

CESDP: A TURKISH PERSPECTIVE

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Abstract

*Despite the fact that it is a policy outside the *acquis communautaire*, the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) constitutes an important part of the European integration process and perhaps a litmus test for its future progress. This paper aims at analysing the development of the CESDP with special reference to Turkey's unique position vis-à-vis this policy. Accordingly, major research questions asked are as follows: "What were the rights that Turkey acquired through WEU Associate Membership and that it lost upon WEU's demise?", "What are Turkey's stakes in the development of the CESDP as the way it is right now?", "What are the current obstacles on the way to a sound deal?", "What is the significance of the CESDP as a European security project?" and "Why should Turkey be accommodated within such a project?"*

*This paper consists of a set of arguments rather than one major argument. One of these arguments is about Turkey's uniqueness with regard to the CESDP. This uniqueness is related to Turkey's status both as a candidate for EU membership and as a non-EU European Ally. Without a clear prospect for EU membership, the issue of inclusion in a European security framework, which is declared as the successor of WEU with regard to Petersberg tasks, constitutes a major concern for Turkey as a former WEU Associate Member that has lost all the rights that it acquired under such status. Therefore, the issue involves a loss of acquired rights that are not replaced in a satisfactory way. The second argument is that the case of Turkey vis-à-vis the CESDP is not about convergence. Although some differences exist with regard to political and security culture between Turkey and the EU Member States, they are only as grave as the differences between the EU Member States themselves. The major stake is thus at the other points. The third argument is on the implications for NATO-EU relations. Turkey is a *demandeur vis-à-vis* the EU due to its*

candidacy for Full Membership. On the other hand, the EU is also a demandeur in its relationship with NATO as it seeks to use NATO assets in its operations. The problem is that the EU continues to regard Turkey as the only demandeur in this whole set of relations. The final argument is that despite some deep misunderstandings between Turkey and the EU, Turkey should be accommodated within the new European security framework (the CESDP), since the need for a holistic approach to security is more compelling and urgent in the post-September 11 world. Turkey's accommodation could also be the way for constructing a credible CESDP that does not suffer from lack of political will for defence spending as well as proactive policies.

Introduction

Despite the fact that it is a policy outside the *acquis communautaire*, the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) constitutes an important part of the European integration process and perhaps a litmus test for its future progress. This paper aims at analysing the development of the CESDP with special reference to Turkey's unique position vis-à-vis this policy.

We all know that the CESDP is a policy developed under the second pillar, the CFSP. Its mainly intergovernmental nature distinguishes it from those policies that belong to the first pillar, which has a supranational character. This is important to our analysis in the sense that the degree of convergence the CESDP requires is different from the policies implemented in a supranational way and its nature and framework are still major areas of debate. These different dynamics of the CESDP make it an interesting case for EU enlargement as well. This is because there are no defined convergence criteria for the EU candidates in this field. It does not also seem possible to determine any due to the fact that even the EU Member States themselves cannot totally agree on the nature, framework and the implementation of the CESDP. Nevertheless, it is a widely accepted view that if achieved successfully, the CESDP will constitute the final stage of the European integration process.

As a basically intergovernmental policy realm, the CESDP suffers from a lack of institutional convergence as well as a convergence of national security and defence policies of EU Member States. This lack of internal convergence complicates the case for the EU candidates. Therefore, the question with regard to EU enlargement here is not of a convergence of policies. This is mainly a field that will develop through deliberation of Member States' stances and thus there are no requirements that should be fulfilled prior to entry to the EU.

This paper consists of a set of arguments rather than one major argument. One of these arguments is about Turkey's uniqueness with regard to the CESDP. This uniqueness is related to Turkey's status both as a candidate for EU membership and as a non-EU European Ally. There are three other countries that are in a similar position, namely, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary. However, these countries have a clear prospect for EU membership whereas Turkey does not. Furthermore, a comparison with the other non-EU European Allies, namely, Norway and Iceland is not relevant due to the fact that these countries are not aspiring for EU membership and do not have major stakes in the development of a CESDP in its present form. Without a clear prospect for EU membership, the issue of inclusion in a European security framework, which is declared as the successor of WEU with regard to Petersberg tasks, constitutes a major concern for Turkey as a former WEU Associate Member that has lost all the rights that it acquired under such status. Therefore, the issue is more complex than a simple inclusion/exclusion conundrum. Rather, it involves a loss of acquired rights that are not replaced in a satisfactory way.

This special situation not only creates major implementation problems for the CESDP as in the case of the Turkish veto over the EU's use of NATO assets but also adds to the distrust and misperceptions between the EU and Turkey. It can be contended that Turkey's situation *vis-à-vis* the CESDP has significant implications for European security integration and the EU enlargement process. On the other hand, this situation is closely linked with Mediterranean security in the sense that at least three

Mediterranean actors are directly or indirectly involved in the issue, namely, Greece, Turkey and Cyprus.

The second argument builds on the first one, asserting that the case of Turkey *vis-à-vis* the CESDP is not, therefore, about convergence. Although some differences exist with regard to political and security culture between Turkey and the EU Member States, they are only as grave as the differences between the EU Member States themselves. The major stake is thus at another point.

The third argument is on the implications for NATO-EU relations. Turkey is a demandeur *vis-à-vis* the EU due to its candidacy for Full Membership. On the other hand, the EU is also a demandeur in its relationship with NATO as it seeks to use NATO assets in its operations. The common belief in Europe is that Turkey is playing the NATO card to get Full Membership in the EU, and if not that, some kind of an association with the CESDP including some decision-making rights. What follows is the logic that both of these mean an intervention in the EU's decision-making autonomy. This belief and the following logic may have some truth in them but they do not convey the whole picture. This is because, while claiming its own decision-making autonomy, the EU prohibits NATO's decision-making autonomy by asking guaranteed access to NATO assets. As a matter of fact, this is not very different from WEU's subordinate situation to the EU, created after Amsterdam. It has the effect of putting NATO into WEU's place, availing itself of NATO in certain operations through guaranteed access to NATO assets. The problem with this picture is that Turkey is blamed with intervening in EU affairs as the EU continues to regard Turkey as the only demandeur in this whole set of relations.

The final argument points to a deep misunderstanding, if not distrust between Turkey and the EU in their relations in general and with regard to the construction of a new European security project in particular. Nevertheless, it acknowledges that the post-September 11 world is not to be adequately handled with the rhetoric of the early 1990s anymore. The need for a holistic approach to security is more compelling and urgent. The

development of a cohesive and comprehensive CESDP as the major European security project is inevitable, in the light of growing US unilateralism and the lingering situation of NATO. Under these circumstances it would be wise to plan ways of accommodating Turkey within this new European security framework. It could also be the way to construct a credible CESDP that does not suffer from lack of political will for defence spending as well as proactive policies.

This paper is structured in a way to cover an analysis of the background to the problematic situation between Turkey and the EU with respect to the CESDP first; and then to go on with a description of the current situation, with a conclusion that emphasizes the role of the CESDP as a European security project and examines the issue of Turkey's accommodation in this respect. Accordingly, subsequent sections will focus on the answers to the following questions: "What were the rights that Turkey acquired through WEU Associate Membership and that it lost upon WEU's demise?", "What are Turkey's stakes in the development of the CESDP as the way it is right now?", "What are the current obstacles on the way to a sound deal?", "What is the significance of the CESDP as a European security project?" and "Why should Turkey be accommodated within such a project?"

Turkey's Associate Membership in WEU¹

The WEU was a unique international organisation in the sense that it had various types of membership. These were namely; Full Member, Associate Member, Observer and Associate Partner status. Different members had different levels of involvement in WEU through which they enjoyed different rights and had different obligations. These various levels of involvement - even in the

¹ For a detailed analysis of WEU Associate Membership and Turkey's status in this regard, see Münevver Cebeci "A Delicate Process of Participation - The question of participation of WEU Associate Members in decision-making for EU-led Petersberg operations, with special reference to Turkey", *Occasional Papers*, No. 10, November 1999, (Paris: Western European Union -Institute for Security Studies). Please also note that here one can only give a very brief summary of the detailed analysis covered in this *Occasional Paper*.

decision-making in WEU - put this organisation in a unique position vis-à-vis its peers. Crucial for understanding the uniqueness of WEU is the idea that its flexible and multiple membership structure "prevented the creation and perception of insiders and outsiders in the overall institutional set-up of the organisation"² and constituted the so-called "WEU family of nations".

