EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Directorate-General for Research

WORKING PAPER

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SUMMARY

This study briefly reviews the effects of the terrorist attacks on the economies of developing and emerging countries, where the main sufferers have been companies in the tourism and transport industry. The structurally weak economies there were particularly hard hit, at a time when economic activity had already slowed. Particularly serious is the disruptive and probably longer-lasting blow to the climate of investment, which relies on confidence in the normal economic processes and a sustainable return on investments.

The attacks of 11 September, or '9-11', were the culmination of a long series of attacks by Muslim extremists on Western, chiefly American, interests. At the same time, Islamic groups within a number of Muslim states have for many years been perpetrating acts of terror against their own governments. The threat has altered radically since the terrorist Al-Qaeda organisation began operating because this organisation, unlike earlier terrorist groups which tended to work in isolation, has built up a well-funded worldwide network.

The study airs a number of theories exploring the reasons behind the attacks. It leans ultimately towards the theory that they were prompted on the one hand by a desire to resist the Americans, who were resented as invaders of the holy places of Islam in Saudi Arabia, as the military and economic superpower and for playing a dominant role in the Gulf region in order to secure their oil supplies. The attacks are also a reflection of hatred and contempt for Western civilisation with its many shortcomings and signs of decadence, as symbolised by the USA in the perpetrators' eyes. They are also an explosive and destructive manifestation of the frustration felt by Islamic extremists at the inability of much of the Islamic-Arab world to resist the progress and modernising pressures of the West and to solve their own social problems. These motives were justified superficially by the exhortation in the Koran to destroy the Jews and Christians through *jihad* (holy war) and thus also by the Palestinian liberation struggle.

The attacks have deepened the ambivalence of US relations with rulers in the Gulf region, especially Saudi Arabia, who on the one hand (and so far) have reliably guaranteed oil supplies but who on the other hand fund Islamic interests worldwide which increasingly threaten the West. The case of the Taliban shows the dangers of a short-sighted foreign policy in which long-term values are sacrificed for the sake of immediate interests.

The study considers the reactions of the world community, especially the United Nations and EU. The attacks have brought about radical shifts in international relations. The focus of development policy has to change too. Over and above the formal coalition against terror the US Administration expects the community of nations to give it unconditional support in its fight against terror. The European Council and European Parliament have voiced express solidarity with the USA. But there are major reservations, born of the belief that international law must take precedence over the possible expediency of pre-emptive military strikes, but born too of the whole political view of how best to fight

terrorism. The study seeks to identify the limits to solidarity with the USA, pointing out the EU's system of values and its different policy approach, which is geared more towards eradicating possible causes of terror.

The study accepts the principle that a military response to terrorist attacks of such severity is appropriate, given that the adversary is so very dangerous. But at the same time it points to the part which a long-term development policy can play in preventing conflict and eradicating possible causes of terror. It notes that there is an increasing willingness worldwide to use force in pursuit of political aims, created by unbridled nationalistic aspirations or ethnic or religious conflicts taking place against a background of a socioeconomic struggle for resources. Where there is democratic deficit and a lack of proper internal crisis management these conflicts erupt and may even lead to the collapse of law and order.

The study judges the attacks of 9-11 to be acts of Islamic fundamentalism, but refuses to equate Islam with terror. The faith of Islam and the majority of moderate Muslims cannot be held collectively responsible for the acts of a few extremists who misappropriate passages of the Koran to justify acts of violence.

The study reviews in detail the challenges faced by Islam at present in its attitudes towards state and society and the culture of the West. The Islamic world is currently in a critical phase of pressure to modernise, which is intensifying the traditional tensions between the various branches of the faith. Extremists who are prepared to use force exploit these religious tensions to gain a leadership role. They are helped here by the twofold role of Islam as a secular and religious force and by the susceptibility of poor, uneducated and indoctrinated people to manipulation. It is thus necessary to strengthen the moderates and bring about political and socioeconomic stability.

As the leading world player in development aid the EU, through a coherent and long-term development policy which is coordinated with its foreign and external economic policy, can help to balance the interests of North and South, build democracy, enforce the observance of human rights and ensure solidly based institutions of state in the developing countries, as well as improving people's material living conditions and opportunities for education. To this extent a coherent and credible development policy helps to prevent conflict.

The study points to the urgent need for state institutions to provide basic services in a number of Arab/Muslim countries. Where the government has failed to do this, poor groups of the population become reliant on religious, charitable establishments headed by religious leaders, who can mobilise the people for their own ends and who, by solving social problems, seek popular support on their way to taking power. The picture is similar with centres of education, many of which – in Pakistan especially – are religious foundations under the control of powerful religious leaders.

