some caution on the econometric findings regarding pulp, citing rather short times series and the fact that data was derived from different databases. The report admits that the estimates as regards the price elasticity of demand for pulp are lower in absolute terms than those for paper assessed in the same report. This is said to be explained by the fact that a large part of the pulp trade is made up of intra-firm trade

The indirect costs amount to <5% of GVA (which does not make it feasible to rank the sector in terms of indirect CO2 costs) (Annex 8).

Data indicates that the indirect CO2 costs may make up 2.2% of GVA in the sector<sup>33</sup>. That estimate was based on Best Available Technologies<sup>34</sup> and the assumption that only mechanical mills make purchases of electricity. Those findings were based on the following data and assumptions. Eurostat GVA for 2008 was used. That data only covers so-called market pulp. Value added for pulp production which is integrated with paper production is reported under the NACE code covering paper and cardboard production.

A CO2 price of €30 and an average of regional CO2 factors were assumed (0.67) (i.e. higher than the CO2 factor of 0.465 used in respect of the sectors in the indirect CO2 cost ranking in Annex 8). On the other hand the calculations are based on the Best Available Techniques which implies that all mills have best available technology in place (which is not the case).

The trade intensity amounts to 46.1% (ranking as No 75 in terms of trade intensity) (Annex 8).

Recent analyses by the Commission indicate that prices for pulp are set globally<sup>35</sup> and that the EU pulp industry is a price-taker. This is not contradicted by the Commission's definition of the relevant geographic market in previous merger cases<sup>36</sup>.

The international reach of pulp supply chains are increasing, reflected in net trade flows favourable to EU main trade partners<sup>37</sup>.

EU pulp is mainly exported to China, Switzerland and Turkey. Non-EU imports originate mostly from woody areas such as Brazil (33% of imports), USA, Canada, Russia and Indonesia. All tariffs for pulp in European markets have been abolished since 2004<sup>38</sup>.

The 2011 Benchmarking Decision does not establish any substitutability between fuel and electricity in respect of pulp (Annex 9).

## **Paper and paperboard (NACE 2112)**

### Sector and product description

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<sup>33</sup> CEPI.

<sup>34</sup> BREF (2001, tables 2.23 and 4.10).

<sup>35</sup> See 2011 Competitiveness report, confirming previous findings in European Commission (SEC (2009) 1111 final), p. 161 ("Since most pulp ... grades are effectively commodities, prices are set by the lowest-cost producers on the global market").

<sup>36</sup> The pulp market was found to be at least EEA-wide market in Case No COMP/ M.5283 (SAPPI/M-Real ) at paragraph 20; see also Case No COM/M5477 of 20.4.2009 at paragraph 24.

<sup>37</sup> Cambridge Econometrics (2011), p. 25; the international and competitive nature of pulp markets are endorsed by De Bruyn et al (2010), pp. 23-24.

<sup>38</sup> European Commission (SEC (2009) 1111), p. 163.

Europe represents a quarter of world paper production (close to 1 000 paper mills) and consumption. Nearly all paper mills relying on mechanical pulp (see above) use autogenerated electricity<sup>39</sup>. Biomass is widely used as a fuel.

The NACE Code 2112 is divided into almost 50 subsectors at Prodcom level (Annex 11).

The sector's GVA at factor cost in 2007 was €15.669bn and employment was 196 400 (Annex 14)

#### Industry and other submissions in support of eligibility<sup>40</sup>

Substitutability between fuel and electricity is cited by the industry as one basis for eligibility. Eligibility should, in the industry federation's view, be confined to products derived from mechanical pulp (whether based on wood or recycled paper) (see above as regards pulp). Eligibility should, according to the federation, be defined at subsector (Prodcom) level.

Industry stakeholders claim that prices are set globally, relying on the same report cited in the section above on the pulp sector. It is alleged that the industry faces increasing competition not only from non-EU competitors (including Asia and South America) but also from other materials such as aluminium, glass and steel. Paper is also said to face increasing competition from the ICT sector.

The risks in the EU are said to involve investment leakage and relocation. The industry maintains that the vast majority of investments made in recent years and planned for the coming years are located in South East Asia and South America. Almost 60% of the pulp investment of the world's top 100 firms in the period 2006-2010 will be carried out in Asia during 2006-2010.

But the industry also claims that in the short term there is scope at the global level for increasing the use of installed capacity to compensate for closure of European plants. It argues that in the medium and long term entry costs are driven down by the presence of significant government subsidies for investment, in particular in the two regions mentioned above.

According to the industry, paper and paperboard being commodities, qualitative differentiation for the same type of product is very limited, although differentiation and branding are significant during later stages of processing, production of finished products and paper use. The industry federation contends that transport costs are low in relation to final product prices.

The industry argues that that mechanical pulp on the one hand and mechanical paper/paperboard production on the other hand are linked to such an extent that the value chain may relocate together in case of carbon leakage affecting pulp production.

#### Elements of assessment

The indirect costs amount to 4.8% of GVA (ranking as No 6 in terms of indirect CO2 costs) (Annex 8).

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<sup>39</sup> So-called 'CHP' (combined heat and power).

<sup>40</sup> A large part of the submissions are based on information from RISI, a consultancy.

The trade intensity amounts to 25.72 % (ranking as No 146 in terms of trade intensity) (Annex 8).

Recent findings by the Commission indicate that prices are set globally<sup>41</sup>, a conclusion which is not inconsistent with the Commission's geographic market definition in previous merger cases<sup>42</sup>. The Commission has also found that there are increased imports to China of input materials (wood, pulp and recovered paper). The EU paper industry has also been found to face export restrictions limiting access to such inputs<sup>43</sup>. No tariffs on paper in European markets apply since 2004.

The market for paper has been found to be international, competitive but at the same time highly diversified. There are various base materials, production methods and applications, varying from printing paper to packaging<sup>44</sup>.

The 2011 Benchmarking Decision does not establish any substitutability between fuel and electricity in respect of paper and paperboard (Annex 9).

## **Manufacture of refined petroleum products (NACE 2320)**

### Sector and product description<sup>45</sup>

Refineries are large complex industrial plants converting crude oil into a wide range of products (Annex 16, figure 31) including light distillates (gasoline, naphtha, LPG), middle distillates (gasoil, diesel, kerosene), heavy distillates and specialized products (lubricants, aromatics, bitumen etc.). The refining process varies in complexity but all techniques follow a similar production pattern. The lighter the final products are, the greater the energy intensity and vice versa. Refining by-products are used in petrochemical processes to produce materials such as plastics.

The industry structure has been described as “relatively fragmented”<sup>46</sup>. There are around 100 refineries in the EU. They are often integrated with production of basic chemicals (for example through steam cracking); indeed, 41 of the 53 steam crackers in the EU are integrated refineries/steam crackers. More than three quarters of the feedstocks of those integrated complexes come from refineries.<sup>47</sup> Close to 800 000 jobs in the downstream petrochemicals sector (notably basic chemicals and plastics) are directly linked to refining activity.

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<sup>41</sup> See p. 169 of the 2011 Competitiveness report, confirming findings in European Commission (SEC (2009) 1111 final), p. 161 (“Since most ... paper grades are effectively commodities, prices are set by the lowest-cost producers on the global market”).

<sup>42</sup> See Case No COMP/M.5950 Munksjö/Arjowiggins of 21 February 2011 at paragraphs 28-31; see also Case No COMP/M.3284 Outokumpu/Boliden finding that in the past the Commission held that the market for fine paper including WFU paper is at least EEA wide.

<sup>43</sup> 2011 Competitiveness report.

<sup>44</sup> De Bruyn et al (2010), pp. 23-24.

<sup>45</sup> “De Bruyn et al (2010), pp. 18-19. How an oil refinery works” (Europia website).

<sup>46</sup> McKinsey (2006), p. 44.

<sup>47</sup> The Commission Staff Working paper on refining and supply of petroleum products in the EU, page 19.

Refineries are characterised by a high degree of auto-generation of electricity<sup>48</sup>.

Prodcom does not contain information for the subsectors within NACE 2320.

The sector's GVA at factor cost in 2007 was €28.29bn and its employment was 124 200 (Annex 14), most of which high-skilled.

#### Industry and other submissions in support of eligibility

The industry federation's main basis for the eligibility claim is low profit margins<sup>49</sup> and a high degree fuel and electricity substitutability<sup>50</sup>. While electricity is on average said to constitute around 14% of the energy used in EU refineries, the share is said to vary significantly from refinery to refinery. The federation maintains that electricity can represent anything between 7% and 25% of a refinery's energy use.

EU refineries are said to produce over 50% of the electricity they consume, for which they receive no free allowances in the context of direct CO<sub>2</sub> costs (2010 Carbon Leakage Decision and the 2011 Benchmarking Decision). In the industry's view internally generated electricity should be added to the imported electricity when assessing the indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs as part of the sector's GVA<sup>51</sup>. On that basis those costs would amount to between 2.5 and 3% of GVA<sup>52</sup>.

Refinery products are described as homogenous commodities which are substitutable if EU fuel standards are met. Prices are said to be determined in open and transparent international markets via hubs. Transport costs are claimed to be small in relation to product value. According to the industry federation imports to the EU become competitive at a CO<sub>2</sub> price of 15-20€

While outright relocation is not seen as a risk, reference is made to risks of investment leakage over the longer term, in particular to the Middle East.

As evidence of low profit margins reference is made to recent announcements by two refiners (Petroplus and Total) and the closure of at least nine refineries since mid-2008.

European refiners are said to be in competition with producers located in the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent and Russia. The sector claims that Europe's high diesel demand due to its large diesel fleet cannot be satisfied by its own refineries and that those non-European refiners do not have similar direct and indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs.

According to the industry, in a situation of low refining margins, many of the previously announced projects may not be implemented and the latest estimate is that only some 14 billion Euros of investments might be spent improving the European refining system by 2020, depending on the economic conditions.

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<sup>48</sup> Amounting to 55% according to Barron et al (2008) (at footnote 26).

<sup>49</sup> Wood Mackenzie, a consultancy, forecasts that North Western European Urals cracking margins will reach \$3.45/bbl in 2010 compared to \$2.62/bbl 2009 and \$4.62/bbl in 2008. According to the consultancy, margins are set to continue to rise slowly, reaching levels of \$5.13/bbl in real (2010) terms by 2015.

<sup>50</sup> See reply to questionnaire by France in support of that argument.

<sup>51</sup> Claims by EUROPIA.

<sup>52</sup> EUROPIA assessment

### Elements of assessment:

The indirect CO2 costs amount to 1.2% of the sector's GVA (ranking as No 39 in terms of indirect CO2 costs) (Annex 8).

The trade intensity amounts to 16.13% (ranking as No 175 in terms of trade intensity) (Annex 8).

It appears from previous competition cases that the geographic market definition (regional, Western Europe, at least EEA-wide etc.) depends on the particular refinery product in question<sup>53</sup>. They also show that some products in this sector were found to be transportable whereas others were deemed not to be transportable due to physical or chemical characteristics, safety requirements and the consequent substantial transport costs. A previous study finds that the refinery sector is able to pass on costs to customers to a large extent<sup>54</sup>.

A further study finds that motor gasoline and fuel oil are supplied almost exclusively from EU refiners and that it is conceivable that the refinery industry is a price-maker which is able to pass on either cash cost or the opportunity cost as in electricity markets<sup>55</sup>.

According to one recent study the world refinery industry is characterised by its regional character<sup>56</sup>. Refinery capacity is dominated by the Middle East, North-West Europe and South America, which together account for almost two thirds of global refineries. According to that study, apart from this structural trade (see below), refineries are traded at local and regional markets.

Another study confirms some markets tend to be 'rather local' due to transport costs and logistics (with the exception of so-called structural imports)<sup>57</sup>.

The EU structurally is dependent for some products in order to match supply and demand. Demand for middle distillates (gasoil/diesel, jet fuel and kerosene) is growing and the demand for gasoline is falling. The EU imports middle distillates from Russia (diesel) and from the Middle East (kerosene and jet fuel) while it exports gasoline largely to the US<sup>58</sup>. Indeed, one industry trend since 1990 involves a shift from gasoline towards diesel (Annex 16, figure 9) due to tax incentivised dieselisation. Tightening of product specifications (e.g. desulphurization) required significant capacity investments<sup>59</sup>.

Profit margins tend to fluctuate, the oil price being a main variable (Annex 16, figure 32). As a result of falling demand while keeping stable capacity, refining margins in 2009 were at their

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<sup>53</sup> See M.4094M.4094 10.08.2006 INEOS / BP DORMAGEN; Case COMP/M.2345 — Deutsche BP/Erdölchemie, 26 April 2001 and Case COMP/M.4005 — Ineos/Innovene, 9 December 2005.

<sup>54</sup> McKinsey (2006), p. 46.

<sup>55</sup> Reinaud (2008), p. 62.

<sup>56</sup> De Bruyn et al (2010), p. 18.

<sup>57</sup> See McKinsey (2006) at p. 45 referring to liquefied petroleum gas; naphta; motor gasoline; kerosene type jet fuel; gas and diesel oil; residual fuel oil; other petroleum products as falling under 'structural imports'.

<sup>58</sup> The Commission Staff Working paper of 17 November 2011 on refining and supply of petroleum products in the EU, Evolution of EU net imports in key petroleum products, page 9, 10.

<sup>59</sup> According to Reinaud (2008) (at p. 62) the Euro 5 legislation necessitated foreign investment in desulphurization amounting to USD 2-4 per barrel.

lowest level in last 15 years. From the mid-1980s the industry was characterised by overcapacity and low profitability. The IEA predicts that the construction of refineries globally over the past two years and a massive contraction in oil consumption during the recession have led to a glut of capacity at the global level.<sup>60</sup>

According to the IFP<sup>61</sup>, a consultancy, complex margins from \$3.4/bbl are "perfectly satisfactory from a refiner's perspective". In the table below the North-West European margin (claimed to be representative for Europe) was 1.3 \$/bbl in North-West European).

**Average annual margins (in \$/bbl)**

YEAR	NWE BRENT CRACKING	LLS CRACKING USA	DUBAI HYDROCRACKING (SINGAPORE)	DUBAI HYDROCRACKING (CHINA)
2007	6.3	4.6	3.6	3.1
2008	5.2	1.9	3.1	2.4
2009	1.3	-0.2	-1.5	-1.8

Source: IEA

The Commission's 2011 Benchmarking Decision confirms fuel and electricity substitutability in respect of a number of products in the refinery sector (Annex 9)<sup>62</sup>.

**Industrial gases (NACE 2411)**

Sector and product description<sup>63</sup>

Industrial gases are produced both by independent operators ("outsourced production") and in-house ("in-sourced production") by manufacturers using industrial gases. At EU level, 47% of oxygen production and 49% of hydrogen production is outsourced.

The metal sector, including steel mills, is by far the largest oxygen consumer among the clients of the European industrial gas federation<sup>64</sup> (58% of all oxygen). Refineries and the petrochemical sector are among the main hydrogen consuming sectors. Oil refining accounts for 48% of the hydrogen produced by federation members (Annex 16, figure 35).

The industrial gases sector comprises ten subsectors (Annex 11), including oxygen and nitrogen which are used in virtually all manufacturing. Industrial gases can be transported in bulk, cylinders and via pipelines.

<sup>60</sup> The Commission Staff Working paper of 17 November 2010 on refining and supply of petroleum products in the EU, page 15.

<sup>61</sup> Commission Staff Working paper on refining and the supply of petroleum products in the EU, page 39.

<sup>62</sup> See also recital 24 of the 2011 Benchmarking Decision which specifically refers to the refinery benchmark.

<sup>63</sup> Eiga.org website.

<sup>64</sup> EIGA.

The sector's GVA at factor cost in 2007 was €4.99bn and employment was 39 000 (Annex 14)

### Industry and other submissions in support of eligibility

The industry federation's key argument for eligibility is the alleged distortions of competition in favour of in-sourced production (i.e. at steel mills, refineries and chemical plants) at the expense of outsourced production.

If industrial gases companies alone (outsourced production) were to bear higher costs related to indirect CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, it is argued that their manufacturing customers (steel mills, chemicals manufacturers and refiners) would face an "incentive" to re-internalise the production of the gases needed in their industrial processes. A study is cited in support of these claims<sup>65</sup>.

The ETS Guidelines should, the industry federation argues, create a level playing field between in-sourced and outsourced oxygen and nitrogen plants.

On a NACE 4 basis, industry stakeholders argue that 2% indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs as a share of GVA should suffice for eligibility. Alternatively, given that the risk of carbon leakage does not extend to the whole of the NACE 2411 sector but in particular to three products at Prodcom level (oxygen, hydrogen and nitrogen) eligibility should be assessed at subsector level.

The risk of carbon leakage (to third countries) is said to be bound up with the risk of carbon leakage affecting clients downstream.

Industry stakeholders explain that industrial gases are not transportable due to intrinsic characteristics, safety issues and high costs except for the small proportion channelled via pipelines. Nevertheless, it is submitted that there is a risk of 'internal carbon leakage' even if relocation to third countries is not at issue.

### Elements of assessment

The indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs amount to 7.5% of the sector's GVA (ranking as No 2 in terms of indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs) (Annex 8).

The trade intensity amounts to 4.17% (ranking as No 221 in terms of trade intensity) (Annex 8).

The 2011 Benchmarking Decision accepts fuel and electricity inter-changeability in respect of two gases (hydrogen and syngas) (Annex 9)<sup>66</sup>.

Recital 23 of the ETS Directive, in the context of setting out principles for compensation for direct CO<sub>2</sub> costs states such rules should "avoid undue distortions of competition between industrial activities carried out in installations operated by a single operator and production in outsourced installations". It could thus by analogy be envisaged to address those specific concerns through an electricity efficiency benchmark (see ... ) in the client eligible sectors (such as steel) that would create the level playing required by recital 23.

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<sup>65</sup> Study by Deloitte dated October 2009.

<sup>66</sup> The second being 'synthesis gas' (which is not one of the 10 subsectors in the relevant Prodcom list (2007)).

## Basic organic chemicals (NACE 2414)

### Sector and product description

The NACE 2414 sector (basic organic chemicals) comprises close to 200 subsectors (Prodcom level) (Annex 11), compared to the NACE 2413 (basic inorganic chemicals) which comprises 98 subsectors (at Prodcom level). The NACE 2413 sector is not assessed qualitatively as it automatically qualifies under Option A3 (see section 4.9 in the main report).

Strong inter-linkages between several upstream and downstream levels and a large number of production steps characterise the chemical sector.

A very large number of products can be derived from the chemical compounds produced upstream by large installations benefiting from economies of scale. Refinery products (NACE 2320) are often used to produce basic organic chemicals (NACE 2414) such as ethylene and propylene which in turn often are used to produce further derivatives within the NACE 2414 sector as well as polymers and other plastics in primary forms (NACE 2416). The graph below illustrates the petrochemical chain:




Figure 1.1: Structure of Industrial Organic Chemistry  
Based on figure by Griesbaum in [CITEPA, 1997 #47]

The chemical industry was not part of ETS 1 and ETS 2.

The sector's GVA at factor cost in 2007 was €27.56bn and employment was 148 300 (Annex 14)

### Industry and other submissions in support of eligibility

In connection with the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision regarding direct fuel the chemical industry argued in favour of eligibility based on the NACE 3 level (which comprises both NACE 2413

and 2414)<sup>67</sup>. This case is no longer explicitly made. Instead the industry's eligibility argumentation focuses on fuel and electricity inter-changeability<sup>68</sup>.

In the view of industry stakeholders even small imported quantities are set the EU price when import prices fall below the lowest domestic price in the internal market. Import duties are claimed to be lower – sometimes much lower – than those of key trading partners (Annex 16, figure 34).

Stakeholders maintain that the EU chemical industry is the most CO<sub>2</sub> and electricity efficient in the world and that chemical production contributes towards the transition to a low-carbon economy.

The risks are said to relate to investment leakage rather than relocation. Given the integration of the chemical industry chain effects in the form of co-location could arise as a result of leakage. Certain products<sup>69</sup> within the NACE 2414 sector are said to be at less risk of carbon leakage if chlorine (a subsector within NACE 2413) is eligible.

The linkages between the organic chemical sector (NACE 2414) and the plastics sector (NACE 2416) and especially commodity polymers are emphasised by industry stakeholders. If for example polyethylene production (2414 or 2416) left Europe, stakeholders assert that 55-60% of European ethylene production would lose its target<sup>70</sup>.

Reference is also made to price clauses automatically releasing buyers from purchase obligations if prices for e.g. ethylene or propylene (part of NACE 2414) risk to reach uncompetitive levels<sup>71</sup>.

The industry accepts that no significant leakage has been observed in the chemical sector during ETS 1 and so far under ETS 2. But it is argued that ETS 3 will impose greater burdens. One industry submission claims that the risk of carbon leakage sets in at a CO<sub>2</sub> price of €12.

### Elements of assessment

The indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs amount to 2.2% of the sector's GVA (ranking as No 23 in terms of indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs) (Annex 8).

The trade intensity amounts to 46.3% (ranking as No 74 in terms of trade intensity) (Annex 8).

According to one study relatively little is so far known about the ability of the ability of the basic organic chemicals sector to pass on their free EUAs<sup>72</sup>. Given the high degree of product differentiation in the basic organic chemical sector it is also difficult to generalise as to pass on ability and carbon leakage risks due to the expected higher electricity costs<sup>73</sup>. On the other a

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<sup>67</sup> European Commission (SEC(2009) 1710), p. 7.

<sup>68</sup> See reply to questionnaire by France in support of this argument.

<sup>69</sup> EDC and VCA.

<sup>70</sup> Plastics Europe.

<sup>71</sup> Plastics Europe.


<sup>72</sup> De Bruyn et al (2010), p. 15.

<sup>73</sup> European Commission (SEC (2009) 1111 final), p. 38.


study on major energy-intensive industries found when considering different sectors' ability to set price that pricing in the basic chemical sector (which includes NACE 2414) was competitive<sup>74</sup>.

The fact that some products are too hazardous to be transported long distances has been taken into account in previous Commission decisions in merger cases concerning some subsectors within NACE 2414<sup>75</sup>. At the same time, the Commission's decisional practice accepts that the extent of the market may be wider if transport of the chemical in question is not deemed hazardous<sup>76</sup>.

There is evidence of a high degree of correlation (both past and forecast) between EU prices and prices in other regions for key basic organic chemicals such as ethylene and propylene<sup>77</sup>.



There is also evidence of a high degree of price correlation between derivatives for ethylene and propylene falling with the NACE 2414 sector as well as other NACE 2414 sectors<sup>78</sup>.



<sup>74</sup> Ecorys (2009), p. 22. That study (p. 41) also refers to some US studies citing high international elasticities of demand for basic organic chemicals. See sections 2.1.4 and 4.9.2.2 in the main report on the major caveats related to such estimates.

<sup>75</sup> See the Commission's decision of 10 August 2005 in Case No COMP/M.4094 - Ineos/BP Dormagen concerning ethylene oxide (considered to be a hazardous product) indicating that the extent of the market did not extend beyond the EEA and Switzerland. The geographic market definition was left open.

<sup>76</sup> See the same Commission decision (M.4094) as regards a product not considered hazardous (ethylene glycol). The decision indicates that the geographic market was at least EEA-wide, although the market definition was left open; see also de Bruyn et al (2010), p. 15.

<sup>77</sup> Source: CMAI, Asian Market Report Light Olefins, March 2011, page 7.  
[http://www.cmaiglobal.com/Marketing/Samples/AMRLO\\_Monthly.pdf](http://www.cmaiglobal.com/Marketing/Samples/AMRLO_Monthly.pdf)

<sup>78</sup> Source: Cefic. See also ICIS Chemical Business November 7-13 2011 on the spot bulk price for benzene spot bulk with exhibiting a strong price correlation across Asia, Europe and the US.

This is also true of key products such as polymers (within NACE 2416) further down the value chains. The scope for passing through costs from the NACE 2414 sector to the NACE 2416 and beyond is thus much reduced.

International benchmarks prices for key petrochemical products (including subsectors within NACE 2414 and 2416) are quoted on the icispricing.com website<sup>79</sup>.

It appears that the basic organic chemical sector (NACE 2414) compared to the basic inorganic chemical sector (NACE 2413) has so far withstood the pressure of international competition well<sup>80</sup>. The basic chemical sector experienced a trade surplus of over €40bn in 2009, while the basic inorganic chemicals sector experienced a deficit. The prices of basic inorganic chemicals also fell by 15.6% between the years 2009-2010 whilst the chemical sector as a whole experienced a rise in price of 1.4%. The Commission has recently described basic organic chemicals as 'one of the EU's most competitive sectors'<sup>81</sup>.

The high level interdependence between production activities in all basic chemical subsectors and exposure to carbon pricing in one chemical subsector could impact on derivatives<sup>82</sup>. But if it were not the case such interdependence could also serve to reduce the carbon leakage risk<sup>83</sup>. Even further upstream the basic chemicals sector is integrated with the petrochemical sectors given that production relies largely on oil and gas among the raw materials. Middle Eastern producers have recently increased their investment in integrated petrochemical production facilities<sup>84</sup>. It appears that investments over the coming years and decade will largely take place outside the EU<sup>85</sup>.

The 2011 Benchmarking Decision establishes substitutability between fuel and electricity in respect of some basic organic chemicals (Annex 9)<sup>86</sup>.

## **Mineral fertilisers and nitrogen compounds (NACE 2415)**

### Sector and product description

The NACE 4 code 2415 comprises 34 subsectors at Prodcom level (Annex 11).

Ammonia is the basic building block of fertilisers. Ammonia is derived from air and natural gas. Adding nitric acid to ammonia results in nitrogen fertiliser. Nitrogen (N) is the main nutrient in

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<sup>79</sup> ICIS pricing report covers all the major chemical markets including key products within the NACE 2414 sectors such as ethylene, propylene, butadiene, benzene, toluene and xylene.

<sup>80</sup> Cambridge Econometrics (2010).

<sup>81</sup> 2011 Competitiveness report, at p. 155 (forthcoming).

<sup>82</sup> Cambridge Econometrics (2010), p. 27.

<sup>83</sup> European Commission (SEC (2009) 1111 final), p. 40.

<sup>84</sup> 2011 Competitiveness report; European Commission (SEC (2009) 1111 final), p. 40.

<sup>85</sup> See ICIS Chemicals Business 23-29 January 2012 which lists various planned investments in the ethylene sector in China.

<sup>86</sup> Chemicals obtained via steam cracking, aromatics as well as ethylene oxide.

EU fertiliser production (10.1m of out of a total of 14.7m tonnes), the remainder being made up of potassium (P) and calcium (K) based fertilisers<sup>87</sup>.

Urea is another form of fertiliser derived from ammonia<sup>88</sup>. Urea accounts for 30% of fertiliser use in the EU.

Fertilisers are produced in powder (granular) or liquid form.

The centrality of natural gas in fertiliser production should be emphasised. Fertiliser producers consume around 5% of global gas production. Natural gas accounts for 90% of the costs of ammonia production. Nitrogen fertilizer use has made nitrous oxide (N<sub>2</sub>O) the third most important greenhouse gas<sup>89</sup>.

This sector only becomes part of the ETS as of 2013.

The sector's GVA at factor cost in 2007 was €3.67bn and employment was 56 400 (Annex 14)

#### Industry and other submissions in support of eligibility

The acceptance of fuel inter-changeability in respect of ammonia in the Commission's 2011 Benchmarking Decision' relating to direct CO<sub>2</sub> costs is adduced by the industry as a ground for eligibility for the NACE 2415 sector.

Nitrogen fertilisers are described as a commodity. The commodity aspect consists, according to the industry, in the nitrogen content (said to account for 80-90% of the price of nitrogen fertilisers). As a result, the price correlation between different types of fertilisers is said to be strong.

The EU fertiliser manufacturing market is said to be fragmented along national lines, a legacy of the divestment by oil and gas companies of their fertiliser divisions.

Relying on a report from 2008<sup>90</sup>, the industry federation argues that EU fertiliser manufacturers are price takers and that the price elasticity of export demand is high and that, consequently, EU producers cannot set prices independently of competitors around the world.

The industry claims that that urea, a form of fertilisers, is traded globally via hubs in the Black Sea Region and the Arab Gulf. Trade flows from these hubs allegedly dictate world fertiliser prices. Reference is made to developed spot markets, characterised by price volatility.

While it is claimed that the current external tariffs of 6.5% on non-EU imports do not shield EU producers from competitive, it is accepted the antidumping duties which are currently in place offer some protection.

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<sup>87</sup> See efma.org.

<sup>88</sup> See Pellervo Economic Research Institute Reports 208 Pellervo (2008)), p. 2; see EFMA Annual Report 2008, p. 19 at [http://www.efma.org/docs/Emission\\_trading.pdf](http://www.efma.org/docs/Emission_trading.pdf)

<sup>89</sup> After CO<sub>2</sub> and methane.

<sup>90</sup> Pellervo Economic Research Institute Reports 208 (2008).

The industry maintains that there is in practice no further scope for reducing electricity consumption given the necessity to use natural gas as feedstock. Other production routes with lower CO<sub>2</sub> content would, it is argued, only be competitive in the long term.


The dependence on gas requires that production facilities be located close to pipelines or LNG terminals. Large investments in such facilities are said have taken place in particular in Russia, the Black Sea Region and Algeria.

