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**COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT**

**ACCOMPANYING THE**

**COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE COUNCIL AND THE  
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT**

**Strategy for Africa: A European Union regional political partnership for peace, security  
and development in the Horn of Africa**

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## COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT

### **ANNEXES TO: “Strategy for Africa: A European Union regional political partnership for peace, security and development in the Horn of Africa”**

This Commission Staff working document includes the following technical annexes referred to in the Communication “Strategy for Africa: A European Union regional political partnership for peace, security and development in the Horn of Africa”:

Annex I: Regional architecture

Annex II: Conflicts and peace processes: Regional perspectives

Annex III: Somalia: Test case for implementation of the regional strategy

Annex IV: Pillars for regional action in the Horn of Africa

Annex V: Table of Key regional indicators

Annex VI: Horn of Africa Population Statistics

## **Annex I: Regional architecture**

The African Union (AU) and sub-regional organisations are important elements and partners in any effort to develop and implement a regional political strategy for the Horn of Africa. They play an important role in promoting and implementing regional cooperation on peace, security and economic integration. All of these relevant regional organisations active throughout the Horn of Africa – the AU, IGAD, EAC, COMESA, as well as the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) – have different mandates, structures, memberships and ambitions. Their effectiveness and potential also vary widely.

The African Union (AU) has made significant progress in developing its capacity to engage in conflict mediation and peacekeeping in the past few years. Its efforts have attracted substantial support from the international donor community, including through the African Peace Facility (APF), which is one of the most tangible aspects of the EU's growing cooperation with the AU. The AU-led African operation in Darfur (AMIS) is particularly challenging for an organisation whose peace and security structures are still in their infancy. The EU is committed to strengthening the political authority of the AU and its ability to deliver. The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) includes an African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), for which the prevention and reduction of intra- and inter-country conflicts are among the key objectives.

**The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), composed of Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda**, has become a central part of the political and security architecture of the Horn of Africa and has played a key role in the Sudan and Somalia peace processes. IGAD is the only sub-regional organisation of which Somalia is a member. Most importantly, IGAD provides a forum for regional dialogue in a sub-region of endemic conflicts, and support for IGAD is therefore central to achieving the EU's objectives in the Horn of Africa.


Although primarily a vehicle for economic integration, the Eastern Africa Community (EAC), - **which includes two IGAD countries: Uganda and Kenya** - is rapidly developing important mechanisms for cooperation on border controls, policing and efforts to combat trafficking and proliferation of SALW amongst its members. It could offer an effective framework for supporting action on important cross-border and bilateral issues between Uganda and Kenya, the two countries in the Horn that are members of the EAC. Furthermore, the EAC Customs Union, which came into effect at the beginning of 2005, is already having a significant positive impact on inter-regional trade.

The **Nile Basin Initiative (NBI)** has emerged as a promising vehicle of regional cooperation on resource sharing. It is focused on cooperation and sharing the benefits of sustainable use of the waters of the Nile Basin.

**The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)** includes all the countries of the Horn of Africa region except Somalia. COMESA is important in promoting trade and investment in the region as well as regional integration, and is also engaged with the EU in the context of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations.

Three countries of the Horn (Djibouti, Somalia and Sudan) are also members of the **League of Arab States (LAS)**, which is increasingly active in the region and is now an observer of the IGAD International Partners Forum.

**OVERLAPPING REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS**



## COMPARISON AMONG REGIONAL BLOCS

Regional bloc <sup>1</sup>	Area (km <sup>2</sup> )	Population	GDP (PPP) (\$US)		Member states
			in millions	per capita	
AU	29,797,500	850,000,000	1,515,000	1,896	53
LAS	13,763,193	319,473,779	1,564,789	7,890	22
COMESA	12,873,957	406,102,471	735,599	1,811	20
IGAD	5,233,604	187,969,775	225,049	1,197	7
EAC	1,763,777	97,865,428	104,239	1,065	3

Reference blocs and countries	Area (km <sup>2</sup> )	Population	GDP (PPP) (\$US)		Member States
			in millions	per capita	
UN	133,178,011	6,411,682,270	55,167,630	8,604	192
EU	3,977,487	460,124,266	11,723,816	25,480	25
China (PRC)	9,596,960	1,306,847,624	8,182,000	6,300	
USA	9,631,420	296,900,571	11,190,000	39,100	