In view of the specific nature of the threat, measures to be considered thus include measures to alleviate poverty, improve education and training opportunities and encourage democracy.

Intercultural dialogue with secular and spiritual leaders of the Islamic world will play a key role here, in pursuit of peaceful coexistence and the joint resolution of international problems, which requires an attitude of basic solidarity with other countries and cultures. This dialogue requires first of all that both sides should critically examine their own value systems and their own priorities. Fruitful dialogue also presupposes openness, tolerance and respect vis-à-vis the partner's culture, traditions and religious beliefs – which, by their very nature, do not require any justification. Dialogue must not constitute interference in the internal affairs of other states. Meaningful dialogue must be aimed at achieving consensus and so must not exclude the discussion of fundamental issues such as democracy, human dignity and human rights, gender equality and the fair and peaceful reconciliation of opposing interests. Civil society as well as the intellectual elite must have a voice in the dialogue, to be fostered through programmes.

The media have an important role to play in furthering understanding between cultures. Governments often take decisions under pressure of public opinion, which is significantly influenced by the media. Conflicts are usually reported in a superficial and sensationalist way which does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the subject or serve the public's need to be informed. Content should be presented as objectively as possible, reflecting the opinions of the parties to the conflict and with an analysis of the causes and motives. Very often journalists are not sufficiently well briefed or educated in the historical and cultural background to events and so cannot evaluate them properly. Training seminars held in the context of intercultural dialogue would thus be a good thing.

The study examines the relationship between the CFSP and development policy. It warns against any scaling down of bodies within the EU Council of Ministers and against merging the development and foreign policy remits, because this will create the risk of development considerations being treated as less important in the decision-making process or even excluded from it altogether. The attacks of 9-11 prove that long-term coherent development cooperation is vital, and so the Council of Development Ministers must be retained as a separate body.

The MEDA programme based on the Barcelona Declaration of 27 and 28 November 1995 and the resolutions adopted at the Valencia Euro-Mediterranean conference of 22 and 23 April 2002 are seen as an excellent framework for successful cooperation with the Arab/Muslim world of the southern Mediterranean states.

There can, however, be no significant progress on this cooperation and on achieving a comprehensive balance with the Arab world until a fair and peaceful settlement of the Middle Eastern conflict is reached. The Palestinian liberation struggle (in view too of the continuing problem of refugees, especially in the neighbouring states) inevitably has an effect of strengthening solidarity amongst the Arab nations which overshadows all relations with the Arab world.

The study thus urges the EU to throw its full political weight into seeking a swift end to the conflict. To that end it needs to speak with one voice and must not leave it to the Americans alone, whose bias in favour of Israel has hampered the search for a settlement.

A. EFFECTS

Industrialised countries

Because the developing countries depend on the prevailing economic climate and mood in the industrialised countries, many major events in the industrialised world impact indirectly on them. Recession in the USA, Japan and Europe caused the rate of economic growth in the developing countries to fall from 5.5% in 2000 to 2.9% in 2001, though the 9-11 factor cannot be measured exactly. The threat of further attacks in the industrialised world would slow the pace of economic recovery and might produce a further indirect impact on the developing countries.

The cost of the 9-11 attacks was huge in the highly capitalised industrialised countries, over and above the immediate loss of human life and the material damage sustained. In addition to the direct damage suffered by buildings and businesses, aviation and tourism were particularly hard hit. The full cost of the damage is thought to run to 12 figures. The overall indirect effects may well be far greater than the direct material damage, in view of the massive increase in military spending undertaken by the USA and the additional security measures taken worldwide, which reduce productivity. And there is no way of measuring the effects of the climate of fear on corporate decision-making. All these effects spill over on to the developing countries.

Developing countries

The consequences of the attacks are all the more serious for the developing countries in that they affected sectors vital to them at a time of slowing economic growth. A World Bank press release on 1 October 2001 estimated that the attacks had condemned a further 10 million people to poverty and tens of thousands of infants to death. It is very hard to quantify the damage, especially long-term, partly because of the difficulty in evaluating the 'confidence' factor which is essential to economic activity. This factor permeates numerous areas and will persist for a long time, because it creates uncertainty amongst all the players in the economy – producers, investors, money lenders, money markets generally and consumers. Uncertainty grows in the face of further threatened attacks and a general increase in willingness to use force in conflicts. This situation, which is completely new in terms of its scale, means that the policy-makers are faced with an extremely difficult task. Part 2 of this study describes the implications of all this for the EU's development policy.

Analysis of the effects of terrorism

At their meeting of 5 and 6 November 2001 the Council of Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers commissioned a report on the potential effects of the events of 9-11 on the Mediterranean countries which are partners in the Barcelona Process. The substance of that report is covered in the analysis which follows. This analysis also draws on the findings of an OECD report on the economic consequences of terrorism.