### Elements of assessment

The indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs amount to 3.7% of the sector's GVA (ranking as No 10 in terms of indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs) (Annex 8).

The trade intensity amounts to 27.36% (ranking as No 139 in terms of trade intensity) (Annex 8).

The claim that fertiliser prices are set internationally and that EU fertiliser manufacturers are price-takers is supported by the Commission's previous decisions in merger cases<sup>91</sup>. There is also evidence of distinct price correlation across regions<sup>92</sup>:



Some carbon leakage literature also finds that the EU fertiliser sector may have faced problems in passing on the opportunity costs of their free EUAs<sup>93</sup>.

The trade position of fertilisers within the chemicals sector broadly defined has been found to be particularly weak<sup>94</sup>.

<sup>91</sup> See Commission Decision in Case No COMP/M.4730 – YARA/Kermia Growhow at para 30 where the market for urea was deemed to be world-wide in scope (with more than 40% of urea sold to industrial customers being imported, mostly from Russia, Ukraine, Egypt, Libya and the Middle East). See also paragraph 20 where the relevant geographic market for field fertilisers was deemed to be at least EEA-wide and where it was considered that the high level of imports into the EEA (N 10%, P 60% and K40%) suggested that the market may be wider.

<sup>92</sup> Source: Cefic.

<sup>93</sup> De Bruyn et al (2010), p. 15.

<sup>94</sup> European Commission (SEC (2009) 1111 final), p. 37.

Considerable spare capacity appears to exist in surrounding non-EU countries; for example, Russia alone is said to possess spare capacity for nitrogen fertiliser production amounting to 2m tonnes (i.e. around one fifth of EU production of nitrogen fertilisers)<sup>95</sup>.

The 2011 Benchmarking Decision accepts that there is substitutability between fuel and electricity in respect of ammonia (Annex 9).

## **Manufacture of plastics in primary forms (NACE 2416)**

### Sector and product description

The NACE 2416 code consists of 51 subsectors at Prodcod level (Annex 11). It is highly integrated upstream with the inorganic chemical sector (chlorine as input for the polymer PVC) as well as with the organic chemical sectors (eg ethylene and propylene as feedstocks for polymers).

Plastics *in primary forms* are compounds formed by the reaction of simple molecules. They are by definition not compounded with other materials. Polymers constitute the main subsector category within NACE 2416.

Of around 20 groups of plastics in primary forms there are five high volume groups: polyethylene; polypropylene; polyvinylchloride (PVC); polystyrene and polyethylene terephthalate (PET) which account for around 75% of plastics production in primary forms in Europe. Those products are often referred to as 'commodity polymers' or 'thermoplastics'. They are used in high volume and wide range of applications, such as packaging.

Plastics in primary forms come in different forms (liquids, pastes, lumps, powders, granules, flakes and similar bulk forms).

The sector's GVA at factor cost in 2007 was €21.88bn and employment was 187 500 (Annex 14)

Europe currently produces about 25% of the estimated worldwide plastics production. High integration along the value chain is a key characteristic of the European plastics industry.

### Industry and other submissions in support of eligibility

The sector adduces fuel substitutability as one of the grounds for eligibility.

It claims that at least 60% of the sector is made up of commodities. Polymers are said to be a key commodity category. The sector federation maintains that the price elasticity of such commodities is determined by global supply and demand; more specifically, if the price of imports fall below the lowest domestic EU price it is claimed that the import price will determine the overall price level (ie the same submission as made by industry in respect of basic organic chemicals (NACE 2414 above).

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<sup>95</sup> See efma.org.

In other words, it is claimed – in line with economic theory – that EU the price is set by the marginal producer. In practice, industry stakeholders assert that prices in North America are price-setting. Transport costs are said to account to 4-10% of the product value.

Industry stakeholders take the view that polymer inter-changeability and large trade imply that for the commodity polymer grades there is a global pricing regime. They claim that prices are generally agreed on a monthly basis.

The great majority of commodity products are said to face carbon leakage risks even in the short term; whereas the risk for highly specialised products is more long term. While, demand for commodity polymers mainly consists of applications where technical properties and customer service are not critical it is argued that specialised (or "engineering") polymers – which normally command a price premium – are becoming increasingly commoditised.

The Middle East and Asia as are cited as the areas where the large majority of the new investments are concentrated and where demand grows more rapidly.

The greatest competitive pressure on the polyethylene and polypropylene market is emanating from the Middle East.

The industry federation maintains that the “ethylene chain” probably includes activities for which Europe is most threatened in terms of cost competitiveness (see above on the NACE 2414 sector).

Three main major factors are said to determine competitiveness: feedstock costs, processing costs and market price. In recent years, the emerging countries of Asia are said to have enjoyed an advantage on all these factors compared to the EU.

For the 14 most important polymers, the net balance is claimed to have been positive for around 2.5 ml tons in 2005, but is said to have fallen to around 1.8 ml tons in 2010.

The industry federation invokes “inter-material competition” between plastics and other materials (paper, metals and wood).

The importance of upstream integration with the petrochemical sector – as a provider of essential raw materials - is stressed. Physical proximity to customer and markets are also considered important.

It is maintained that abatement (e.g. through transition to less carbon intensive polymers) cannot be achieved in the short term.

It is stressed that the plastics and polymer industry in a wider sense consists of polymer manufacturers, converters and machine manufacturers, the overall turnover of which in the EU and the EEA in 2007 was in excess of 300 billion Euro<sup>96</sup>, with the total industry employing more

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<sup>96</sup> Plastics Europe 2007.


than 1.6 million people including all related industries. Integration is said to be strong between NACE 2414 (organic base chemicals) and 2416 (polymers).

### Elements of assessment

The indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs amount to 1.7% of the sector's GVA (ranking as No 30 in terms of indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs) (Annex 8).

The trade intensity amounts to 27.14% (ranking as No 140 in terms of trade intensity) (Annex 8).

The plastics sector provided a study based on data for the period 2005-2010 indicating that at least the following six subsectors have trade intensities of 25% and indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs of 2.9%/GVA for the respective subsectors: Low Density Polyethylene (LDPE) (Prodcom: 24161039; Linear Low Density Polyethylene (LLDPE) (Prodcom: 24161035); High Density Polyethylene (HDPE) (Prodcom: 24161050); Polypropylene (PP) (Prodcom: 24165130); Polyvinyl Chloride (PVC) (Prodcom: 24163010) and Polycarbonate (PC) (Prodcom: 24164040). The calculations were based on a CO<sub>2</sub> price of €30 and a CO<sub>2</sub> factor of 0.465 CO<sub>2</sub>t/MWh<sup>97</sup>. Strong price correlations across major producing regions indicate that bulk polymers are globally priced<sup>98</sup>.



The GGC countries<sup>99</sup> are extending their exports beyond the major dry bulk polymers<sup>100</sup> as reported in a trade journal (*"the GCC governments are initiating multiple strategies to help GCC countries to grow from being exporters of polyolefins to exporters of finished polyolefin products"*).<sup>101</sup> Another trade publication reports that Saudi Arabia is studying a development of local products that could be exported to Europe, including automotive-grade plastics.<sup>102</sup>

There are indications that different installations compete on price, partly because of the low degree of product differentiation of the sector. Transport costs are relatively low in relation to the product value<sup>103</sup>. By 2015, it is expected that 90% of imports into the EU will come from the

<sup>97</sup> Consumption data was obtained from ICIS's proprietary databases, converted into €based on exchange rates published by Eurostat.

<sup>98</sup> See extensive list of prices on icispricing.com.

<sup>99</sup> *Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations, which include Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.*

<sup>100</sup> Polyethylene (PE), polypropylene (PP), polystyrene (PS), polyethylene terephthalate (PET) and PVC

<sup>101</sup> Chemical Week, June 1, 2009.

<sup>102</sup> ICIS Chemical Business, May 30 – June 5, 2011, Saudi clusters, Plastics in the driving seat, page 30-31.

<sup>103</sup> Ibidem.

Middle East<sup>104</sup>. There are indications that the EU's trading position has deteriorated sharply (Annex 16, figure 36).

The production of plastics in primary forms is linked with other sectors and subsectors both upstream and downstream. According to one recent study on carbon leakage, to the extent these other sectors do not relocate and downsize the risk of carbon leakage is reduced also in relation to the plastics sector (and vice versa)<sup>105</sup>.

It appears that investments over the coming years and decade will largely take place outside the EU<sup>106</sup>.

There is evidence of low profit margins, at least in some subsectors<sup>107</sup>.

Plastics in primary forms was one of five sectors deemed eligible under a qualitative assessment in the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision<sup>108</sup>. This conclusion was based on additional research finding that the CO<sub>2</sub> costs (direct and indirect) were closer to 5% than in the Commission's initial findings (3%)<sup>109</sup>.

The 2011 Benchmarking Decision does not establish substitutability between fuel and electricity in respect of plastics in primary forms (Annex 9).

## **Manufacture of synthetic rubber in primary forms (NACE 2417)**

### Sector and product description

Building of synthetic rubber plants in Europe, North America and Japan begin in earnest after 1945. Synthetic rubber overtook natural rubber in production and consumption volume in the 1960s.

Synthetic rubber is synthesised in steam crackers from petroleum and other minerals.

Synthetic rubber is thus one of the numerous outputs of steam crackers (which also produce polymers (NACE 2416)). Synthetic rubber uses butadiene and/or benzene (NACE 2414) as feedstocks.

Emulsion styrene butadiene rubber (ESBR) is the largest volume synthetic rubber. ESBR accounts for about 30% synthetic rubber production. Styrene butadiene rubber (SBR) is another major product (12%)<sup>110</sup>. There are ten ESBR and 15 SBR plants in Europe (excluding Russia).

The sector's GVA at factor cost in 2007 was €577m and employment was 5 900 (Annex 14).

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<sup>104</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>105</sup> See Cambridge Economics (2011).

<sup>106</sup> See ICIS Chemicals Business 23-29 January 2012.

<sup>107</sup> See recital 66 of Council Implementing Regulation No 1030/2010 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of certain PETs originating in China.

<sup>108</sup> See recital 19 of the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision.

<sup>109</sup> Cambridge Econometrics (2010), p. 30.

<sup>110</sup> Polymer BREF, Table 8.1.

Production of synthetic rubber in primary forms (NACE 2417) is built into the petrochemicals value-chain. For example, as ESBR production relies on monomers (such as styrene and butadiene in NACE 2414) the plants are located as part of integrated refineries or chemical complexes, or as adjuncts to such complexes.<sup>111</sup>

Tyre sales account for nearly three quarters of SBR demand. Its other end uses include food packaging, automotive industry and engine lubricants.

### Industry and other submissions in support of eligibility

In respect of EPDM (another synthetic rubber mainly used by the automotive sector (sealing, air ducts, and hoses) it is argued that market prices are established in fierce global competition and that, therefore, any additional costs of the EU ETS cannot be passed on to downstream customers.

Asymmetric cost impacts on EU producers may, it is argued, increase due to higher trade intensities in the future. It is contended that the impact will continue to vary from one year to another, as in the past, in response to supply and demand shifts, changes in market demand and increasing international competition. Reference is made to announced capacity expansions of producers in the Middle East, China and in South Korea.

Between 2007 and 2010 several plants in France, Romania, and Bulgaria reportedly shut down.

### Elements of assessment

The indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs amount to <5% (which does not allow for a ranking in terms of the sector's GVA) (Annex 8).

The trade intensity amounts to 32.08% (ranking as No 103 in terms of trade intensity) (Annex 8).

Synthetic rubbers are traded on international exchanges along with natural rubbers.<sup>112</sup>

From 2009 to 2014, demand for SBR is forecast to grow at an average annual growth rate of 6.3% in Europe. <sup>113</sup> There are indications of risks of increased import from Asia, particularly China<sup>114</sup> and India, due to a build-up capacity which is outstripping demand in that region.<sup>115</sup> China is scaling up capacity with new plants that are planned to start operating before 2014<sup>116</sup>.

The 2011 Benchmarking Decision does not establish fuel and electricity substitutability in respect of products falling within this NACE 4 sector (Annex 9).

### **Manufacture of man-made fibres (NACE 2470)**

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<sup>111</sup> Polymers BREF, Chapter 7, page 119, August 2007.

<sup>112</sup> They are traded on commercial exchanges in Tokyo, Singapore, London and on NYMEX.

<sup>113</sup> Chemicals Economic Handbook, Styrene butadiene elastomers, p. 38, 42, 47, 50 etc.

<sup>114</sup> Chemicals Economic Handbook, Styrene butadiene elastomers.

<sup>115</sup> ICIS, March 17-23, 2008, page 38.

<sup>116</sup> Chemicals Economic Handbook, Styrene butadiene elastomers.

## Sector and product description

Polyester accounts for around 75% of man-made fibre production, followed by polyamide (nylon) and other fibres (such acrylic and cellulosic)<sup>117</sup>. The man-made fibres sector provides raw materials for a wide variety of uses, including textiles, transport (e.g. tyres and airbags), construction, housing, aerospace, hygienic/medical applications, environmental protection as well energy savings applications (e.g. wind mills).

The man-made fibre sector is capital intensive. The lifetime of investments typically exceeds 20 years. There are production facilities in almost every EU Member State.

The sector's GVA at factor cost in 2007 was €2.754 bn and employment was 41 200 (Annex 14).

The man-made fibres industry forms part of the European textile supply chain with a value-added of €65 billion, 128 000 companies and a two-million strong workforce<sup>118</sup>.

## Industry and other submissions in support of eligibility

Industry submissions<sup>119</sup> focus not only on polyester and polyamide (nylon) but also cover aramid, acrylic, polypropylene and polyethylene. Industry stakeholders emphasise that the sector is closely linked with the production of polymers (included in NACE 2416) and that electricity represents an important share of total production costs. Energy costs are said to be of the same order of magnitude as labour costs. The industry argues that EU production unit costs are high compared with China. Transport costs are said to be relatively low and supply chains are described as global.

The industry federation argues that global competition is intense and that increased costs cannot be passed through to consumers. Production of the sector is said to be mainly of the commodity type with globally set prices. Overcapacity in Asia, notably in China, is cited. A decline in EU output over 2000-2010 is said to have taken place.

The industry federation claims that uncertainty about the level of the CO<sub>2</sub> price and its compensation is holding back new investment into Europe.

Industry profit margins are said to range from 3% (10 year average for polyester) to negative.

The industry states that global prices are under pressure due to weak demand (not only in Europe but also in Asia), increased cost of inputs and China's expansion of production capacity.

Non-EU imports are said to originate mostly from China, India and South Korea. China is said to account for 60% of world polyester fibres.

Import duties on man-made fibres into European markets are to be the lowest in the world.

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<sup>117</sup> Total world production of all types of man-made fibres, in 2010, was 53 million tones (Industry data – CIRFS).

<sup>118</sup> Source Eurostat

<sup>119</sup> Response by CIRFS to Commission Consultation of March-May 2011.

Physical proximity of man-made fibres is said to be critical to the competitiveness of downstream users because it claimed to reduce input costs, facilitate the development of new products and increase the flexibility of the supply chain.

### Elements of assessment

The indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs amount to 2.8% of the sector's GVA (ranking as No 16 in terms of indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs) (Annex 8).

The trade intensity amounts to 32.78% (ranking as No 119 in terms of trade intensity) (Annex 8).

There are indications that the man-made fibres sector is a price-taker. Key man-made fibres appear to be of a commodity type with global reference prices<sup>120</sup>.

In previous merger decisions the Commission found that, depending on the products, the market has been to be at least EEA or EU wide or no more than EEA wide<sup>121</sup>. In some cases the geographic scope of the market was left open<sup>122</sup>.

Over the past decade Chinese and Indian production capacity of polyester increased by a factor 4.5 and 2.8 times respectively<sup>123</sup>. Non-EU producers, in particular China, were the main beneficiaries of the consumption increase of 20% during the years 2005-2007. Over the past year capacity has expanded in Turkey as well as in South America, notably Brazil<sup>124</sup>. In the Chinese man-made fibres sector there is currently an estimated overcapacity of 25-30%<sup>125</sup>. Anti-dumping duties have been imposed on imports of polyester industrial filament yarn from China<sup>126</sup>.

EU production fell by 24% since its pre-crisis peak in early 2008<sup>127</sup>. Over the past year, it appears that production facilities from Germany have relocated to Israel and US firms have divested in Spain<sup>128</sup>.

Provisional anti-dumping duties imposed in 2010 are referred to as evidence of pressure on polyester fibre prices<sup>129</sup>. It appears from that investigation that sector's profit margin in 2005 was 3.0% turning to a loss of 1.1% in 2007<sup>130</sup>.

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<sup>120</sup> See prices for nylon and polyester fibres and yarns available on [icispricing.com](http://icispricing.com).

<sup>121</sup> See Cases M.214 - DuPont/ICI; M.206; No IV/M.1182 - AKZO NOBEL /COURTAULDS110; Rhone Poulenc/SNIA; M.1337 - Koch/Saba/Hoechst; No COMP/M.3341 and Case No COMP/M.2187 and CVC/Lenzing. (in particular paragraphs 132-133).

<sup>122</sup> See e.g. Case COMP/M.3341, paragraph 16.

<sup>123</sup> PCI World Synthetic Fibres Supply/Demand Report 2010.

<sup>124</sup> PCI Fibres Report N° 280 of December 2011

<sup>125</sup> Commission Regulation N° 478/2010 of 1 June 2010 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of high tenacity yarn of polyesters originating in the People's Republic of China

<sup>126</sup> Commission Regulation N° 478/2010 of 1 June 2010 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of high tenacity yarn of polyesters originating in the People's Republic of China

<sup>127</sup> Eurostat.

<sup>128</sup> PCI Fibres Report N° 280 of December 2011

<sup>129</sup> Profitability has steadily decreased from 2006 onwards due to dumped imports (Commission Regulation N° 478/2010 of 1 June 2010 imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on imports of high tenacity yarn of polyesters originating in the People's Republic of China)

The 2011 Benchmarking Decision does not establish fuel and electricity substitutability in respect of products falling within this NACE 4 sector (Annex 9).

## **Manufacture of cement (NACE 2651)**

### Sector and product description

The sector contains eight subsectors (Prodcom level) (Annex 11). The European standard for common cement<sup>131</sup> covers 27 products. It has been estimated that so-called Portland cement makes up 85% of EU cement production<sup>132</sup>.

Clinker is a key input in cement production. Clinker production is the most energy and electricity intensive part of cement production. Cement is produced in grinding plants.

The degree of auto-generated electricity is relatively low<sup>133</sup>. The sector's GVA at factor cost in 2007 was €9.96bn and employment was 64 100 (Annex 14)

### Industry and other submissions in support of eligibility

Eligibility is advocated on the basis of the sector's inclusion under the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision as regards direct costs. While industry stakeholders accept that there is as yet no hard evidence of relocation, they claim that the sector as a whole will be at risk of carbon leakage at CO<sub>2</sub> price of 35€<sup>134</sup>.

At a CO<sub>2</sub> price of €25, the industry claims that more than 80% of EU clinker production will be at risk of offshoring by 2020 as follows: 100% of Italian, Greek, Polish and UK production; virtually all of Spanish production; 75% of German production; 65% of French production and 70% of the production of the smaller EU producers.

While the sector acknowledges that land transport of clinker is not economically viable beyond a radius of 300 km, it contends that transport by sea is viable over much longer distances (as evidenced by large imports from China in recent years). The industry accepts that cement is more expensive to transport than clinker. Unlike cement, clinker does not require special equipment.

While there are many variants of cement, the industry claims that there is substitutability between EU and non-EU cement.

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<sup>130</sup> Data from European Commission Regulation 478/2010

<sup>131</sup> EN 197-1: 2000

<sup>132</sup> Ecorys (2009).

<sup>133</sup> 6% according to McKinsey 2006, p. 41.

<sup>134</sup> Reference is made to a study prepared in 2008, Boston Consulting Group ("Assessment of the Impact of the 2013-2020 ETS Proposal on the European Cement Industry" November 2008) and 2012, Boston Consulting Group, Key arguments justifying the European cement industry's application for state aid to balance offshoring risk caused by the increase of electricity prices due to EU-ETS, January 2012.

The abovementioned report from 2008 submitted by the industry argues that the carbon leakage risks relate in particular to clinker. It singles out zones in the EU deemed to be at particular risk of carbon leakage in relating to clinker (Annex 16, figure 39).

Eligibility is also advocated on the basis of the significant new capacity (mainly for clinker) said to have been installed in Northern Africa, Turkey and the Middle East. The sector also refers to recent announcements of new capacity (100m tonnes) coming on stream in Turkey by 2020.

The industry maintains that regional trade intensity in both the Mediterranean basin and in areas which are close to port facilities in fact exceeds 10%.

In addition to risks of investment leakage to China and India, the 2008 report submitted by the industry considers that risks of carbon leakage (and ultimately relocation) concern the EU's neighbouring regions (including North Africa, the Middle East, Turkey and Ukraine). The EU's global share of cement production is said to be 8%. It is expected to fall to 6-7% in 2020.

In respect of what is described as the most competitive offshore regions (ie the Mediterranean basin), reference is made to announcements to build nine plants in Saudi Arabia, three in Egypt and seven in the UAE. An additional capacity increase of 1.4 plants per year and per country would, the sector argues, suffice to induce the EU's entire clinker production to be offshored to North Africa, the Middle East and Turkey.

#### Elements of assessment:

The indirect costs amount to 4.4% of GVA (ranking as No 8 in terms of indirect CO2 costs) (Annex 8).

The trade intensity amounts to 6.75% (ranking as No 209 in terms of trade intensity) (Annex 8). Trade intensities between Europe and non-EU regions are thus among the lowest of all manufacturing sectors (about 7%).

Cement prices appear to differ considerably across regions (Annex 16, figures 21-22).

According to the Commission's practice in merger cases the geographic extent of the cement market takes the form of a set of markets, centred around the various factories, overlapping with each other and covering the whole of Europe<sup>135</sup>. The size of each market and the extent of the overlaps are determined by the distance from the factory. The EU cement industry is highly concentrated<sup>136</sup>.

As study on electricity intensive industries finds that a cement plant usually serves customers within a 150 km radius<sup>137</sup>.

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<sup>135</sup> Case COMP/F-2/38.401 EN 197-1 Standard – EMC/European Cement Producers dated 28 September 2005 (Commission decision rejected a complaint in antitrust proceedings).

<sup>136</sup> European Commission (SEC (2009) 1111 final), p. 25.

<sup>137</sup> See p. 13 in Ecorys (2009) ("Estimating Sectoral Price Elasticities for the Energy-Intensive Sectors").

A study cited by another sector (steel) estimating the price of elasticity of demand for certain sectors finds that the elasticity is lower for cement compared to the other sectors estimated (pulp, paper, steel and aluminium)<sup>138</sup>.

It appears that transport cost by land<sup>139</sup> reduces the risk of carbon leakage in particular in relation to cement but also in relation to its key intermediary, clinker<sup>140</sup>.

Clinker imports to the EU exceed cement imports by a factor of four<sup>141</sup>. China is the main player on the world clinker market, accounting for 67% of production. It is also the largest importer to the EU, covering over 40% of non-EU imports (Annex 16, figure 12).

Based on current environmental performance it has been found that the industry is unlikely to be able to make major further improvements in the short term<sup>142</sup>.

The 2011 Benchmarking Decision does not establish substitutability between fuel and electricity in respect of cement (Annex 9).

## **Other non-metallic mineral products (NACE 2682)**

### Sector and product description

The main application of carbon and graphite are carbon and graphite electrodes for the steel, aluminium or silicon-metal industries. Other industrial applications include fuel cells or semiconductors. Carbon allows for less conductivity than graphite and is used in among other things aluminium production<sup>143</sup>.

Graphite is a naturally occurring form of carbon which is mined. Production of artificial graphite (Prodcom: 26821400) is one of 15 sectors within the NACE 2682 code which is heterogenous. (Annex 11). Depending on the subsector there are significant variations in terms of energy (including electricity) intensity.

The sector's GVA at factor cost in 2007 was €4.62bn and employment was 68 100 (Annex 14).

### Industry and other submissions in support of eligibility

The eligibility claim is made by the industry at Prodcom level in favour of two subsectors within NACE 2682. First, Artificial graphite, colloidal, semi-colloidal graphite, and preparations (Prodcom: 26821400) and, second, Exfoliated vermiculite, expanded clays, foamed slag and similar expanded mineral materials and mixtures thereof (Prodcom: 26821620). Later industry submissions focused in particular on artificial graphite (Prodcom: 26821400).

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<sup>138</sup> See reply to questionnaire by Eurofer which refers to the following price elasticities of demand estimated by the International Energy Agency: EAF steel: - 1.56; BOF steel -1.56; aluminium: -0.86 and cement: -0.27.

<sup>139</sup> Cement is not transported by long over more than +/- 200 km (European Commission (SEC (2009) 1111 final), p. 29).

<sup>140</sup> Bergmann et al (2007), p. 78; de Bruyn et al (2010) pp. 21-22.

<sup>141</sup> European Commission (SEC (2009) 1111 final), p. 27.

<sup>142</sup> European Commission (SEC(2009) 1111 final), pp. 23-24.

<sup>143</sup> Carbongraphite.org web site.

The industry claims that all sectors and subsectors qualified under the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision for direct CO<sub>2</sub> costs should qualify under the ETS Guidelines. In any case, with reference to the inclusion in the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision for direct CO<sub>2</sub> costs (direct fuels). Exchangeability between direct fuel and electricity is cited as an argument in favour eligibility in respect of the two subsectors mentioned above. Equal treatment is said to be required for those plants that rely to a greater extent on electricity compared to direct fuels.

The industry federation claims that energy makes up more than 4% of the GVA of these two subsectors.

In respect of artificial graphite (26821400) it is specified that the indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs amount to 5.2% of EU GVA.

It effectively claims that the two subsectors are price-takers given that the market is said to be global.

Reference is also made to ongoing and expected anti-dumping cases in relation to the carbon and graphite sector in the EU.

The industry asserts that production of artificial graphite is highly electricity intensive. In support it cites reference document on best available techniques (BREF on non-ferrous metals), which shows that electricity accounts for around 80% of energy input.

The industry argues that the producers of graphite electrodes are facing tough international competition. Reference is made to the imposition by the EU in December 2010 of a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of graphite electrodes originating from India and initiated an anti-dumping proceeding against China.

### Elements of assessment

The indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs amount to 1.2% of the sector's GVA (ranking as No 40 in terms of indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs) (Annex 8).

The trade intensity amounts to 17.91% (ranking as No 169 in terms of trade intensity) (Annex 8).

Although the claims are not made for the sector as a whole, no evidence has been provided suggesting that any of the two subsectors would have indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs amounting to more than 4% of the EU GVA for those subsectors.

In terms of pricing, there are some indications that artificial graphite is sold in a competitive global market<sup>144</sup>. For graphite electrodes there appears to be a high degree of correlation between export prices for graphite electrodes from Japan, Europe and North America<sup>145</sup>.

The 2011 Benchmarking Decision does not establish fuel and electricity substitutability in respect of products falling within this NACE 4 sector (Annex 9).

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<sup>144</sup> <http://www.indmin.com/MarketTracker/197195/Graphite.html?id=GT-C>

<sup>145</sup> PCI Carbon Databank report: January 2012

## **Manufacture of basic iron, steel and ferro-alloys (NACE 2710)**

### Sector and product description

Primary steel production relies on virgin raw materials (iron ore, coal and limestone) (Annex 16, figure 30). In addition to direct fuels, primary steel production use electricity generated from waste gases derived from the raw materials. This production route is also called "BOF"(blast oxygen furnace). Typically, BOF steel does not contain alloy elements. It is mostly used to product so-called flat products (e.g. for the automotive industry).

Secondary steel production rely on old steel (scrap) which is melted in "electric arc furnaces" at mills which tend to be smaller than the large integrated BOF installations<sup>146</sup> (accounting for lower market concentration among EAF producers). Electric arc production uses significantly more electricity than primary steelmaking. It accounts for close to 40% of EU steelmaking. After processing (rolling) mostly 'long' products are used e.g. in the construction industry.

Steel from both production routes – so called semi-finished or crude steel - are either processed at the same site (integrated steel mills) or transported for processing elsewhere.

While semi-finished (or "crude" steel), irrespective of production route, is a largely homogenous production, the number variants of processed (or "rolled") steel (i.e. the end-product) can be counted in thousands of products.

It has been estimated that 14% of electricity used in the BOF route is auto-generated<sup>147</sup>. No auto-generation is involved in the EAF route.

The NACE code 2710 is divided into 64 subsectors at Prodcom level (Annex 11).

These subsectors include ferroalloy and silicon, ferro-manganese, ferro-silico-manganese, ferro-chromium, ferro-molybdenum, ferro-silicon and silicon metal.

The sector's GVA at factor cost in 2007 was €42.83bn and employment was 401 700 (Annex 14)

### Industry and other submissions in support of eligibility

The industry submissions are focussed on electric arc steel production. Carbon leakage is said to exist in particular at the level of semi-finished steel, not the wide variety of final processed (or "rolled") products.

Eligibility should be based on subsector level, by relying on the product boundaries defined in the Commission's 2011 Benchmarking Decision which defines the basis for compensation for direct fuel use and which accepts substitutability between fuel and electricity. The Decision is said to accept the importance of electric arc production by including electricity within the production definition.