Associate Membership is a status created by the Declaration on WEU (Declaration No. 30) attached to the Maastricht Treaty in 1991. Through this Declaration, the non-EU European members of NATO were invited to become WEU Associate Members. Their status was later defined in a detailed way in the Petersberg Declaration of 19 June 1992 and the Declaration on Associate Membership made in Rome on 20 November 1992. The Associate Membership of Turkey, Iceland and Norway became effective in 1995. Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland were also invited to become WEU Associate Members in March 1999 and subsequent to their acquisition of Full Membership in NATO, which was declared in the Washington Summit of April 1999, their status became effective in May 1999.

Associate Membership was a non-Modified Brussels Treaty (non-MBT) status, in that Associate Members were not endowed with Full Membership rights designed by that treaty and their status only consisted of non-Article V activities. At its starkest, they were neither under Article V guarantee, nor held responsible for Article V missions. Notwithstanding, the Associate Members could participate fully in the meetings of the WEU Council, its working groups and the subsidiary bodies under certain conditions: a) Their participation should not prejudice the provisions laid down in Article VIII of the MBT, and b) At the request of a majority of the Full Members, or half of the Full Members including the Presidency, participation might be restricted to Full Members. Stated as such, Associate Members had the right to speak and

² Natalie Tocci and Marc Houben, "Accommodating Turkey in ESDP", CEPS Policy Brief No. 5, May 2001, (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies), p. 4.

submit proposals, but they did not have the right to block a decision unanimously agreed by Full Members. They were associated to the Planning Cell through special arrangements and could appoint liaison officers to the Cell. In operational terms, they took part on the same basis as Full Members in WEU military operations (as well as exercises and planning) to which they committed forces. They could nominate Forces Answerable to WEU (FAWEU) on the same basis as Full Members. They had the right to be consulted and informed on WEU operations in which they were interested. They would also be directly involved in the planning and preparation of WEU operations in which NATO assets and capabilities were used within the framework of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs). Associate Partners and Observers could not enjoy such rights since they were not NATO members (bar Denmark). Therefore, it can be contended that Associate Members had these privileged rights on account of their NATO membership.

Associate Members were connected to the WEU telecommunications system (WEUCOM), could participate in the activities of the Satellite Centre and were regularly informed about WEU's space activities. Turkey, Norway and Denmark (as observer and as a NATO ally) could participate in WEU Working Groups (except for the Security Committee) with decision-making at 13 and 16 (in some cases) such as the Transatlantic Forum, EUROCOM, EUROLONGTERM and Western European Logistics Group. On the other hand, Associate Members still have full rights and responsibilities with regard to the activities of the Western European Armaments Group (WEAG).

MPs from Associate Members were fully involved in the work of the WEU Assembly, although the Associate Members did not contribute to the Assembly's budget. This notwithstanding, the Associate Members were, in fact, contributing to the WEU budget (though less than the Full Members' contribution)³. Observers and

³ Turkey and Norway covered 1.9% of the WEU budget while Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and Iceland covered 2.46% altogether. For more information on these numbers see: Antonio Missiroli, "EU-NATO Cooperation in Crisis

Associate Partners could not contribute to the budget and their participation in Working Groups and other WEU decision-making bodies were limited. They could only contribute to those military operations to which they committed forces. This stark difference between the statuses of Associate Members on the one hand and the Observers and Associate Partners on the other is a reflection of the significantly high degree of involvement that the Associate Members acquired by virtue of their NATO membership.

It was the Cologne European Council Declaration of June 1999 that announced WEU's demise as an organisation by the end of the year 2000 and led to the loss of all member statuses of WEU, bar Full Membership. Before moving on to a detailed analysis of Turkey's stakes that emerged due to the loss of its Associate Membership rights and the subsequent developments, a close look at how the European security landscape changed before and after WEU's demise would be useful.

The Construction of a CESDP and the Issue of Turkey's Involvement

From the Amsterdam Treaty to NATO's Washington Summit

Although criticised by the Europeanists for falling short of designing a significant structure for a European security and defence policy, the Amsterdam Treaty, in fact, included some important provisions. The Treaty "gave the CFSP a new scope and a wider framework, to include Petersberg tasks and take steps towards a common defence policy, and, thus, to open the way for the possibility of WEU's future integration in the EU (Article 17)"⁴. The EU Member States could not agree to integrate WEU in the EU; however, they established a stronger institutional link between the two organisations. Accordingly, the EU would avail itself of WEU to elaborate and implement decisions of the Union on Petersberg tasks and in such cases the European Council would

Management: No Turkish Delight for ESDP", *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 33 No. 1, March 2002, p. 11, [his] endnote (6).

⁴ Cebeci, footnote (1), p. 15.

establish the guidelines (Article 17.3). This provision was significant in the sense that it had put WEU in a subordinate position with regard to the cases where the EU would avail itself of WEU. This was exactly the point where the involvement of the WEU nations except for the Full Members came to the fore as a problematic issue. It was certain that the non-EU WEU nations would be confronted with the problem of participation in EU-led WEU operations that would be conducted without the use of NATO assets. This problem was partly resolved when it was agreed in WEU's Erfurt Declaration of November 18, 1997 that the Associate Members and Observers would participate fully in accordance with their status in all Petersberg operations undertaken by WEU. Nevertheless, the point with regard to "full participation" was not clarified and there were criticisms that the distinction between different WEU member statuses were getting blurred due to the fact that the Observers' status had been gradually upgraded since July 1997, owing to their membership in the EU. This was a clear shift from a WEU having intensive ties with NATO and favouring NATO nations towards a WEU that would be subordinated to the EU and, thus, would favour EU nations according to the new arrangements.

Another significant shift occurred in October 1998, giving a new course to the European security debate. This was a change in British foreign policy⁵. The British government withdrew its longstanding veto over a possible EU/WEU merger and put forward a proposal on the development of an EU defence capability allowing Member States to assemble and deploy troops in rapid response to crises. This unexpected British proposal that the EU should assume a defence capability paved the way for a Joint Franco-British Declaration on European Defence, which was made in Saint Malo on December 2, 1998. This declaration and following consultations in the Vienna Council and other informal ministerial meetings finally led to the decisions that were adopted by the

⁵ For a further analysis of the sudden shift in British foreign policy and the British Government's new position, see, Richard G. Whitman, "Amsterdam's Unfinished Business?", *Occasional Papers*, No. 7, Western European Union - Institute for Security Studies, January 1999.

European Council in Cologne in June 1999. Before continuing with the Cologne European Council, it is necessary to evoke the US and NATO reactions to the St. Malo developments at this point.

The US government declared its support for the European defence initiative, stressing, however, that it should not be at the expense of NATO and its non-EU European members. US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright repeatedly referred to three conditions in this respect: that the EU members should avoid decoupling, duplication and discrimination in putting this initiative into action⁶. One of these “three Ds”, discrimination, was significant in the sense that it starkly laid down the US views on the issue of participation of non-EU European Allies. According to this view, non-EU European members of NATO should not be excluded from the efforts for the establishment of a European defence capability and any kind of arrangement that would be made thereafter.

In NATO's Washington Summit Communiqué of 24 April 1999, the Allies announced that they welcomed the new impetus given to the strengthening of a common European policy in security and defence by the Treaty of Amsterdam and the reflections launched since then in WEU and, following the St-Malo Declaration, in the EU. They stressed that this was a process, which had implications for all Allies. Emphasising this point, the Allies stressed that NATO and the EU should ensure the development of effective mutual consultation, cooperation and transparency, building on the mechanisms existing between NATO and WEU. A natural complement of this provision was the Allies' emphasis on the situation of non-EU European NATO members. In this regard, the Allies stated that they attached “the utmost importance to ensuring the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European NATO Allies in EU-led crisis response operations, building on the existing consultation arrangements within WEU”. The phrase “the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European Allies” reveals the Allied view that these developments should not take place at the

⁶ See several Financial Times issues published after the launch of the British initiative and St-Malo Declaration, including the one published on 7 December 1998.

expense of non-EU European Allies and should not exclude them from a future European defence capability. In view of the probability of a loss of rights on the part of WEU Associate Members, the statement suggested that their involvement should be “built on existing consultation arrangements within WEU”. This statement could be interpreted as a clause that aimed at the protection of the rights of the Associate Members that they acquired within the WEU framework. EU-ISS senior research fellow Antonio Missiroli contends that some other interpretations are also possible and that the NATO statement only added to the ambivalence of the situation in that it paved the way to contrasting interpretations of its stringency⁷. NATO's Washington Communiqué is important in the sense that Turkey's main claims on the issue are based on this document and its interpretation from a Turkish perspective. This point will be analysed in detail below.