Different types of damage

A distinction is made between short- and long-term damage. Short-term damage is in turn divided into direct damage (immediate loss of income, e.g. from tourism) and indirect damage (e.g. drop in exports, more difficult access to money markets). Long-term damage concerns the potential for growth of the countries concerned. Disadvantage of this kind stems from e.g. a desire to avoid risk (reduction in investments) or increased spending on security.

1. Short-term effects

(a) The southern Mediterranean states

In 2001 a worldwide recession had already begun and was particularly pronounced in the countries of the Mediterranean, so the events of 9-11 impacted on an economic order which was already weakened.

In the immediate aftermath of the attacks the economy recovered quickly in the USA and Europe thanks to good crisis management, notably by the central banks, so the immediate effects were largely short-lived. The longer-term effects are hard to ascertain, partly because of structural weaknesses in the southern Mediterranean economies concerned. The events of 9-11 to some degree acted as a catalyst: the importance of how to resolve their debt problem now receded compared with the problems of the structural weakness of economic growth, unemployment (about 20% regionally) and poverty. Population growth means that some 25 million new jobs will be needed over the next 15 years. It is also necessary to strengthen the confidence of economic players, foreign players in particular, and to press on more energetically with reforms in the financial sector, with regard to foreign investment and a market economy which works properly. The climate for productive investment must be improved. This will not be possible without peace in the Middle East.

(b) Individual sectors

(i) One of the first measurable effects was the sharp 28,6% fall or so in crude oil prices from 24,5 USD/barrel in August 2001 to about 17,5 USD/barrel in December 2001, caused by a fall in demand and the fear of a worldwide recession.

(ii) International tourism, which counts many developing and emerging countries amongst its main destinations, especially in the Arab/Muslim world, is one of the economic sectors which has suffered the most. In the countries bordering the Mediterranean, tourism provides 25% of foreign currency income and 10% of jobs. In the Middle East, tourism was down some 34% by the end of 2001, though admittedly this fall was due largely to the second *intifada* and the reaction of the Israeli Government.

There was a 65% cancellation rate for holidays to the Caribbean[1], where hotel occupancy was just 15%. A quarter of the population in this region works in hotels and catering and related sectors. Tourism as a proportion of GNP in the Caribbean ranges from 13% in Trinidad and Tobago to 69% in St Lucia.

(iii) The attacks had a direct impact on money markets too, on financial service providers and the transport industry. Thousands lost their jobs here. Foreign direct investment in many developing and emerging countries also dipped sharply, and is likely in future to concentrate on more secure areas of the world.

(c) Countries and regions most affected

(i) Turkey and Egypt
These countries experienced a severe economic recession. Turkey's national economy, hard hit by the collapse of the financial sector, suffered greatly as interest rates rose due to the country's high level of national debt (90% of GNP). Egypt's income from tourism fell by 50%. Income from Suez Canal dues and foreign investment were also markedly down.

(ii) Mashreq countries and Israel
The effects on these are hard to ascertain due to the simultaneous increase in violence.

(iii) Maghreb countries
This group of countries seems to have absorbed the direct effects relatively well. Tunisia stands out by virtue of the April 2002 attack on a synagogue in Djerba (income from tourism down 22%). The country also had to cope with the aftermath of a severe drought. Morocco initially lost around 15% of its tourist income but has since made this up. Most of the Mediterranean countries made swift adjustments to their budgetary and balance of payments policies.

(iv) Latin America
This region will continue to feel the effects of 9-11 acutely, due to the woes of the financial sector in some countries but also to the region's dependence on the US economy. The World Bank expects economic growth in 2001 to be just 1%, down 3.2% on the year 2000. The IMF predicts a fall of 2.5%.

2. Long-term effects

An OECD report of June 2002[2] on the economic consequences of terrorism points to the potential long-term effects of the attacks, which may resonate in three areas:

(a) Transport costs
In the short term the increase in maritime transport and air freight costs was no more than 10%. But in the longer term, additional security measures (especially for perishable air freight) is likely to push up transport costs, and smaller exporters in the developing countries may lose their competitive edge due to time-consuming administrative

procedures. Sizeable cost increases are also likely as a result of discriminatory measures (compulsory certification) in respect of certain places of origin regarded as unsafe. The cost of delays, customs clearance and safety checks in developing countries may add 5-13% to the price of goods. Industry experts expect an overall increase in prices solely as a result of additional security measures.

(b) Tourism

According to the World Tourism Organisation the fear of further attacks prompted cancellations of 12-15% in October 2001 compared with the previous year. Even now the situation has not quite returned to normal. In the developing countries tourism accounts for around 2-3% of GNP. The figure is higher in the Caribbean, South Pacific and some countries of the Middle East and North Africa. It is expected to fluctuate over the medium term, the factors determining it being outside the control of national authorities.