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<sup>146</sup> De Bruyn et al (2010), p 20.

<sup>147</sup> McKinsey (2006), see figures 2-8.

Steel is said to be increasingly traded. A number of antidumping procedures are cited as one example of increasing trade in steel. Non-EU competitors are spread across the world (including Brazil, Ukraine, Turkey, Iran, Russia, India, China and the US) (Annex 16, figures 10-11). A considerable excess capacity for steel production is said to exist outside the EU. This spare capacity is said to be twice the size of overall EU production<sup>148</sup>.

Non-EU producers are increasingly said to be certifying their products according to international standards. The industry federation claims that relocation and/or production shifts are most likely in favour of North Africa, Turkey and CIS.

The industry is of the view that no further electricity efficiency gains are possible in electric arc production until 2020.

According to the industry steel prices are de facto set globally. Moreover, even if only a very small share of steel production is traded in the form of futures contracts at exchanges such as the London Metal Exchange<sup>149</sup>, the steel products traded on that exchange increasingly serve as international benchmarks. Previous findings on the price elasticity of steel compared to other sectors are cited<sup>150</sup>. Transport costs are said to be low compared to the price of semi-finished steel.

In terms of trade the EU is the largest steel importer in the world (Annex 16, figure 10). Japan, China, the EU, Russia and Ukraine (in that order) are the largest exporter. Trade in steel is said to have consistently risen over the recent two decades. Certain submissions deal specifically with ferro-alloys (which make up some of the subsectors in NACE 2710).

Arguments relating to ferro-silicon (a ferro-alloy) similar to those relating to semi-finished steel are adduced. For example, ferro-alloys are said to be commodities; prices are claimed to be set according to international benchmarks; transport costs are said to make up an insignificant part product value; a number of antidumping procedures are said to testify to trade exposure.

### Elements of assessment

The indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs amount to 3.6% of the sector's GVA (ranking as No 11 in terms of indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs) (Annex 8).

The trade intensity amounts to 32.31% (ranking as No 122 in terms of trade intensity) (Annex 8).

Recent findings by the Commission indicate that prices are set internationally<sup>151</sup>. This is not inconsistent with previous Commission decisions in merger cases<sup>152</sup>. The relatively homogenous nature of the products, the fact that they are traded on a large scale internationally as well as the

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<sup>148</sup> See OECD questionnaire dsti(su)/sc(2011)4 dated April 2011.

<sup>149</sup> 0.8% of total steel output The product traded on the exchange are in 'billet' form (which tend to produced by the EAF route..

<sup>150</sup> Reference is made to the following price elasticities of demand estimated by the International Energy Agency: EAF steel: - 1.56; BOF steel -1.56; aluminium: -0.86 and cement: -0.27.

<sup>151</sup> 2011 Competitiveness report (forthcoming).

<sup>152</sup> See paragraph 65 of the Commission Decision in Case No COMP/M.4137 (Arcelor-Mittal) in which the Commission defined the geographic market for semi-finished steel as at least EEA wide.

correlation between domestic EU and import prices support these conclusions<sup>153</sup>. One study considers that EAF steel is more of a commodity than BOF steel<sup>154</sup>.

The EU accounted for 12% of world steel production in 2010. Iron ore accounts for 40% of total costs of steel production. Any increases in the iron ore prices are automatically transferred to steel producers. Steel prices have been found to be directly linked to iron ore prices<sup>155</sup>. There are indications that the EU electric arc sector suffers from lack of availability of the vital input, i.e. scrap steel, partly due to export restrictions. Similar restrictions apply to iron ore<sup>156</sup>.

Steel is indeed a heavily traded good; about 40% of worldwide production is being traded. The largest import flows into the EU originate from China and Russia (Annex 16, figure 10)<sup>157</sup>. Imports into the EU have risen over the past decade (Annex 16, figure 11).

One report<sup>158</sup> found that significant abatement of CO<sub>2</sub> emissions in the BOF production route would require long-term efforts (at least five years to deliver a concept and five years to confirm technical and economical viability).

The 2011 Benchmarking Decision accepts that there is substitutability between fuel and electricity in respect of steel (Annex 9).

## **Copper production (NACE 2744)**

### Sector and product description

The NACE 2744 code is divided into 14 subsectors (Annex 11).

Copper ore is extracted from mines. At smelters the ore or copper concentrates (copper content of around 30%) is transformed (refined) via electrolysis (an electro-intensive process) into so-called copper cathodes (primary production route). Copper cathodes contain more than 99% copper. A dozen refineries are operated by six owners in the EU (of which two own copper mines).

Scrap copper may also be used as raw material (secondary production route).

It is in particular cathodes (an intermediate commodity product) which are internationally traded.

All in all around 40 installations producing copper form part of the ETS.

The sector's GVA at factor cost in 2007 was €3.82bn and employment was 46 300 (Annex 14)

### Industry and other submissions in support of eligibility

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<sup>153</sup> Cambridge Econometrics (2010).

<sup>154</sup> According to McKinsey (2006) (p. 25) long products are mostly commodities (competing with concrete) whereas flat products are more often specialties (competing with aluminium).

<sup>155</sup> See pp. 146, 167 of the 2011 Competitiveness report.

<sup>156</sup> Ibidem, p.169.

<sup>157</sup> De Bruyn et al (2010), p 20.

<sup>158</sup> McKinsey (2006), p. 23.

Industry submissions argue that EU copper producers are unable to pass on the CO2 component in electricity prices due to the fact that world copper prices are set via trading at commodity exchanges and in particular the London Metal Exchange (LME).

The LME's daily reference prices (based on the most liquid trading session) are said to be used as global reference prices. The issue of transport costs do not arise as most copper (and other metal) deliveries are made to LME warehouses. In any case transport costs are low in relation to the product value.

The industry claims that no primary copper smelter set up in the last year. Nor has any major refurbishment taken place during this period.

### Elements of assessment

The indirect CO2 costs amount to 3.4% of the sector's GVA (ranking as No 13 in terms of indirect CO2 costs) (Annex 8).

The trade intensity amounts to 34.59 % (ranking as No 114 in terms of trade intensity) (Annex 8).

Previous Commission decisions in merger cases confirm that the relevant geographic market is global on account of reference prices being set by commodity exchanges, in particular the LME. One decision describes describing the price for copper cathodes set at that exchange as the “world copper price”<sup>159</sup>. Other more recent assessments confirm the findings that EU producers cannot influence prices due to price-setting at the LME. There appears to be strong convergence between LME prices and those of other exchanges (Annex 16, table 24). This is the case even if the price elasticity of demand for copper is considered to be low in the long run (given that copper only has a few substitutes, principally aluminium)<sup>160</sup>. As aluminium is the most electricity intensive sector and is highly traded good it may face similar impacts or stronger cost impacts from the CO2 cost component in electricity prices<sup>161</sup>. Transport costs appear to be less important in this sector given that a significant part of deliveries are made to LME warehouses (Annex 16, figure 37)

Europe – accounting for 14% of world production - is a net importer of copper. Copper metal (cathodes) and concentrates are mainly imported from Chile, accounting for nearly 50% of non-EU imports<sup>162</sup>.

The 2011 Benchmarking Decision does not establish substitutability between fuel and electricity in respect of copper (Annex 9).

### **Hollow glass (NACE 2613)**

#### Sector and product description

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<sup>159</sup> See the Commission's Decision in Case M4781 of 23 January 2008, paragraphs 15, 25, 27-28.

<sup>160</sup> Cambridge Econometrics (2010), p. 21.

<sup>161</sup> Cambridge Econometrics (2010), p. 21..

<sup>162</sup> De Bruyn et al (2010), p. 26

The terms "hollow glass" and "container glass" will be used interchangeably below to denote the NACE 2613 sector.

A fundamental distinction must be made within the NACE 2613 sector between bottles and jars (i.e. beer bottles, wine bottles and containers for food packaging) on the one hand and tableware (i.e. drinking glasses) and flaconnage (i.e. bottles used for perfumes and pharmaceutical products) on the other hand. These products have different physical and market characteristics<sup>163</sup>.

In 2007 close to 3 000 container glass companies, employing about 119 400 staff, generated a GVA of €5.4bn.

### Industry and other submissions in support of eligibility

According to the industry transport costs vary significantly across different parts of the sector. In a number of the sub-sectors transport costs form an insignificant proportion of the cost/value of the product.

This is particularly true, the industry argues, in relation to flaconnage production. It is acknowledged that the picture is more complex as regards the transport of bottles. For transport by truck, reference is made to survey suggesting that the maximum distance between furnace and final customers was likely to be between 600 and 1 000 km. According to the industry trucking transport costs from Ukraine into the EU were typically in the region of €50-70/tonne and from Russia costs were estimated to be around €100/tonne. This compared with European production costs of around €300/tonne.

Reference is also made to the scope for seaborne transport allowing products to be transported over significantly greater distances.

The container glass industry claims to be in competition with other packaging materials in particular with plastics, aluminium and paper. A level playing field between directly substitutable materials is considered essential to ensure fair competition and prevent market distortions.

Competition with PET, a commodity polymer within NACE 2614, is emphasised by the industry in particular. The industry federation explains that PET bottle manufacturing involves the cracking of ethylene and the production of monoethylene glycol (MEG), the chemical precursor to PET bottle resin. It is claimed that most MEG production takes place outside of the EU in globally competitive markets and therefore is unlikely to see its price rise as a result of phase III of the EU ETS.

The container glass sector claims to use a variety of different technologies. It explains that electricity is used for glass melting through resistive electrical heating and for appliances. Depending on the installation, the share of electricity in energy consumed is said to range from 10% (boosting as an aid to oil/gas burners) to 100% (full electric melting). For that reason it is

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<sup>163</sup> As reflected by their different treatment in the 2011 Benchmarking Decision (one benchmark for coloured bottles, one benchmark for colourless bottles and fall-back benchmarks for tableware, flaconnage and extra-white flint).

submitted that more detailed assessments of carbon leakage risks should be carried out at installation level.

The production of container glass is claimed to have increasingly moved out of the EU over recent years. Investments in significant new capacity in India, China, United Arab Emirates are already said to serve the EU market. Import volumes are said to have risen by more than 50% between 2005 and 2009 and the net trade balance between the EU27 and the rest of the world is claimed to have fallen by over 25% over the last five years.

The industry refers to several plant closures over past years. Ten plants with more than 10 000 job losses between 2004 and 2008 have been indentified by the industry federation<sup>164</sup>.

### Elements of assessment

The indirect CO2 costs amount to 2.6% of the sector's GVA (ranking as No 17 in terms of indirect CO2 costs) (Annex 8).

The trade intensity amounts to 24.32% (ranking as No 150 in terms of trade intensity) (Annex 8).

One study finds that transport costs limits export ability for the glass sectors, in particular for hollow glass<sup>165</sup>.

A 2009 study submitted by a consultancy acting on behalf of the European trade body<sup>166</sup> suggested that the price elasticity of demand in the sector as a whole was -0.54. That study makes a comparison with another study<sup>167</sup> which found the following elasticities: -0.27 in the cement sector, -0.5 in the newsprint sector, -0.62 in the steel sector and -0.8 in the aluminium sector. Reference is made to section 4.9.2.2 in the main report; see also Annex 16, tables 20 and 25 on so-called Armington elasticities.

For bottle and jars, there are indications that new production capacity is being added in partiucular outside the EU's south eastern and eastern borders<sup>168</sup>.

Eurostat figures show a net decline the EU trade position of the container glass industry (NACE 2613) (i.e. bottles, jars, tableware and flaconnage)<sup>169</sup>.

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<sup>164</sup> FEVE.

<sup>165</sup> Ecofys (2009), p. 28.

<sup>166</sup> Most of the elements derive from a study by Vivid Economics from 2009 commissined by the European trade body FEVE.


<sup>167</sup> Smale et al (2006).

<sup>168</sup> 2009 study by Vivid Economics.

<sup>169</sup> Eurostat (Comext).

For the sector as whole, the deterioration in the trade balance is largely a result of changes in trade patterns between Europe and North America and the Asia-Pacific

Figure 4 Despite falls, the EU27 has a positive trade balance with every region apart from Asia-Pacific



Source: Vivid Economics and Comext data

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The 2011 Benchmarking Decision does not establish substitutability between fuel and electricity in respect of hollow glass (Annex 9).

## Manufacture of stainless steel pipes (NACE 2722)

### Industry and other submissions in support of eligibility

The industry submits that the historical separation between the basic steel products and steel pipe is unique (and is not replicated in the aluminium and copper sectors).

The industry submission is focused on seamless pipe mills, a subsector within NACE 2722 said to be particularly electro-intensive. Another large segment is said to be the small welded pipes market.

While the small welded tubes industry is still said to be mainly oriented towards the local market, the seamless and large-welded pipes industry is globally oriented.

Industry stakeholders contend that steel pipe capacity is increasing in China and elsewhere.

The steel pipe industry reiterates that not integrating the steel pipe sector into the steel basic sector eligible for indirect compensation would cause several serious distortions of competition in particularly towards:

Steel pipes are claimed to be in competition with other steel products for the same applications like beams and open profiles in the construction, and like bars and flat products in automotive and engineering sectors. All these steel products said to be in direct competition are downstream products of the steel industry made out from the same intermediate materials (steel billet or coils) but, unlike steel pipes, they are all included in the basic steel sector (NACE 2710). This would, it is argued, damage steel pipes which would lose market share dramatically.

The industry claims that pipes made out of aluminium are competing with steel pipes in sectors such as furniture. Copper pipes are said to be an alternative to steel pipes for water distribution

lines in buildings and in general for fluids conveyance. Severe distortions of competition for the steel pipe manufacturing would allegedly arise.

In support of the claim that indirect CO<sub>2</sub> cost increases cannot be passed on, reference is made to the evolution of the EU manufacturing market share for exports to third countries. This is said to show a decrease from around 23% in 2005 to around 15% in 2011 to the benefit of China (which is claimed to produce more than one steel pipe out of two in the world compared with one out of three in 2006). Japan, CIS and North and Latin America are, besides the EU, said to be the other main producers of steel pipes.

The industry asserts that the basic material to produce seamless pipes is a steel billet which represents more than 50% of the cost. Steel billets are produced by electric arc furnace (EAF) plants which are high electricity intensive (see section on NACE 2710 above).

The Prodcom codes of billets for pipes are covered by the numbers 27102121, 27102221 and 27102321; however, only part of those product are said to come from EAF plants.

The steel pipe sector considers it imperative, as far as the criteria of eligibility for compensation are concerned, not to rely on code numbers but on a specific industry definition. It is claimed that the two specific fuel and electricity benchmarks for EAF plants (see section on NACE 2710 above) will ease the definition and collection of data in view of the possible inclusion of that sub sector in the scheme.

### Elements of assessment

The indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs amount to 0.7% of the sector's GVA (not allowing for a ranking in terms of indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs) (Annex 8).

The trade intensity amounts to 45.17% (ranking as No 77 in terms of trade intensity) (Annex 8).

It appears that the NACE 2722 was not included in the basic steel code (NACE 2710) due to the coverage of the (now expired) European Coal and Steel Treaty (which excluded steel pipes)<sup>170</sup>.

The specific segment of the NACE 2722 concerned by the eligibility claims comprises the following subsectors at Prodcom level: 27221010, 27221021, 27221023, 27221041, 27221043, 27221045 and 27221050.

The 2011 Benchmarking Decision does establish substitutability between fuel and electricity in respect electric arc steel out of which (at least in part) steel pipes are produced (Annex 10).

### **Other non-ferrous metals (NACE 2745)**

#### Sector and product description

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<sup>170</sup> See Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (1951), Annex 1, footnote (observation) 5.

The nickel industry is the largest sub-sector in NACE 2745 (other non-ferrous metals), which also include chromium and manganese. Figures for 2010 show that nickel and so-called nickel semi-products represented around half of the entire NACE code (54 % by volume and 50% by value).

Raw nickel-containing ore is not normally transported. Processed ore ("primary nickel") is transported, as "secondary nickel" (produced from scrap). The main application of secondary nickel is stainless steel (around 60-65%).

The sector's employment in 2007 was 18 000 (Annex 14).

The nickel-related value chain is estimated to be in excess of €80-100bn in value-added terms representing 1.2 million jobs, of which around €50 billion (0.7 million jobs) is estimated to be dependent on nickel<sup>171</sup>.

In the EU and EEA, nickel metal production is carried out in Finland, the UK, France (including in New Caledonia), Greece and Norway. Their main competitors are Norilsk Nickel (Russia), Jinchuan (China) and Vale (Canada).

#### Industry and other submissions in support of eligibility

Nickel production is said to be the most energy-intensive metal within NACE 2745. It is claimed to be more energy-intensive than aluminium production.<sup>172</sup>

While the nickel industry is small both in the EU and globally, it is claimed that it forms a significant link in the value chain due to the critical importance of – inter alia - nickel-containing alloys, nickel in plating and nickel containing products used in transport (autos, trains, aerospace and jet engines), engineering, electronics, construction and medical devices. The nickel value chain is said to significantly contribute to the attractiveness of the EU as a location for complex, high value-added manufacturing, because of the local presence of clusters of suppliers of specialist nickel products, including extensive feedback loops with EU-based nickel refiners.

The industry argues that increased Chinese production is squeezing EU suppliers both through increased input prices and through increased product market competition.

It claims that while the nickel subsector is small is critical importance for sectors producing nickel-containing alloys.

#### Elements of assessment

The indirect CO2 costs amount to 2% of the sector's GVA (ranking as No 25 in terms of indirect CO2 costs) (Annex 8).

The trade intensity amounts to 73.81% (ranking as No 22 in terms of trade intensity) (Annex 8).

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<sup>171</sup> Weinberg Report on the Socio-Economic Assessment of the EU Nickel Value Chain, published 2009. Available upon request at the Nickel Institute.

<sup>172</sup> On average 237 gigajoules are needed per tonne of nickel metal output compared with 100 gj/t for aluminium. 2000 Nickel Life Cycle Data (published on [www.nickelinstitute.org](http://www.nickelinstitute.org))

Global nickel prices are set and referenced through the London Metals Exchange (LME), the Shanghai Metals Exchange and the Chicago Exchange<sup>173</sup>.

According to a decision by the Commission in the merger area transport costs make up less than 0.5% of the average nickel price quoted on the London Metal Exchange (LME)<sup>174</sup>. That decision found that most nickel is a commodity traded on a global basis.

While the share of EU in world primary nickel production in recent years has been around 7-9% and its share of world production in the 22%-31% range<sup>175</sup>, Chinese nickel capacity is planned to rise from an estimated 455 kt in 2011 to some 750-1100 kt by 2015<sup>176</sup>.

The 2011 Benchmarking Decision does not establish substitutability between fuel and electricity in respect of the NACE 2745 sector (Annex 9).

## **Casting of iron, steel and light metals (NACE 2751, NACE 2752 and NACE 2753)**

### Sector and production description

Foundries melt ferrous and non-ferrous metals and alloys and reshape them into products or at least near their finished shape through pouring and solidification of the molten metal or alloy into a mold. The essence of the process of making iron and steel castings consists of pouring molten iron, steel or steel alloys into a mould.

Casting products are used by in particular the automotive sector but also for power station constructions.

The three casting subsectors comprise around 5 000 enterprises and employ around 240 000 staff in the EU. Their combined value added in 2007 was €1bn. 80% of these foundries are SMEs. Around of Europe's foundries have electrical melting devices. According to figures for 2007 the GVA was €1bn.

The EU is the second largest producers of castings after China.

### Industry and other submissions in support of eligibility

The eligibility claim is essentially based on the fact that casting was deemed eligible (as one of five sectors) under the qualitative assessment in the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision.

Given the lack of EU level data, trade intensity data and other sources for a number of Member States were relied upon. For example, for Germany a trade intensity (based on 2007 figures) of no less than 10% is considered plausible. Data for Italy for 2005-2007 provides a range of 14.3%-17.4%<sup>177</sup>.

### Elements of assessment

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<sup>173</sup> Ecorys/ Cambridge Econometrics, "Competitiveness of the EU Non-ferrous Metals Industries" 2011

<sup>174</sup> Paragraphs 27-28 of The Commission Decision of 6 February 2007 in Case No COMP/M.4476 - NORILSK NICKEL / OMG NICKEL.

<sup>175</sup> 2006-2011 estimate INSG figures- a drop occurred in 2009 as a consequence of economic crisis. Recovery is slowly ongoing.

<sup>176</sup> Presentation Xu Aidong, Beijing Antaike Information Development Co. Ltd 2011.

<sup>177</sup> <http://www.coeweb.istat.it/default2.htm>

The indirect CO<sub>2</sub> cost of casting of iron amount to 3.6% of the sector's GVA . The indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs of casting of steel amount to 1.4% of the sector's GVA . The indirect CO<sub>2</sub> costs of casting of light metals amount to 1.1% of the sector's GVA.

Trade intensity of the casting sector can not be specified at EU level (due to the fact that Eurostat does not report any trade data for NACE 27.5X category, no statistical data on trade for the European foundry industry are available for recent years). The industry provided national data on trade intensity (see section on industry submissions above). Nevertheless, one study<sup>178</sup> finds that the trade intensity for casting of steel to be around 10%. The national data submitted does not show that the trade intensity for any of the three casting sectors would exceed 25%.

In view of lack of quantitative data (in particular trade intensity data), casting was one of the five sectors deemed eligible under the qualitative assessment of the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision.

One study<sup>179</sup> notes that steel casting is a distinct production process from the manufacture of steel characterised by a high degree of vertical integration. As a result, it finds it difficult to isolate the CO<sub>2</sub> cost impact on the casting sector. It finds that the CO<sub>2</sub> abatement potential limited that the production process mainly involves pouring molten steel into casts.

It also finds that the capacity increase in the EU is exceeded greatly by capacity increases in China. Between the years 1993-2004, ferrous foundries in Europe increased production by around 25% from 11 million to 13.5 million tonnes. During this same time period China increased its capacity by 73% from 12 to 30 million tonnes; maintaining its dominant market position.

The 2011 Benchmarking Decision does not establish substitutability between fuel and electricity in respect of the three casting sectors (Annex 9).

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<sup>178</sup> Cambridge econometrics (2010).

<sup>179</sup> Cambridge econometrics (2010).

## ANNEX 11

### List of subsectors

PRODCOM	Description
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#### **NACE 13.10 : Mining of iron ores**

Number of subsectors: 2

13101030	Non-agglomerated iron ores and concentrates (excluding roasted iron pyrites)
13101050	Agglomerated iron ores and concentrates (excluding roasted iron pyrites)

#### **NACE 14.40 : Production of salt**

Number of subsectors: 6

14401000	Salt (sodium chloride); rock salt; sea salt; salt from brine; salt in brine (including table salt and denatured salt)
14401001	Rock salt (dry mined)
14401003	Sea salt (by solar evaporation)
14401005	Vacuum salt (solution mined)
14401007	Salt in brine (solution mined)
14401009	Others

#### **NACE 15.62 : Manufacture of starches and starch products**

Number of subsectors: 17

15621030	Crude maize (corn) oil and its fractions (excluding chemically modified)
15621050	Refined maize (corn) oil and its fractions (excluding chemically modified)
15622110	Glucose and glucose syrup (excluding with added flavouring or colouring matter)
15622120	Chemically pure fructose in solid form; fructose and fructose syrup, containing in the dry state > 50 % of fructose; isoglucose excluding with added flavouring or colouring matter
15622130	Maltodextrine and maltodextine syrup (excluding with added flavouring or colouring matter)
15622140	Caramel, on a sugar base
15622150	Caramel, on a starch base
15622190	Chemically pure maltose; artificial honey
15622211	Wheat starch
15622213	Maize (corn) starch
15622215	Potato starch
15622219	Starches (including rice, manioc, arrowroot and sago palm pith) (excluding wheat, maize (corn) and potato)
15622230	Inulin
15622250	Wheat gluten (excluding wheat gluten prepared for use as a glue or as a glazing or dressing for the textile industry)
15622270	Dextrins and other modified starches (including ester/etherified,

	soluble starch, pregelatinised/swelling starch, dialdehyde starch, starch treated with formaldehyde/epichlorohydrin)
15622300	Tapioca and substitutes therefor prepared from starch; in the form of flakes; grains; pearls; siftings or similar forms
15623000	Residues of starch manufacture and similar residues

### **NACE 21.11 : Manufacture of pulp**

Number of subsectors: 16

21111100	Chemical wood pulp, dissolving grades
21111213	Unbleached coniferous chemical wood pulp, soda or sulphate (excluding dissolving grades)
21111215	Semi-bleached or bleached coniferous chemical wood pulp, soda or sulphate (excluding dissolving grades)
21111253	Unbleached non-coniferous chemical wood pulp, soda or sulphate (excluding dissolving grades)
21111255	Semi-bleached or bleached non-coniferous chemical wood pulp, soda or sulphate (excluding dissolving grades)
21111313	Unbleached coniferous chemical wood pulp, sulphite (excluding dissolving grades)
21111315	Semi-bleached or bleached coniferous chemical wood pulp, sulphite (excluding dissolving grades)
21111353	Unbleached non-coniferous chemical wood pulp, sulphite (excluding dissolving grades)
21111355	Semi-bleached or bleached non-coniferous chemical wood pulp, sulphite (excluding dissolving grades)
21111415	Thermo-mechanical wood pulp
21111419	Mechanical wood pulp (excluding thermo-mechanical wood pulp)
21111430	Semi-chemical wood pulp
21111433	Chemi-thermo mechanical wood pulp (CTMP)
21111435	Other chemi-mechanical wood pulp (TCMP, CRMP)
21111439	Other semi-chemical wood pulp
21111450	Pulp of other fibrous cellulosic material

### **NACE 21.12 : Manufacture of paper and paperboard**

Number of subsectors: 59

21121150	Newsprint in rolls or sheets
21121200	Hand-made paper and paperboard in rolls or sheets (excluding newsprint)
21121310	Uncoated paper and paperboard in rolls or sheets; used as a base for photo-sensitive; heat-sensitive or electro-sensitive paper or paperboard
21121355	Uncoated wallpaper base; in rolls or sheets containing <= 10% by weight of fibres obtained by a mechanical process
21121359	Uncoated wallpaper base; in rolls or sheets containing > 10% by weight of fibres obtained by a mechanical process
21121410	Graphic paper, paperboard : mechanical fibres <= 10%, weight < 40 g/m2
21121435	Graphic paper, paperboard : mechanical fibres <= 10%, weight >= 40 g/m2 but <= 150 g/m2, in rolls
21121439	Graphic paper, paperboard : mechanical fibres <= 10%, weight >= 40 g/m2 but <= 150 g/m2, sheets
21121450	Graphic paper, paperboard : mechanical fibres <= 10%, weight > 150 g/m2
21121470	Graphic paper, paperboard : mechanical fibres > 10%
21122130	Cellulose wadding for household or sanitary purposes, in rolls of a width > 36 cm or in rectangular (including square sheets) with at least one side > 36 cm in an unfolded state
21122155	Creped paper and webs of cellulose fibres for household/ sanitary purposes, in rolls, width > 36 cm, rectangular sheets min. one side > 36cm in unfolded state, weight <= 25 g/m2/ply

21122157	Creped paper and webs of cellulose fibres for household/sanitary purposes, in rolls, width > 36 cm, rectangular sheets min. one side > 36 cm in unfolded state, weight > 25 g/m2/ply
21122190	Paper stock for household : others
21122250	Uncoated, unbleached kraftliner in rolls or sheets (excluding for writing, printing or other graphic purposes, punch card stock and punch card tape paper)
21122290	Uncoated kraftliner in rolls or sheets (excluding unbleached, for writing; printing or other graphic purposes, punch card stock and punch card tape paper)
21122315	Uncoated, unbleached sack kraft paper (excluding for writing, printing or other graphic purposes, punch card stock and punch card tape paper)
21122319	Uncoated sack kraft paper (excluding unbleached, for writing, printing or other graphic purposes, punch card stock and punch card tape paper)
21122333	Uncoated kraft paper and paperboard weighing <= 150 g/m2 (excluding kraftliner, sack kraft paper, for writing, printing and other graphic purposes, etc)
21122335	Uncoated kraft paper/paperboard weighing between 150-225g/m2 (excluding kraftliner, sack kraft paper, for writing, printing or other graphic purposes, punch card stock and tape paper)
21122337	Uncoated kraft paper and paperboard weighing > 225 g/m2 excluding kraftliner, sack kraft paper - for writing, printing and other graphic purposes, punch card stock, punch card tape paper
21122350	Creped or crinkled sack kraft paper; creped or crinkled; in rolls or sheets
21122400	Uncoated fluting paper; in rolls or sheets
21122520	Uncoated testliner (recycled liner board), weight <= 150 g/m2, in rolls or sheets
21122540	Uncoated testliner (recycled liner board), weight > 150 g/m2, in rolls or sheets
21123010	Sulphite wrapping paper in rolls or sheets
21123020	Cigarette paper (excluding in the form of booklets or tubes), in rolls > 5 cm wide
21123030	Uncoated filter paper and paperboard in rolls or sheets
21123040	Uncoated felt paper and paperboard in rolls or sheets
21123061	Other uncoated paper and paperboard, in rolls or sheets, weight <= 150 g/m2 (excluding products of HS 4802, fluting paper, testliner, sulphite wrapping paper, filter or felt paper and paperboard)
21123065	Other uncoated paper and paperboard, in rolls or sheets, weight > 150 g/m2 and < 225 g/m2 (excluding products of HS 4802, fluting paper, testliner, sulphite wrapping paper, filter or felt paper and paperboard)
21123069	Other uncoated paper and paperboard, in rolls or sheets, weight >= 225 g/m2 (excluding products of HS 4802, fluting paper, testliner, sulphite wrapping paper, filter or felt paper and paperboard)
21124010	Vegetable parchment in rolls or sheets
21124030	Greaseproof papers in rolls or sheets
21124050	Tracing papers in rolls or sheets
21124070	Glassine and other glazed transparent or translucent papers in rolls or sheets
21125100	Composite paper and paperboard in rolls or sheets (including strawpaper and paperboard) (excluding surface coated or impregnated)
21125230	Creped or crinkled kraft paper in rolls or sheets (excluding sack kraft paper)
21125250	Embossed or perforated paper and paperboard in rolls or sheets (excluding perforated paper and paperboard cards for Jacquard or similar machines; paper lace; music cards; etc)
21125335	Coated base for paper..., for photo-, heat-, electro-sensitive paper, weight <= 150 g/m2, m.f. <= 10%
21125337	Coated paper, for writing, printing, graphic purposes (excluding coated base, weight <= 150 g/m2)
21125360	Light-weight coated paper for writing, printing, graphic purposes, m.f. > 10%

21125375	Other coated mech. graphic paper for writing, printing, graphic purposes, m.f. > 10%, rolls
21125379	Other coated mech. graphic paper for writing, printing, graphic purposes, m.f. > 10%, sheets
21125430	Other coated kraft paper, other than for writing, printing or graphic purposes
21125453	Multi-ply paper and paperboard, coated, of which each layer is bleached
21125455	Multi-ply paper and paperboard, coated, with 1 bleached outer layer
21125459	Multi-ply paper and paperboard, coated, others
21125470	Paper/paperboard in rolls or sheets, coated on one/both sides with kaolin or other inorganic substances excluding of a kind used for any graphic purposes, multi-ply paper/paperboard
21125530	Carbon or similar copying paper in rolls of a width > 36 cm or in rectangular ((including square) sheets with at least one side > 36 cm in an unfolded state)
21125550	Self-copy paper in rolls of a width > 36 cm or in rectangular (including square) sheets with one side > 36 cm and the other > 15 cm in the unfolded state
21125590	Copying or transfer paper in rolls of a width > 36 cm or in rectangular sheets with min. one side > 36 cm in unfolded state excluding carbon or similar copying paper, self-copy paper
21125610	Tarred, bituminized or asphalted paper and paperboard in rolls or sheets
21125633	Self-adhesive paper and paperboard in rolls or sheets
21125635	Gummed paper and paperboard in rolls or sheets (excluding self-adhesives)
21125655	Bleached paper and paperboard in rolls or sheets, coated, impregnated or covered with plastics weighing > 150 g/m <sup>2</sup> (excluding adhesives)
21125659	Paper and paperboard in rolls or sheets, coated, impregnated or covered with plastics (excluding adhesives, bleached and weighing > 150 g/m <sup>2</sup> )
21125670	Paper and paperboard in rolls or sheets, coated, impregnated or covered with wax, paraffin wax, stearin, oil or glycerol
21125700	Other paper, paperboard, coated..., n.e.c.