The Alliance's new Strategic Concept, adopted on 23 and 24 April 1999, included substantial statements about the new European defence initiative and the participation of non-EU European Allies in this framework. It reiterated that all European Allies should be involved in the new European defence initiative, "building on arrangements developed by NATO and WEU". The Allies suggested that the initiative would enable *all* European Allies to make a more coherent and effective contribution to the missions and activities of the Alliance as an expression of the Allies' shared responsibilities. It would reinforce the Transatlantic partnership and assist the European Allies to act by themselves as required through the readiness of the Alliance, "on a case-by-case basis" and "by consensus", to make its assets and capabilities available for operations in which the Alliance was not engaged militarily under the political control and strategic direction of WEU or as otherwise agreed, taking into account the full participation of all European Allies if they were so to choose. The Strategic concept also used the terms “full participation” and “building on arrangements developed by NATO and WEU” adding that any decision on the use of NATO assets would be made on a "case-by-case basis" and

⁷ Missiroli, footnote (3), p. 13.

by "consensus". This is also another point on which Turkey bases its claims and will be discussed in the following sections.

*Cologne, Helsinki and Nice Developments*⁸

Building on the developments achieved after St. Malo. The European Council Declaration on strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence made in Cologne in June 1999 announced that the EU members decided to give the Union necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities in this field. In international crises and for the implementation of the Petersberg tasks in such situations, the Union should have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces; the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, without prejudice to NATO actions. With this intention, the European Council tasked the General Affairs Council to prepare the conditions and measures necessary to achieve the objectives set out in the Declaration, including the arrangements for the inclusion of those functions of WEU, which would be necessary for the EU to fulfil its new responsibilities for Petersberg tasks. The European Council set the time limit for the completion of the necessary arrangements as the end of the year 2000. Upon completion of those arrangements, WEU, as an organization, would have completed its purpose. This statement was the most important part of the Cologne European Council Declaration, since it openly announced the demise of WEU as an organization by the end of the year 2000.

However, WEU's demise as an organisation did not mean the annulment of the MBT, in that the alliance between the ten Full Members of WEU would remain the foundation of the collective defense of its members. Therefore, the collective defense guarantee (Article V) of the Modified Brussels Treaty (1954) would not be affected by this demise. The neutral status of some of the EU

⁸ For the texts of all these European Councils (texts dealing with the CESDP) please see Maartje Rutten (ed.) "From St Malo to Nice - European defence: core documents", *Chaillot Papers*, No. 47, May 2001, (Paris: Western European Union -Institute for Security Studies).

members would not be affected either, since the EU would only take on the non-Article V functions of WEU that it mostly performed in the area of crisis management, and thus, Petersberg tasks. Concerning the non-EU European Allies, WEU Associate Membership would come to an end since it was a non-MBT status. On this point, the European Council only stressed that arrangements, which would allow the non-EU European Allies to take part to the fullest possible extent within the CESDP framework would be put in place.

The Cologne European Council decisions on the CESDP were mostly criticized for their vagueness. According to the US and some non-EU European Allies, the Declaration remained inadequate and elusive in emphasizing NATO as the first resort in the conduct of crisis management operations, in defining the arrangements for the establishment of institutional links between the EU and NATO, in determining the status of non-EU European Allies, and above all, in describing how the EU would maintain the necessary capabilities⁹.

The Helsinki European Council of December 1999 was significant in two respects. First it recognised Turkey as a "candidate" for EU accession. Secondly, it clarified some of the points mentioned above, appeasing the non-EU Allies to a certain extent. On the face of it, these two different aspects of Helsinki decisions may be regarded as separate points, however, in reality, they are interlinked. A closer look at these decisions reveals that the EU regards Turkey's case with regard to the CESDP as an extension of the country's quest for EU membership and thus develops its policies accordingly. This point will be clarified below.

With regard to the CESDP, the Helsinki European Council laid down the necessary provisions for the establishment of the political and military bodies necessary for the planning, decision-making

⁹ Munevver Cebeci, "European Security and Defence Identity: A Trojan Horse for Transatlantic Relations?", *Turkey Investor*, Issue No. 12, May-June 2000, p 22.

and implementation of autonomous EU-led operations. It further set a common European "headline goal", stating that the "Member States must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year, military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks". This statement marked the creation of a European task force for crisis management, usually referred to as European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF). For the creation of the ERRF, the European Council established collective capability goals in the fields of command and control, intelligence and strategic transport. Implementation and review methods were also envisaged within this framework. Accordingly, the existing defence planning procedures would be used, including, as appropriate, those in NATO.

The Helsinki European Council reiterated the EU members' determination "to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises". This process would avoid unnecessary duplication and would not imply the creation of a European army. This was an open statement of the EU members' acceptance of NATO as the "first resort" in crisis situations. What is more, it was clearly maintained in the Presidency reports adopted by the Council that NATO remained the foundation of the collective defence of its members and would continue to have an important role in crisis management. The European Council envisaged that the EU crisis management operations could be carried out with or without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities.

There were also clauses on the involvement of non-EU European Allies. The Helsinki European Council acknowledged that measures would be taken for necessary dialogue, consultation and cooperation with NATO, its non-EU members and with "candidate countries", "with full respect for the decision-making autonomy of the EU and the single institutional framework of the Union". Accordingly, the non-EU European Allies could participate if they so wished in an operation requiring recourse to NATO assets and capabilities whereas they had to be *invited* by the Council in case of EU-only operations. Nonetheless, the non-EU European Allies and

the candidate countries were granted same rights and obligations in the day-to-day conduct of the operations to which they committed significant military forces. Notwithstanding the open statements on other matters, the question of the establishment of institutional links between NATO and the EU and the issue of the involvement of non-EU European Allies were not mentioned in a detailed way and were again left vague. As a matter of fact, the main problem with regard to the Helsinki decisions was that the EU members had not made a distinction between the non-EU European Allies and the other candidate countries and they were put "in the same basket"¹⁰. This explains and endorses the assumption that the EU regards Turkey's case with regard to the CESDP as an extension of its quest for EU membership and thus develops its policies accordingly. This is a crucial point that should be kept in mind since it constitutes the point of departure for one of the major arguments of this paper.

The Feira European Council of June 2000 made a trivial distinction between the accession candidates and the non-EU European Allies. Accordingly, exchanges would be made with the non-EU European NATO members where the subject matter required it, such as on questions concerning the nature and functioning of EU-led operations using NATO assets and capabilities; and a single, inclusive structure would be established, in which all the 15 countries concerned (the non-EU European Allies and the candidates for accession to the EU) could enjoy the necessary dialogue, consultation and cooperation with the EU. Nevertheless, these provisions also fell short of clarifying the picture.

The Nice European Council of December 2000, on the other hand, adopted a Presidency report that clearly defined the arrangements concerning the non-EU European Allies and other countries, which are candidates for accession to the EU. It contained some specific arrangements for the non-EU European Allies. Although these arrangements were a step forward from Feira, they were still far from satisfying the non-EU European Allies, especially Turkey. Furthermore, it should be kept in mind that it was this report that

¹⁰ Missiroli, footnote (3), p. 14.

identified the structure, competence and the tasks of the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the Military Staff, and the Military Committee. Therefore, a clearer picture with regard to the involvement of the non-EU Allies and the candidate countries within this framework came as no surprise.