(c) Remittances from foreign workers

Stricter immigration controls are reducing the numbers of foreign workers in the industrialised and emerging countries and with them the volume of remittances they send home. These remittances are a major source of income in the workers' home countries, even outstripping export earnings. This phenomenon affects Central America, the Caribbean, Middle East and the Mediterranean countries.

3. Other effects

Consumer spending in the Mediterranean countries has fallen and the rate of savings has risen, leading to a further slowing of growth. Figures are not yet available to show whether the rate of foreign investment, already the lowest in the world (GNP has risen by only 1.5-2.5% over a decade), has fallen any further. But in all probability it will have. Markedly higher risk premiums have been charged on the money markets. Some countries will be more heavily reliant on external financial aid.

In many Muslim countries the governments cracked down hard on Islamic groups in the wake of the 9-11 attacks. Many extremists and agitators thought to be a threat to national security were jailed, opposition parties were watched more closely and civil liberties were curbed. Press and media freedom in the Islamic countries has remained broadly unaffected, though *The Annual Survey of Press Freedom 2002* published by Freedom House reports a few cases of tighter restrictions in e.g. Jordan, where an amendment of the penal code now means that journalists 'face prison if they publish material which could breach national unity, divide the population or damage the image and reputation of the state'. In the fight against terrorism it is inevitable that some Arab governments will display reactionary tendencies.

Due to stricter selection, the number of students from Islamic countries studying at Western universities has fallen and they are supervised more closely by their host universities. This has direct implications for the educational level of those wishing to study, who may rethink their plans and turn their backs on the West.

It is academic to wonder how far the funding of development policy is losing out because of the new priorities. The Monterrey Conference of 18-22 March 2002 suggests that most donor countries realise only too well that, in view of the huge dangers which threaten, development policy is more important than ever. But there is no escaping the fact that money spent on defence and security means that less money is available elsewhere.

"The coalition against terrorism must advance hand in hand with a coalition for development" (Romano Prodi, addressing the European Parliament on 24 October 2001).

B. Implications for European development policy

The question 'what are the implications for development policy of the attacks of 11 September 2001 on the World Trade Center in New York, the Pentagon and the failed attack on the White House in Washington?' implicitly assumes that development policy can cushion the effects being felt at present and perhaps help to prevent conflicts in future.

To determine how effective development policy can be in doing this we need to look very closely at the perpetrators of the attacks and their motives, the root causes of their action, and also at the economic, social, intellectual and cultural background, particularly in the Arab/Muslim world. These attacks can only be explained in terms of a larger timescale and context. An unprejudiced analysis is needed of the role of the Western industrialised nations, especially the USA, in international relations. Power politics and economic considerations, above all oil supplies, are essential parts of the equation here. Oil supplies play a fateful role for the development of the oil-producing countries and international relations too. Proper analysis is required here, if we are to identify the correct course of action to be taken, which, however, is not confined to development policy alone. As the Bible tells us, trying to understand our adversary does not mean we have to agree with him.

l. The world after 9-11

The events of 9-11 struck to the very heart of the USA and ushered in a new era in international relations. The attacks mark the culmination of a long series of ongoing hostile acts aimed chiefly at US citizens and interests. The current wave of suicide attacks dates back to April 1983 when a suicide bomber attacked the US embassy in Beirut, killing 63 people. That attack was followed by another against a US army base in Beirut in which 299 people died.

(a) 9-11 as the worst attack yet on America

It is now virtually accepted that the attacks were inspired and financed by Osama Bin Laden, the millionaire exiled by the Saudi regime, and his supporters in the Al-Qaeda organisation. The USA had previously suspected him of masterminding earlier attacks on US targets: a building occupied by US military advisers in Saudi Arabia attacked on 13 November 1995, an attack in Khobar, Saudi Arabia, on 25 June 1996 in which many people were killed and injured, the bombing in August 1998 of the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam which killed hundreds and injured thousands more, and the attack on the US destroyer *USS Cole* in the Gulf of Aden in October 2000.