#### **NACE 24.11 : Manufacture of industrial gases**

Number of subsectors: 10

24111120	Argon
24111130	Rare gases (excluding argon)
24111150	Hydrogen
24111160	Nitrogen
24111170	Oxygen
24111230	Carbon dioxide
24111250	Sulphur trioxide (sulphuric anhydride); diarsenic trioxide
24111270	Nitrogen oxides
24111290	Inorganic oxygen compounds of non metals (excluding sulphur trioxide (sulphuric anhydride); diarsenic trioxide, nitrogen oxides, silicon dioxide, sulphur dioxide, carbon dioxide)
24111300	Liquid air; compressed air

#### **NACE 24.14 : Manufacture of other organic basic chemicals**

Number of subsectors: 196

24141120	Saturated acyclic hydrocarbons
24141130	Unsaturated acyclic hydrocarbons; ethylene
24141140	Unsaturated acyclic hydrocarbons; propene (propylene)
24141150	Unsaturated acyclic hydrocarbons; butene (butylene) and isomers thereof
24141165	Unsaturated acyclic hydrocarbons; buta-1.3-diene
24141167	Unsaturated acyclic hydrocarbons; Isoprene
24141190	Unsaturated acyclic hydrocarbons (excluding ethylene, propene, butene, buta-1.3-diene and isoprene)
24141213	Cyclohexane
24141215	Cyclanes; cyclenes and cycloterpenes (excluding cyclohexane)

24141223	Benzene
24141225	Toluene
24141243	o-Xylene
24141245	p-Xylene
24141247	m-Xylene and mixed xylene isomers
24141250	Styrene
24141260	Ethylbenzene
24141270	Cumene
24141280	Naphthalene and anthracene
24141290	Biphenyl, terphenyls, vinyltoluenes, cyclic hydrocarbons excluding cyclanes, cyclenes, cycloterpenes, benzene, toluene, xylenes, styrene, ethylbenzene, cumene, naphthalene, anthracene
24141313	Chloromethane (methyl chloride) and chloroethane (ethyl chloride)
24141315	Dichloromethane (methylene chloride)
24141323	Chloroform (trichloromethane)
24141325	Carbon tetrachloride
24141353	1,2-Dichloroethane (ethylene dichloride)
24141357	Saturated chlorinated derivatives of acyclic hydrocarbons, n.e.c.
24141371	Vinyl chloride (chloroethylene)
24141373	Trichloroethylene
24141375	Tetrachloroethylene (perchloroethylene)
24141379	Unsaturated chlorinated derivatives of acyclic hydrocarbons (excluding vinyl chloride, trichloroethylene, tetrachloroethylene)
24141450	Derivatives of hydrocarbon containing only sulpho groups; their salts and ethyl esters
24141470	Derivatives of hydrocarbon containing only nitro or only nitroso groups
24141490	Derivatives of hydrocarbon (excluding those containing only sulpho groups; their salts and ethyl esters, those containing only nitro or only nitroso groups)
24141510	Fluorinated; brominated or iodinated derivatives of acyclic hydrocarbons
24141530	Halogenated derivatives of acyclic hydrocarbons containing >= 2 different halogens
24141553	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6-Hexachlorocyclohexane
24141559	Halogenated derivatives of cyclanic; cyclenic or cycloterpenic hydrocarbons (excluding 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6-Hexachlorocyclohexane)
24141573	Chlorobenzene; o-dichlorobenzene and p-dichlorobenzene
24141575	Hexachlorobenzene and DDT (1,1,1-trichloro-2,2-bis(p-chlorophenyl)ethane)
24141579	Halogenated derivatives of aromatic hydrocarbons excluding chloro-, o-dichloro-, p-dichloro-, hexachlorobenzene, DDT (1,1,1-trichloro-2,2-bis(p-chlorophenyl)ethane)
24142100	Industrial fatty alcohols
24142210	Methanol (methyl alcohol)
24142220	Propan-1-ol (propyl alcohol) and propan-2-ol (isopropyl alcohol)
24142230	Butan-1-ol (n-butyl alcohol)
24142240	Butanols (excluding butan-1-ol (n-butyl alcohol))
24142263	Octanol (octyl alcohol) and isomers thereof
24142265	Lauryl alcohol; cetyl alcohol; stearyl alcohol and other saturated monohydric alcohols (excluding methyl, propyl and isopropyl, n-butyl, other butanols, octyl)
24142273	Acyclic terpene alcohols
24142275	Allyl alcohol and other unsaturated monohydric alcohols (excluding acyclic terpene alcohols)
24142310	Ethylene glycol (ethanediol)
24142320	Propylene glycol (propane-1,2-diol)
24142333	D-glucitol (sorbitol)
24142339	Diols and polyhydric alcohols (excluding ethylene glycol and propylene glycol, D-glucitol)
24142350	Halogenated, sulphonated, nitrated or nitrosated derivatives of acyclic alcohols
24142373	Cyclanic, cyclenic or cycloterpenic alcohols and their halogenated, sulphonated, nitrated or nitrosated derivatives
24142375	Aromatic alcohols and their halogenated, sulphonated, nitrated or nitrosated derivatives
24142415	Phenol (hydroxybenzene) and its salts

24142417	Cresols and their salts
24142419	Monophenols and their salts (excluding phenol and its salts, cresols and its salts)
24142433	4,4-Isopropylidenediphenol (bisphenol A; diphenylolpropane) and its salts
24142439	Polyphenols (including salts; excluding 4,4 isopropylidenediphenol) and phenol-alcohols
24142453	Phenol or phenol-alcohol derivatives containing only halogen substituents and their salts
24142455	Phenol or phenol-alcohol derivatives containing only sulpho groups; their salts and esters
24142459	Phenols or phenol-alcohol derivatives (excluding those containing only halogen substituents and their salts, those containing sulpho groups their salts and esters)
24143120	Industrial stearic acid
24143130	Industrial oleic acid
24143150	Industrial tall oil fatty acids
24143195	Industrial monocarboxylic fatty acids distilled (excluding stearic, oleic tall oil)
24143197	Industrial monocarboxylic fatty acids (excluding stearic, oleic, tall oil, distilled)
24143215	Ethyl acetate
24143217	Vinyl acetate
24143219	Esters of acetic acid (excluding ethyl acetate, vinyl acetate)
24143220	Mono-, di- or tri-chloroacetic acids; propionic, butanoic and pentanoic acids; their salts and esters
24143235	Palmitic acid
24143237	Salts and esters of palmitic acid
24143243	Salts of stearic acid
24143245	Stearic acid
24143247	Esters of stearic acid
24143253	Formic acid
24143255	Salts and esters of formic acid
24143271	Acetic acid
24143277	Acetic anhydride
24143278	Salts of acetic acid
24143280	Lauric acid and others; salts and esters
24143310	Acrylic acid and its salts and other monocarboxylic acid
24143320	Esters of acrylic acid
24143330	Methacrylic acid and its salts
24143340	Esters of methacrylic acid
24143350	Oleic, linoleic or linolenic acids; their salts and esters
24143363	Benzoic acid; its salts and esters
24143365	Benzoyl peroxide and benzoyl chloride
24143367	Phenylacetic acid; its salts and esters
24143370	Aromatic monocarboxylic acids, (anhydrides), halides, peroxides, peroxyacids, derivatives excluding benzoic acid, phenylacetic acids their salts/esters, benzoyl peroxide, benzoyl chloride
24143383	Oxalic, azelaic, maleic, other, cyclanic, cylenic acids, salts
24143385	Adipic acid; its salts and esters
24143387	Maleic anhydride
24143413	Dibutyl orthophthalates
24143415	Diocetyl orthophthalates
24143423	Dinonyl or didecyl orthophthalates
24143425	Esters of orthophthalic acid (excluding dibutyl orthophthalates, dioctyl orthophthalates, dinonyl and didecyl orthophthalates)
24143433	Phthalic anhydride
24143435	Terephthalic acid and its salts
24143443	Dimethyl terephthalate
24143445	Aromatic polycarboxylic acids, their anhydrides, their derivatives, n.e.c.
24143473	Citric acid and its salts and esters
24143475	Carboxylic acid with alcohol, phenol, aldehyde or ketone functions

24144113	Methylamine; di- or trimethylamine and their salts
24144115	Diethylamine and its salts
24144117	Acyclic monoamines and their derivatives; and salts thereof (excluding methylamine; di- or trimethylamine, diethylamine)
24144123	Ethylenediamine and its salts
24144125	Hexamethylenediamine and its salts
24144127	Acyclic polyamines their derivatives; and salts thereof (excluding ethylenediamine and its salts, hexamethylenediamine and its salts)
24144130	Cyclanic, cyclenic or cycloterpenic mono- or polyamines, and their derivatives; salts thereof
24144151	Aniline and its salts (excluding derivatives)
24144153	Aniline derivatives and their salts
24144155	Toluidines and their derivatives; and salts thereof
24144157	Aromatic monoamines and their derivatives and salts (excluding aniline, toluidines)
24144170	Aromatic polyamines and their derivatives; salts thereof
24144233	Monoethanolamine and its salts
24144235	Diethanolamine and its salts
24144237	Triethanolamine and its salts
24144239	Amino-alcohols, their ethers and esters with only 1 oxygen function and their salts excluding monoethanolamine and its salts, diethanolamine and its salts, triethanolamine and its salts
24144290	Oxygen-function amino-compounds (excluding amino-alcohols, their esters and ethers and salts thereof, lysine and its salts and esters, glutamic acid its salts and esters)
24144310	Ureines and their derivatives; salts thereof
24144320	Saccharin and its salts
24144330	Imides and their derivatives, and salts thereof (excluding saccharin and its salts)
24144340	Imines and their derivatives; and salts thereof
24144350	Acrylonitrile
24144360	1-Cyanoguanidine (dicyandiamide)
24144370	Nitrile-function compounds (excluding acrylonitrile, 1-cyanoguanidine (dicyandiamide))
24144420	Diazo-, azo- or azoxy-compounds
24144430	Organic derivatives of hydrazine or of hydroxylamine
24144450	Isocyanates
24144490	Compounds with other nitrogen function (excluding isocyanates)
24145135	Thiocarbamates; dithiocarbamates; thiuram mono-, di- or tetrasulphides
24145137	Methionine
24145139	Organo-sulphur compounds (excluding thiocarbamates, dithiocarbamates, thiuram mono-, di- or tetrasulphides, methionine)
24145150	Organo-inorganic compounds (excluding organo-sulphur compounds)
24145210	Heterocyclic compounds with oxygen only hetero-atom(s) (including coumarin; methylcoumarins and ethylcoumarins) (excluding other lactones)
24145230	Heterocyclic compounds with nitrogen only hetero-atom(s); containing an unfused imidazole ring (excluding hydantoin and its derivatives)
24145250	Compounds with pyridine, (iso)quinoline cycle,... other heterocyclic compounds only with N
24145260	Melamine
24145270	6-Hexanelactam (epsilon-caprolactam)
24145290	Nucleic acids and other heterocyclic compounds - thiazole, benzothiazole, other cycles
24145350	Phosphoric esters; and their salts (including lactophosphates; their halogenated; sulphonated; nitrated or nitrosated derivatives)
24145375	Thiophosphoric esters (phosphorothioates) their salts and halogenated; sulphonated; nitrated or nitrosated derivatives
24145379	Esters of other inorganic acids of non-metals (excluding of hydrogen halides), etc, n.e.c.
24146111	Methanal (formaldehyde)
24146113	Ethanal (acetaldehyde)
24146115	Butanal (butyraldehyde; normal isomer)

24146119	Acyclic aldehydes, without other oxygen function (excluding methanal (formaldehyde), ethanal (acetaldehyde), butanal (butyraldehyde; normal isomer))
24146120	Cyclic aldehydes; without other oxygen function
24146130	Aldehyde-alcohols
24146143	Vanillin (4-hydroxy-3-methoxybenzaldehyde)
24146145	Ethylvanillin (3-ethoxy-4-hydroxybenzaldehyde)
24146147	Aldehyde-ethers,aldehyde-phenols,aldehydes (other oxygen function) excluding vanillin (4-hydroxy-3-methoxybenzaldehyde), ethylvanillin (3-ethoxy-4-hydroxybenzaldehyde)
24146150	Cyclic polymers of aldehydes
24146160	Paraformaldehyde
24146170	Halogenated; sulphonated; nitrated or nitrosated derivatives of aldehydes; (including with other oxygen function, cyclic polymers of aldehydes, paraformaldehyde)
24146211	Acetone
24146213	Butanone (methyl ethyl ketone)
24146215	4-Methylpentan-2-one (methyl isobutyl ketone)
24146219	Acyclic ketones; without other oxygen function (excluding acetone, butanone (methyl ethyl ketone), 4-methylpentan-2-one (methyl isobutyl ketone))
24146231	Camphor; aromatic ketones without other oxygen function; ketone-alcohols; ketone-aldehydes; ketone-phenols and ketones with other oxygen function
24146233	Cyclohexanone and methylcyclohexanones
24146235	Ionones and methylionones
24146239	Cyclanic, cyclenic or cycloterpenic ketones without oxygen function (excluding camphor, cyclohexanone and methylcyclohexanones, ionones and methylionones)
24146260	Quinones
24146270	Halogenated; sulphonated; nitrated or nitrosated derivatives of ketones and quinones
24146313	Diethyl ether
24146319	Acyclic ethers and their halogenated, sulphonated, nitrated or nitrosated derivatives (excluding diethyl ether)
24146323	Cyclanic, cyclenic or cycloterpenic ethers and their halogenated, sulphonated, nitrated or nitrosated derivatives
24146325	Aromatic ethers and their halogenated, sulphonated, nitrated or nitrosated derivatives
24146333	2,2-Oxydiethanol (diethylene glycol; digol)
24146339	Ether-alcohols and their halogenated, sulphonated, nitrated or nitrosated derivatives (excluding 2,2-Oxydiethanol)
24146350	Ether-phenols; ether-alcohol-phenols and their halogenated, sulphonated, nitrated or nitrosated derivatives
24146360	Alcohol; ether and ketone peroxides and their halogenated, sulphonated, nitrated or nitrosated derivatives
24146373	Oxirane (ethylene oxide)
24146375	Methyloxirane (propylene oxide)
24146379	Epoxides, epoxyalcohols, -phenols, epoxyethers, with a 3-membered ring and their halogenated, sulphonated, nitrated/nitrosated derivatives excluding oxirane, methyloxirane (propylene oxide)
24146380	Acetals and hemiacetals and their halogenated; sulphonated; nitrated or nitrosated derivatives
24146430	Other organic compounds, n.e.c.
24146450	Rennet and concentrates thereof
24146470	Enzymes; prepared enzymes (not elsewhere specified or included) (excluding rennet and concentrates)
24147120	Activated natural mineral products; animal black
24147130	Tall oil; whether or not refined
24147140	Gum, wood or sulphate turpentine oils, pine oil and other alike
24147150	Rosin and resin acids; and derivatives; rosin spirit and oils; run gums
24147170	Wood tar; wood tar oils; wood creosote; wood naphtha; vegetable pitch; brewers' pitch and similar preparations based on rosin, resin acids or on vegetable pitch
24147200	Wood charcoal whether or not agglomerated (including shell or nut charcoal)
24147320	Benzol (benzene)

24147330	Toluol (toluene) and xylol (xylenes)
24147340	Naphthalene and other aromatic hydrocarbon mixtures (excluding benzole, toluole, xylene)
24147350	Phenols
24147365	Creosote oils
24147367	Other oils and oil products, n.e.c.
24147370	Pitch and pitch coke; obtained from coal tar or from other mineral tars

### **NACE 24.15 : Manufacture of fertilizers and nitrogen compounds**

Number of subsectors: 34

24151050	Nitric acid; sulphonitric acids
24151075	Anhydrous ammonia
24151077	Ammonia in aqueous solution
24152020	Ammonium chloride
24152030	Nitrites
24152050	Nitrates of potassium
24153013	Urea containing > 45% by weight of nitrogen on the dry anhydrous product (excluding in tablets or similar forms or in packages of a weight of <= 10 kg)
24153019	Urea containing <= 45% by weight of nitrogen on the dry anhydrous product (excluding in tablets or similar forms or in packages of a weight of <= 10 kg)
24153023	Ammonium sulphate (excluding in tablets or similar forms or in packages of a weight of <= 10 kg)
24153029	Double salts and mixtures of ammonium sulphate and ammonium nitrate (excluding in tablets or similar forms or in packages of a weight of <= 10 kg)
24153030	Ammonium nitrate (excluding in tablets or similar forms or in packages of a weight of <= 10 kg)
24153043	Mixtures of ammonium nitrate with calcium carbonate, <= 28% nitrogen by weight
24153045	Mixtures of ammonium nitrate with calcium carbonate, > 28% nitrogen by weight
24153060	Double salts and mixtures of calcium nitrate and ammonium nitrate (excluding in tablets or similar forms or in packages of a weight of <= 10 kg)
24153080	Mixtures of urea and ammonium nitrate in aqueous or ammoniacal solution (excluding in tablets or similar forms or in packages of a weight of <= 10 kg)
24153095	Mineral or chemical fertilizers, nitrogenous, n.e.c.
24154035	Superphosphates (excluding potassic, in tablets or similar forms or in packages of a weight of <= 10 kg)
24154090	Mineral or chemical fertilizers, phosphatic n.e.c.
24155030	Potassium chloride (excluding in tablets or similar forms or in packages of a weight of <= 10 kg)
24155050	Potassium sulphate (excluding in tablets or similar forms or in packages of a weight of <= 10 kg)
24155090	Mineral or chemical fertilizers, potassic, n.e.c.
24156000	Animal or vegetable fertilizers
24157050	Natural sodium nitrate (excluding in tablets or similar forms or in packages of a weight of <= 10 kg)
24157070	Sodium nitrate (excluding natural, in tablets or similar forms or in packages of a weight of <= 10 kg)
24158010	Fertilizers in tablets or similar forms or in packages of a gross weight of <= 10 kg)
24158023	Fertilizers containing nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium, > 10% nitrogen
24158025	Fertilizers containing nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium, <= 10% nitrogen
24158030	Diammonium hydrogenorthophosphate (diammonium phosphate) (excluding in tablets or similar forms or in packages of a weight of <= 10 kg)
24158040	Ammonium dihydrogenorthophosphate (monoammonium phosphate)
24158053	Mineral or chemical fertilizers containing nitrates and phosphates, n.e.c.
24158059	Mineral or chemical fertilizers with nitrogen and phosphorus, n.e.c.
24158063	Potassic superphosphates (excluding in tablets or similar forms or in packages of a weight of <= 10 kg)
24158069	Mineral/chemical fertilizers with both phosphorus and potassium excluding potassic superphosphates (in tablets/similar forms/in packages: weight <=10kg, those with nitrogen)

24158090	Other fertilizers, n.e.c.
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**NACE 24.16 : Manufacture of plastics in primary forms**

Number of subsectors: 51

24161035	Linear polyethylene having a specific gravity < 0.94, in primary forms
24161039	Polyethylene having a specific gravity < 0.94, in primary forms (excluding linear)
24161050	Polyethylene having a specific gravity of >= 0.94, in primary forms
24161070	Ethylene-vinyl acetate copolymers, in primary forms
24161090	Polymers of ethylene, in primary forms (excluding polyethylene, ethylene-vinyl acetate copolymers)
24162035	Expansible polystyrene, in primary forms
24162039	Polystyrene, in primary forms (excluding expansible polystyrene)
24162050	Styrene-acrylonitrile (SAN) copolymers, in primary forms
24162070	Acrylonitrile-butadiene-styrene (ABS) copolymers, in primary forms
24162090	Polymers of styrene, in primary forms (excluding polystyrene, styrene-acrylonitrile (SAN) copolymers, acrylonitrile-butadiene-styrene (ABS) copolymers)
24163010	Polyvinyl chloride, not mixed with any other substances, in primary forms
24163023	Non-plasticised polyvinyl chloride mixed with any other substance, in primary forms
24163025	Plasticised polyvinyl chloride mixed with any other substance, in primary forms
24163040	Vinyl chloride-vinyl acetate copolymers and other vinyl chloride copolymers, in primary forms
24163050	Vinylidene chloride polymers, in primary forms
24163060	Polytetrafluoroethylene, in primary forms
24163070	Fluoro-polymers, in primary forms (excluding polytetrafluoroethylene)
24163090	Polymers of halogenated olefins, in primary forms, n.e.c.
24164013	Polyacetals, in primary forms
24164015	Polyethylene glycols and other polyether alcohols, in primary forms
24164020	Polyethers, in primary forms (excluding polyacetals, polyether alcohols)
24164030	Epoxide resins, in primary forms
24164040	Polycarbonates, in primary forms
24164050	Alkyd resins, in primary forms
24164062	Polyethylene terephthalate having a viscosity number of >= 78 ml/g
24164064	Other polyethylene terephthalate
24164070	Unsaturated liquid polyesters, in primary forms (excluding polyacetals, polyethers, epoxide resins, polycarbonates, alkyd resins, polyethylene terephthalate)
24164080	Unsaturated polyesters, in primary forms (excluding liquid polyesters, polyacetals, polyethers, epoxide resins, polycarbonates, alkyd resins, polyethylene terephthalate)
24164090	Polyesters, in primary forms (excluding polyacetals, polyethers, epoxide resins, polycarbonates, alkyd resins, polyethylene terephthalate, other unsaturated polyesters)
24165130	Polypropylene, in primary forms
24165150	Polymers of propylene or of other olefins, in primary forms (excluding polypropylene)
24165230	Polymers of vinyl acetate, in aqueous dispersion, in primary forms
24165250	Polymers of vinyl acetate, in primary forms (excluding in aqueous dispersion)
24165270	Polymers of vinyl esters or other vinyl polymers, in primary forms (excluding vinyl acetate)
24165350	Polymethyl methacrylate, in primary forms
24165390	Acrylic polymers, in primary forms (excluding polymethyl methacrylate)
24165450	Polyamide -6, -11, -12, -6.6, -6.9, -6.10 or -6.12, in primary forms
24165490	Polyamides, in primary forms (excluding polyamide -6, -11, -12, -6.6, -6.9, -6.10 or -6.12)
24165550	Urea resins and thiourea resins, in primary forms
24165570	Melamine resins, in primary forms
24165630	Amino resins, in primary forms (excluding urea and thiourea resins, melamine resins)
24165650	Phenolic resins, in primary forms
24165670	Polyurethanes, in primary forms
24165700	Silicones, in primary forms

24165810	Petroleum resins, coumarone, indene or coumarone-indene resins and polyterpenes, in primary forms
24165820	Polysulphides, polysulphones polyxylene resins, poly (1.4 diisopropylbenzene), polyvinyl ketones, polyethyleneimines and polyimides, in primary forms
24165830	Cellulose acetates, in primary forms
24165840	Cellulose nitrates, in primary forms (including collodions)
24165850	Cellulose ethers and cellulose and its related derivatives, in primary forms (excluding cellulose acetates, cellulose nitrates)
24165860	Natural and modified polymers, in primary forms (including alginic acid, hardened proteins, chemical derivatives of natural rubber)
24165870	Ion-exchangers based on synthetic or natural polymers

#### **NACE 24.17 : Manufacture of synthetic rubber in primary forms**

Number of subsectors: 2

24701050	Synthetic latex rubber
24701090	Synthetic rubber (excluding latex)

#### **NACE 24.70 : Manufacture of man-made fibres**

Number of subsectors: 18

24701195	Polypropylene synthetic tow and staple not carded, combed or otherwise processed for spinning
24701197	Other synthetic tow and staple not carded, combed or otherwise processed for spinning
24701240	High tenacity synthetic filament yarn
24701313	Textured yarn of nylon or other polyamides n.p.r.s. (excluding sewing thread)
24701315	Textured yarn of polyesters n.p.r.s. (excluding sewing thread)
24701323	Textured yarn of polypropylene n.p.r.s. (excluding sewing thread)
24701325	Textured yarn n.p.r.s. (excluding sewing thread, of nylon and other polyamides, of polyesters, of polypropylene)
24701330	Nylon or other polyamides and polyesters not textured filament yarn, n.p.r.s. (excluding sewing thread)
24701350	Single yarn of polyester, n.p.r.s. (excluding sewing thread, high tenacity, textured, multiple or cabled yarns)
24701370	Polypropylene not textured filament yarn, n.p.r.s. (excluding sewing thread)
24701390	Other synthetic not textured filament yarn, n.p.r.s. (excluding sewing thread)
24701400	Synthetic monofilament $\geq 67$ decitex and of which the cross-sectional dimension $\leq 1$ mm; strip and the like of synthetic textile materials of an apparent width $\leq 5$ mm
24702100	Artificial tow and staple, not carded, combed or otherwise processed for spinning
24702200	High tenacity filament yarn of viscose rayon, n.p.r.s. (excluding sewing thread)
24702390	Artificial filament yarn $< 67$ decitex, n.p.r.s. (excluding sewing thread)
24702400	Artificial monofilament of $\geq 67$ decitex and of which the cross-sectional dimension $\leq 1$ mm; strip and the like of artificial textile materials of an apparent width $\leq 5$ mm
24703050	Waste of synthetic fibres (including noils, yarn waste, garnetted stock)
24703070	Waste of artificial fibres (including noils, yarn waste, garnetted stock)

#### **NACE 26.13 : Manufacture of hollow glass**

Number of subsectors: 18

26131110	Glass preserving jars, stoppers, lids and other closures (including stoppers and closures of any material presented with the containers for which they are intended)
26131116	Containers made from tubing of glass (excluding preserving jars)
26131122	Glass containers of a nominal capacity $\geq 2,5$ litres (excluding preserving jars)
26131128	Bottles of colourless glass of a nominal capacity $< 2,5$ litres, for beverages and foodstuffs (excluding bottles covered with leather or composition leather, infant's feeding bottles)
26131134	Bottles of coloured glass of a nominal capacity $< 2,5$ litres, for beverages and foodstuffs (excluding bottles covered with leather or composition leather, infant's feeding bottles)
26131140	Glass containers for beverages and foodstuffs of a nominal capacity $< 2,5$ litres (excluding bottles, flasks)

	covered with leather or composition leather, domestic glassware, vacuum flasks and vessels)
26131146	Glass containers for pharmaceutical products of a nominal capacity < 2,5 litres
26131152	Glass containers of a nominal capacity < 2,5 litres for the conveyance or packing of goods (excluding for beverages and foodstuffs, for pharmaceutical products, containers made from glass tubing)
26131220	Drinking glasses (including stemware drinking glasses), other than of glass ceramics, of lead crystal, gathered by hand
26131240	Drinking glasses (including stemware drinking glasses), other than of glass ceramics, of lead crystal, gathered mechanically
26131260	Drinking glasses (excluding stemware drinking glasses and products of glass ceramics or lead crystal), of toughened glass
26131280	Other drinking glasses
26131310	Table or kitchen glassware of lead crystal gathered by hand (excluding of glass-ceramics, of toughened glass, drinking glasses)
26131330	Table or kitchen glassware of lead crystal gathered mechanically (excluding of glass ceramics, of toughened glass, drinking glasses)
26131350	Table/kitchen glassware with linear coefficient of expansion $\leq 5 \times 10^{-6}/K$ , temperature range of 0 °C to 300 °C excluding of glass ceramics, lead crystal/toughened glass, drinking glasses
26131360	Glass-ceramic table, kitchen, toilet, office, indoor decoration or similar purpose glassware
26131390	Table/kitchen glassware (excluding drinking), toughened glass
26131400	Glass inners for vacuum flasks or for other vacuum vessels (including unfinished and finished)

#### **NACE 26.51 : Manufacture of cement**

Number of subsectors: 8

26511100	Cement clinker
26511210	White Portland cement
26511230	Grey Portland cement (including blended cement)
26511250	Alumina cement
26511290	Other hydraulic cements
26521033	Quicklime
26521035	Slaked lime
26521050	Hydraulic lime

#### **NACE 26.82 : Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products n.e.c.**

Number of subsectors: 15

26821150	Fabricated asbestos fibres; mixtures with a basis of asbestos or with a basis of asbestos and magnesium carbonate; articles of such mixtures or of asbestos (for example, thread, woven fabric, clothing, headgear, footwear, gaskets), whether or not reinforced (excluding Articles of asbestos-cement, of cellulose fibre-cement or the like as well as Friction material and articles thereof)
26821190	Friction material and articles thereof (for example, sheets, rolls, strips, segments, discs, washers, pads), not mounted, for brakes, for clutches or the like, with a basis of asbestos, of other mineral substances or of cellulose, whether or not combined with textile or other materials
26821253	Roofing or water-proofing felts based on bitumen (in rolls)
26821259	Other products based on bitumen (in rolls)
26821290	Products based on bitumen (excluding in rolls)
26821300	Bituminous mixtures based on natural and artificial aggregate and bitumen or natural asphalt as a binder
26821400	Artificial graphite, colloidal, semi-colloidal graphite, and preparations
26821500	Artificial corundum (excluding mechanical mixtures)
26821610	Slag wool, rock wool and similar mineral wools and mixtures thereof, in bulk, sheets or rolls
26821620	Exfoliated vermiculite, expanded clays, foamed slag and similar expanded mineral materials and mixtures thereof
26821630	Mixtures and articles of heat/sound-insulating materials n.e.c.