*Source:* CIA World Factbook, IMF WEO (data as of 2004)

## Annex II: Conflicts and peace processes: Regional perspectives

	<b>Ethiopia</b>	<b>Eritrea</b>	<b>Sudan</b>	<b>Somalia</b>	<b>Uganda</b>	<b>Kenya</b>	<b>Djibouti</b>
<b>Ethiopia</b>	Current internal situation characterised by low-level conflicts especially on the pastoral periphery. None threatening the survival of the state.	Border agreement not fully implemented.	After war with Eritrea, sought to normalise relations with Sudan. Agreed to demarcate common border in 2002.	Concern about ethnic Somali region of Eth. Hosts refugees. Support for SRRC (against TNG). Strong support for TFG and operates against militant Islam.	No common border	Ethiopian incursions in pursuit of OLF. Tense border region. Smuggling, arms trafficking and cattle rustling.	Complex relationship. Stationed troops at invitation of govt to protect road transport.
<b>Eritrea</b>	Inter-state war 1998-2000. Support for Eth opposition and rebel groups – including OLF and ONLF.	Internal conflicts suppressed.	Has sought to improve relations with Sudan since war with Eth. Eastern Front/Darfur indicates positive signs even if circumstantial.	No common border. However, Eritrea has given support to the Islamic courts.	No common border	No common border	Relations strained by Et Er war. Support for FRUD; ethnic Afar problem spills over into Djibouti.
<b>Sudan</b>	Support for OLF, ONLF and other opposition groups in 1990s. Now seeking normalisation and demarcation of border.	Support for Islamist groups. Hosts many Eritrean refugees. Relationship now improving. Asmara talks EF - Sudan, with the Eritrean mediation.	Comprehensive Peace Agreement has concluded N-S civil war. Major conflict in Darfur, could spread to Kordofan.	Facilitating dialogue between the TFG and the Islamic courts as Arab League Presidency and maintaining contacts with Islamic Courts.	Relations improved. Juba talks between Uganda, Sudan and LRA.	Ilemi triangle border dispute. Resource conflicts among pastoralists from Sudan, Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia.	No common border
<b>Somalia</b>	Lack of demarcated border, rise of Islamic courts and related tension; relations with TFG are robust.	No common border. Some Somali factions receive support from Eritrea.	No common border.	Peace and reconciliation process ongoing under the auspices of TFIs: governance, security and Islamic courts issues provide formidable challenges.	No common border.	Somali instability spills over into Kenya. Armed Somali groups operating in NE Kenya.	Issaq (Somaliland) involvement in Djibouti politics.
<b>Uganda</b>	No common border. Close relationship between leaders.	No common border.	Improved relations. SPLA facilitating LRA cessation of hostilities.	No common border. Uganda has offered to send peacekeepers.	More stabilisation in the north after a period of conflict as a result of the Juba talks with LRA. Gov. amnesty offered; ICC arrest warrants issued	Tribal cross-border clashes over cattle and pastures.	No common border.
<b>Kenya</b>	Tense and insecure border. Cattle rustling and arms smuggling. Resource conflicts between pastoralists. Ethiopian incursions in pursuit of OLF.	No common border	Ilemi triangle border dispute. Resource conflicts among pastoralists from Sudan, Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia. Kenya a sponsor of Sudan peace process.	Tense border. Arms smuggling. Cattle rustling. Hosts many Somali refugees. Insecurity in K's ethnic Somali region in NE. K supports TFG and is major sponsor of current peace process. Kenya concerned about rise of Islamic fundamentalism.	Tribal cross-border clashes over cattle and pastures. Arms trafficking, smuggling.	Relatively stable internally. Low-level conflicts in NE border areas and political agitation in coastal areas.	No common border
<b>Djibouti</b>	Complex relationship. Cooperative on trade. Djibouti's Afar problem spills over into Ethiopia.	Relations w. Eritrea strained by Eth.-Er war. Relations seem to be improving.	No common border	Complex relations. 60% of Djibouti population ethnic Somali. Increasingly supports TFG and not supportive of desegregation of the country.	No common border	No common border	Peace concluded.