(b) Attacks in other countries

Not only US citizens and interests have been targeted. From the 1970s onward several attacks were carried out in **Egypt** by the Muslim Brotherhood and other groups, which claimed not only 1 200 victims, mainly tourists (e.g. 58 Swiss tourists and four Egyptians killed at Luxor in 1997), but also the life of the country's president Anwar al Sadat in 1981. Other attacks have occurred in **Algeria**, where in the space of more than ten years tens of thousands of civilians have been killed, mainly by Islamic groups such as the GIA; in **Pakistan** in May 2002 (against French submarine builders) and in **India,** where there is fighting chiefly between different religious groups, and lastly in the **Philippines**, where an Islamic criminal gang (Abu Sayyaf) carries on its dirty work (kidnappings, extortion and hostage killings), allegedly in retaliation for decades of economic oppression by central government. The 1980s and 1990s saw several attacks in **Paris** in which many people were killed and injured. Recently (December 2000) plans were discovered for an attack on institutions in Strasbourg. In April 2002 there was an arson attack on the Jewish synagogue in Djerba, thought to be the work of Al-Qaeda.

(c) Reaction of the world community

The United Nations Security Council condemned the attacks the next day in the sharpest terms, as a threat to world peace and security. At the same time it declared itself ready to fight terrorism. On 28 September the Security Council called on all states to implement a comprehensive package of measures to combat terrorism.

From 27 to 29 November 2001 a conference was convened jointly by the United Nations Development Programme, the World Bank, Asian Development Bank and the Commission to identify needs and priorities for the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

The governments of almost all states, including the Islamic states, condemned the attacks in official statements. The USA successfully assembled a broad-based coalition against terror, which included many Islamic states, aimed principally at destroying the Al-Qaeda network and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan which supported it and which has now been removed by force.

The extraordinary European Council of 21 September 2001 in **Brussels** approved a Plan of Action for initiatives in the following areas: police and justice cooperation, diplomatic measures, humanitarian aid, aviation safety, economic and financial measures and emergency aid. Significantly, the summit declined to equate terrorism in any way with the Arab/Muslim world and declared that Europe would join with the USA in resolutely fighting terrorism.

On 4 October 2001, in a resolution on the extraordinary European Council of 21 September 2001[3], the European Parliament made a number of demands regarding internal and external security, justice cooperation and economic questions and expressed solidarity with the Government and people of the USA. At the same time it called for a more in-depth political dialogue with those countries and regions of the world in which

terrorism originates. Most significantly, it unequivocally condemned any misuse of religion as a justification for murder and refused to recognise any particular civilisation as superior by virtue of its religion.

The **Ghent** European summit of 19 October 2001 set priorities for the implementation of agreed measures in the areas of police and justice cooperation and resolved to cooperate closely with the USA. In particular, the Council gave support to the American military operations in Afghanistan begun on 7 October, and declared them to be reconcilable with the United Nations Charter, given that the Taliban regime had refused to hand over the leaders of Al-Qaeda suspected of being behind the attacks. The Council pledged large-scale humanitarian aid and EU help in rebuilding Afghanistan. It also called for a resumption of the Middle Eastern peace process and closer cultural cooperation with the Arab/Muslim world to prevent it from being equated with terrorism.

The **Laeken** European summit of 14 and 15 December 2001 again urged an end to the violence in the Middle East and expressed support for the sending of an international force to Afghanistan to restore stability and order. Humanitarian aid of EUR 360 million was promised.

Following the attacks of 9-11 and as part of the efforts to build an international coalition against terror the current President of the Council, the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana, and the Commissioner for external relations Christopher Patten paid visits to Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, Syria and, together with President Prodi, to other countries of the Middle East. Pakistan was given the sum of EUR 100 million by the EU. Other meetings were held around the margins of the UN plenary session of 9 to 15 November 2001. At the same time an intensive schedule of visits was completed by the Commissioner for Development, Poul Nielson.

(d) International conferences

Following the attacks of 9-11, conferences and seminars were held worldwide on the nature of Islam and relations between this faith and its militant supporters and the civilisation of the West. A few of them are mentioned below.

Fifty leading activists representing women's movements met in Brussels on 4 December 2001 for a conference with Afghani women and called for the Taliban regime to be replaced by a democratic government which respected women's rights.

On 28 November 2001 a colloquium of Arab intellectuals was held in Cairo, which called for a critical analysis of the religious texts of Islam. Fundamentalist ideology, they claimed, was misusing the faith to mobilise the masses.

On 19 and 20 December 2001 an 'Interfaith Meeting' was held in Brussels, attended by leaders of Judaism, Christianity and Islam and chaired by Commission President Romano Prodi and Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew, to examine the role of the faiths in the peace process.

On 12 and 13 February a joint forum was held in Istanbul between all the EU foreign ministers and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, to reinforce good relations between the civilisations.

In April the Arab League held a meeting in Beirut, chiefly on the Middle Eastern conflict and its consequences for the world situation.

In the course of the ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting) on 6 and 7 June the EU foreign ministers agreed to cooperate closely in the fight against terrorism.