The Presidency Report made a differentiation between permanent consultation arrangements during non-crisis periods and arrangements during crisis periods. For non-crisis periods, the Report stipulated a minimum of two meetings to be held during each Presidency at EU+15 format, and on an ad hoc basis. Within this framework, a minimum of two meetings would also be held at EU+6 format. The Report envisaged one ministerial meeting bringing together the 15 and the 6 countries that would be held during each Presidency. The PSC would have the leading role in the implementation of these arrangements. A minimum of two meetings would be held at Military Committee level. Exchanges at military experts level would also be done for the establishment of capability objectives as well as for enabling the non-EU European Allies and other candidates to contribute to the process of enhancing European military capabilities. Meetings of military experts could be called on for other purposes, such as for information on the strategic options in crisis times.

The non-EU European Allies and other candidates were also given the right to appoint a representative from their missions to the EU to follow the ESDP and act as an interlocutor with regard to the PSC, if they so wished. The willing third countries were given the right to appoint a liaison officer accredited to the EU Military Staff. In addition, the Report opened the way for specific liaison arrangements for NATO/EU exercises.

For crisis periods, two phases were determined by the Report: pre-operational phase and operational base. For the pre-operational phase, intensified dialogues and consultations were envisaged in the event of the eruption of a crisis. When the possibility of an EU-led crisis management operation was under consideration, these consultations would be made with the aim of ensuring that the countries potentially contributing to such an operation were

informed of the EU's intentions, particularly with regard to the military options envisaged. These consultations could be held at politico-military experts level. If the EU began to examine in depth an option requiring the use of NATO assets and capabilities, particular attention would be paid to consultation of the NATO 6.

For the operational phase, the Nice Presidency Report reiterated that the non-EU European Allies could participate if they so wished in an operation requiring recourse to NATO assets and capabilities whereas they had to be *invited* by the Council in case of EU-only operations. However, there were some additions in terms of modalities. Accordingly, once the Council had chosen the strategic military option(s) the operational planning work would be presented to the 15 and the 6, which had expressed their intention to take part in the operation so that they could decide on the volume of their contribution. After the decision to start the operation and the subsequent invitation for the interested third parties to join, the operational planning for the operations requiring recourse to NATO assets and capabilities would be carried out by the Alliance's planning bodies and the non-EU European Allies would be involved in planning according to the procedures laid down within NATO. On the other hand, the operational planning for an autonomous EU operation would be carried out within one of the European strategic level headquarters. For autonomous EU operations in which the 15 and the 6 were invited to take part, they might send liaison officers to the European Military Staff bodies at strategic level for exchanges of information on operational planning and the contributions envisaged.

The Presidency report stipulated that the Committee of Contributors would be responsible for the day-to-day management of the operations. All EU Member States and only the contributing third countries would take part - on an equal footing - in the day-to-day management of the operations. Nevertheless, PSC would retain the political control and the strategic direction of the operations and it would only take account of the views expressed by the Committee of Contributors.

By and large, it can be contended that the provisions of the Nice Presidency report envisaged a structure within which the non-EU European allies and other candidates would be involved in decision-*shaping* and implementation phases of the CESDP (although on slightly different levels) while the decision-*making* proper and political control would remain the EU's preserve. It is obvious that the Nice arrangements were also far from replacing the rights that the non-EU European Allies acquired through their Associate Membership in WEU.

It is worth pondering on a very interesting point with regard to the Nice Presidency Report here. Under two headings in the Report, the issue of guaranteed access to NATO planning capabilities and assets were mentioned. One of them was "Standing Arrangements for Consultation and Cooperation between the EU and NATO" and the other was "Annex to the Permanent Arrangements for Consultation and Cooperation on the Implementation of Paragraph 10 of the Washington Communiqué". Under the former heading, the Presidency laid down the provisions for NATO/EU relations in times of crises and it envisaged that upon the determination of initial strategic military options, the Staff might "call on external planning sources, in particular the guaranteed access to NATO planning capabilities, to analyse and refine these options"¹¹. Under the latter heading, the Presidency report stated that building on the Washington Communiqué¹², it was suggested that the EU should have guaranteed permanent access to NATO's planning capabilities. Within this procedure the DSACEUR would be involved (perhaps to silence opposition) as a strategic coordinator. Concerning other NATO assets and capabilities, the Report suggested that a *pre-identified* set of assets and capabilities of the Alliance would be ready at the EU's disposal in case it needed them. These assets and capabilities would be determined by EU and Alliance experts, validated by a meeting of the Military Committees of the two organisations and approved under each organisation's specific procedures. With regard to the chain of

¹¹ From the text of the Nice Presidency Report in Rutten, footnote (8), p. 205.

¹² This point reflects the differences of interpretation between Turkey and EU with regard to the Washington Communiqué.

command, through consultations with the NAC, the Council would appoint the operation commander. The Report stipulated that, from then on, the entire chain of command should remain under the political control and strategic direction of the EU throughout the operation¹³. Within that framework, the operation commander would "report on the conduct of the operation to EU bodies only"¹⁴. NATO would only be informed of developments in the situation by the appropriate bodies.

To put it bluntly, the Nice Presidency Report implicitly suggested that NATO would replace WEU's subordinate position vis-à-vis the EU so that the EU would avail itself of NATO through guaranteed access to its assets and capabilities. At this point, Antonio Missiroli's term "EU-isation of ESDI"¹⁵ can be appropriately used to define this situation, although he may not have intended to use this term for coming up with such an argument. For brainstorming purposes, this term may be reworded as the "EU-isation of NATO", if one finds the former wording as inadequate to describe the situation. As a matter of fact, Missiroli mentions a *partial* "ESDP-isation of NATO"¹⁶ in order to mean NATO's "becoming an essential provider of military services for missions in the European area"¹⁷.

Turkey's Stakes

Given the fact that Turkey lacks a clear prospect for EU membership¹⁸, it can be asserted that Turkey's stakes in the development of the CESDP in its current structure are greater than all the other non-EU European Allies' stakes. This is especially true in the sense that Iceland and Norway have already made clear that

¹³ Rutten, footnote (8), p. 208.

¹⁴ *ibid.*

¹⁵ Missiroli, footnote (3), p. 15.

¹⁶ *ibid.*, p. 22.

¹⁷ *ibid.*

¹⁸ Please note that notwithstanding the Helsinki decision that recognised Turkey as an EU candidate, the country's name was not even mentioned in the Nice Treaty arrangements for adjusting the weighted voting system to EU enlargement. This is a clear reflection of the EU's intentions about Turkey.

they would not mind as long as they were fully informed about the developments, and that a solution which would - in a way - mean their entrance in the EU from the backdoor would not be in their interest¹⁹. The three other Associate Members, namely, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, on the other hand, are in the process of accession negotiations with the EU, and, thus, have a clear prospect for EU membership. This means that they do not have to worry about exclusion from the CESDP. These are the facts that raise Turkey's stakes while making Turkey's case unique.

In the light of the data given above concerning the institutional arrangements with regard to the CESDP, Turkey's stakes in the development of the CESDP in its current structure may be listed as follows:

1. stakes arising from the loss of its Associate Membership rights in WEU and a backtracking of the NATO's Washington Summit decisions,
2. stakes with regard to Greece and Cyprus²⁰,
3. geo-political concerns arising from geographical proximity to potential crisis areas, and
4. stakes arising from a possible downgrading of Turkey's status in European security affairs and sensitivity in public opinion.

Stakes arising from the loss of its Associate Membership rights in WEU and a backtracking on the NATO Washington Summit decisions

It is obvious that even the Nice European Council decisions fell short of replacing the rights that the non-EU European Allies enjoyed due to their Associate Membership in WEU and granting these countries a similar level of participation in the CESDP structure. Furthermore, Nice Decisions overlooked the decisions

¹⁹ Cebeci, footnote (1), p. 23.

²⁰ Please note that for the sake of simplicity and to avoid any confusion, the name "Cyprus" is used here to define the Greek Cypriot authority on the island. This does not necessarily reflect the writer's view of the Cyprus question.

adopted at NATO's Washington Summit, which called for the non-EU European Allies' fullest possible involvement within the new EU defence structure, built on existing consultation arrangements within the WEU. Therefore, the Nice decisions were regarded as "backtracking in comparison to the Washington decisions"²¹ by Turkish officials.