26821650	Worked mica and articles of mica
26821670	Non-electrical articles of graphite or other carbon
26821680	Articles of peat (including sheets, cylinder shells and plant pots) (excluding textile articles of peat fibre)
26821690	Articles of stone or other mineral substances, n.e.c.

<b>NACE 27.10 : Manufacture of basic iron and steel and of ferro-alloys</b>	
Number of subsectors: 64	
27101100	Pig iron and spiegeleisen in pigs, blocks or other primary forms. Ferrous products obtained by direct reduction of iron ore and other spongy ferrous products
27101250	Granules and powders, of pig iron, spiegeleisen, iron or steel
27101310	Slag and dross
27101320	Ferrous scrap
27102010	Ferro-manganese
27102020	Ferro-silicon
27102030	Ferro-silico-manganese
27102040	Ferro-chromium
27102050	Ferro-molybdenum
27102090	Other ferro alloys n.e.c.
27103110	Flat semi-finished products (of non-alloy steel)
27103121	Ingots, other primary forms and long semi-finished products for seamless tubes (of non-alloy steel)
27103122	Other ingots, primary forms and long semi-finished products including blanks (of non-alloy steel)
271031Z0	Ingots, other primary forms and long semi-finished products, of non-alloy steel
27103210	Flat semi-finished products (slabs) (of stainless steel)
27103221	Ingots, other primary forms and long semi-finished products for seamless tubes (of stainless steel)
27103222	Other ingots, primary forms and long semi-finished products (of stainless steel)
271032Z0	Ingots, other primary forms and long semi-finished products, of stainless steel
27103310	Flat semi-finished products (of alloy steel other than of stainless steel)
27103321	Ingots, other primary forms and long semi-finished products for seamless tubes (of alloy steel other than of stainless steel)
27103322	Other ingots, primary forms and long semi-finished products (of alloy steel other than of stainless steel)
271033Z0	Ingots, other primary forms and long semi-finished products, of alloy steel other than stainless steel
27104111	Hot rolled flat products in coil for rerolling of a width of 600 mm or more (of stainless steel)
27104112	Other hot rolled flat products in coil of a width of 600 mm or more (of stainless steel)
27104121	Hot rolled flat products in coil for rerolling of a width of less than 600 mm (of stainless steel)
27104122	Other hot rolled flat products in coil of a width of less than 600 mm (of stainless steel)
27104130	Plates and sheets produced by cutting from hot rolled wide strip of a width of 600 mm or more (of stainless steel)
27104140	Plates and sheets produced on a reversing mill (quarto) of a width of 600 mm or more and wide flats (of stainless steel)
27104150	Cold rolled sheet, plate and wide strip of a width of 600 mm or more (of stainless steel)
271041Z5	Hot rolled flat products in coil of a width $\geq$ 600 mm, of stainless steel
271041Z6	Hot rolled flat products in coil of a width $<$ 600 mm, of stainless steel
27104200	Hot rolled wire rod in coil (of stainless steel)
27104310	Hot rolled round bars (of stainless steel)
27104320	Hot rolled bars other than round bars and sections (of stainless steel)
27104330	Forged bars (of stainless steel)
27105000	Hot rolled flat and long products of high speed steel
27106020	Hot rolled flat products in coil (wide strip) of a width of 600 mm or more (of steel other than of stainless steel or of high speed steel)
27106030	Hot rolled flat products in coil (narrow or slit strip) of a width of less than 600 mm (of steel other than of stainless steel or of high speed steel)

27106040	Plates and sheets produced by cutting from hot rolled wide strip of a width of 600 mm or more, and wide flats (of steel other than of stainless steel or of high speed steel)
27106050	Plates and sheets produced on a reversing mill (quarto) of a width of 600 mm or more and wide flats (of steel other than of stainless steel or of high speed steel)
27107111	Uncoated cold rolled sheet, plate and strip of a width of 600 mm or more (of steel other than of stainless steel)
27107112	Electrical sheet and strip not finally annealed of a width of 600 mm or more
27107120	Electrical sheet and strip, grain non-oriented of a width of 600 mm or more
27107130	Electrical sheet and strip, grain oriented of a width of 600 mm or more
271071Z0	Uncoated cold rolled sheet, plate and strip (including electrical sheet and strip not finally annealed), of a width $\geq$ 600 mm, of steel other than stainless steel
27107210	Tinplate, other tinned sheet and strip, including electrolytically chromium coated steel (ECCS)
27107220	Hot dipped metal coated sheet and strip of a width of 600 mm or more
27107230	Electrolytically metal coated sheet and strip of a width of 600 mm or more
27107240	Organic coated sheet of a width of 600 mm or more
27108110	Ribbed or other deformed wire rod (of non-alloy steel)
27108120	Wire rod of free-cutting steel
27108130	Wire rod used for concrete reinforcing (mesh/cold ribbed bars)
27108140	Wire rod for tyre cord
27108190	Other wire rod (of non-alloy steel)
27108210	Hot rolled wire rod (of bearing steel)
27108290	Hot rolled wire rod (of alloy steel wire rod other than of bearing steel, high speed steel and stainless steel)
27108310	Hot rolled concrete reinforcing bars
27108320	Hot rolled bars in free-cutting steels
27108330	Hot rolled bars in bearing steels
27108340	Hot rolled bars in tool steels
27108350	Hot rolled and forged light sections of a web height of less than 80 mm and angles
27108361	Hollow drill bars and rods
27108364	Hot rolled bars (excluding hollow drill bars and rods) of non-alloy steel (of other than of free-cutting steel)
27108367	Hot rolled bars (excluding hollow drill bars and rods) of alloy steel (other than of stainless, tool, bearing and high speed steel)
27109110	U-sections of a web height of 80 mm or more (of non-alloy steel)
27109120	I-sections of a web height of 80 mm or more (of non-alloy steel)
27109130	H-sections of a web height of 80 mm or more (of non-alloy steel)
27109210	Sheet piling (of steel)
27109220	Welded and cold formed sections (of steel)
27109230	Railway material (of steel)
2710T110	Pig iron
2710T121	Crude steel: non-alloy steel produced in electric furnaces
2710T122	Crude steel: non-alloy steel produced by other processes than in electric furnaces
2710T131	Crude steel: alloy steel other than stainless steel produced in electric furnaces
2710T132	Crude steel: alloy steel other than stainless steel produced by other processes than in electric furnaces
2710T141	Crude steel: stainless and heat resisting steel produced in electric furnaces
2710T142	Crude steel: stainless and heat resisting steel produced by other processes than in electric furnaces
2710T211	Hot rolled flat products in coil (wide strip) of a width of 600 mm or more
2710T212	Hot rolled flat products in coil of a width less than 600 mm
2710T221	Plate and sheet rolled in lengths in wide strip mills
2710T222	Plate, sheet and wide flat, hot rolled in mills other than wide strip mills
2710T231	Hot rolled wire rod
2710T241	Concrete reinforcing bars
2710T242	Other hot rolled bars
2710T243	Hot rolled and forged light sections of a web height of less than 80 mm and angles
2710T244	Heavy sections
2710T251	Sheet piling

2710T252	Railway material
2710T260	Welded sections
2710T310	Cold rolled sheet, plate and strip and blackplate, >= 600 wide
2710T320	Electrical sheet and strip
2710T330	Tinplate, other tinned sheet and electrically chromium coated steel (ECCS)
2710T340	Hot dipped metal coated sheet
2710T350	Electrolytically metal coated sheet
2710T360	Organic coated sheet

### **NACE 27.22 : Manufacture of steel tubes**

Number of subsectors: 29

27221010	Seamless tubes, pipes and hollow profiles, of stainless steel
27221021	Seamless tubes, pipes and hollow profiles, cold drawn or cold rolled for precise application, not of stainless steel
27221023	Seamless tubes, pipes and hollow profiles, cold finished not cold drawn or cold rolled for precision application, not of stainless steel
27221030	Iron or steel tubes; pipes and hollow profiles; seamless (excl. cast iron)
27221041	Seamless tubes, pipes and hollow profiles, not of stainless steel, not cold finished, external diameter <= 168.3 mm
27221043	Seamless tubes, pipes and hollow profiles, not of stainless steel, not cold finished, external diameter > 168.3 mm, <= 406.4 mm
27221045	Seamless tubes, pipes and hollow profiles, not of stainless steel, not cold finished, external diameter > 406.4 mm
27221050	Seamless hollow profiles and seamless tubes and pipes, of non circular cross-section, hot or cold finished, of steel
27221053	Iron or steel welded; riveted or similarly closed tubes and pipes with internal and external circular cross-sections; external diameter > 406.4 mm
27221055	Iron or steel open seam or welded; riveted or similarly closed tubes; pipes and hollow profiles the external diameter of which is > 406.4 mm
27221060	Tubes and pipes, having circular cross-sections and an external diameter of > 406,4 mm, of flat rolled products of iron or steel e.g., welded, riveted or similarly closed
27221061	Longitudinally welded tubes and pipes of iron (excl. cast iron) or steel with internal and external circular cross-sections; external diameter > 406.4 mm
27221065	Spirally welded, riveted or similarly closed tubes and pipes of iron (excl. cast iron) or steel with internal and external circular cross-sections; external diameter > 406.4 mm
27221070	Open seam or welded, riveted or similarly closed tubes; pipes and hollow profiles of stainless steel, external diameter <= 406.4 mm
27221081	Open seam or welded, riveted or similarly closed tubes, pipes and hollow profiles, not stainless steel, exter. diam. <= 406.4 mm, circular cross-section, wall thick. <=2 mm, cold drawn or otherwise cold finished for precise application
27221083	Open seam or welded, riveted or similarly closed tubes; pipes and hollow profiles, not of stainless steel, exter. diam. <= 406.4 mm, circular cross-section, wall thick. >2 mm, cold drawn or otherwise cold finished, for precision application
27221085	Open seam or welded, riveted or similarly closed tubes; pipes and hollow profiles, not of circular cross-section, not cold drawn or otherwise cold finished, for precision application
27221086	Precision tubes and pipes, of circular cross-section, of non-alloy steel, cold formed and welded or cold formed and cold drawn or cold rolled after welding, of an external diameter =< 406,4 mm and a wall thickness > 2 mm
27221091	Open seam or welded, riveted or similarly closed tubes; pipes and hollow profiles, not of stainless steel, external diameter <= 406.4 mm, of circular cross-section, not cold drawn or otherwise cold finished, not for precision application
27221092	Tubes and pipes, of circular cross-section, of steel other than stainless steel, hot or cold formed and welded, riveted or similarly closed, of an external diameter =< 406,4 mm
27221093	Open seam or welded, riveted or similarly closed tubes; pipes and hollow profiles, not of circular cross-section, not cold drawn or otherwise cold finished, not for precision application
27221094	Tubes and pipes, of square or rectangular cross-section, of steel, hot or cold formed and welded, of a wall thickness =< 2 mm

27221096	Tubes and pipes, of square or rectangular cross-section, of steel, hot or cold formed and welded, of a wall thickness > 2 mm
27221098	Tubes and pipes, of other cross-section than circular, square or rectangular, and hollow profiles, of steel hot or cold formed and welded
27222010	Steel flanges (including stainless steel) (excluding cast fittings)
27222030	Steel threaded tube or pipe fittings (including stainless steel, elbows; bends and sleeves) (excluding cast fittings)
27222050	Steel tube or pipe fittings (including stainless steel) (excluding butt welding fittings, threaded fittings, cast fittings, flanges)
27222073	Steel butt welding elbows and bends for tubes or pipes (including stainless steel) (excluding cast fittings)
27222075	Steel butt welding fittings for tubes or pipes (including stainless steel) (excluding cast fittings, elbows and bends)

#### **NACE 27.44 : Copper production**

Number of subsectors: 14

27441100	Copper mattes; cement copper (precipitated copper) (excluding copper powder)
27441200	Unrefined copper, copper anodes for electrolytic refining (including blister copper) (excluding electrocopper-plating, electroplating anodes)
27441330	Unwrought unalloyed refined copper (excluding rolled, extruded or forged sintered products)
27441350	Unwrought copper alloys (excluding rolled, extruded or forged sintered products)
27441370	Master alloys of copper (including alloys which are not usefully malleable) (excluding copper phosphide (phosphor copper) containing > 15% by weight of phosphorous)
27442100	Copper powders and flakes excluding cement copper, powders/flake powders used in the preparation of paints such as bronzes/golds, (chemical compounds), refined copper shot
27442200	Copper and copper alloy bars, rods, profiles and hollow profiles (excluding bars and rods obtained by casting or sintering, copper wire rod in coils)
27442330	Copper wire, refined (transv. section > 6 mm), of copper alloy
27442350	Copper wire with cross-sectional dimension > 0.5 mm, < 6 mm (excluding twine or cord reinforced with wire, stranded wire and cables)
27442370	Copper wire with cross-sectional dimension <= 0.5 mm (excluding twine or cord reinforced with wire, stranded wire and cables)
27442400	Copper and copper alloy plates, sheets and strip of a thickness > 0.15 mm (excluding expanded copper metal, insulated electric strip)
27442500	Copper foil, of a thickness (excluding any backing) <= 0.15 mm
27442630	Copper tubes and pipes
27442650	Copper and copper alloy tube/pipe fittings including couplings, elbows, sleeves, tees and joints excluding bolts and nuts used for assembling/fixing pipes/tubes, fittings with taps, cocks, valves

#### **NACE 27.45 : Other non-ferrous metal production**

Number of subsectors: 23

27451100	Nickel mattes, nickel oxide sinters and other intermediate products of nickel metallurgy (including impure nickel oxides, nickel speiss, impure ferro-nickel)
27451230	Non-alloy unwrought nickel (excluding nickel powders and flakes)
27451250	Unwrought nickel alloy (excluding nickel powders and flakes)
27452100	Nickel powders and flakes (excluding nickel oxide sinters)
27452200	Nickel and nickel alloy bars, rods, profiles and wires (excluding prepared bars, rods or profiles for use in structures, insulated electric bars and wire, enamelled wire)
27452300	Nickel and nickel alloy plate, sheet, strip and foil (excluding expanded metal)
27452430	Nickel tubes, pipes
27452450	Nickel tube or pipe fittings (couplings, elbows, sleeves)
27453013	Unwrought tungsten (wolfram) bars and rods obtained by sintering, tungsten powders, waste and scrap (excluding carbide)
27453015	Wrought tungsten (wolfram) bars, rods, plate, sheet, strip, foil and wire (excluding bars and rods obtained by sintering, carbide)
27453017	Molybdenum, articles thereof, powders, waste and scrap (excluding alloy molybdenum without a predominance of molybdenum, carbide)

27453023	Tantalum, articles thereof, powders, waste and scrap (excluding carbide)
27453025	Magnesium, articles thereof, powders, waste and scrap (excluding carbide)
27453027	Cobalt mattes and other intermediate products of cobalt metallurgy, cobalt, articles thereof, powders, waste and scrap (excluding carbide)
27453033	Bismuth, articles thereof, powders, waste and scrap (including bismuth-lead-tin alloys, bismuth-indium-lead-tin-cadmium alloys (excluding carbide)
27453035	Unwrought cadmium, powders, waste and scrap (including cadmium zinc alloys) (excluding carbide)
27453037	Wrought cadmium and articles thereof (including cadmium zinc alloys) (excluding carbide)
27453043	Titanium, articles thereof, powders, waste and scrap (excluding carbide)
27453045	Zirconium, articles thereof, powders, waste and scrap (excluding carbide)
27453047	Antimony, articles thereof, powders, waste and scrap (excluding carbide)
27453053	Manganese, articles thereof, powders, waste and scrap (excluding carbide)
27453055	Beryllium, chromium, germanium, vanadium, gallium, hafnium, indium, niobium (columbium), rhenium, thallium, articles of these metals, powders, waste and scrap (excluding carbide)
27453057	Cermets, articles thereof, waste and scrap (excluding cermets containing fissile or radioactive substances, carbide)



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Part 4

**COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT**

**Impact Assessment Report**

*Accompanying the document*

**Communication of the Commission**

**Guidelines on certain State aid measures in the context of Greenhouse Gas Emission  
Allowance Trading Scheme**

{C(2012) 3230 final}  
{SWD(2012) 131 final}

**ANNEXES**

**ANNEX 12.....2**

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## ANNEX 12

### The CO2 price and electricity efficiency benchmarks: two of the five variables used to determine the maximum aid amount

#### *The CO2 price*

The CO2 price variable related to the maximum aid amount should be distinguished from the CO2 price used to calculate sector gross value added and thereby sector eligibility (for the latter eligibility-related CO2 price see 4.6 Section of the main report).

The CO2 price which forms part of the formula determining the maximum aid amount should be fixed in relation to the period in respect of which the State aid is granted.

The future CO2 price can be assumed to reflect companies' planning horizon better than the spot price. One possibility would therefore be to use – in respect of the period in which the aid will be granted - the average of the future prices observed over a reference period (e.g. a number of months or a year).

Such an approach could have two benefits. First, future prices would already be known *ex ante* for the aid amount calculation (i.e. the average of observed prices over a period in respect of the period during which the aid will granted). Second, the CO2 price used would be based on the type of price information business normally take into account in this context (e.g. decisions on investment).

The higher the value of this variable (the CO2 price in the period for which aid is paid), the higher the maximum aid amount.

#### *The product-specific electricity efficiency benchmarks*


Article 10a(6) of the ETS Directive requires that product benchmarks corresponding to the most electricity efficient methods of production be established. If a particular installation's efficiency in terms of use of electricity (MWh/tonne of the product concerned) meets the benchmark there will be no reduction of the aid. Conversely, **if the actual efficiency is below the benchmark the aid level will fall by a corresponding amount.**

At the time of writing the work on the product benchmarks (in terms of MWh/tonne of each product in question) is still ongoing. It is therefore premature to set out outright options in relation to what is likely to be a proposal of a very technical nature. The legal requirement in Article 10a(6) is that the benchmarks should correspond to the most electricity efficient techniques. It may be presumed that that there will be two categories of benchmarks: **primary** and **fallback benchmarks**.

Such primary electricity benchmarks could in the first place be developed for products manufactured through particularly electro-intensive processes with a sufficient number of installations to derive an average from a benchmark curves (see example in figure below). Primary benchmarks could also rely on reference documents on "Best Available Techniques"

('BREFs')<sup>1</sup> (e.g. if the number of installations in the sector is insufficient to draw up a benchmark curve).

Figure: **Electricity benchmarking curve for primary aluminum (2007) (primary smelting process – electrolysis) (the average electricity consumption of the 10 % most efficient plants)**



Source: EEA, 2009

As regards compensation for direct CO<sub>2</sub> costs 52 primary product benchmarks were established in the 2011 Benchmarking Decision, accounting for around 75% of direct emissions of all products entitled to compensation under the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision. The benchmarks are expressed in terms of EUAs (i.e. free allocation of permits) per tonne of production.

These 52 benchmarks relate to 'products' (not necessarily corresponding to Prodcom product definitions).<sup>2</sup> The boundaries of the production processes are precisely defined<sup>3</sup>. For 14 of the 52 primary benchmarks the boundaries include not only use of fuel but also electricity (fuel and electricity substitutability). But as mentioned compensation is only given for fuel use.

Second, as in the case of the 2011 Benchmarking Decision, the ETS Guidelines would have to establish so-called **fallback benchmarks** applicable to all other products which fall within eligible sectors or subsectors to be defined by the ETS Guidelines. The secondary benchmarks may involve dividing the installation's electricity consumption over a period time by its production in tonnes over the same period (MWh/tonnes of the product) A correction factor (0.X) could also be envisaged to ensure that products subject to fall-back benchmarks are neither favoured nor disadvantaged compared to products subject to the primary benchmarks. Some stakeholders have recommended a correction factor which is as low as 0.5 (i.e. 50%). Others recommend a factor of 100% or close to 100%.

<sup>1</sup> BREFs are established in accordance with Directive 2008/1/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 January 2008 concerning integrated pollution prevention and control has been used to derive benchmark values. Some 30 BREFs have been adopted (Bergmann et al (2007)).

<sup>2</sup> See recital 4 of the 2011 Benchmarking Decision.

<sup>3</sup> See recital 4 of the 2011 Benchmarking Decision ("*In principle, for each product one benchmark should be defined. Where a product is a direct substitute of another product, both should be covered by the same product benchmark and the related product definition*").

## ANNEX 13

### The CO2 factor, the merit curve and modelling to determine pass-on of CO2


#### 4.5.1 The impact of the CO2 on the "merit curve"

As mentioned in section 4.5 it is the **"marginal production"** which sets the wholesale price for all consumers (such as manufacturing industry) which buy electricity at the wholesale level (i.e. directly from the electricity grid).

The "marginal production" at any given hour of the day in the relevant geographic area ("price-setting area") is the most expensive production which is in operation at that hour. Some hours of the day are "peak" hours when demand is particularly high. In many cases (although this will vary across areas) the marginal production consists of gas-fired electricity production. This means that the marginal electricity produced during the day is often gas (which can be used more flexibly even if it is more expensive than coal). During night-time (so-called constant "base-load" demand) it may not be necessary to resort to gas production and the marginal production is often made up of coal.

Thus at any point in time there is a range of electricity generating installations (e.g. hydropower, nuclear power, gas and coal) in operation which are ordered accordance to their relative variable production costs, starting with the cheapest production and ending with the most expensive – i.e. "marginal" - production. Accordingly, in any given geographic area, for any particular hour during a particular day a so-called "merit curve" can be established (see example in figure below).

**Figure: Merit curve in the Nordic countries**



*Source: Reply to questionnaire by the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise*

The marginal production de facto sets the price for all buyers in the price-setting area.

In practice the merit curve for each hour results from a daily round of bids to sell (by electricity generators) and offers to buy (by large electricity consumers or traders) at the electricity exchanges. Matching the bids and offers, the electricity exchanges will establish the price each hour the next day ("day ahead" or "spot" prices).<sup>4</sup> The bid corresponding to the marginal production thus becomes price-setting.<sup>5</sup>

**The introduction of the ETS in 2005 had a significant impact on the "merit order" in EU electricity markets.**<sup>6</sup> Whereas in the pre-ETS era, gas would often have constituted the price-setting marginal production during peak hours (daytime) due to the cost of producing electricity from gas being more expensive than other forms of electricity production. But as coal is roughly twice as CO<sub>2</sub> intensive compared to gas the introduction of a CO<sub>2</sub> price via the ETS would often lead to a reversal of the merit order resulting coal-fired production shifting to the right along the merit order (see figures below), thereby de facto setting the price for the whole area.<sup>7</sup>

The price increase borne by e.g. industrial installations in that area would thus not correspond to **the price difference between coal production before and after the introduction of the ETS but to the difference between the gas-based price before ETS and the coal-based price following the introduction of the ETS.** The figures below illustrate a shift along the merit curve from coal to gas production using CCGT.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Electricity futures are also traded on the EU exchanges (as in the case of the CO<sub>2</sub> trading exchanges).

<sup>5</sup> See e.g. reply to questionnaire by Germany (defining the marginal production as the "Grenzgebot").

<sup>6</sup> Pype (2011).

<sup>7</sup> See e.g. reply to questionnaire by the European Aluminium Association.

<sup>8</sup> CCGT stands for "Combined Cycle Gas Technology" and is one of the more CO<sub>2</sub> efficient forms of gas-fired gas production.

**Figure: Expected reversals of the merit order at different CO2 prices**




Fig. 7 ETS-induced changes in the EU-20 merit order at 20 €/t and 2006 fuel prices




Fig. 8 ETS-induced changes in the EU-20 merit order at 40 €/t and 2006 fuel prices

Source: IFIEC (2008)

An additional challenge in attempting to determine the precise impact of CO2 pricing on electricity prices is that the impact would moreover have to be assessed at EU level. Indeed, Article 10a(6) requires that the CO2 factor correspond to "the CO2 emissions of the relevant European electricity mix"<sup>9</sup>.

As mentioned in section 4.5.2 the type of EU-wide modelling that would be required to determine the difference between an ETS scenario and a non-ETS scenario at EU level has not been carried out. Indeed, for the same reason it is not possible to state whether the compensation of direct CO2 costs (via the 2010 Carbon Leakage Decision and the 2011 Benchmarking

<sup>9</sup> While the Finnish and French versions use the term "average" the clearly majority of the language versions use the term "relevant" (Slavic, Baltic, Greek languages to be verified).

Decision) overcompensates or under-compensates the installations receiving free allowances for their direct CO<sub>2</sub> emissions.

Calculating the cost impact of the ETS on electricity prices would be relatively straightforward if there were no reversals in the merit order and if it were assumed that electricity markets were perfectly competitive (resulting in a 100% pass on of cost increases). Given these two (heroic) assumptions it would be possible to add the CO<sub>2</sub> cost component to the marginal production cost of the marginal production (typically gas without the ETS) which would remain the same before and after any cost increase.

But as mentioned it is likely that the introduction of the ETS has led to reversals in the merit order: typically (from gas in a non-ETS world to coal in an ETS world) given that the CO<sub>2</sub> cost affects coal significantly more than gas. The likelihood, precise nature and extent of such reversals of the merit order across the different price-setting areas in the EU over time may vary considerably, further complicating the task of estimating the effect of the reversals at an EU level.