2. Understanding the attacks

Since 9-11 numerous attempts have been made to understand the reasons behind the attacks. There is some overlap of supposed motives. What matters is that the planning had started years beforehand, so the reasons do not lie solely in the political situation immediately prior to the attacks. They have to be viewed as part of a broad-based campaign of Islamic terrorism and in the context of the series of attacks which began as far back as 1993 with the earlier attempt to blow up the WTC.

(a) America's role in world politics

Given that the attacks were targeted chiefly at US citizens and institutions, a determining factor is the view which the perpetrators have of their adversary as the dominant economic and above all military power: the attacks were aimed at the symbols of America's military and economic might.

- Public branding of the USA as 'the great Satan' by the revolutionary regime in Iran after 1979 painted a picture of the enemy which the Shi'ite leaders in Teheran kept alive for decades in the world media to good effect by regularly organising mass demonstrations. Years before that the USA had already been vehemently attacked for the Vietnam War and its intervention in other parts of the world.

- Bitterness at the US role in Saudi Arabia and her presence in the 'holy places' of Islam, particularly at the fact that the defence of Saudi Arabia against Iraqi invasion coincided neatly with the safeguarding of American oil supplies, with the USA propping up an undemocratic and unpopular regime (which had expelled Bin Laden for his involvement in earlier attacks and under pressure from the Americans had not allowed him back in after he was expelled from Sudan).

This suggests that the reason is nationalistic resistance to foreign interference, inspired by religious fanaticism. In a video, Bin Laden notably stressed that the Arab world had been humiliated for 80 years, ever since the Arab provinces of the now defunct Ottoman Empire were divided up between the mandate powers Great Britain and France (plus, in the case of Palestine, the League of Nations) at the San Remo conference of 19 to 26 April 1920.

At present Arab nationalism, in its objective of a fairer share-out of petrodollar income, comes up against the Saudi-US community of interests (protection of the Saudi regime in return for guaranteed oil supplies for the USA). Dangerous, inconsistent and thus politically explosive is this American support for the Wahhabis who, by funding Islamic groups worldwide, are ignoring aspirations towards democracy in Arab countries too and are seeking to buy (an increasingly endangered) peace in their own country. Democratic reform through the encouragement of moderate forces and investment in widespread education are the only way to ensure a peaceful and lasting balance of interests in the region, but these can probably only be achieved if the Wahhabi royal house takes the radical step of renouncing its claim to absolute rule. In the long term the double game, in which the Americans are involved actively by their role as protectors but paradoxically as victims too, will be impossible to sustain. In this case too it may prove that the USA, by following a failed, short-sighted policy which prioritises stability and secure oil supplies, has been ill-advised in supporting a conservative regime, against the flow of the tide. Increased American interest of late in a change of regime in Iraq might well stem from belated realisation of this fact, and if that change is brought about by force it may prove to be a further and fatal mistake. Unpopular though the Iraqi dictator may be, even with the Arabs, US military intervention in Iraq would create an effect of solidarity against the West which would affect the security interests of the EU too. If the Middle Eastern conflict continued without a settlement, Arab governments would face public pressures which would be hard to resist.

- Political and ideological rejection by the Americans of the Taliban regime, with which Bin Laden and his followers were closely identified, after they had initially supported it for reasons of US oil interests (pipeline through Afghanistan). It is a bitter irony of history that it was the USA, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia which supplied the Mujahideen with money and weapons to resist the Soviet occupying force during the war in Afghanistan, those same Islamic warriors who then made no distinction between the Soviet and American 'Satan', since both powers were perceived as invaders. Even after this, the USA and Pakistan gave support to the fundamentalists educated in Pakistani madrassahs. Fighters from Chechnya, Pakistan, Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Sudan, tried and tested in the war against the Soviets, then took their message of violence home to their own countries. Algeria's GIA continues to bear bloody witness to its past training.

- US action perceived as hegemony and imperialism in the Gulf region, where it claims a national interest by virtue of its need for guaranteed oil supplies, which it would be prepared to defend by force of arms. This is seen as misappropriation, though the Americans can refer to an agreement of 1945 between President F. Roosevelt and King Ibn Saud concerning oil supplies. No one denies that the industrialised nations have a huge interest in oil supplies from the Gulf region, but the way in which the USA uses its muscle to secure its economic interests is criticised.

- The not-unbiased position of the USA in the Middle Eastern conflict. This would mean that the attacks are intended to show solidarity with the Palestinian 'brothers' in their second *intifada* (begun in September 2000). The Americans are accused of applying international law selectively here. The bitter consequence of the attacks is they have given Israel and the USA an excuse vis-à-vis the rest of the world for taking a tougher line with the Palestinians.