But what are the rights that are lost and not replaced? Although the WEU Associate Members did not have the right to veto a decision taken unanimously by the WEU Full Members, they had a right to speak in the decision-making process. On the operational side of the issue, they had all the rights that the WEU Full Members enjoyed with regard to those WEU operations that would be made through access to NATO assets. With regard to EU-led WEU operations, they would not be able to participate only if a majority of Full Members decided so. However, this is not the case that we observe right now, especially with regard to the non-EU European Allies' participation in EU-only operations. This is exactly the point around which Turkey's stakes revolve. According to Nice decisions, non-EU European Allies can participate in an autonomous EU operation only if they are invited by the Council. Due to the intergovernmental nature of the CESDP, the decision on such an invitation is subject to unanimous voting, which means that even a single EU member "can block an invitation to a non-EU European Ally like Turkey to take part in any given autonomous EU operation"²². This brings us to the issue of Turkey's stakes with regard to Greece and Cyprus.

Stakes with regard to Greece and Cyprus

Turkey's stakes with regard to Greece and Cyprus have two dimensions. One of them is about the possible use of EU/CESDP and ERF against Turkey by Greece and the other is being left out of an operation that would seriously affect its security interests,

²¹ Onur Öymen- Permanent Representative of Turkey to NATO, "Guest Editorial: Turkey and the New Challenges to European Security", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 6, 2001, p. 403.

²² *ibid.*

especially in its neighbourhood, due to a Greek (or a future Cypriot, or most probably, a future Greek and Cypriot) veto.

In the Petersberg Declaration, which declared Turkey as a WEU Associate Member along with Norway and Iceland, and Greece as a Full Member, Part III-A envisaged the relationship between Associate Members and Full Members. According to this Declaration, their mutual differences would be settled by peaceful means and they should also refrain from resorting to the threat or use of force against each other. The crucial point with regard to this declaration was that the following paragraph stressed that the security guarantees and defence commitments in the Treaties which bound the Member States within WEU and which bound them within NATO were mutually reinforcing and would not be invoked by those subscribing to Part III of the Petersberg Declaration in disputes between Member States of either of the two organisations. Although this statement did not refer to any specific countries, it was obvious that it addressed Turkey and Greece due to their thorny relationship. Recalling that as a Full Member Greece would be protected under the Article V guarantee of WEU, this was an escape clause, on the part of the WEU Full Members, which would prevent WEU involvement in any kind of a dispute between Turkey and Greece as it would mean direct confrontation with Turkey. The practical impact of this clause was that Greece was not given the card to use WEU against Turkey in their disputes.

The conditions that the said clause covered formed a significant part of the Protocol of Accession that Greece signed on 20 November 1992²³. It is because of this Protocol of Accession that this specific clause is still valid, although the non-MBT arrangements of the WEU no longer hold. Therefore, there is no problem with regard to Turkey's loss of its Associate Membership in this regard. What constitutes a stake for Turkey is the involvement of the EU in any kind of a Greek-Turkish dispute

²³ For further information on Greece's accession to the WEU see, Assembly of Western European Union, *WEU*, Report submitted by Mrs. Guirado (Spain) and Mrs. Katseli (Greece) on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations, (Paris: Assembly of WEU), 1998, pp. 40, 41.

through the CESDP. Such a situation would allow Greece to use the EU/CESDP card against Turkey in their relations. Such behaviour on the Greek side does not lack precedence if one considers Greece's blocking of EU financial aid to Turkey, which was a part of the Financial Protocol of the Customs Union decision between Turkey and the EU. Therefore, it can be contended that the first stake with regard to Greece is the probability that it can use the CESDP or the ERRF against Turkey in case of a dispute over the Aegean or Cyprus, which are top security priority areas for Turkey. This would raise Turkish concerns seriously if the ERRF ended up as a European Army in the future. That is why Turkey seeks a similar arrangement to that covered by the Petersberg declaration, which would prohibit the use of EU/CESDP against it.

The same scenario holds true for Cyprus as well. The EU has repeatedly declared that Cyprus would be accepted as a Full Member regardless of the issue of the resolution of the Cyprus conflict, and thus has already become a part of the problem rather than being a part of the solution. If we consider that Cyprus will become an EU member soon, the same logic applies to Cyprus too. As a matter of fact, Cyprus has already revealed its intention, as its representative stated at an EU+15 informal meeting of Defence Ministers before the Nice Summit, that they regarded the ERRF as a potential peacekeeping force on the island²⁴. Considering that Turkey and the EU have increasingly taken diverging positions on the Cyprus conflict since early 90s, it would not be hard to guess why Turkey has a stake in the issue. At this point, it can be asserted that Turkey is trying to prevent these political divergences from spreading to the security domain²⁵.

The second stake is about participation in CESDP operations. As mentioned above, there is a high probability that Greece may veto a decision to invite Turkey to join an EU-only operation and thus block its participation. Turkish policy makers also consider the probability that using its veto in NATO against certain operations (especially those to be conducted in sensitive areas for Turkey),

²⁴ Missiroli, footnote (3), p. 17.

²⁵ Tocci and Houben, footnote (2), p. 6.

Greece could bypass the principle of NATO's being the first resort in crisis situations, and cause the matter to be considered in the EU for an autonomous EU operation and then use its veto in the CESDP to make sure that Turkey is not invited to participate in the operation, leaving Turkey totally out of the picture. Although this appears as a worst-case scenario, it does not seem very unrealistic. Assuming that Cyprus will also become an EU member soon, it is natural that Turkey raises stakes on these probabilities. Such cases would be crucial for Turkey especially if an EU-only operation (without Turkey's involvement due to a Greek veto, for instance) were to take place in a geographical area that would seriously affect the country's security interests.

Geo-political concerns arising from geographical proximity to potential crisis areas

One does not have to be an expert to spot that the CESDP is a part of a larger European project, the project of the EU's becoming a global actor. This means that it has the intention of handling crises in and around Europe through the use of CESDP/ERRF. As a country surrounded by 13 of the 16 potential crisis areas defined by NATO, it is obvious that Turkey would be critically affected from an operation of CESDP/ERRF that would take place in its neighbourhood. Therefore, Turkish officials emphasize that Turkey's participation in operations that would take place in its immediate neighbourhood is of great importance for Turkey not only as a NATO ally but also as a regional actor whose interests would inevitably be affected by further developments. In particular, the use of NATO assets and capabilities in such operations via guaranteed access by the EU could have negative implications for Turkey's security interests. In view of such a possibility, Turkey wants to retain its right to veto the use of NATO assets and capabilities in operations that would seriously affect Turkey's security interests. That is why Turkey opposes the EU's guaranteed access to NATO assets and capabilities and insists on approval on a case-by-case basis.

An EU-only operation (without recourse to NATO assets) in its neighbourhood might also seriously affect Turkey's security

interests. For example, EU intervention in the Caspian Region, Palestine, the Balkans or the Caucasus or even in the Kurdish regions of Iraq might directly impact Turkey's security concerns and raise its stakes. Turkey needs its voice to be heard in the EU before, during and after a decision regarding an autonomous EU operation in Turkey's neighbourhood, so that it can make sure that the EU Member States take its stakes into consideration and decide accordingly. The need to have a say in the CESDP affairs is closely related to Turkey's role in European security.

Stakes arising from a possible downgrading of Turkey's status in European security affairs and sensitivity in public opinion

Turkey's loss of Associate Member rights in WEU and lack of adequate arrangements to replace these rights within the CESDP framework have some practical and psychological implications. On the practical side of the issue, the CESDP arrangements do not envisage Turkey's participation in CESDP military exercises or in the work of the Satellite Centre. The situation looks more complicated in view of the ongoing WEU operations taken over by the EU - to which Turkey has committed forces. The case of Turkey's involvement in the MAPE, the police element that is taken over by the EU from WEU in Albania, remains elusive, for example²⁶. Therefore, Turkey's loss is not only confined to some decision-making rights but it also has some practical implications. Turkey's involvement in WEU exercises and operations in a sense enhanced Turkey's involvement in European security affairs. That is why deprivation from the status provided by WEU Associate Membership is regarded by the political elites and by public opinion as Turkey's being forced to accept a "lesser role"²⁷ in European security affairs when compared to the country's previous situation. Given that Turkey "has contributed to NATO for 50 years"²⁸ and that "it has proportionately provided more soldiers and more resources than any other European army"²⁹ due to its

²⁶ For further information see Tocci and Houben, footnote (2), p. 7.