### **Annex III: Somalia: Test case for implementation of the regional strategy**

Peace and stability in Somalia represents a test case for effective implementation of the regional political partnership. Continued instability can have a major impact on the region, particularly on neighbouring countries such as Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya, and direct repercussions on the EU. At the same time, IGAD Member States, the African Union and the League of Arab States are all significantly engaged in Somalia. All the destabilising factors analysed in the Communication (vested interests, trafficking, fundamentalism, pastoralism, migration and natural resources) are present in Somalia, and the regional partnership will seek to anchor Somalia in a broader regional framework and facilitate long-term commitment and unity of purpose from all regional and international actors.

In this context, the EU should be committed to giving continued political and financial support to regional initiatives led by the African Union, IGAD and the League of Arab States, including piloting trilateral cooperation programmes between the regional organisations, the Transitional Federal Institutions and the EU.

The regional partnership should also promote coordination of common policy objectives and continued engagement of the international community through existing coordination bodies such as the Coordination and Monitoring Committee (CMC), the International Contact Group (ICG) and IGAD's Partners Forum (IPF).

## **Annex IV: Pillars for regional action in the Horn of Africa**

### **1) Governance and security aspects**

The EU should propose a structured dialogue on Governance and Security in 2007 with regional partners, including Egypt and Yemen to allow for exchanges of good practice and encourage the involvement of civil society. A first step would be a conference that should come up with concrete proposals to be further discussed at regional and national levels. This process will constitute the focal point for regional efforts to reinvigorate governance and security; it will also facilitate exchanges of good practice and encourage the involvement of civil society.

The EU should to promote an EU - IGAD / League of Arab States Forum on the Horn of Africa to serve as a convening body for interaction with national political Islamist movements, in the interests of peace and stability in the Horn region. The African Union will have to be a key partner in the Forum, and the experience of dealing with other political Islamist movements in Sub-Saharan Africa will have to be taken into account. Its focus will be on developing concrete programmes for governments, civil society and the private sector to develop common perceptions of the challenges of democratisation and cultural and religious diversity.

The EU should also support the IGAD Peace and Security Strategy, including IGAD's Counter-Terrorism Programme seeking to aid the Member States in the objectives of ratifying counter-terrorism conventions, harmonising anti-terrorist legislation and building regional networks among state and non-state actors.

There will be a strong focus on the strengthening of political, judicial and civil society institutions and organisations, with particular reference to regional grass-roots organisations such as the IGAD NGO/CSO Forum and the Inter-Parliamentary Union, which are part of the IGAD agenda for improved governance in the region. Furthermore, the Commission will specifically support, through national and regional indicative programmes and the "Non-State Actors and Local Authorities" and the "Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights" thematic programmes, a strengthened role of civil society in promoting human rights and democratic reform, developing political participation and supporting conflict prevention as well as networking and coordination activities in the Horn of Africa.

A specific area on which the EU should focus is education as a mechanism to promote fundamental universal values and democratisation targeting the 'lost generation' in the Horn of Africa who have identified themselves with conflict and extremism. The Commission will support, through the "Investing in People" thematic programme, the "European Facility for primary education in difficult partnerships", which will have a specific angle on the Horn of Africa. Furthermore, education support will be considered as a major sector of intervention under EC bilateral and budget support programmes in all the Horn of Africa countries. This will complement and act as a catalyst to broaden EU support.

### **2) Development of border regions and management of transnational flows**

Attention will be paid to reforming border controls and trade tariff regimes in the region to facilitate and encourage cross-border trade and development, while removing some existing incentives for illicit trafficking and corruption. This could include support to bilateral initiatives to enhance the monitoring of borders, such as the Ethiopia and Eritrea Military



Coordination Commission, the border commission between Djibouti and Eritrea or joint training programmes for customs services. This is a specific area where enhanced coordination between COMESA, EAC and IGAD will have to be ensured.

The EU should consider developing further its cooperation with partners to actively support efforts to prevent and reduce SALW proliferation and associated armed violence in the region. It should also support programmes focusing on development and implementation of National Action Plans, national strategies and the Nairobi Protocol. The EU should support the Regional Centre for Small Arms and Light Weapons (RECSA), which leads and coordinates the implementation of the Nairobi Protocol, and regional action to address issues including the control of arms dealers (private dealers) and local smugglers, porous borders and weak cross-border controls, national legislative review and harmonisation, law-enforcement capacity, the regulation of arms transfers and cooperation with civil society.