- The continuing bombing of Iraqi targets for failure to observe the no-fly zones, and the embargo against Iraq which continues to be enforced by the Security Council but is criticised even in the West for its terrible effects on food and medical supplies, with young children suffering the most. The American threat to bomb Iraq back into the stone age was prompted by deep bitterness and a feeling of humiliation. The attacks on the WTC were seen as a retaliation against America for waging war with 'smart' weapons, which killed thousands of Iraqis. There is in addition the continuing threat of war against Iraq to topple the regime, which the Americans went on supporting even after its war of aggression against Iran as a way of containing the expansionist Shi'ite regime in Teheran (1980-88), perceived by America as a threat.

(b) Conflicts between civilisations in general

- The attacks were seen as a desperate last stand by declining radical Islam against Western economic and technological superiority as embodied by the USA and regarded as a provocation; this interpretation sees the Arab/Muslim countries as an outdated civilisation which, having failed to advance its own civilisation in the present age, can only make its mark by violently and destructively opposing the dominant culture of the West: terrorism as a defence against the pressures of progress and modernisation. This theory argues that Bin Laden had to attack the USA, the political superpower, as a way of giving legitimacy to Islam as the universal power and so earning approbation and support from the Islamic world.

- International Islamic movements have adopted popular frustrations and social demands as their own cause. Given that many countries are in fact Islamic states, opposition to the ruling government cannot be fought on a religious and cultural platform, which leaves the industrialised world as the only target for aggression.

Frustration is born of an unsuccessful transition from colonial rule which brought neither prosperity nor democracy and the failure of the neoliberal economic system, which excludes large groups of the population from the benefits of the modern age and further accentuates the gulf between rich and poor. Efforts were thus also made to justify the attacks as a legitimate war against a Western world which exploits the developing countries. Notwithstanding the fact that 15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudis from the educated and trained social middle class, who are hardly poor.

- Another view is that the faithful are waging 'holy war' against the infidel to combat a social model which is irreconcilable with Islam and deeply offensive to Muslim beliefs (role of the sexes, family planning, role of religion in state and society, understanding of democracy, law, extravagance and moral decadence of a society driven by consumerism and pleasure which knows no taboos and whose only god is money). Presented in this way, the West can easily become the focus of emotions such as hatred and contempt in a society of traditional values.

- The attacks of 9-11 are of course acts perpetrated by Islamic terrorists, but they are seen too as a reaction to undesirable worldwide phenomena (nationalism, religious fanaticism, poverty, injustice and the social deprivation of whole groups of society, the North-South divide). They are seen as heralding future quarrels which for the moment are being acted out in the developing and emerging countries over the ownership of and struggle for resources but which are also penetrating the industrialised countries of the West, the nations supposedly truly to blame (cf. the religious conflicts between Muslims and Hindus in India, clashes between Indian and Pakistani nationalist and religious forces over Kashmir, and internal conflicts in Sudan and Nigeria).

- In the Islamic world it is widely held that the attacks cannot have been the work of Muslims because they are irreconcilable with the laws of the Koran, which forbid suicide and the killing of the innocent. So there must have been a conspiracy. But this is given the lie by the fact that the hijackers were devout Muslims and it is clear from documents they left behind that their aim was to kill as many Jews and Christians as possible. The plan for these attacks cannot of course be seen as representative of Islam as a whole in the way that it is in the context of Afghanistan and Pakistan (radicalisation through a state of war).

- Huntington's theory of cultural conflict focuses on the potential nature of future conflicts and suggests ways of resolving such conflicts peacefully. Huntington sees the events of 9-11 as vindicating his theory of the 'clash of civilisations' and at the same time warns against allowing intra-Islamic conflicts to become global, pointing out that in most Islamic states the government in power is not democratic, whilst the opposition is fundamentalist. Following the attacks, Bin Laden said that his intention had been precisely to trigger war between the two civilisations. The fact that the USA managed to build a coalition against terror which also included a number of Arab/Muslim countries does not necessarily invalidate Huntington's argument.

When all the motives are considered it seems most likely that the attacks, on the evidence of the presumed attackers themselves, are acts of Islamic terrorism inspired by religious fanaticism in pursuit of real political aims, namely to fight the US position of hegemony in the Arab/Islamic region. A further aim of Bin Laden was doubtless to win Arab and Muslim support for the Islamic cause. But we must again emphasise the disastrous way in

which the US secret services, in conjunction with the government of Pakistan, have helped to feed this Islamic militancy over the years.

3. Islam and the conflicting pressures of tradition and modernity

(a) Attitude of religious leaders

Two eminent spokesmen for the two main branches of Islam, Sheikh Mohamed Sayed Tantawi, the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar in Cairo who leads the Sunni Muslims, and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, spiritual leader of the Shi'ites in Iran, publicly and emphatically condemned the attacks of 9-11, saying that nothing in the Koran justified them. But the Sunni leader did this not out of principle, but on the grounds that Bin Laden had harmed the Islamic cause, discredited Islam in the eyes of the world when it was gaining ground, and robbed it of its legitimacy.