²⁷ Öymen, footnote (20), p. 402

²⁸ Ismail Cem, "A Necessary Role in Defence", *Financial Times*, May 29, 2001.

²⁹ *ibid.*

population and Gross National Product, it is not hard to guess why it has stakes in a lessening of its status in European security affairs. It should also be kept in mind that Turkey has the biggest army in Europe.

Comments by some European analysts also add to Turkey's stakes. Peter Schmidt's proposal for special ties between Turkey and the EU along the lines of the NATO-Russia Joint Council³⁰ is worth special consideration here. Especially when it is contemplated that the CFSP arrangements between EU and Russia envisage monthly consultations, and that the rare frequency of consultations between the EU and non-EU European Allies is not even based on such a regular basis, there is no gainsaying that Turkey has already been put in a very disadvantaged position. This simply means that a key NATO ally that constituted the southern flank of Europe against the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact during the Cold War is regarded in the same category - and in some cases in a lesser one - as the major power which threatened Europe for almost forty-five years. From a Turkish point of view, this is not only the devaluation of the country to the status of an old adversary but also a lack of appreciation on Europe's part. This is exactly the point where Turkey's position vis-à-vis the CESDP adds to the general frustration in Turkish public opinion over the EU's treatment of the country especially with regard to its quest for EU membership. This is exactly the point where a question comes to Turkish minds: "If the EU is serious about its accession process towards Turkey, why does it insist upon an ESDP institutional structure that moves away from the WEU framework?"³¹

Current Situation

In the light of Turkey's stakes analysed in detail above, Turkey stated its demands for a sound solution to the problem as follows:

³⁰ Peter Schmidt, "Neuorientierung in der Sicherheitspolitik?", *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik*, January 1999, p. 17.

³¹ As a matter of fact, this question also comes to European minds and here it is quoted from Tocci and Houben, footnote (2), p. 7.

1. Turkish foreign policy-makers contended that NATO had already established its position on the issue of guaranteed access by the EU to NATO's assets and capabilities³². Therefore, they demanded that the EU build on the decisions taken at NATO's Washington Summit concerning this issue. These statements reveal that Turkey does not regard the issue as a dispute between Turkey and the EU but rather as a NATO matter. That is why it asks its fellow NATO members to abide by the decisions taken in Washington.
2. Within this framework, Turkey's major expectation from the EU was stated as the adoption of any necessary provisions that would enable the participation of non-EU European Allies in EU operations (including preparation and planning, political control and strategic direction) if those operations made use of NATO's assets and capabilities, or if and when these countries raised their concerns that the envisaged EU operation was in their geographical proximity or might even have an effect on their own security interests³³.
3. Turkish officials also demanded that the EU establish the necessary arrangements for enabling the non-EU European Allies to participate in EU exercises (including preparation and planning) in order to ensure full operational coherence and effectiveness in any future operation³⁴.

Turkish Foreign Minister, Ismail Cem, summarised the Turkish stance with regard to the CESDP in an article in the Financial Times dated May 29, 2001 as follows: "Turkey is not prepared to allow the use of these [NATO] capabilities and assets it shares unless it has a right to participate reasonably in their use."

Many proposals for persuading Turkey to come to terms with the EU were proposed from 1999 till early December 2001. Among all the proposals, an informal British paper is worth mentioning here.

³² Cem, footnote (27)

³³ This paragraph is basically taken from Öymen, footnote (20), p. 404.

³⁴ This paragraph is basically taken from *ibid.*

The British proposal was significant in the sense that while emphasizing the concept of assured access for the EU to some pre-determined NATO assets³⁵, it made a stark distinction between "strategic" and "non-strategic" assets. According to the proposal, the EU would have automatic access to non-strategic assets (including SHAPE). With regard to the strategic assets (such as air refuelling and airlift, as well as C3I), the EU would need approval from the NAC. The proposal also envisaged increased consultations at EU+6. The proposal also gave some assurances to Turkey that its security concerns would be taken into account in cases concerning its immediate geographical security environment³⁶. The British proposal, although initially agreed by the Turkish government, was later rejected due to opposition from its National Security Council.

The Ankara Agreement (so-called "Istanbul Document")

Turkey agreed on another proposal by the British, this time drafted together with the US, in the wake of the NAC ministerial held on 6 December. Interestingly, there is a lot of confusion about its name since it is frequently referred to as the Ankara Deal or the Ankara Agreement by the press, but its original name is the Istanbul Document with a subtitle as "the final version agreed by Ankara"³⁷. The document basically laid down the terms for EU-NATO cooperation in military crisis management including the arrangements with regard to the situation of non-EU European Allies. The most important point that the document covered in this respect was the statement that in whatever crisis, the CESDP would not be used against any Ally and would respect in every case the obligations of EU Members States towards their NATO Allies.

³⁵ As a matter of fact this was not very different from the wording of the Nice Presidency Report which used the phrase "guaranteed access to a pre-identified set of NATO assets".

³⁶ For further information on the British proposal and Turkish response see Judy Dempsey, "Turkey agrees to use of NATO assets by EU force", *Financial Times*, 30 May 2001.

³⁷ Missiroli, footnote (3), p. 21

With regard to institutional matters, the document envisaged more frequent consultations with non-EU European Allies. It also introduced some arrangements that would enable them to provide input to the CESDP and be associated with decisions and actions within this policy domain. The document also stipulated a mechanism through which the non-EU European Allies would be permanent interlocutors of the PSC. They would also be given the right to assign representatives to the Military Committee. Building on the former British proposal, the criterion of geographical proximity was introduced once again, with the statement that in case of crises in the geographic proximity of non-EU European Allies - with a potential to affect their national security interests considerably - the EU Council would engage in dialogue and consultations with the countries concerned and would take their positions into consideration within the confines of Article 17 of the Treaty on European Union.

On the operational side of the issue, non-EU European Allies would be entitled to be involved as observers in operations which would be planned and coordinated by SHAPE and conducted without their participation. In case of autonomous EU operations in which the non-EU European Allies were invited to commit forces, the Committee of Contributors would act as the main forum for the management of the operation whereas the PSC would retain political control over the operation.

The Istanbul Document was found satisfactory by the Turkish government, since it was a text that took Turkey's major stakes (if not all of them) into consideration and adequately addressed the issue of reducing them. The explicit statement that the CESDP would not be used against any Ally and the provisions for further involvement of the non-EU European Allies within the CESDP structures through assigning representatives, establishment of permanent arrangements with the PSC, etc., were the basic points that satisfied Turkey to a certain extent, although the operational arrangements introduced were still suffering from vagueness. Nevertheless, Turkey agreed on the deal and openly stated that it

was the last document that it agreed on and that it would not negotiate on this document³⁸.

Greek concerns were also taken into consideration and Turkey's name was not mentioned in the documents. Instead the term "non-EU European Allies" was used. Nevertheless, the Greeks were not as satisfied with the Istanbul Document as the Turks were. As a matter of fact, they perceived the document as a "take-it-or-leave-it" proposal³⁹ as Turkey declared that it would not negotiate on it. Although the Greek government did not reject the deal as a whole in the first instance, it prevented the issue from being taken up at the Laeken European Council on 14-15 December 2001. Therefore, the Belgian Presidency could not declare that a deal has been reached between the EU and NATO on the issue of the use of NATO assets and capabilities by the EU. Nevertheless, on paper the CESDP was declared operational at the Laeken European Council, despite the fact that in reality it could not become so due to Greek objections this time. The CESDP's first task on the agenda, the task of taking over the peacekeeping operation "Amber Fox" in Macedonia from NATO, was endangered by these objections⁴⁰.