#### *4.5.2 Modelling to assess the impact of the CO<sub>2</sub> price on electricity prices*

The cost impact of ETS has been estimated in respect of certain parts of the EU. A study using one particular model ("BID") finds that have found that the impact in Norway has been around 0.6 (i.e. for each rise in the CO<sub>2</sub> price by 1€ the electricity was found to have risen by 0.6€).<sup>10</sup> The estimated transfer factors for other Member States are all found to be in the within the interval between 0.4 and 0.8-0.9; for example, the factor for Germany is around 0.7.<sup>11</sup>

As the ETS Guidelines must define a CO<sub>2</sub> factor in respect of all Member States it does not appear feasible, based on the available information, to develop one single model that would capture the entirety of the current state of EU electricity markets.<sup>12</sup> The model referred to above in fact only captures the two most integrated regional entities in Europe: the **Central Western area** and the **Nordic area**. **Elsewhere in Europe markets are mostly national in scope** which would require that the same or similar model is developed in respect of more than a dozen Member States<sup>13</sup>. **Recourse to the 'transfer factor' as the CO<sub>2</sub> factor as described above is not considered feasible given time and resource constraints.**

But it is still possible to set out meaningful options regarding the CO<sub>2</sub> factor. A higher rather a lower CO<sub>2</sub> factor will mean a higher maximum aid ceiling. Thus a factor based on the marginal production will tend to be higher than the average CO<sub>2</sub> emissions of electricity in the EU. Different alternatives may also have bearing on incentives to use particular electricity generating technologies. This is confirmed by the abovementioned recent modelling regarding Norway and other Member States which found that the transfer factor can be expected to fall within a range defined by the CO<sub>2</sub> factors of the two most common forms of marginal production (gas and coal) (i.e. between around 0.4 to around 0.9 CO<sub>2</sub>t/MWh) (see figure below).<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Pöyry (2011).

<sup>11</sup> Pöyry (2011).


<sup>12</sup> See non-paper by the European Commission entitled "The Internal Energy Market – Time to Switch into Higher Gear".

<sup>13</sup> Pype (2011).

<sup>14</sup> Pöyry (2011).

**Figure: Estimated CO2 transfer factors for six Member States in 2013 in range between CO2 factors for gas and coal**

Figure 9: Estimated transfer factors for the 2013 base case, ton CO<sub>2</sub>/MWh.



Source: Pöyry (2011)

Indeed, gas-fired plants tend – depending on their efficiency – to have a CO<sub>2</sub> factor roughly in the region of 0.4 CO<sub>2</sub>t/MWh. The most efficient gas-fired plans do not consume more than around 0.35 CO<sub>2</sub>t/MWh. Black (or “hard”) coal (hereafter "coal") has a CO<sub>2</sub> factor of around 0.8-0.9. The CO<sub>2</sub> factor of oil fired electricity generation plants is somewhere in-between the coal and gas CO<sub>2</sub> emission factors. This type of electricity is sometimes described as “grey” as opposed (CO<sub>2</sub>-free) “green” electricity (see Article 10a(6)).



EUROPEAN COMMISSION

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Part 5

**COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT**

**Impact Assessment Report**

*Accompanying the document*

**Communication of the Commission**

**Guidelines on certain State aid measures in the context of Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading Scheme**

{C(2012) 3230 final}  
{SWD(2012) 131 final}

## ANNEXES

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## ANNEX 14

### Value added at factor cost and number of persons of employment at NACE 4 level (2007)

NACE	Description	Value added at factor costs (Mio €)	Number of persons employed per enterprise (hundreds)
1010	Mining and agglomeration of hard coal	n.a.	646.11
1020	Mining and agglomeration of lignite	2,774.1	774.93
1030	Extraction and agglomeration of peat	517.4	11.42
1110	Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas	56,795	201.27
1120	Service activities incidental to oil and gas extraction, excluding surveying	5,609.8	68.18
1200	Mining of uranium and thorium ores	n.a.	n.a.
1310	Mining of iron ores	n.a.	n.a.
1320	Mining of non-ferrous metal ores, except uranium and thorium ores	4,244.7	135.93
1411	Quarrying of ornamental and building stone	2,305.8	9.81
1412	Quarrying of limestone, gypsum and chalk	992.6	14.39
1413	Quarrying of slate	147.9	13.13
1421	Operation of gravel and sand pits	8,921.7	n.a.
1422	Mining of clays and kaolin	713	30
1430	Mining of chemical and fertilizer minerals	251.7	26.59
1440	Production of salt	549.5	17.92
1450	Other mining and quarrying n.e.c.	796.4	11.48
1511	Production and preserving of meat	10,181.3	3,159
1512	Production and preserving of poultrymeat	4,000	n.a.
1513	Production of meat and poultrymeat products	18,812	5,413
1520	Processing and preserving of fish and fish products	4,329.6	1,259
1531	Processing and preserving of potatoes	2,786	428
1532	Manufacture of fruit and vegetable juice	1,897.5	365
1533	Processing and preserving of fruit and vegetables n.e.c.	8,071.7	2,030
1541	Manufacture of crude oils and fats	n.a.	301
1542	Manufacture of refined oils and fats	1,545.7	234

1543	Manufacture of margarine and similar edible fats	n.a.	124
1551	Operation of dairies and cheese making	17,582.8	3,342
1552	Manufacture of ice cream	1,900	n.a.
1561	Manufacture of grain mill products	5,273.4	1,017
1562	Manufacture of starches and starch products	1,962	184
1571	Manufacture of prepared feeds for farm animals	5,400.8	983
1572	Manufacture of prepared pet foods	2,587	294
1581	Manufacture of bread; manufacture of fresh pastry goods and cakes	30,722.2	13,548
1582	Manufacture of rusks and biscuits; manufacture of preserved pastry goods and cakes	6,796.6	1,582
1583	Manufacture of sugar	3,482.7	411
1584	Manufacture of cocoa; chocolate and sugar confectionery	12,066.5	1,919
1585	Manufacture of macaroni, noodles, couscous and similar farinaceous products	2,120.8	574
1586	Processing of tea and coffee	4,672.6	589
1587	Manufacture of condiments and seasonings	2,600	510
1588	Manufacture of homogenized food preparations and dietetic food	2,369.4	261
1589	Manufacture of other food products n.e.c.	n.a.	1,400
1591	Manufacture of distilled potable alcoholic beverages	6,707.4	592
1592	Production of ethyl alcohol from fermented materials	327.6	87
1593	Manufacture of wines	5,300	908
1594	Manufacture of cider and other fruit wines	653.1	63
1595	Manufacture of other non-distilled fermented beverages	96.7	14
1596	Manufacture of beer	11,681	1,350
1597	Manufacture of malt	405.1	n.a.
1598	Production of mineral waters and soft drinks	9,514.9	1,559
1600	Manufacture of tobacco products	8,526.4	550
1711	Preparation and spinning of cotton-type fibres	680.3	299
1712	Preparation and spinning of woollen-type fibres	507.2	160
1713	Preparation and spinning of worsted-type fibres	465.5	171
1714	Preparation and spinning of flax-type fibres	140.3	51

1715	Throwing and preparation of silk, including from noils, and throwing and texturing of synthetic or artificial filament yarns	500.6	152
1716	Manufacture of sewing threads	287.9	93
1717	Preparation and spinning of other textile fibres	320.8	97
1721	Cotton-type weaving	2,221.5	818
1722	Woollen-type weaving	451.7	147
1723	Worsted-type weaving	777.3	199
1724	Silk-type weaving	1,009.6	246
1725	Other textile weaving	1,006.6	272
1730	Finishing of textiles	3,382.1	1,059
1740	Manufacture of made-up textile articles, except apparel	n.a.	n.a.
1751	Manufacture of carpets and rugs	2,070	438
1752	Manufacture of cordage, rope, twine and netting	456.6	167
1753	Manufacture of non-wovens and articles made from non-wovens, except apparel	1,367.6	243
1754	Manufacture of other textiles n.e.c.	4,937.6	1,340
1760	Manufacture of knitted and crocheted fabrics	1,224	400
1771	Manufacture of knitted and crocheted hosiery	n.a.	n.a.
1772	Manufacture of knitted and crocheted pullovers, cardigans and similar articles	1,754.6	952
1810	Manufacture of leather clothes	n.a.	n.a.
1821	Manufacture of workwear	1,185.6	736
1822	Manufacture of other outerwear	14,807.6	8,212
1823	Manufacture of underwear	3,134.5	1,993
1824	Manufacture of other wearing apparel and accessories n.e.c.	3,913.8	1,693
1830	Dressing and dyeing of fur; manufacture of articles of fur	375	202
1910	Tanning and dressing of leather; manufacture of luggage, handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear	13,070.8	5,278
1920	Manufacture of luggage, handbags and the like, saddler	3,465	1,085
1930	Manufacture of footwear	7,630.5	3,686
2010	Sawmilling and planing of wood; impregnation of wood	9,894.2	3,078
2020	Manufacture of veneer sheets; manufacture of plywood, laminboard, particle board, fibre board and other panels and boards	6,640.7	1,222

2030	Manufacture of builders' carpentry and joinery	17,200	5,750
2040	Manufacture of wooden containers	3,271.4	1,013
2051	Manufacture of other products of wood	3,265	1,364
2052	Manufacture of articles of cork, straw and plaiting materials	700	240
2111	Manufacture of pulp	2,181.9	n.a.
2112	Manufacture of paper and paperboard	15,669	1,964
2121	Manufacture of corrugated paper and paperboard and of containers of paper and paperboard	12,794.8	2,707
2122	Manufacture of household and sanitary goods and of toilet requisites	4,995.4	782
2123	Manufacture of paper stationery	2,193.7	514
2124	Manufacture of wallpaper	n.a.	58
2125	Manufacture of other articles of paper and paperboard n.e.c.	3,839.7	755
2211	Publishing of books	12,755.1	2,011
2212	Publishing of newspapers	18,573.5	3,023
2213	Publishing of journals and periodicals	15,935.2	2,693
2214	Publishing of sound recordings	1,100	210
2215	Other publishing	2,089.7	514
2221	Printing of newspapers	2,200	390
2222	Printing n.e.c.	31,237.7	7,150
2223	Bookbinding	2,176.9	605
2224	Pre-press activities	3,362.5	796
2225	Ancillary activities related to printing	2,600	670
2231	Reproduction of sound recording	855	154
2232	Reproduction of video recording	521.1	101
2233	Reproduction of computer media	n.a.	95
2310	Manufacture of coke oven products	666.5	102
2320	Manufacture of refined petroleum products	28,289.3	1,242
2330	Processing of nuclear fuel	856.4	308
2411	Manufacture of industrial gases	4,994.8	390
2412	Manufacture of dyes and pigments	2,549.3	358
2413	Manufacture of other inorganic basic chemicals	6,278.1	788

2414	Manufacture of other organic basic chemicals	27,561.6	1,483
2415	Manufacture of fertilizers and nitrogen compounds	3,672.4	564
2416	Manufacture of plastics in primary forms	21,881.6	1,875

2417	Manufacture of synthetic rubber in primary forms	577.1	59
2420	Manufacture of pesticides and other agro-chemical products	2,934.8	271
2430	Manufacture of paints, varnishes and similar coatings, printing ink and mastics	12,555.3	1,741
2441	Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products	6,827.9	565
2442	Manufacture of pharmaceutical preparations	66,853.2	5,546
2451	Manufacture of soap and detergents, cleaning and polishing preparations	7,965.8	1,145
2452	Manufacture of perfumes and toilet preparations	9,681.8	1,449
2461	Manufacture of explosives	1,178.9	203
2462	Manufacture of glues and gelatines	1,775.2	231
2463	Manufacture of essential oils	1,667.5	187
2464	Manufacture of photographic chemical material	1,177.3	112
2465	Manufacture of prepared unrecorded media	89.7	24
2466	Manufacture of other chemical products n.e.c.	10,872.6	1,205
2470	Manufacture of man-made fibres	2,754.3	412
2511	Manufacture of rubber tyres and tubes	8,582.5	1,294
2512	Retreading and rebuilding of rubber tyres	n.a.	n.a.
2513	Manufacture of other rubber products	9,747	2,263
2521	Manufacture of plastic plates, sheets, tubes and profiles	16,000	2,900
2522	Manufacture of plastic packing goods	11,690.8	2,565
2523	Manufacture of builders' ware of plastic	10,780.4	2,640
2625	Manufacture of other ceramic products	n.a.	n.a.
2524	Manufacture of other plastic products	25,392.5	5,931
2611	Manufacture of refractory ceramic products	2,688.3	388
2612	Shaping and processing of flat glass	5,391.2	1,256
2630	Manufacture of hollow glass and flags	5,406.5	1,996
2614	Manufacture of glass fibres	1,905.6	249
2640	Manufacture of bricks, tiles and construction products	4,631.6	841
2615	Manufacture of products of other glass, including technical glassware	2,856.9	664
2651	Manufacture of cement	9,959.2	641
2622	Manufacture of ceramic household and ornamental articles	1,030.0	849
2653	Manufacture of plaster	299.3	42
2622	Manufacture of ceramic sanitary fixtures	1,703.4	346
2661	Manufacture of concrete products for construction purposes	14,026.5	2,867
2623	Manufacture of ceramic insulators and insulating fittings	441.9	95
2662	Manufacture of plaster products for construction purposes	2,294.6	208
2624	Manufacture of other technical ceramic products	6,947.8	1,188

2664	Manufacture of mortars	1,758.9	241
2665	Manufacture of fibre cement	652.6	107
2666	Manufacture of other articles of concrete, plaster and cement	1,283.1	332
2670	Cutting, shaping and finishing of ornamental and building stone	n.a.	2,000
2681	Production of abrasive products	1,602.3	303
2682	Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products n.e.c.	4,621.4	681
2710	Manufacture of basic iron and steel and of ferro-alloys	42,831.1	4,017
2721	Manufacture of cast iron tubes	n.a.	n.a.
2722	Manufacture of steel tubes	n.a.	1,193
2731	Cold drawing	496.6	75
2732	Cold rolling of narrow strip	1,367.4	185
2733	Cold forming or folding	1,354	208
2734	Wire drawing	1,789	310
2741	Precious metals production	900	105
2742	Aluminium production	8,971.1	1,208
2743	Lead, zinc and tin production	2,638.1	231
2744	Copper production	3,816.7	463
2745	Other non-ferrous metal production	n.a.	180
2751	Casting of iron	4,769.9	1,122
2752	Casting of steel	1,977.8	384
2753	Casting of light metals	4,271.1	920
2754	Casting of other non-ferrous metals	1,447.9	333
2811	Manufacture of metal structures and parts of structures	31,984.1	7,809
2812	Manufacture of builders' carpentry and joinery of metal	12,258.9	3,773
2821	Manufacture of tanks, reservoirs and containers of metal	3,753.7	915
2822	Manufacture of central heating radiators and boilers	3,800	800
2830	Manufacture of steam generators, except central heating hot water boilers	7,219	1,525
2840	Forging, pressing, stamping and roll forming of metal; powder metallurgy	17,354.9	3,266
2851	Treatment and coating of metals	12,945.7	2,906
2852	General mechanical engineering	37,213.2	8,785
2861	Manufacture of cutlery	1,021.7	215
2862	Manufacture of tools	9,971.2	2,037
2863	Manufacture of locks and hinges	7,362.5	1,737
2871	Manufacture of steel drums and similar containers	937	200
2872	Manufacture of light metal packaging	3,990	683
2873	Manufacture of wire products	3,600	722


2874	Manufacture of fasteners, screw machine products, chain and springs	6,152	1,175
2875	Manufacture of other fabricated metal products n.e.c.	17,260.6	4,242
2911	Manufacture of engines and turbines, except aircraft, vehicle and cycle engines	8,392	1,129
2912	Manufacture of pumps and compressors	15,359.2	2,364
2913	Manufacture of taps and valves	11,336	n.a.
2914	Manufacture of bearings, gears, gearing and driving elements	13,000	2,236
2921	Manufacture of furnaces and furnace burners	2,335.4	434
2922	Manufacture of lifting and handling equipment	22,039.8	3,773
2923	Manufacture of non-domestic cooling and ventilation equipment	16,000	3,000
2924	Manufacture of other general purpose machinery n.e.c.	22,717.8	4,012
2931	Manufacture of agricultural tractors	1,900	300
2932	Manufacture of other agricultural and forestry machinery	8,363	1,869
2941	Manufacture of portable hand held power tools	2,000	331
2942	Manufacture of other metalworking machine tools	9,942.2	1,742
2943	Manufacture of other machine tools n.e.c.	6,700	1,213
2951	Manufacture of machinery for metallurgy	2,860	578
2952	Manufacture of machinery for mining, quarrying and construction	11,858.1	2,029
2953	Manufacture of machinery for food, beverage and tobacco processing	6,696.4	1,302
2954	Manufacture of machinery for textile, apparel and leather production	3,749.9	788
2955	Manufacture of machinery for paper and paperboard production	2,800	n.a.
2956	Manufacture of other special purpose machinery n.e.c.	23,789.4	4,457
2960	Manufacture of weapons and ammunition	5,347.6	962
2971	Manufacture of electric domestic appliances	11,337.4	2,463
2972	Manufacture of non-electric domestic appliances	1,723.5	418
3001	Manufacture of office machinery	n.a.	317
3002	Manufacture of computers and other information processing equipment	17,994	3,169



3120	Manufacture of electricity distribution and control apparatus	31,700	5,390
3130	Manufacture of insulated wire and cable	6,614	n.a.
3140	Manufacture of accumulators, primary cells and primary batteries	1,679.6	331
3150	Manufacture of lighting equipment and electric lamps	8,265.4	1,665
3161	Manufacture of electrical equipment for engines and vehicles n.e.c.	8,220.1	2,609
3162	Manufacture of other electrical equipment n.e.c.	12,259.5	2,419
3210	Manufacture of electronic valves and tubes and other electronic components	20,000	n.a.
3220	Manufacture of television and radio transmitters and apparatus for line telephony and line telegraphy	n.a.	2,714
3230	Manufacture of television and radio receivers, sound or video recording or reproducing apparatus and associated goods	7,681.1	1,604
3310	Manufacture of medical and surgical equipment and orthopaedic appliances	24,064.3	4,567
3320	Manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring, checking, testing, navigating and other purposes, except industrial process control equipment	25,032	3,757
3330	Manufacture of industrial process control equipment	5,490.4	1,005
3340	Manufacture of optical instruments and photographic equipment	7,718.4	1,251
3350	Manufacture of watches and clocks	600	119
3410	Manufacture of motor vehicles	95,463.2	11,000
3420	Manufacture of bodies (coachwork) for motor vehicles; manufacture of trailers and semi-trailers	9,273.2	2,000
3430	Manufacture of parts and accessories for motor vehicles and their engines	50,659.1	9,677
3511	Building and repairing of ships	9,525.9	2,326
3512	Building and repairing of pleasure and sporting boats	4,000	800
3520	Manufacture of railway and tramway locomotives and rolling stock	7,586.8	1,655
3530	Manufacture of aircraft and spacecraft	31,738.4	3,998
3541	Manufacture of motorcycles	1,469.9	265



3542	Manufacture of bicycles	775.8	228
3543	Manufacture of invalid carriages	370.8	69
3550	Manufacture of other transport equipment n.e.c.	527.3	129
3611	Manufacture of chairs and seats	9,011.2	2,902
3612	Manufacture of other office and shop furniture	7,478.6	1,842
3613	Manufacture of other kitchen furniture	5,017.5	1,350
3614	Manufacture of other furniture	17,822.2	7,015
3615	Manufacture of mattresses	1,810.5	460
3621	Striking of coins	298.1	48
3622	Manufacture of jewellery and related articles n.e.c.	3,523.3	1,088
3630	Manufacture of musical instruments	738.9	236
3640	Manufacture of sports goods	1,700	430
3650	Manufacture of games and toys	n.a.	571
3661	Manufacture of imitation jewellery	n.a.	n.a.
3662	Manufacture of brooms and brushes	948.5	246
3663	Other manufacturing n.e.c.	5,799.7	1,811
3710	Recycling of metal waste and scrap	n.a.	800
3720	Recycling of non-metal waste and scrap	4,329.6	826

# ANNEX 15


## Share of sectors of national GDP












## Estonia







## Ireland





















## Portugal





## Romania











EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Strasbourg, 22.5.2012  
SWD(2012) 130 final

Part 6

**COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT**

**Impact Assessment Report**

*Accompanying the document*

**Communication of the Commission**

**Guidelines on certain State aid measures in the context of Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading Scheme**

{C(2012) 3230 final}  
{SWD(2012) 131 final}

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
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


(1) 2005.  
Source: Eurostat (National accounts)

Source: Eurostat Key Figures on European Business (2008)

**Figure 2:**

**Figure 1.3:** Structure of the non-financial business economy, EU-27, 2005 (%)




(1) Electricity, gas and water supply (Section E); including rounded estimates based on non-confidential data.

Source: Eurostat (SBS)

Source: Eurostat Key Figures on European Business (2008)

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(1) Including rounded estimates based on non-confidential data.  
Source: Eurostat (SBS)

Source: Eurostat Key Figures on European Business (2008)

### Figure 4:





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Source: IFIEC (2008)


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*Source: EC DG ENER – ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE – Priorities for 2020 and beyond (2011)*

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


*Source: Suwala (forthcoming)*

*Source: Dröge (2009)*

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
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Source: PRIMES

Source: SEC(2011) 288 final

**Figure 8:**



**Chart 18**


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Source Climate Strategies (2007): Hourcade, Neuhoff, et al.

Source: Carbon Trust (2008)

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
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Source: Barron et al (2008)

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
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These 6 countries account for approximately 50% of total non-EU iron and steel trade.


Source: Dröge (2009)

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
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Source: Dröge (2009)

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
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Source: Climate Strategies (2007): Hourcade, Neuhoff, et al.

Source: Climate Strategies (2007)

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
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
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Note: Assuming 20 EUR/tCO<sub>2</sub> carbon price, and 14 EUR/MWh electricity price increase. Source: de Bruyn et al., 2008.

Source: De Bruyn et al (2008)


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Source: Hourcade et al (2007)


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
Source: Hourcade et al (2007)

**Figure 18:**



Source: Carbon 2011

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Source: Carbon 2010

**Figure 20:**



Source: Carbon 2011

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



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**Figure 22:**



**Chart 8**


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
Source, POLES, JRC, IPTS

Results of the global GHG emissions projections using the POLES model:

Source: SEC(2011) 288 final

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
\*For reference only ETS carbon price is represented

Source: PRIMES, GAINS

Source: SEC(2011) 288 final

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Source: SEC(2011) 779 final

**Figure 26:**



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(source: KEMA, Imperial College London)

Source: EC DG ENER – ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE – Priorities for 2020 and beyond (2011)


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	Brokered OTC		Exchange		Total traded volumes
	forward	spot	futures / forwards derivatives	spot	
Germany	4,109.9	38.2	257.0	135.0	4,540.0
Nordic	1,100.0	0.0	1,195.9	285.5	2,581.4
UK	1,020.8	39.9	0.0	12.6	1,073.4
France	500.7	11.7	28.0	52.6	593.0
The Netherlands	206.8	2.3	34.0	29.1	271.2
Spain	168.1	1.5	0.0	201.0	370.6
Czech Rep	82.6	1.1	24.3	3.0	111.0
Italy	72.0	0.0	0.0	213.0	285.0
Belgium	71.1	0.4	8.4	10.1	90.0
Hungary	38.7	0.4	3.5	0.0	42.6
Poland	31.3	0.0	0.0	2.8	34.1
Romania	6.9	0.0	11.5	6.3	24.7
<b>Total traded volumes</b>	<b>7,407.8</b>	<b>95.6</b>	<b>1,562.6</b>	<b>951.0</b>	<b>10,017.0</b>
<b>Total In %</b>	<b>74.0%</b>	<b>1.0%</b>	<b>15.6%</b>	<b>9.5%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

Source: Argus Media Limited, GME, EEX, APX, PXE, Polpx, Opcom

Source: EC DG ENER B2 – REMIT: ensuring integrity of gas and electricity markets – Florence School of Regulation Energy Law & Policy (2011)

Figure 28:



© European Union – Directorate-General for Energy – November 2010


- Gas
- Electricity
- Electricity and gas
- Oil and gas
- Smart Grids for Electricity in the EU

Map 1: Priority corridors for electricity, gas and oil

Source: EC DG ENER – ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE – Priorities for 2020 and beyond (2011)

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AND 2015-2025**



Source: ENTSO-E

Source: SEC(2010) 1395/2

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




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Source: Barron et al (2008)

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


Source: IEA, 2008

Source: Barron et al (2008)

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
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
Source: norwatt.no

Source: Reply to questionnaire by Norwegian Industries.

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


Source: Presentation of the findings of the Deloitte report  
Analyzing the post 2012 EU-ETS potential impacts on the European  
Industrial Gases sector July 25th 2008 (part of reply to questionnaire)

**Figure 36:**

Nel settore delle poliolefine (polietilene e polipropilene) i trend internazionali evidenziano per l'Europa un netto peggioramento della posizione di net trade.

*Grafico 1 – Net trade poliolefine in Europa (kton)*






*Fonte: CMAI*

*Source: Reply to Questionnaire by ENI S.p.a*

**Figure 37:**


**COPPER STOCKS CHARTS**



ICSG 2009 Statistical Yearbook- July 2010

Source: ICSG Statistical Yearbook – July 2010

**Figure 38: Trade in iron ore**




Source: BHP

**Figure 39: Cement**

Figure 1 illustrates the EU regions at risk of offshoring for different CO<sub>2</sub> prices.

Figure 1



Source: Boston Consulting Group ("Assessment of the Impact of the 2013-2020 ETS Proposal on the European Cement Industry") (2008) (submitted by Cembureau)



EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Strasbourg, 22.5.2012  
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Part 7

**COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT**

**Impact Assessment Report**

*Accompanying the document*

**Communication of the Commission**

**Guidelines on certain State aid measures in the context of Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading Scheme**

{C(2012) 3230 final}  
{SWD(2012) 131 final}

**ANNEXES**

**ANNEX 16.....2**

Additional tables .....2

## ANNEX 16

### Additional tables

**Table 1:**

**Table 1.3:** Share of value added in the non-financial business economy, 2005 (%) (1)

	BE	BG	CZ	DK	DE	EE	IE	EL	ES	FR	IT	CY	LV	LT
Mining & quarrying	0.2	3.9	2.0	5.5	0.6	1.5	0.7	1.3	0.5	0.5	1.3	0.6	0.5	1.0
Food, bev. & tob.	4.3	5.8	4.4	4.3	3.2	3.4	6.5	4.9	3.8	3.9	3.4	5.2	4.3	5.6
Textiles & textile prod.	1.3	4.5	1.6	0.4	0.6	2.5	0.3	1.6	0.9	0.8	2.7	0.5	1.7	3.3
Leather & leather prod.	0.1	0.4	0.1	:	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.9	0.1	0.0	0.1
Wood & wood prod.	0.6	0.7	1.3	0.7	0.6	3.8	0.4	0.3	0.6	0.5	0.9	1.1	4.7	2.2
Pulp, paper, printing	2.3	1.6	2.1	2.2	2.6	2.1	4.8	2.5	2.2	2.0	2.2	1.3	1.8	1.6
Ref. petr.; nucl. fuel	1.4	:	0.3	:	0.5	0.4	:	1.7	1.4	0.8	0.5	0.1	:	5.0
Chem. & man-made fib.	7.3	2.4	2.3	3.1	4.1	1.3	13.1	1.3	2.2	3.4	2.6	1.0	0.9	1.8
Rubber & plastics	1.4	1.0	2.4	1.2	1.9	1.0	0.6	0.7	1.2	1.5	1.6	0.5	0.6	1.2
Other non-metal. min.	1.6	2.5	3.0	1.0	1.2	2.2	1.0	1.7	2.3	1.1	2.1	2.5	1.1	1.4
Basic & fabric. metals	4.9	4.2	6.9	2.4	5.5	2.5	0.8	4.0	3.9	3.6	6.2	1.8	2.1	1.6
Mach. & equip. n.e.c.	2.1	3.2	3.9	3.3	6.1	1.2	0.8	0.8	1.8	2.3	5.0	0.4	0.8	1.0
Elec. & optical equip.	2.4	2.2	5.1	2.6	5.8	3.2	7.8	0.8	1.4	3.3	3.3	0.2	1.2	1.7
Transport equip.	2.7	0.8	5.1	0.7	6.6	1.2	0.5	0.9	2.3	3.7	2.1	0.1	0.8	1.0
Manufacturing n.e.c.	0.9	1.0	1.6	1.3	1.0	2.1	:	0.6	1.0	1.0	1.7	0.9	1.3	2.0
Elec., gas & water	3.7	10.1	5.8	2.6	3.9	5.7	:	5.0	2.8	3.1	3.2	3.9	4.7	7.1
Construction	7.1	7.4	7.8	8.0	5.1	9.3	6.4	9.0	16.9	8.3	9.8	15.4	8.6	10.6
Motor trades	2.8	3.1	2.1	2.6	3.4	3.1	1.5	3.1	2.8	2.4	2.5	3.3	4.2	3.6
Wholesale trade	10.5	9.9	9.4	11.5	7.5	13.0	9.0	14.9	9.3	8.3	8.7	9.3	16.5	10.8
Retail trade	7.0	4.9	5.6	5.7	6.4	6.3	5.6	11.7	8.1	8.3	7.2	10.1	8.1	7.0
Hotels & restaurants	2.6	2.9	2.0	1.9	1.9	2.3	3.6	4.9	4.7	3.5	3.2	12.2	2.3	1.6
Land trans.; pipe.	4.7	5.2	5.5	3.4	2.3	4.5	1.4	4.1	3.8	4.2	3.6	1.2	6.4	7.6
Water transport	0.5	1.0	:	3.4	0.6	-0.1	:	1.7	0.1	0.2	0.5	2.1	0.3	0.7
Air transport	0.3	0.3	:	0.3	-0.2	0.3	:	0.2	0.5	0.7	0.4	1.4	1.0	0.1
Other trans.; travel ag.	2.8	3.5	1.4	2.5	3.3	5.6	2.1	2.8	2.6	2.5	2.6	4.4	7.3	3.1
Post & telecoms	5.7	9.5	4.7	3.6	4.4	5.0	6.4	6.1	3.9	4.9	5.1	5.7	5.7	4.6
Real estate	2.2	1.2	2.2	11.3	5.6	6.2	2.4	0.4	6.1	4.7	2.9	6.2	4.5	4.1
Renting	1.6	0.3	0.4	0.7	1.6	1.0	0.7	0.7	1.0	1.4	0.6	0.7	0.9	0.4
Computer services	2.6	1.3	2.0	3.2	2.8	1.3	3.3	1.1	1.7	3.1	2.7	1.1	1.4	1.1
R&D	0.4	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.5	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.2	0.4	0.2	:	0.3	0.1
Other business act.	11.8	4.3	8.4	10.0	10.5	7.6	8.9	10.3	9.8	15.3	10.5	6.6	5.8	6.2

(1) The Czech Republic, 2004; data not available for some Member States in 2005 were substituted by information for 2004.