The EU will work with partners to address the question of migration, refugees and IDPs in the Horn of Africa. Where appropriate and if possible it will engage in a political dialogue on migration in the framework of Article 13 of the Cotonou Agreement, which should cover every relevant aspect, from the improvement of the linkages between migration and development to countries' commitments to address irregular migration flows and to respect their obligations regarding readmission. In addition, specific efforts will be made to reinforce the ongoing EU/AU dialogue on migration.

Such an approach will require additional support to the host communities, states and the relevant organisations working in the field to prevent south-south migration and refugee crises from spreading political instability in the region. Particular focus will be given, inter alia, through the EC Migration and Asylum Thematic Programme<sup>1</sup> on south-north migration flows, improving the reception conditions for refugees, improving the capacities of migration services, tackling human trafficking and smuggling, and consolidating the existing legislative and institutional framework on international protection and migration. This should be complemented by strengthening the linkage and synergies between migration and development in the Horn of Africa and by supporting the efforts of countries in the region to better manage migration flows via regional and national strategy papers.

### **3) Sustainable natural resource management**

The combination of livelihood insecurity, natural resources management, and border and political issues has been a constant source of conflict involving pastoral communities. A medium- and long-term strategy will be developed with the aim of increasing recognition and addressing this specific problem in all its dimensions (environmental, socio-economic, political and security). One of the key questions to be tackled is pastoral governance and the relationship between the formal institutions of the state and the informal/traditional rules and social structures of the pastoralists.

An IGAD-EU structured dialogue that could be kick started by an international conference on pastoralism and food security could lead to a regional strategic response which should follow basic principles of flexibility in institutional design, subsidiarity and simple organisation structures. The initiative should also build on the important partnership for livestock

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<sup>1</sup> This thematic programme should be included within the Development Cooperation Instrument which currently discussed between European Parliament and Council.

development, poverty reduction and sustainable growth in Africa (African Livestock - ALive). The EU would also be prepared to support a sustainable land management and desertification programme with IGAD through the thematic programme on environment and sustainable management of natural resources, including energy.

Closely related to the issue of pastoralism is the fact that the Horn region is structurally food insecure as exemplified by the current drought in the region. Drought is, however, rarely the primary cause of food insecurity; the problem is more complex and chronic. The EU is prepared to support rapid response facilities but this should go hand in hand with more structural support for development of effective regional food security strategies, notably through the EDF-supported Regional Food Security and Risk Management Programme (REFORM) for eastern and southern Africa, to be implemented by IGAD and COMESA. Furthermore, in the context of the EU Strategy for Africa, a new initiative will foster a better understanding of the root causes and dynamics of food insecurity, agricultural policy development, harmonisation and alignment, using NEPAD as a framework for cooperation. IGAD is an eligible partner in this context and will be supported, *inter alia*, through the Food Security Thematic Programme (FSTP). The FSTP will also be the Community instrument for tackling food insecurity in those countries in the region where state failure/fragility (e.g. Somalia) will not permit the full utilisation of the EDF to link relief, rehabilitation and development.


The EU should also support plans to expand the IGAD-led CEWARN (Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism), which is helping to promote sensitivity to pastoralist conflicts, especially in vulnerable border regions, among Member States. CEWARN is currently considered to be the most developed conflict early warning system in Africa.

The EU will consolidate its engagement with, and support for, the NBI. The contribution from the ACP-EU Water Facility (€18 million) comes at a time when the NBI enters its implementation phase. It will boost participation and ownership and will fast-track activities in two subsidiary programmes which have a strong focus on poverty reduction and sustainable livelihoods: flood preparedness in the eastern Nile and river basin development in the Mara and Sio-Malaba-Malakasi basins in the equatorial lakes region. It will also, in the context of the recently launched Infrastructure Partnership, support multi-purpose development programmes in the eastern Nile (Ethiopia - Sudan), with emphasis on hydropower.

Furthermore, the strategic partnership for water affairs signed in 2002 between AMCOW and the EU in the framework of the EU Water Initiative should be strengthened. Its transboundary river basin management may support and reinforce peace and security initiatives. Activities such as the Country Dialogue for water initiated in Ethiopia and the programme for Lake Victoria-Kagera (shared by four countries) should be further developed.