Greek Stakes and Objections

The "take-it-or-leave-it" attitude that Greece was faced with just before the NAC Meeting in December 2001, in a way, left the Greek government in a disadvantaged position with regard to domestic politics in view of the looming local government

³⁸ For the reflections on the Istanbul Document in the press please see Leyla Boulton and Judy Dempsey, "Turkey lifts objection to EU rapid reaction force" *Financial Times*, 04 December 2001 and "Turkish military compromise comes when NATO is at stake: Common sense prevails in Ankara over European Army", *Turkish Daily News*, 04 December 2001.

³⁹ Missiroli, footnote (3), p. 21.

⁴⁰ For further information on the implications of Greek objections for operation Amber Fox, see, Judy Dempsey, "Greek-Turkish Dispute hinders Amber Fox mission - EU military operation in doubt", *Financial Times*, May 16 2002, and Kerin Hope, "Greece adds to dispute on Turkey's role in EU force", *Financial Times*, May 28, 2002.

elections and, thus, limited its area for manoeuvre in its external relations. Therefore, it was basically the way in which the Ankara agreement was reached and then presented to Greece that raised Greek objections. The major argument on which Greek claims were based was that this deal, which gave non-member Turkey a say in the EU's use of NATO facilities undermined the autonomy of the EU. Greece also regarded the text of the Ankara Agreement as one-sided since the deal was only negotiated with Turkey, and Greece was asked to accept it. Furthermore, Greek authorities claimed that the document compromised Greek security. Stating its objections as such, Greece put forward several principles concerning the CESDP. These principles are as follows⁴¹:

Equality between NATO and the EU: This is mainly about the decision-making autonomy of the two organisations, reflecting the Greek view that the decision-making autonomy of NATO and the EU should be equally respected. It is also a reference to a provision in the Istanbul Document, which suggests that the EU will not undertake action in areas touching vital interests and in the geographical proximity of a NATO country. Greece wants to add the following statement to this paragraph: "NATO will not undertake action in areas touching vital interests and in the geographical proximity of an EU country".

Reciprocity in some of the concerns: As Greece regards the Ankara agreement as a one-sided text, it asks for a new or amended text, which will equally address Greek and Turkish concerns and thus involve reciprocal guarantees. For example the guarantee that the ESDP would not be used against Turkey can be reciprocated with a guarantee that Turkey will not use force against an EU country.

Peaceful settlement of disputes: This principle can be read as the Greek quest for a solution to Turkish-Greek disputes via the International Court of Justice, which was also covered by the

⁴¹ "Papandreou briefs the TDN over the basic principles for the EU army: Both Ankara and Athens open for discussions over the ESDP", *Turkish Daily News*, June 27, 2002.

Helsinki European Council and the Accession Partnership Document prepared by the European Commission for Turkey.

Not to use force and not to use the threat of force: This principle is related with Greek perceptions of Turkey as a threat. As an extension of the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes, this principle is designed to make the parties refrain from the use or threat of force in their disputes.

These principles at least clarified what assurances Greece needed in order to accept an EU-NATO deal. However, such a deal could not be reached at the Seville European Council and the issue was skilfully postponed by the Greek government to the period of Greek Presidency of the CESDP, which amounts to one year together with the coming Greek Presidency of the EU. Just before Greece's taking up of the CESDP presidency due to Danish opt-out, Turkish officials declared that the Istanbul Document was the bottom line vis-à-vis the CESDP, but if any additions were made to it, Turkey would first see the wording and then decide to negotiate on the additions. This was actually an opening on Turkey's part in that it was a shift from Turkey's initial stance on the issue. In June 2002, top Turkish officials briefing the Turkish Daily News said that Turkey was ready to negotiate the ESDP with the Greek side⁴².

The basic flaw in the Greek logic (that giving non-member Turkey a say in the EU's use of NATO facilities undermines the autonomy of the EU) is that it overlooks the fact that the EU as an autonomous organization, demands to use NATO assets, the assets of another autonomous organization. The decision on the use of NATO assets is subject to Turkish approval since decision-making in NATO is unanimous. Therefore, Turkey has a say in the issue, not as a non-member intervening in EU's decision-making autonomy but as a NATO member, which has a right to veto the use of NATO assets by other organizations. Simple and out. What complicates the issue is that the EU and especially Greece prefer and insist to see Turkey only as a candidate - a demandeur from the EU, playing the NATO card to get in the EU - so that they can have

⁴² *ibid.*

leverage on the country. Theirs, of course, is an inadequate presentation of the issue that inevitably adds to the already constructed negative image of Turkey in Europe. Examples of how Turkey was defined with regard to the CESDP could help one to see this picture clearly: Charles Grant describes Turkey's stance on the issue as "unwilling to compromise, inflexible and unreasonable"⁴³. Antonio Missiroli contends that Turkey's stance on the issue has raised "a fundamental problem of *political style*" in that European policy-making requires a certain degree of flexibility and willingness to compromise in order to settle diverging national interests and Turkey has showed neither on this issue⁴⁴. He also states that Turkey has been persisting in acting as a "demandeur" on the one hand, "taking political hostages" on the other⁴⁵. Although he acknowledges that the EU is also a demandeur vis-à-vis NATO, he does not base his arguments on a more balanced approach and gives in to the European logic described above. These are only a few of the many examples one can come across when one reads about the CESDP.

Although some European analysts are eager to praise the victory of liberal-institutionalist and critical theories over the realist theory with regard to the European integration process and thus the EU, the Greek case is a significant example of how realist policies can be pursued successfully within the EU framework. The game played by Greece with regard to Turkey's quest for membership in the EU in general and to the CESDP in particular is a clear example of the fact that balance of power can be maintained against a challenging country by using the EU. It is quite natural for a country to pursue its own national interests. The chance to use the CESDP, especially if it becomes effective and credible in the future, against Turkey can be regarded as the realisation of Greek aspirations to change the balance in Greek-Turkish relations in its favour. Especially in view of the lingering role of NATO in

⁴³ Charles Grant, "A European View of ESDP", Paper prepared for the IISS/CEPS European Security Forum, 10 September 2001, p. 2.

⁴⁴ Missiroli, footnote (3), p. 19.

⁴⁵ *ibid.*

European Security, this may tip the scales in an unprecedented way.

By virtue of being a member of a club, Greece does have a right to enjoy the privileges provided by that club. But the issue here is that the nature and the aims of the club, as described by liberal-institutionalist and critical theorists, contradict the member's ends. Especially when we consider that the EU was founded to overcome animosities between European countries and establish a cooperative framework on the continent, as the European rhetoric suggests, the Greek attitude does not fit in this picture. Greek objections to Turkish involvement in the CESDP constitute a clear indication of Greek intention to use the CESDP against Turkey. This in a way testifies to the realist assumption that national interests and power politics supersede the motives for cooperation and still shape world politics. It also alludes to the weakness of the CFSP/CESDP as an intergovernmental project, telling a lot about how only one Member State can block the whole system to achieve its own foreign policy aims.

Conclusion: CESDP as a European Security Project and Turkey

Since its inception, the CFSP and its new component, the CESDP, have suffered from a lack of political will on the part of the Member States, as policy realms that touch sensitive areas such as national sovereignty and top priority national interests. Institutional turf battles and inconsistencies, as well as problems with regard to convergence of national security and defence policies and a general reluctance to spend more on defence have constituted the major obstacles to the establishment of an effective and credible CFSP/CESDP. The events of September 11 took place in just such an unfavourable climate for the CFSP/CESDP.