Source: Eurostat (SBS)

Source: Eurostat Key Figures on European Business (2008)

## Table 2:

**Table 1.3:** Share of value added in the non-financial business economy, 2005 (%) (1) (continued)

	LU	HU	MT	NL	AT	PL	PT	RO	SI	SK	FI	SE	UK	NO
Mining & quarrying	0.2	0.4	:	2.4	0.7	4.7	0.8	8.2	0.8	1.2	0.4	0.9	3.5	39.2
Food, bev. & tob.	2.1	4.9	:	4.5	2.9	9.2	3.9	5.0	3.2	2.8	2.8	2.4	3.2	2.3
Textiles & textile prod.	1.4	1.2	:	0.4	0.7	1.3	3.3	4.1	2.1	1.4	0.6	0.3	0.5	0.2
Leather & leather prod.	0.0	0.2	:	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.9	1.1	0.6	0.6	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
Wood & wood prod.	0.4	0.6	:	0.4	1.4	1.1	1.2	1.1	1.3	0.9	1.7	1.3	0.4	0.6
Pulp, paper, printing	1.6	2.0	:	2.7	2.6	2.4	2.5	1.5	2.8	2.4	6.3	3.8	2.6	1.7
Ref. petr.; nuclear fuel	:	2.9	:	0.2	:	4.3	:	0.6	0.0	:	1.0	0.3	0.3	0.3
Chem. & man-made fib.	0.6	4.0	:	4.4	2.2	2.9	1.6	2.0	5.7	1.4	2.5	4.0	2.3	1.3
Rubber & plastics	3.3	1.8	:	0.8	1.3	1.9	1.0	1.2	2.6	2.1	1.3	0.9	1.1	0.2
Other non-metal. min.	2.0	1.7	:	0.8	2.0	2.2	2.5	2.1	1.8	2.4	1.6	0.7	0.7	0.6
Basic & fabric. metals	6.1	3.5	:	3.1	5.7	4.1	2.9	4.2	7.3	8.7	5.5	4.9	2.2	1.9
Mach. & equip. n.e.c.	1.2	2.6	:	2.4	4.4	2.6	1.7	2.0	4.6	3.4	4.8	4.3	1.7	1.1
Elec. & optical equip.	0.2	10.7	:	2.3	4.1	2.5	2.0	2.4	4.5	5.0	9.7	5.0	2.1	1.1
Transport equip.	0.2	4.8	:	1.5	2.8	3.3	1.4	3.1	2.3	4.2	1.2	4.5	2.4	1.8
Manufacturing n.e.c.	0.2	0.7	:	0.7	1.5	1.7	1.2	1.8	1.9	1.4	0.9	0.9	0.9	0.5
Elec., gas & water	1.8	5.7	:	2.0	3.8	7.2	4.6	7.3	4.4	14.8	3.9	4.3	3.0	2.9
Construction	11.2	5.8	:	9.6	9.0	5.9	12.2	7.0	8.3	5.4	8.7	7.3	9.0	5.9
Motor trades	3.0	2.5	:	2.6	2.7	2.1	3.4	3.0	3.4	1.4	2.7	2.7	3.1	1.9
Wholesale trade	9.1	8.5	:	13.6	10.0	11.1	11.7	10.2	9.0	9.5	8.0	9.2	8.3	6.0
Retail trade	5.3	5.4	:	6.9	6.9	6.5	8.3	5.5	7.9	5.5	6.5	5.9	8.0	4.5
Hotels & restaurants	3.6	1.7	:	2.7	4.6	1.1	4.1	1.5	3.1	1.0	2.2	2.1	3.8	1.5
Land trans.; pipe.	5.9	5.2	:	3.9	4.3	4.2	3.4	4.4	3.7	4.4	4.5	3.7	2.5	3.3
Water transport	0.1	0.1	:	1.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	:	0.1	0.1	0.7	0.7	0.3	2.7
Air transport	3.5	0.2	:	1.2	0.4	0.2	0.9	:	0.3	0.0	0.8	0.3	1.0	0.5
Other trans.; travel ag.	1.1	1.9	:	2.7	3.6	1.2	3.2	2.2	1.9	1.6	2.1	2.2	3.0	1.9
Post & telecoms	9.2	6.5	:	4.7	3.4	5.3	5.2	7.2	4.5	6.2	3.5	3.8	4.7	2.6
Real estate	:	3.8	:	4.9	4.5	3.1	2.9	1.8	1.5	1.5	4.2	7.4	4.3	4.4
Renting	1.4	0.8	:	1.6	1.9	0.4	1.1	0.5	0.1	0.6	0.5	0.8	1.7	0.5
Computer services	2.5	2.0	:	3.4	2.2	1.2	1.4	1.7	1.9	1.9	3.3	4.7	5.1	2.1
R&D	:	0.2	:	0.7	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.5	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.7	0.3
Other business act.	16.4	7.6	:	14.0	9.4	5.9	9.5	6.2	8.1	5.8	7.9	9.9	17.2	6.5

(1) The Czech Republic, 2004; data not available for some Member States in 2005 were substituted by information for 2004.

Source: Eurostat (SBS)

Source: Eurostat Key Figures on European Business (2008)

### Table 3:

**Table 2.1:** Most specialised Member States by activity, 2005  
(% of national value added in the non-financial business economy) (1)

	Share		Share	
	1st	(%)	2nd	(%)
Mining & quarrying	RO	8.2	DK	5.5
Food, bev. & tob.	PL	9.2	IE	6.5
Textiles & textile prod.	BG	4.5	RO	4.1
Leather & leather prod.	RO	1.1	IT	0.9
Wood & wood prod.	LV	4.7	EE	3.8
Pulp, paper, printing	FI	6.3	IE	4.8
Coke, ref. petr.; nucl. fuel	LT	5.0	PL	4.3
Chem. & man-made fib.	IE	13.1	BE	7.3
Rubber & plastics	LU	3.3	SI	2.6
Other non-metal. min.	CZ	3.0	BG	2.5
Basic & fabric. metals	SK	8.7	SI	7.3
Mach. & equip. n.e.c.	DE	6.1	IT	5.0
Elec. & optical equip.	HU	10.7	FI	9.7
Transport equip.	DE	6.6	CZ	5.1
Manufacturing n.e.c.	EE	2.1	LT	2.0
Elec., gas & water	SK	14.8	BG	10.1
Construction	ES	16.9	CY	15.4
Motor trades	LV	4.2	LT	3.6
Wholesale trade	LV	16.5	EL	14.9
Retail trade	EL	11.7	CY	10.1
Hotels & restaurants	CY	12.2	EL	4.9
Land trans.; pipe.	LT	7.6	LV	6.4
Water transport	DK	3.4	CY	2.1
Air transport	LU	3.5	CY	1.4
Other trans.; travel ag.	LV	7.3	EE	5.6
Post & telecoms	BG	9.5	LU	9.2
Real estate	DK	11.3	SE	7.4
Renting	AT	1.9	UK	1.7
Computer services	UK	5.1	SE	4.7
R&D	NL	0.7	UK	0.7
Other business act.	UK	17.2	LU	16.4

(1) Including rounded estimates based on non-confidential data; the Czech Republic, 2004; Malta, not available; data not available for some Member States in 2005 were substituted by information for 2004; there are a limited number of activity-country pairings for which no information was available.

Source: Eurostat (SBS)

Source: Eurostat Key Figures on European Business (2008)

## Table 4:

**Table 2.2:** Most specialised activities per Member State, 2005  
(% of national value added in the non-financial business economy, EU-27=100) (1)

	1st	2nd
BE	Chem. & man-made fib. (220.3)	Ref. petr.; nuclear fuel (205.1)
BG	Textiles & textile prod. (410.0)	Elec., gas & water (304.5)
CZ	Other non-metal. min. (220.7)	Wood & wood prod. (200.3)
DK	Water transport (766.2)	Mining & quarrying (410.0)
DE	Transport equip. (186.5)	Mach. & equip. n.e.c. (180.7)
EE	Wood & wood prod. (558.4)	Textiles & textile prod. (229.2)
IE	Chem. & man-made fib. (393.0)	Elec. & optical equip. (209.5)
EL	Water transport (384.8)	Ref. petr.; nuclear fuel (234.2)
ES	Ref. petr.; nuclear fuel (203.8)	Construction (198.9)
FR	Other business act. (133.5)	Air transport (127.5)
IT	Leather & leather prod. (384.1)	Textiles & textile prod. (244.0)
CY	Water transport (470.9)	Hotels & restaurants (381.0)
LV	Wood & wood prod. (692.1)	Other trans.; travel ag. (262.5)
LT	Ref. petr.; nuclear fuel (715.9)	Wood & wood prod. (319.7)
LU	Air transport (632.7)	Rubber & plastics (221.2)
HU	Ref. petr.; nuclear fuel (417.0)	Elec. & optical equip. (288.7)
MT	:	:
NL	Water transport (227.2)	Air transport (225.8)
AT	Wood & wood prod. (208.8)	Renting (145.5)
PL	Ref. petr.; nuclear fuel (605.1)	Mining & quarrying (348.8)
PT	Leather & leather prod. (364.7)	Textiles & textile prod. (298.3)
RO	Mining & quarrying (605.1)	Leather & leather prod. (477.7)
SI	Leather & leather prod. (263.7)	Wood & wood prod. (192.2)
SK	Elec., gas & water (445.3)	Leather & leather prod. (263.8)
FI	Elec. & optical equip. (260.0)	Wood & wood prod. (253.1)
SE	Wood & wood prod. (194.3)	Real estate (171.8)
UK	Mining & quarrying (262.0)	R&D (184.5)

(1) Including rounded estimates based on non-confidential data: the Czech Republic, 2004; data not available for some Member States in 2005 were substituted by information for 2004; there are a limited number of activity-country pairings for which no information was available.

Source: Eurostat (SBS)

Source: Eurostat Key Figures on European Business (2008)

**Table 5:**

**Table 6.1:** Most specialised region by activity (NACE sections and divisions), EU-27 and Norway, 2007 <sup>(1)</sup>  
 (% share of total non-financial business economy employment of the region and the median and average share of all regions)

Activity (NACE)	All regions		Most specialised region	
	Median share (%)	Average share (%)	Name (NUTS 2 region)	Share of the region (%)
<b>Mining and quarrying (C 10–14)</b>	0.3	0.7	Agder og Rogaland (NO04)	13.1
Coal, lignite and peat (10)	0.0	0.2	Śląskie (PL22)	c
Crude petroleum and natural gas (11)	0.0	0.2	Agder og Rogaland (NO04)	12.8
Uranium and thorium ores (12)	0.0	0.0	Severovýchod (CZ05)	c
Metal ores (13)	0.0	0.0	Övre Norrland (SE33)	c
Gewinnung von Steinen und Erden (14)	0.2	0.2	Świętokrzyskie (PL33)	c
<b>Manufacturing (D 15–37)</b>	24.9	25.9	Západné Slovensko (SK02)	56.1
Food and beverages (15)	3.6	3.8	Bretagne (FR52)	10.9
Tobacco products (16)	0.0	0.1	Trier (DEB2)	c
Textiles (17)	0.4	0.7	Prov. West-Vlaanderen (BE25)	5.5
Wearing apparel; fur (18)	0.3	1.0	Dytiki Makedonia (GR13)	11.6
Leather and leather products (19)	0.1	0.3	Marche (ITE3)	7.6
Wood and wood products (20)	0.9	1.2	Itä-Suomi (FI13)	5.7
Pulp, paper and paper products (21)	0.4	0.6	Norra Mellansverige (SE31)	4.5
Publishing and printing (22)	1.0	1.1	Inner London (UKI1)	4.0
Fuel processing (23)	0.0	0.1	Cumbria (UKD1)	c
Chemicals and chemical products (24)	1.0	1.3	Rheinessen-Pfalz (DEB3)	10.9
Rubber and plastic products (25)	1.2	1.4	Auvergne (FR72)	6.3
Other non-metallic mineral products (26)	1.1	1.3	Świętokrzyskie (PL33)	5.4
Basic metals (27)	0.5	1.0	Východné Slovensko (SK04)	8.3
Fabricated metal products (28)	2.7	3.0	Arnsberg (DEA5)	8.8
Machinery and equipment (29)	2.2	2.8	Unterfranken (DE26)	12.3
Office machinery and computers (30)	0.0	0.1	Southern and Eastern (IE02)	1.3
Electrical machinery and apparatus (31)	0.9	1.3	Západné Slovensko (SK02)	10.2
Radio, TV and communication equipment (32)	0.3	0.5	Pohjois-Suomi (FI1A)	5.9
Medical, precision and optical equipment (33)	0.6	0.7	Border, Midland and Western (IE01)	5.5
Motor vehicles and (semi)-trailers (34)	0.8	1.6	Braunschweig (DE91)	c
Other transport equipment (35)	0.5	0.8	Sud-Est (RO22)	6.1
Furniture and other manufacturing (36)	1.0	1.4	Warmińsko-mazurskie (PL62)	7.9
Recycling (37)	0.1	0.1	Brandenburg-Nordost (DE41)	0.7
<b>Electricity, gas and water supply (E 40–41)</b>	1.0	1.2	Severozapaden (BG31)	5.3
Electricity, gas and hot water supply (40)	0.8	0.9	Sud-Vest Oltenia (RO41)	4.4
Water supply (41)	0.2	0.3	Východné Slovensko (SK04)	1.8
<b>Construction (F 45)</b>	10.9	11.2	Castilla-La Mancha (ES42)	29.0
<b>Distributive trades (G 50–52)</b>	25.8	25.7	Kriti (GR43)	46.3
Motor trades (50)	3.5	3.6	Brandenburg-Südwest (DE42)	7.0
Wholesale trade (51)	7.2	7.5	Peloponnisos (GR25)	16.1
Retail trade and repair (52)	14.3	14.6	Kriti (GR43)	31.3
<b>Hotels and restaurants (H 55)</b>	7.1	8.0	Notio Aigaio (GR42)	31.6
<b>Transport, storage and communication (I 60–64)</b>	8.2	8.9	Åland (FI20)	45.0
Real estate activities (60)	4.3	4.5	Bourgogne (FR26)	20.6
Renting (61)	0.1	0.4	Åland (FI20)	35.7
Computer activities (62)	0.0	0.2	Outer London (UKI2)	3.7
Research and development (63) <sup>(2)</sup>	1.8	2.0	Bremen (DE50)	13.1

Source: Eurostat Regional Yearbook 2010

**Table 6:****Table 3.1:** Most specialised regions in different activities, 2005  
(% of non-financial business economy employment) (1)

	Median share (%) (2)	Most specialised region (NUTS code)	(%)
Mining & quarrying	0.3	Slaskie (PL22)	11.0
Food, bev. & tob.	3.9	Bretagne (FR52)	12.1
Textiles	0.8	Norte (PT11)	14.1
Leather	0.1	Marche (ITE3)	7.9
Wood & wood prod.	0.9	Itä-Suomi (FI3)	c
Pulp, paper, printing	1.7	Mellersta Norrland (SE07)	6.5
Ref. petr.; nuc. fuel	0.0	Cumbria (UKD1)	c
Chem. & man-m. fib.	1.0	Rheinhesen-Pfalz (DEB3)	12.4
Rubber & plastics	1.2	Auvergne (FR72)	9.1
Oth. non-metal. min.	1.2	Swietokrzyskie (PL33)	5.5
Basic & fabr. metals	3.5	Amsberg (DEA5)	14.7
Mach. & equip. n.e.c.	2.2	Unterfranken (DE26)	12.3
Elec. & optical equip.	2.2	Západné Slovensko (SK02)	14.0
Transport equip.	1.6	Braunschweig (DE91)	c
Manufacturing n.e.c.	1.2	Warmińsko-Mazurskie (PL62)	8.1
Elec. gas & water	1.0	Severozapaden (BG11)	9.0
Construction	10.3	Andalucía (ES61)	28.2
Motor trades	3.6	Réunion (FR94)	6.8
Wholesale trade	7.2	Attiki (GR30)	15.4
Retail trade	14.6	Kriti (GR43)	24.9
Hotels & rest.	7.0	Ionia Nisia (GR22)	29.8
Land trans.; pipe.	4.5	Bratislavský kraj (SK01)	14.9
Water transport	0.1	Åland (FI20)	41.3
Air transport	0.0	Corse (FR83)	7.2
Oth. trans.; trav. ag.	1.7	Bremen (DE50)	11.9
Post & telecoms	1.8	Köln (DEA2)	25.7
Real estate	1.9	Latvija (LV)	5.4
Renting	0.4	Hamburg (DE60)	1.7
Computer serv.	1.3	Berks., Bucks. and Oxon (UKJ1)	7.8
R&D	0.2	Oberbayern (DE21)	2.2
Other business act.	11.6	Inner London (UKI1)	36.9

(1) NUTS 2003 classification; Bulgaria, pre-accession NUTS; the Czech Republic and Norway, 2004; Luxembourg, national series based on enterprises and not local units; Malta, not available; c, confidential.

(2) The median share is the share of the middle region when ranking all regions by their employment share.

Source: Eurostat (SBS)

Source: Eurostat Key Figures on European Business (2008)

**Table 7:**

Analyst	Instrument	Q2-11 (€)	H2-11 (€)	FY-11 (€)	2012 (€)	2013 (€)	P3 (€)
70Watt	EUAs	17	17	16.6	--	--	--
	CERs	13	13	12.7	--	--	--
BarCap	EUAs	17.6	21	18.75	28	30	40
	CERs	13.3	16	14.25	20	22	25
Citi	EUAs	--	--	--	20	--	25
	CERs	--	--	--	--	--	--
Deutsche Bank	EUAs	18.5	18.5	17.75	21.85	22.7	26.2
	CERs	--	--	--	--	--	--
Nomisma Energy	EUAs	16.4	17	16.5	20.1	19.4	24.8
	CERs	12.4	13.1	12.60	15.9	--	--
Point Carbon	EUAs	19	19	18	22	22	30
	CERs	15	15	14	14	18	23
Sagacarbon	EUAs	16.5	17	16.5	21	35	35
	CERs	12	13	12.45	19	25	31
SocGen/orbeo	EUAs	16	16.75	16.2	19	24	--
	CERs	11.5	12	11.8	13	21	--
UniCredit	EUAs	18.05	18.05	17.4	19.3	20	25
	CERs	13.45	13.45	13	--	--	--
Average	EUAs	17.35	18	17.2	21.6	24.75	30.15

Source: PointCarbon

## Table 8:

Table 12: Average yearly total investments and fuel expenses

Total average yearly investments	2011-20	2021-30	2031-40	2041-50	Average
Reference (frag. action, ref. fossil f. prices)	816	916	969	1014	929
Effect. Techn. (frag. action, ref. fossil f. prices)	863	1040	1299	1589	1198
Effect. Techn. (glob. action, low fossil f. prices)	858	1040	1309	1592	1200
Delay. Clim. Act. (frag. action, ref. fossil f. prices)	845	1011	1392	1689	1234
Total average yearly fuel expenses	2011-20	2021-30	2031-40	2041-50	Average
Reference (frag. action, ref. fossil f. prices)	930	1170	1259	1376	1184
Effect. Techn. (frag. action, ref. fossil f. prices)	911	1067	1034	1019	1008
Effect. Techn. (glob. action, low fossil f. prices)	892	968	834	760	863
Delay. Clim. Act. (frag. action, ref. fossil f. prices)	922	1118	1061	993	1023

Source: PRIMES, GAINS

Source: European Commission (SEC (2011) 288)

## Table 9:

Table 26: EU-27 Greenhouse gas emissions by sector in the Global action scenario,

Variable	1990	2000	2005	2010	2020	2030	2040	2050
1990 = 100%								
GHG Total	100	93	95	86	73	55	36	22
GHG Power Sector	100	89	95	82	61	40	20	7
GHG industry	100	89	87	79	65	57	41	28
GHG transport	100	111	118	120	117	94	71	48
GHG residential services	100	90	91	81	77	54	33	21

Source: POLES, JRC, IPTS

Source: European Commission (SEC (2011) 288)

## Table 10:

Table 1: Sectoral reductions

GHG reductions compared to 1990	2005	2030	2050
Total	-7%	-40 to -44%	-79 to -82%
Sectors			
Power (CO <sub>2</sub> )	-7%	-54 to -68%	-93 to -99%
Industry (CO <sub>2</sub> )	-20%	-34 to -40%	-83 to -87%
Transport (incl. CO <sub>2</sub> aviation, excl. maritime)	+30%	+20 to -9%	-54 to -67%
Residential and services (CO <sub>2</sub> )	-12%	-37 to -53%	-88 to -91%
Agriculture (non-CO <sub>2</sub> )	-20%	-36 to -37%	-42 to -49%
Other non-CO <sub>2</sub> emissions	-30%	-72 to -73%	-70 to -78%

Source: European Commission (COM (2011) 112).

**Table 11:**

Industry	Indirect CO <sub>2</sub> emissions	Direct CO <sub>2</sub> emissions	Total CO <sub>2</sub> emissions
Chemical pulp	0.07	0.04	0.12
Chemical P&P	0.62	0.00	0.62
Mechanical P&P	1.03	0.00	1.03
Thermo-mech.P&P	0.12	0.02	0.14
Recovered fibre P&P	0.27	0.34	0.61

Table 2 - Carbon intensity in pulp and paper production, tons of CO<sub>2</sub> per ton of pulp/paper produced.  
Source: McKinsey and Ecofys (2006), p.32.

Source: Hourcade et al (2007)

**Table 12:**

Table 15: Energy and CO<sub>2</sub> related data for the production of basic organic chemicals (DG2414)

	Fuel (GJ/t <sub>ch</sub> )	Electricity <sup>(1)</sup> (GJ/t <sub>ch</sub> )	Energy intensity (GJ/t <sub>ch</sub> )	CO <sub>2</sub> intensity (tCO <sub>2</sub> /t <sub>ch</sub> )	Energy cost (€/t <sub>ch</sub> )	Price of product (€/t <sub>ch</sub> )	Cost for CO <sub>2</sub> -allowance		
							Euro (€/t <sub>ch</sub> )	Percentage of energy cost (%)	Percentage of product price (%)
Ethylene <sup>(1)</sup>	34	n/a	33	1.9	355	900 <sup>(3)</sup> (5/2007)	38	10.7	4.2
Propylene <sup>(1)(2)</sup>	57	n/a	57	2.9	600	850 <sup>(3)</sup> (5/2007)	58	9.7	6.8
Butadiene <sup>(1)(3)</sup>	192	n/a	192	9.8	2020	920 <sup>(3)</sup> (5/2007)	196	9.7	21.3
Ethylene oxide (integrated) <sup>(4)</sup>	51.3	0.2	51.5	total: 3.7 process related: 0.7	542	890 <sup>(3)</sup> (5/2007)	74	13.7	8.3
Mono ethylene glycol (integrated) <sup>(5)</sup>	64.2	0.3	64.5	4.6	678	810 <sup>(3)</sup> (5/2007)	93	13.7	11.5
Vinyl Chloride Monomer (VCM) (integrated) <sup>(6)</sup>	20.7	3.7	24.4	1.6	247	600 <sup>(3)</sup> (5/2007)	32	13.0	5.3
Benzene from pygas	9.5	0.9	10.4	0.8	113	870 <sup>(3)</sup> (5/2007)	16.2	14.3	1.9
Benzene from HDA	9.7	0.3	10.0	0.7	106	870 <sup>(3)</sup> (5/2007)	14.9	14.1	1.7
Benzene from reformat	14.4	1.4	15.8	1.2	171	970 <sup>(3)</sup> (5/2007)	24.5	14.3	2.5
Para-Xylene from reformat	21.6	2.1	23.7	1.8	256	880 <sup>(3)</sup> (5/2007)	36.7	14.3	4.2

Source: Energy consumption of current installations for the production of basic organic chemicals in Europe (BREF-orgchem).

Source: Bergman et al (2007)

**Table 13:**

**CO2 per electricity output**  
(tCO2 / MWh)

Country	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
EU-27	0.445	0.428	0.426	0.428	0.430	0.436	0.422	0.415	0.413	0.414	0.392	0.380
Austria	0.174	0.164	0.158	0.180	0.169	0.216	0.198	0.192	0.181	0.161	0.154	0.135
Belgium	0.302	0.258	0.275	0.268	0.279	0.282	0.284	0.280	0.266	0.253	0.241	0.234
Bulgaria	0.646	0.604	0.564	0.614	0.569	0.616	0.623	0.588	0.573	0.687	0.685	0.663
Cyprus	0.869	0.883	0.862	0.799	0.778	0.784	0.790	0.793	0.785	0.780	0.781	0.764
Czech Republic	0.819	0.781	0.778	0.760	0.718	0.747	0.735	0.756	0.733	0.732	0.724	0.695
Denmark	0.713	0.670	0.637	0.643	0.621	0.629	0.574	0.552	0.610	0.590	0.578	0.584
Estonia	1.484	1.477	1.377	1.356	1.308	1.273	1.251	1.185	1.172	1.106	1.138	1.171
Finland	0.298	0.293	0.271	0.327	0.359	0.400	0.343	0.265	0.358	0.337	0.269	0.307
France	0.100	0.085	0.080	0.067	0.076	0.081	0.077	0.087	0.081	0.082	0.078	0.080
Germany	0.559	0.543	0.547	0.564	0.565	0.566	0.550	0.535	0.525	0.538	0.510	0.515
Greece	1.014	0.960	0.956	0.967	0.938	0.900	0.906	0.904	0.845	0.863	0.836	0.824
Hungary	0.649	0.633	0.630	0.611	0.563	0.629	0.574	0.480	0.495	0.463	0.443	0.408
Iceland												
Ireland	0.696	0.700	0.653	0.673	0.628	0.599	0.576	0.583	0.524	0.494	0.464	0.441
Italy	0.442	0.420	0.416	0.417	0.431	0.425	0.404	0.393	0.383	0.382	0.358	0.334
Latvia	0.528	0.640	0.540	0.542	0.562	0.546	0.421	0.403	0.409	0.396	0.350	0.328
Lithuania	0.356	0.383	0.354	0.285	0.225	0.198	0.197	0.267	0.302	0.240	0.216	0.206
Luxembourg	0.118	0.167	0.152	0.214	0.289	0.296	0.308	0.303	0.305	0.295	0.283	0.298
Malta	0.939	0.906	0.869	0.918	0.877	0.882	0.868	0.876	0.874	0.879	0.855	0.857
Netherlands	0.564	0.559	0.555	0.568	0.567	0.571	0.553	0.538	0.506	0.501	0.487	0.463
Norway	0.005	0.005	0.004	0.005	0.005	0.007	0.006	0.004	0.005	0.007	0.005	0.013
Poland	1.202	1.178	1.141	1.150	1.129	1.126	1.096	1.072	1.073	1.058	1.055	1.039
Portugal	0.411	0.508	0.425	0.409	0.482	0.381	0.427	0.479	0.395	0.368	0.365	0.344
Romania	0.992	0.916	0.898	0.925	0.927	0.951	0.867	0.779	0.778	0.785	0.730	0.675
Slovakia	0.333	0.310	0.294	0.309	0.293	0.316	0.305	0.279	0.263	0.259	0.262	0.255
Slovenia	0.422	0.389	0.399	0.425	0.439	0.444	0.411	0.416	0.420	0.436	0.387	0.369
Spain	0.355	0.409	0.400	0.356	0.401	0.349	0.357	0.374	0.339	0.352	0.289	0.255
Sweden	0.058	0.049	0.041	0.045	0.056	0.070	0.057	0.049	0.052	0.049	0.047	0.055
Switzerland	0.037	0.031	0.032	0.031	0.034	0.034	0.036	0.041	0.041	0.037	0.037	0.037
Turkey	0.530	0.554	0.577	0.607	0.532	0.491	0.468	0.517	0.484	0.525	0.511	0.494
United Kingdom	0.427	0.398	0.420	0.439	0.425	0.436	0.439	0.433	0.457	0.447	0.443	0.399

Source: Calculations by DG COMP based on data from the European Environment Agency

**Table 14:**

**CO2 per electricity output  
(comparison with EU average)**

Country	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Austria	39%	38%	37%	42%	39%	50%	47%	46%	44%	39%	39%	36%
Belgium	68%	60%	64%	63%	65%	65%	67%	68%	64%	61%	61%	62%
Bulgaria	145%	141%	132%	144%	132%	141%	148%	142%	139%	166%	175%	175%
Cyprus	195%	206%	202%	187%	181%	180%	187%	191%	190%	189%	199%	201%
Czech Republic	184%	182%	182%	178%	167%	171%	174%	182%	177%	177%	185%	183%
Denmark	160%	156%	149%	150%	144%	144%	136%	133%	148%	143%	147%	154%
Estonia	334%	345%	323%	317%	304%	292%	296%	286%	284%	267%	291%	309%
Finland	67%	68%	64%	77%	83%	92%	81%	64%	87%	81%	69%	81%
France	22%	20%	19%	16%	18%	19%	18%	21%	20%	20%	20%	21%
Germany	126%	127%	128%	132%	131%	130%	130%	129%	127%	130%	130%	136%
Greece	228%	224%	224%	226%	218%	207%	215%	218%	205%	209%	213%	217%
Hungary	146%	148%	148%	143%	131%	144%	136%	116%	120%	112%	113%	108%
Iceland												
Ireland	157%	164%	153%	157%	146%	137%	137%	141%	127%	119%	118%	116%
Italy	99%	98%	98%	98%	100%	98%	96%	95%	93%	92%	91%	88%
Latvia	119%	150%	127%	127%	130%	125%	100%	97%	99%	96%	89%	86%
Lithuania	80%	89%	83%	67%	52%	45%	47%	64%	73%	58%	55%	54%
Luxembourg	27%	39%	36%	50%	67%	68%	73%	73%	74%	71%	72%	78%
Malta	211%	212%	204%	215%	204%	202%	206%	211%	212%	212%	218%	226%
Netherlands	127%	130%	130%	133%	132%	131%	131%	130%	123%	121%	124%	122%
Norway												
Poland	270%	275%	268%	269%	262%	258%	260%	258%	260%	256%	269%	274%
Portugal	92%	119%	100%	96%	112%	87%	101%	115%	96%	89%	93%	91%
Romania	223%	214%	211%	216%	215%	218%	206%	188%	188%	190%	186%	178%
Slovakia	75%	72%	69%	72%	68%	73%	72%	67%	64%	63%	67%	67%
Slovenia	95%	91%	94%	99%	102%	102%	98%	100%	102%	106%	99%	97%
Spain	80%	96%	94%	83%	93%	80%	85%	90%	82%	85%	74%	67%
Sweden	13%	11%	10%	11%	13%	16%	13%	12%	13%	12%	12%	15%
Switzerland												
Turkey												
United Kingdom	96%	93%	98%	103%	99%	100%	104%	104%	111%	108%	113%	105%

Source: Calculations by DG COMP based on data from the European Environment Agency.