### Annex V: Table of Key regional indicators

	Territorial size	Population size	Major ethnic groups (% per group)	Resources and economy
Sudan (Khartoum)	2,505,810 sq km	35.5 million	Figures for Sudan are unreliable. The population is composed mostly of Arabs (about 40% of the total) in the north and Africans in the south. But many Arabs are of mixed ancestry. Other ethnic groups in the North include Nuba, Fur, Jaaliyin, Kababbish, Baggara, Masalit, Zaghawa, Rashaida, Nubian, and Beja. The main group in the south is the Dinka, other larger groups are the Nuer, Azande and Shilluk.	Crude oil and petroleum products. Rain fed agriculture – cotton, livestock, sugar, gum. Light industry. 5.2% growth (2004)
Ethiopia (Addis Ababa)	1,127,127 sq km	70 million	Oromo 40%, Amhara and Tigre 32%, Sidamo 9%, Shankella 6%, Somali 6%, Afar 4%, Gurage 2%, other 1%	Subsistence agriculture. Coffee. Light industry. Construction. 12.3% growth (2004)
Eritrea (Asmara)	121,320 sq km	4.2 million	Ethnic Tigrinya 50%, Tigre and Kunama 40%, Afar 4%, Saho (Red Sea coast dwellers) 3%, other 3%	Industries: food processing, beverages, textiles. Subsistence agriculture. 2% growth (2004) Italy is the main trading partner in the EU.
Somalia (Mogadishu)	637,657 sq km	8.0 million	Somali 85%, Bantu and other non-Somali 15%	Agriculture, especially livestock. Fisheries. Informal banking and wireless telecoms. 2.1% growth (est 2003)
Djibouti (Djibouti)	23,000 sq km	779,100	Somali 60%, Afar 35%, French, Arab, Ethiopian, and Italian 5%	Service activities related to strategic location and free zone status. 3.0% growth (2004) France is the main EU trading partner.
Uganda (Kampala)	236,040 sq km	27.8 million	Baganda 17%, Ankole 8%, Basoga 8%, Iteso 8%, Bakiga 7%, Langi 6%, Rwanda 6%, Bagisu 5%, Acholi 4%, Lugbara 4%, Batoro 3%, Bunyoro 3%, Alur 2%, Bagwere 2%, Bakonjo 2%, Jopodhola 2%, Karamojong 2%, Rundi 2%, non-African (European, Asian, Arab) 1%, other 8%	Natural resources include fertile soils, regular rainfall, and sizable mineral deposits of copper and cobalt. Agriculture is the main sector. Coffee accounts for bulk of export revenues. 5.6% growth (2004). UK is the main EU trading partner.
Kenya (Nairobi)	582,650 sq km	33.5 million	Kikuyu 22%, Luhya 14%, Luo 13%, Kalenjin 12%, Kamba	Tourism. Regional hub for trade, investment,



11%, Kisii 6%, Meru 6%, other African 15%, non-African (Asian, European, and Arab) 1%

banking, transport, aid. Agriculture, fisheries. Food processing. Light industry. Annual growth 4.3% (2004)

Source: *World Development indicators 2006* (data as of 2004)

## Annex VI: Horn of Africa Population Statistics

State of World Population Report (2006 Sept)

	Demographic Data and Estimates IGAD					Area & Density*		
	Total Population 2006 (millions)	Projected Population 2050 (millions)	<i>Ave Pop. growth rate % 2005-2010</i>	<i>Percent Urban (2005)</i>	<i>Urban growth rate 2005-2010 %</i>	Population/ha arable & perm crop land	Area of Countries (km2)	Population density per km2
WORLD	6.540	9.076	1,1	49	2,0		51.789.601	125,0
AFRICA	926	1.937	2,1	38	3,2		11.698.111	77,0
<b>IGAD</b>	<b>195,2</b>	<b>480,5</b>	<b>2,7</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>4,1</b>		<b>5.209.680</b>	<b>48,3</b>
Sudan	37,0	67	2,1	41	4,2	1,2	2.505.810	14,0
Djibouti	0,8	1,5	2,1	86	2,1	592,0	23.200	31,0
Eritrea	4,6	11	3,1	19	5,2	5,5	117.600	37,9
Ethiopia	79,3	170	2,3	16	4,0	5,1	1.104.000	67,2
Kenya	35,1	83	2,6	21	3,9	4,7	580.370	56,6
Somalia	8,5	21	3,1	35	4,3	5,0	637.660	16,9
Uganda	29,9	127	3,6	13	4,8	2,8	241.040	114,6

(\* Area and Density figures from FAO 'Aquastat database')