The immediate European response to the September 11 attacks was a "renationalisation of security and defence reflexes"⁴⁶. Despite the

⁴⁶ Jolyon Howorth, "CESDP After 11 September: From Short-term Confusion to Long-term Cohesion?", *EUSA Review*, Vol 15, No. 1, Winter 2002, p. 1.

initial invocation of NATO's Article 5, the EU Member States preferred to engage in bilateral talks with the US to show their solidarity and made their individual pledge of military assets directly to the US rather than using the NATO framework. Furthermore, their view of the causes of and the ways to deal with terrorism differed to a great extent. The UK attitude was significant in this respect, since it abandoned its role of a leading power in the CESDP and shifted its policy to an unconditional transatlanticism that even superseded its stance before October 1998. Another divisive development was the establishment of an unofficial *directoire* by Germany, France and the UK through a meeting on the military involvement of their respective national forces in Afghanistan. This meeting was held just before the European Council in Ghent that would take place on October 19, 2001, and had the effect of overshadowing the decisions of the European Council⁴⁷. The *directoire* planned to meet again on November 5 at a dinner in London, but upon protests from other EU members, a last minute change occurred and the number of participants at the dinner was raised to eight with the addition of Berlusconi, Aznar, Solana, Verhofstadt and Kok. The establishment of this *directoire* was indicative of a new distinction with regard to the CESDP in that there appeared to exist two levels of security actors within the EU: the serious ones and the others⁴⁸. This marked the addition of a new division within the CFSP/CESDP to those already existing ones such as, Allies and neutrals, militarists and pacifists, Transatlanticists and Europeanists and an "opt-out" Denmark⁴⁹. The *directoire* raised "distrust and suspicion of the big three"⁵⁰ on the part of the other Member States.

On the other hand, the September 11 attacks have also had a positive impact on the CESDP. The US resort to unilateralist policies immediately after the invocation of NATO's Article 5 and the need for a retreat from Europe in order to focus more on the

⁴⁷ *ibid.*, p. 2.

⁴⁸ Simon Duke, "CESDP and the EU Response to 11 September: Identifying the Weakest Link", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol. 7, 2002, p. 161.

⁴⁹ Howorth, footnote (46), p. 2.

⁵⁰ Duke, footnote (48), p. 169.

fight against terrorism via increased involvement in other parts of the world inevitably put the development of a solely European security and defence capability on the front burner of the European security agenda. The initial sentiment in Europe after the invocation of Article 5 was that NATO was the major European security and defence organisation and would continue to be so for a long period of time. Nevertheless, events took a very different course and the modest military commitments of the European Allies as well as the US determination to go it alone and to "discuss military cooperation via multiple bilateralisms"⁵¹ undermined NATO in a considerable way. The solidarity that the Allies showed immediately after the attacks emphasized NATO's political significance whereas modest action on the military side underscored NATO's diminishing role as a collective defence organisation. With NATO enlargement on the agenda, it is not hard to guess that NATO's role as a collective defence organisation will be further diluted and it will rather serve as a platform of collective security. These developments with regard to NATO also reveal the need for an autonomous European defence capability strengthening the prospects for the CESDP.

Furthermore, the changed nature of security threats after the end of the Cold War and increased emphasis on global and non-military aspects of security after September 11, caused the CESDP to be considered by many analysts as the only European security and defence framework via which these threats could be handled effectively⁵². These views proceed from the assumption that the EU's role as a civilian power endows the CFSP/CESDP with a wide spectrum of foreign policy tools ranging from humanitarian and development aid to economic sanctions that are essential for the pursuance of long-term policies for the elimination of root causes of terrorism and other security challenges. Apart from being an effective short-term policy tool aimed at suppression of the problems rather than solving them, military power is important in the sense that it provides an effective deterrent as well as an

⁵¹ Howorth, footnote (46), p. 2.

⁵² For such analyses please see Howorth, footnote (46), p. 3 and Duke, footnote (48), pp. 164, 165 and 168.

apposite policy tool to back up economic, political and diplomatic measures and render them effective and credible. Therefore, the growing emphasis on the significance of the CESDP hinges on the idea that the EU as a civilian power has to back up its foreign policy with credible military force in order to deal effectively with the challenges brought about by the end of the Cold War and September 11. This also marks the need for more cross-pillar policies, blurring the lines between the three pillars.

Notwithstanding these positive changes with regard to the CESDP, the institutional maze that takes the form of turf battles between different bodies (such as those between the HR-CFSP and the DG Responsible for External Relations, between the GAC and the Commission, and between foreign ministries and defence ministries); difficulties with regard to the intersections between communitarized and intergovernmental policy realms; and the urgent need for regular and formal meetings of Council of Defence Ministers circumvents the creation and implementation of effective and efficient policies. The differences between Member States with regard to cultural approaches to security policy as well as their political methods; the predominance of national sovereignty in this policy domain also remain as weaknesses of the CESDP. Another weakness that needs urgent consideration is the need for increased defence spending⁵³. This is especially important since the question of the use of NATO assets and capabilities is still unresolved and the EU may have to duplicate some strategic assets if this problem persists. It is also worth mentioning here that the widening gap between European and US military capabilities also hinders interoperability within NATO urging the need for more military spending by EU members.

Under such conditions the issue of accommodation of Turkey within the CESDP comes to the fore. This is due to several reasons.

⁵³ For a detailed analysis of the institutional, national and defence spending problems facing the CESDP please see Jolyon Howorth, "European defence and the Changing Politics of the European Union: Hanging Together or Hanging Separately?", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 39, No. 4, November 2001, pp. 765-789.

First of all, post-Cold War security challenges, especially those observed after September 11, require a holistic approach to security⁵⁴. Such an approach is not only confined to "a high degree of integration between the internal and external security aspects of the EU"⁵⁵ and increased consistency between the communitarized and intergovernmental policy realms in this respect. It also necessitates the involvement of all significant security actors in Europe within this framework. Turkey, as a NATO member and having the biggest army in Europe is definitely a major European security actor, which has already offered an infantry brigade of 5000 men, two air squadrons (and two transport aircraft) and one amphibious infantry battalion (plus seven ships and one submarine) to the ERRF⁵⁶.

In view of the widening gap between European and US military capabilities and the lingering role of NATO in European security, the contribution that Turkey's defence capabilities can make to the CESDP should not be overlooked. Inclusion of Turkey within the CESDP may prove the sincerity of European attempts for a more balanced burden-sharing within the Alliance. This may even be a way of reducing US concerns on the issue. It should also be kept in mind that Turkish forces are apt to the Petersberg tasks and military measures for countering terrorism more than any other European army due to its experience and capabilities for *rapid deployability, sustainability, flexibility, survivability, interoperability* as well as *effective command and control*.

However, it is this military strength of Turkey and its experience with regard to combating terrorism that marks the cultural difference between Turkey and the EU with regard to security. The predominance of Turkish General Staff in Turkish politics and foreign affairs, some methods used for combating terrorism that sometimes inevitably contradicted with the protection and preservation of fundamental rights are some of the factors that

⁵⁴ For arguments supporting this view see Cebeci, footnote (1) p. 30 and Duke, footnote (48), p. 169.

⁵⁵ Duke, footnote (48), p. 169.

⁵⁶ This information is taken from Missiroli, footnote (3), p. 25 [his] endnote (13).

negatively affect Turkey's quest for becoming a Full Member in the EU in general and being accommodated in the CESDP in particular. Many analysts contend that there are evident differences of approach to security between Turkey and Europe in the sense that Turkey pursues realist policies in this realm and this does not fit in with the liberal-institutionalist and some times critical set of ideas that guide the EU in its security policy⁵⁷. Not without irony however, these analysts do not draw the same grey picture with regard to the differences between the EU Member States in this respect, ranging from unilateral German recognition of former Yugoslav republics, to the British involvement in the military action against Iraq in February 1998, while praising the idealist nature of the European integration project.

This does not, of course, mean that the argument here is based on the assumption that there are no differences between Turkey and the EU in their approach to security or that the irony in European politics is put forward to justify Turkey's realist stance with regard to security. It only serves to come up with the conclusion that the differences between Turkey and the EU with regard to their approach to security are only as grave as the ones between individual EU Member States. However, the negative image of Turkey already constructed in European minds make the differences look bigger than they are.

There is no gainsaying that there are crucial misunderstandings and misperceptions between Turkey and the EU. However, it is in the interest of both parties to improve their security relations regardless of the issue of Turkey's membership in the EU, which seems a remote possibility, if not totally out of question. As a matter of fact, the need for such an improvement is all the more compelling after September 11. What Europe needs right now is a holistic approach to security and not to draw new dividing lines across Europe, especially when there is a risk that it may be interpreted as an

⁵⁷ Some even go further and call Turkey a soft-security consuming country in this respect. For an example of such arguments see, Dietrich Jung, "Turkey and Europe: Ongoing Hypocrisy?", COPRI Working Paper No. 35 (2001).

intentional move to leave the Muslim world on the one side and the Christian world on the other.