**Table 15:****Table 20. Impact of the proposed package on different economic sectors for EU 27 in 2020 in percentage difference from base)**

SECTOR	Output			Employment			Wages		
	2010	2015	2020	2010	2015	2020	2010	2015	2020
1 Agriculture etc	0	0.15	0.41	0	0.05	0.46	0	0.77	0.85
2 Coal	0	-0.93	-1.39	0	0	0	0	0	0
3 Oil & Gas etc	0	-0.15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
4 Other Mining	0	-0.23	-0.36	0	-0.49	-1.4	0	0.88	1.7
5 Food, Drink & Tob.	0	0.71	1.74	0	0.06	0.39	0	0.6	1.22
6 Text., Cloth. & Leath	0	0.29	0.82	0	-0.02	0.07	0	0.85	1.19
7 Wood & Paper	0	0.07	0.31	0	0.63	1.12	0	0.33	0.81
8 Printing & Publishing	0	0.46	0.7	0	0.14	0.61	0	0.66	0.58
9 Manuf. Fuels	0	-2.49	-4.06	0	-0.84	-1	0	0.88	1.75
10 Pharmaceuticals	0	0.44	0.14	0	-0.22	0.49	0	0.32	0.45
11 Chemicals nes	0	0.31	0.58	0	0.73	1.34	0	0.03	0.23
12 Rubber & Plastics	0	0.75	1.18	0	0.93	1.52	0	0.42	0.52
13 Non-Met. Min. Prods.	0	0.06	-0.28	0	0.54	1.28	0	0.46	0.31
14 Basic Metals	0	0.24	0.15	0	0.56	1.32	0	0.33	0.61
15 Metal Goods	0	0.71	0.93	0	0.29	0.58	0	0.53	0.8
16 Mech. Engineering	0	0.76	0.95	0	0.2	0.44	0	0.19	0.52
17 Electronics	0	2.27	3.14	0	1.06	0.93	0	0.73	1.07
18 Elec. Eng. & Instrum.	0	-0.01	-0.15	0	0.16	0.21	0	0.22	0.8
19 Motor Vehicles	0	0.25	0.11	0	0.25	0.46	0	0.41	0.76
20 Oth. Transp. Equip.	0	-0.08	-0.19	0	0.05	0.05	0	0.78	1.63
21 Manuf. nes	0	0.43	0.58	0	0.17	0.45	0	0.24	0.83
22 Electricity	0	0.75	0.5	0	0	0	0	1.49	2.89
23 Gas Supply	0	-4.29	-6.05	0	0	0	0	1.55	2.86
24 Water Supply	0	0.07	0.28	0	0	0	0	1.67	3.08
25 Construction	0	1.42	1.81	0	0.58	0.2	0	1.64	3.08
26 Distribution	0	-0.03	-0.08	0	-0.1	-0.08	0	0.37	0.73
27 Retailing	0	0.5	0.98	0	0.05	0.34	0	0.26	0.79
28 Hotels & Catering	0	0.58	0.75	0	-0.02	0.04	0	0.95	2.03
29 Land Transport etc	0	-0.11	-0.27	0	0.42	0.55	0	1.17	1.85
30 Water Transport	0	-0.01	0.33	0	0.32	1.6	0	1.18	2.12
31 Air Transport	0	-0.73	-1.42	0	0.74	0.04	0	0.76	0.69
32 Communications	0	0.25	0.5	0	2.28	2.69	0	-1.23	-0.98
33 Banking & Finance	0	0.45	0.7	0	-0.01	0.06	0	0.24	0.49
34 Insurance	0	0.66	1.52	0	0.06	0.29	0	0.18	1.15
35 Computing Services	0	0.58	0.84	0	0.39	0.28	0	0.28	1.12
36 Prof. Services	0	0.2	0.3	0	-0.03	0.1	0	0.25	1.2
37 Other Bus. Services	0	0.31	0.43	0	0.09	0.17	0	-0.03	0.63
38 Public Admin. & Def.	0	0.02	0.01	0	0	0	0	1.47	2.83
39 Education	0	-0.03	-0.06	0	0	0	0	1.51	2.86
40 Health & Social Work	0	0.07	0.08	0	0	0	0	1.34	2.64
41 Misc. Services	0	0.4	0.57	0	-0.42	-0.79	0	1.16	2.34
<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.29</b>	<b>0.42</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.11</b>	<b>0.18</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>n/a</b>	<b>n/a</b>

Source(s): E3ME, Cambridge Econometrics

Source: European Commission (SEC(2011) 779).

**Table 16:****Table 4: Sources of global refinery CO<sub>2</sub> emissions**

Source	Fraction
Oil and gas fuel firing of furnaces and boilers	65%
Regeneration of cracker catalyst	16%
Flares	< 3%
Methane steam reforming to make hydrogen	2%
Incineration and effluent processes	1%
Power <sup>26</sup>	13%

Source: Gale and Freund (2001)

Source: Barron et al (2008) (footnote 26: On average 55% of electricity needs from grid. (so very high degree of autogeneration))

**Table 17:**

Table 4 Annual electricity cost savings from the IFIEC method according to equation [3]. Cost savings are calculated by multiplying columns A, B and C.

	Electricity use industry 2020 <sup>1)</sup> (TWh)	Electricity use househ. & services 2020 (TWh)	Electricity use total 2020 (TWh)	Benchmark (*10 <sup>6</sup> ton CO <sub>2</sub> /TWh)	CO <sub>2</sub> price (€/ton)	Cost savings industry (billion €/yr)	Cost savings househ. & services (billion €/yr)	Cost savings users total (billion €/yr)
	A1	A2	A3	B	C	A1*B*C	A2*B*C	A3*B*C
EU-27	1127	1554	2682	0.515	40	23.2	32.0	55.2
EU-25	1094	1525	2619	0.515	40	22.5	31.4	54.0
EU-15	994	1386	2380	0.515	40	20.5	28.5	49.0
Belgium	39	39	79	0.515	40	0.8	0.8	1.6
Bulgaria	10	15	25	0.515	40	0.2	0.3	0.5
Czech Republic	23	30	53	0.515	40	0.5	0.6	1.1
Denmark	10	23	33	0.515	40	0.2	0.5	0.7
Germany	232	269	501	0.515	40	4.8	5.5	10.3
Estonia	2	4	6	0.515	40	0.04	0.08	0.12
Ireland	8	17	24	0.515	40	0.2	0.3	0.5
Greece	14	36	51	0.515	40	0.3	0.7	1.0
Spain	105	132	237	0.515	40	2.2	2.7	4.9
France	134	276	410	0.515	40	2.8	5.7	8.5
Italy	145	146	291	0.515	40	3.0	3.0	6.0
Cyprus	1	3	4	0.515	40	0.01	0.07	0.08
Latvia	2	4	6	0.515	40	0.04	0.08	0.11
Lithuania	3	5	8	0.515	40	0.06	0.10	0.16
Luxemburg	4	2	6	0.515	40	0.08	0.04	0.12
Hungary	9	22	31	0.515	40	0.19	0.5	0.6
Malta	1	1	2	0.515	40	0.01	0.02	0.04
Netherlands	42	61	103	0.515	40	0.9	1.3	2.1
Austria	24	29	54	0.515	40	0.5	0.6	1.1
Poland	41	54	95	0.515	40	0.9	1.1	2.0
Portugal	17	29	46	0.515	40	0.4	0.6	0.9
Romania	24	14	37	0.515	40	0.5	0.3	0.8
Slovenia	7	5	13	0.515	40	0.15	0.11	0.26
Slovakia	11	11	22	0.515	40	0.23	0.23	0.46
Finland	43	37	80	0.515	40	0.9	0.8	1.7
Sweden	58	71	129	0.515	40	1.2	1.5	2.6
United Kingdom	119	218	337	0.515	40	2.4	4.5	6.9

1) See main text, electricity consumption in 2020 is set at 2005 values.

2) The Commission assumes a carbon price of 39 €/t-CO<sub>2</sub> in its impact assessment that accompanies the final 2008 climate package proposal (EC, 2008b).

Source: IFIEC (2008)

**Table 18:**Table 11 Benchmark values at different CO<sub>2</sub> reduction and electricity production scenarios. Summary data of Table 5.

Benchmark values (Mt-CO <sub>2</sub> / TWh)	-21% CO <sub>2</sub> emission 2020 compared to 2005	-30% CO <sub>2</sub> emission 2020 compared to 2005	-40% CO <sub>2</sub> emission 2020 compared to 2005
High TWh scenario (baseline)	0.44	0.39	0.33
Low TWh scenario	0.59	0.52	0.45
Uncertainty	0.14	0.13	0.12
Average benchmark value <sup>a</sup>	0.515	0.455	0.39

a) these values are used for the costs savings calculations in paragraph 3.4

Source: IFIEC (2008)

**Table 19:**Table 5 *Some illustrative calculations of CO<sub>2</sub> price required for coal-gas fuel shift.*

		2005 fuel price indication			
		Gas	Coal	Gas	Coal
Emission factor	t-CO <sub>2</sub> /MWh	0.4	0.9	0.4	0.9
Fuel price at plant	€/GJ	7.0	2.8	7.0	2.8
Efficiency	%	0.49	0.37	0.49	0.37
Fuel costs	€/MWh	51.4	27.2	51.4	27.2
Mark-up <sup>a</sup>	€/MWh	7.0	15.0	0.0	0.0
Short run marginal costs	€/MWh	58.4	42.2	51.4	27.2
CO <sub>2</sub> price - fuel shift	Euro/ton CO <sub>2</sub>	32		48 <sup>b</sup>	
CO <sub>2</sub> costs	€/MWh	12.9	29.1	19.3	43.5
Overall marginal costs	€/MWh	71.4	71.4	70.8	70.8
		2007 fuel price indication			
		Gas	Coal	Gas	Coal
Emission factor	t-CO <sub>2</sub> /MWh	0.4	0.9	0.4	0.9
Fuel price at plant	€/GJ	5.0	1.8	5.0	1.8
Efficiency	%	0.49	0.37	0.49	0.37
Fuel costs	€/MWh	36.7	17.5	36.7	17.5
Mark-up <sup>a</sup>	€/MWh	7.0	15.0	0.0	0.0
Short run marginal costs	€/MWh	43.7	32.5	36.7	17.5
CO <sub>2</sub> price - fuel shift	€/ton CO <sub>2</sub>	22 <sup>b</sup>		38	
CO <sub>2</sub> costs	€/MWh	9.0	20.2	15.4	34.6
Overall marginal costs	€/MWh	52.7	52.7	52.1	52.1

<sup>a</sup> for explanation, see main text, <sup>b</sup> variants used in Figure 13

<sup>12</sup> Data refer to so called carbon-adjusted spreads

<sup>13</sup> Note, that in our simple illustrative model, we did not consider updating (also called 'moving baseline'), i.e. renewed grandfathering at the start of trading period based on a more recent (set of) base year(s). According to Matthes et al. (2007) such updating undermines incentives for a shift from coal to gas.

Source: IFIEC (2008)

**Table 20:**Table 8 *Price elasticity of export and import of raw materials in Western Europe (CPB, 2000; CBP/RIVM, 2001)<sup>a</sup>.*

	Export	Import
Steel	-4 <sup>b</sup>	2
Aluminum	-3	2
Petrochemicals (monomers)	-5	4
Petrochemicals (polymers)	-5	2
Paper	-2	2
Nitrogen fertilizer	-4	4
Phosphorous fertilizer	-4	4

a) data for Western Europe do not necessarily extrapolate to the EU-27.

b) example calculation: a 5% increase of cost of steel production in Western Europe (relative to other regions) leads to a decrease of export to a level of  $100/(100+5*4)=83\%$ , so a decrease in export of 17%.

Table 9 *Consequences of electricity price increase of 6.5% on production levels in basic industries (CPB, 2003)<sup>a</sup>.*

	Total production	Primary production	Secondary production	Energy use
Steel	-2.5	-5	0.5	-5
Aluminum	-2	-4	0.5	-6
Plastic	-2	-2	n.a.	-4
Paper	-0.25	-0.5	0.25	-5
Nitrogen	-2	-0.4	n.a.	-4

a) calculations were made on the scale of Western Europe, which compared probably to the EU-10. Calculations on the EU-27 scale would result in lower reductions of production levels in response to ET ETS-induced increases in electricity prices.

Source: IFIEC (2008)

**Table 21:**

Table 10 *Electricity production (fossil fuelled), CO<sub>2</sub> and benchmark scenarios for the EU25. For explanation, see main text.*

<b>Base line</b>	<b>1990</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2020</b>
TWh (fossil fuelled) base line	1403	1620	1791	2436
CO <sub>2</sub> (Mton)	1363	1295	1342	1333
Benchmark (Mton CO <sub>2</sub> /TWh)	0.97	0.80	0.75	<b>0.55*</b>
<b>-21% CO<sub>2</sub> in 2020 compared to 2005</b>				
TWh (fossil fuelled) base line	1403	1620	1791	2436
CO <sub>2</sub> (Mton)	1363	1295	1342	1060
Benchmark (Mton CO <sub>2</sub> /TWh)	0.97	0.80	0.75	<b>0.44</b>
<b>-30% CO<sub>2</sub> in 2020 compared to 2005</b>				
TWh (fossil fuelled) base line	1403	1620	1791	2436
CO <sub>2</sub> (Mton of CO <sub>2</sub> )	1363	1295	1342	939
Benchmark (Mton CO <sub>2</sub> /TWh)	0.97	0.80	0.75	<b>0.39</b>
<b>-40% CO<sub>2</sub> in 2020 compared to 2005</b>				
TWh (fossil fuelled) base line	1403	1620	1791	2436
CO <sub>2</sub> (Mton of CO <sub>2</sub> )	1363	1295	1342	805
Benchmark (Mton CO <sub>2</sub> /TWh)	0.97	0.80	0.75	<b>0.33</b>
<b>-21% CO<sub>2</sub> in 2020 compared to 2005 (lower bound)</b>				
TWh (fossil fuelled) –lower bound	1403	1620	1791	1791
CO <sub>2</sub> (Mton of CO <sub>2</sub> )	1363	1295	1342	1060
Benchmark (Mton CO <sub>2</sub> /TWh)	0.97	0.80	0.75	<b>0.59</b>
<b>-30% CO<sub>2</sub> in 2020 compared to 2005 (lower bound)</b>				
TWh (fossil fuelled) –lower bound	1403	1620	1791	1791
CO <sub>2</sub> (Mton of CO <sub>2</sub> )	1363	1295	1342	939
Benchmark (Mton CO <sub>2</sub> /TWh)	0.97	0.80	0.75	<b>0.52</b>
<b>-40% CO<sub>2</sub> in 2020 compared to 2005 (lower bound)</b>				
TWh (fossil fuelled) –lower bound	1403	1620	1791	1791
CO <sub>2</sub> (Mton of CO <sub>2</sub> )	1363	1295	1342	805
Benchmark (Mton CO <sub>2</sub> /TWh)	0.97	0.80	0.75	<b>0.45</b>

\* the reduction in the benchmark value, compared to 2005, in the base line scenario results from the PRIMES assumptions on further 'gasification', see main text.

Source: IFIEC (2008)

**Table 22:**

Tabella 1 – *Tassi di crescita della domanda di materie plastiche per area geografica e tasso di crescita del PIL*

	2000-2008	2008-2009	2009-2010	2010-2015	2015-2025
<b>By Region</b>					
North America	-0.8	-6.9	4.3	2.6	1.9
Latin America	4.6	-0.3	5.1	4.9	4.3
Europe	1.7	-7.2	2.9	2.9	2.5
Former USSR	16.5	-10.5	7.4	7.5	6.1
Africa	7.2	6.0	6.5	6.1	5.2
Middle East	8.1	5.7	6.6	6.0	4.9
North East Asia	5.3	12.6	7.9	5.5	4.0
Asia & Pacific	6.1	7.0	7.3	6.7	6.1
<b>Total World</b>	<b>3.4</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>5.9</b>	<b>4.7</b>	<b>3.9</b>
GDP Growth	2.9	-2.0	3.3	3.4	3.1

Fonte: Parpinelli Tecnon

Source: IFIEC (2008)

**Table 24:**


**TABLE 9. LME, COMEX AND U.S. PRODUCER PRICES**

Currency in U.S. Dollars

PERIOD	LME Grade A, Cash \$/metric tonne	LME Grade A, Cash Cents/pound	COMEX HG, 1st Pos. \$/metric tonne	COMEX HG, 1st Pos. Cents/pound	U.S. Producer Price Cents/pound
<b>ANNUAL AVERAGES</b>					
2000	1.814,3	82,29	1.851,2	83,97	88,16
2001	1.577,8	71,57	1.599,8	72,57	76,85
2002	1.557,5	70,65	1.580,4	71,69	75,82
2003	1.779,9	80,73	1.785,5	80,99	85,17
2004	2.868,3	130,11	2.847,7	129,17	134,20
2005	3.683,6	167,09	3.710,5	168,31	173,57
2006	6.727,2	305,14	6.821,5	309,42	315,59
2007	7.126,35	323,25	7.117,39	322,84	328,67
2008	6.951,52	315,32	6.904,48	313,18	318,87
2009	5.163,59	234,22	5.214,71	236,54	242,36

<b>ANNUAL HIGHS</b>					
2000	2.009,0	91,13	2046,99	92,85	97,17
2001	1.837,0	83,33	1911,41	86,70	91,02
2002	1.689,5	76,63	1727,32	78,35	82,51
2003	2.293,0	104,01	2297,21	104,20	108,39
2004	3.287,0	149,10	3400,63	154,25	159,52
2005	4.650,0	210,92	5026,53	228,00	233,27
2006	8.788,0	398,62	8984,93	407,55	413,38
2007	8.301,00	376,53	8.276,14	375,40	381,23
2008	8.985,00	407,55	8.989,34	407,75	413,58
2009	7.346,00	333,21	7.335,87	332,75	338,58

<b>ANNUAL LOWS</b>					
2000	1.607,0	72,89	1635,83	74,20	78,26
2001	1.319,0	59,83	1331,59	60,40	64,62
2002	1.421,0	64,46	1438,51	65,25	69,41
2003	1.544,5	70,06	1563,08	70,90	75,09
2004	2.337,0	106,00	2342,41	106,25	110,44
2005	3.072,0	139,34	3075,44	139,50	144,77
2006	4.537,0	205,80	4695,84	213,00	218,83
2007	5.225,50	237,02	5.301,01	240,45	246,28
2008	2.770,00	125,65	2.750,04	124,74	130,58
2009	3.050,50	138,37	3.044,58	138,10	143,93



Source: ICSG 2010 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK (2000-2009) Vol. 7 – International Copper Study Group

**Table 25:**

<b>TABLE 2.1 COMPARISON OF ESTIMATES OF ARMINGTON ELASTICITIES IN ENERGY-INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES</b>			
<b>Sectors</b>	<b>Long-run</b>	<b>Short-run</b>	<b>Others</b>
<b>NACE C Mining and quarrying</b>			
Mining and quarrying (NACE C)			1.04 <sup>(5)</sup> 2.07 <sup>(6)</sup>
<b>NACE 11 Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas</b>			
Crude petroleum and natural gas (NACE 11.1)			0.31 <sup>(1)</sup>
<b>NACE 13 Mining and quarrying, except of energy producing materials</b>			
Iron and ferroalloy ores mining (NACE 13.1)			1.22 <sup>(1)</sup>
<b>NACE 14 Other mining and quarrying</b>			
Stone, sand and gravel (NACE 14.1 and 14.2)			0.97 <sup>(1)</sup>
Chemical and fertilizer mineral mining (NACE 14.3)			1.13 <sup>(1)</sup>
<b>NACE 20 Manufacture of wood and of products ...</b>			
Wood (NACE 20)			3.13 <sup>(4)</sup>
<b>NACE 21 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products</b>			
Manufacturing of paper and paper products (NACE 21)			2.01 <sup>(5)</sup> 0.72 <sup>(6)</sup>
Paper (NACE 21.12)			1.52 <sup>(4)</sup>
Paper mills, except building paper (NACE 21.12)		1.055 <sup>(2)</sup>	0.97 <sup>(1)</sup>
Paperboard mills (NACE 21.12)		0.89 <sup>(2)</sup>	1.50 <sup>(1)</sup>
Sanitary paper products (NACE 21.22)		0.39 <sup>(2)</sup>	1.42 <sup>(1)</sup>
Building paper and board mills (NACE 21.12)			0.97 <sup>(1)</sup>
Paper coating and glazing (NACE 17.12)			1.68 <sup>(1)</sup>

<b>TABLE 2.1 COMPARISON OF ESTIMATES OF ARMINGTON ELASTICITIES IN ENERGY-INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES</b>			
<b>Sectors</b>	<b>Long-run</b>	<b>Short-run</b>	<b>Others</b>
Paperboard containers and boxes (NACE 21.21)			1.48 <sup>(1)</sup>
Setup paperboard boxes (NACE 21.21)		0.76 <sup>(2)</sup>	
Corrugated, solid fiber boxes (NACE 21.21)		1.50 <sup>(2)</sup>	
<b>NACE 23 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum &amp; nuclear</b>			
Coal & Coke (NACE 23.1)			4.40 <sup>(3)</sup>
Petroleum (NACE 23.2)			5.61 <sup>(3)</sup>
<b>NACE 24 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products</b>			
Manufacturing of chemicals etc (NACE 24)			1.16 <sup>(5)</sup> 2.30 <sup>(6)</sup>
Chemicals (NACE 24)			1.31 <sup>(4)</sup>
Chemical nec (NACE 24)			4.16 <sup>(4)</sup>
Industrial organic and inorganic chemicals (NACE 24.11-24.14)			0.48 <sup>(1)</sup>
Inorganic chemicals (NACE 24.11-24.14)			1.41 <sup>(3)</sup>
Organic chemicals (NACE 24.11-24.14)			7.50 <sup>(3)</sup>
Industrial gases (NACE 24.11)	1.05 <sup>(2)</sup>	0.96 <sup>(2)</sup>	
Inorganic pigments (NACE 24.12)	1.15 <sup>(2)</sup>	0.48 <sup>(2)</sup>	
Alkali and chlorine (NACE 24.13)		0.76 <sup>(2)</sup>	
Agriculture chemicals (NACE 24.2)	1.62 <sup>(2)</sup>	1.03 <sup>(2)</sup>	0.31 <sup>(1)</sup>
Phosphatic fertilizers (NACE 24.15)		1.21 <sup>(2)</sup>	
Fertilizers (NACE 24.15)			1.34 <sup>(3)</sup>
Adhesive and sealants (NACE 24.62)	1.87 <sup>(2)</sup>	1.18 <sup>(2)</sup>	
Explosives (NACE 24.61)		0.92 <sup>(2)</sup>	
Printing ink (NACE 24.66)		0.70 <sup>(2)</sup>	
Carbon black (NACE 24.66)		-0.24 <sup>(2)</sup>	
Plastic materials and raisins (NACE 24.16)	4.83 <sup>(2)</sup>	0.87 <sup>(2)</sup>	1.71 <sup>(1)</sup>
Plastic in primary (NACE 24.16)			6.06 <sup>(3)</sup>
Chemical material nes (NACE 24.6)			6.75 <sup>(3)</sup>
Chemical preparations	1.81 <sup>(2)</sup>	1.11 <sup>(2)</sup>	0.96 <sup>(1)</sup>
Dyeing, tanning			6.73 <sup>(3)</sup>
<b>NACE 25 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products</b>			
Plastic in non-primary (NACE 25.2)			5.54 <sup>(3)</sup> 1.45 <sup>(4)</sup>
<b>NACE 26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products</b>			
Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products (NACE 26)			0.56 <sup>(5)</sup> 1.14 <sup>(6)</sup>
Glass and glass products, except containers (NACE 26.1)			0.36 <sup>(1)</sup>

**TABLE 2.1 COMPARISON OF ESTIMATES OF ARMINGTON ELASTICITIES IN ENERGY-INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES**

Sectors	Long-run	Short-run	Others
			1.03 <sup>(4)</sup>
Flat glass (NACE 26.11)		0.89 <sup>(2)</sup>	
Pressed and blown glass (NACE 26.13 and NACE 26.15)		4.85 <sup>(2)</sup>	
Glass produced from pur.glass (NACE 26.15)		1.11 <sup>(2)</sup>	
Ceramic wall and floor tiles (NACE 26.3)		0.53 <sup>(2)</sup>	0.88 <sup>(1)</sup>
Ceramic plumbing and electrical supplies (NACE 26.24)			0.84 <sup>(1)</sup>
Vitreous plumbing fixtures (NACE 26.24)		0.78 <sup>(2)</sup>	
Porcelain electrical supplies (NACE 26.24)	1.02 <sup>(2)</sup>	0.95 <sup>(2)</sup>	
China and earthenware products (NACE 26.21)			1.45 <sup>(1)</sup> 3.78 <sup>(4)</sup>
Stone and non-metallic mineral products (NACE 26.7 and 26.8)			0.82 <sup>(1)</sup>
Non-metallic mineral products (NACE 26.8)		1.21 <sup>(2)</sup>	2.65 <sup>(3)</sup> 6.62 <sup>(4)</sup>
Cement, hydraulic (NACE 26.51)		0.73 <sup>(2)</sup>	1.09 <sup>(1)</sup>
Brick and structural clay tile (NACE 26.4)			1.04 <sup>(1)</sup>
Clay refractories (NACE 26.4)	1.46 <sup>(2)</sup>	0.95 <sup>(2)</sup>	
<b>NACE 27 Manufacture of basic metals</b>			
Basic metals (NACE 27)			0.71 <sup>(5)</sup> 2.60 <sup>(6)</sup>
Metal			1.01 <sup>(4)</sup>
Primary steel (NACE 27.1)			0.76 <sup>(1)</sup>
Iron and steel foundries (NACE 27.51 and 27.52)			3.06 <sup>(1)</sup> 3.53 <sup>(3)</sup>
Metal heat treating and primary metal			0.69 <sup>(1)</sup>
Primary copper (NACE 27.44)			0.91 <sup>(1)</sup>
Nonferrous metals (NACE 25.42-27.45)			6.66 <sup>(3)</sup> 1.52 <sup>(4)</sup>
Manufacture of metal nes (NACE 27.41)			4.85 <sup>(3)</sup>
Note(s): 1 Reinert & Roland Host, 1992 2 Gallaway et al, 2003 3 Hummels, 1999 4 Erkel-Rousse and Mirza, 2002, TLS-IV 5 Saito, 2004, bilateral trade data 6 Saito, 2004, multilateral trade data  NACE Rev1.1 codes reported in brackets show where the industry can be included.			

Source: Cambridge Econometrics et al (2009)