Spokesmen for Islam repeatedly said that the perpetrators had not acted in the name of Islam. There was no *jihad*, since this could only be proclaimed by a religious authority in a fatwa. Also, holy war was only allowed in defence of one's own territory. Certain passages of the Koran such as the 9th sura, verse 29, which urged Muslims to 'fight against those who do not believe in Allah', had to be seen in their historical context, when Islam needed to establish, spread and define itself in relation to Christianity. The idea of just war is not alien to Christianity either, as the writings of St Augustine prove[4]. A number of leaders, however, for example Omar Bakri, spokesman for the international Islamic movement Al-Muhajiroun, and Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani, the leader of Jamiat-Ulema-i-Pakistan, publicly endorsed the attacks.

(b) Conflicting trends within Islam itself and modernisation

The Islamic world is not monolithic: Islam, like all the major faiths, is taught and lived differently in different parts of the world. The various branches disagree violently, and the fundamentalists use the Koran and traditions to support an ideology of violent conflict. They also point to the 47th sura, verse 35: 'So be not slack and do not sue for peace (with the unbelievers) for you will, certainly, have the upper hand'.

In areas where Islam is followed strictly the traditional values, particularly Shari'ah[5], the Islamic code of laws which to the Western mind appears inhumane, has remained totally untouched by the Enlightenment and rationalism[6].

The powerful influences of the West, above all its pressure to adopt democracy, a new understanding of the role of the state, the emphasis on human rights, the Western ideal of free development of the individual, the value attached to individuality, have led to conflict in the Islamic states and even tested them to breaking point. Given the rapid advance of globalisation, the feeling of being swamped by the culture of an economically and technologically superior West was bound to engender feelings of alienation, a kind of cultural colonisation, and thus powerful resistance movements. Islam is currently experiencing a period of upheaval, and in Europe during the Reformation and religious

wars of the 16th and 17th centuries this led to a degree of radicalisation, so that one can fairly speak of a shift in the stages of civilisation. Islamic fundamentalism is a major worry to the Muslim states themselves, and in Arab states too there is increasingly talk of Islam having failed as a political movement. (Except in Algeria the fundamentalists have suffered electoral defeat everywhere in recent years.) Religion as a basis for defining one's identity is challenged. The need to modernise, perceived as essential, whilst at the same time remaining true to the traditions, leads to conflict for the individual as well as for society as a whole. This conflict, together with the pressing social issues, can only be resolved by opening up Islam. An encouraging sign is the recent agreement of the warring parties in Sudan to remove the constitutional reference to Shari'ah as the state religion. This was a constant barrier to peaceful coexistence between Christians and Muslims.

In the longer term Islam will certainly adapt, just as secularisation in Europe had to be achieved gradually and in the teeth of strong opposition from representatives of the Roman Catholic Church who played an ambiguous role in the areas of democracy, human rights and gender equality. This adaptation to modern ways - some religious leaders would rather 'islamize' modernity than modernize Islam - becomes all the more pressing and probable as the network of international relations and exchanges becomes denser. In this context we should bear in mind the recent new moves towards democracy in Turkey.

(c) Failure of the state: influence of the Islamists

The economic and political climate in many Islamic states is currently difficult. In economic and social terms they are unable to cope with the fast growth in their population (poor popular acceptance of family planning). Large sections of the population, especially young people, have no prospects and no voice in political decision-making. Influential religious leaders exploit this situation and challenge the state. They use Islam as a social 'glue' which binds people together and gives them an identity, and their highly active Islamic institutions provide basic services and welfare in all areas where the state does not fulfil its duties or does so only imperfectly. Phenomena which are initially religious in nature take on a socially relevant substance. (Religious foundations in the industrialised countries of the West, which are socially very important, have a fundamentally different ethos: they do not compete with the state but complement it.)

At the same time this means that burgeoning secular civil societies are squeezed out. The fundamentalists want to get the masses behind them and make a social movement into a political one. Because the state is manifestly incompetent and corrupt it constantly feels obliged to justify itself. This plan succeeded in Iran in 1979. It clearly shows that the mullahs' ultimate concern was to hang on to their power, which they saw as having been expropriated by the Shah and now see as being threatened by efforts towards reform and democratisation.

Whilst poverty is in itself no excuse for terrorism, it is a fact of life that impoverished and poorly educated masses can be manipulated by those with spiritual, religious or financial influence. Realisation of this is a valuable starting point for development measures. A population which follows irrational, fanatical and hate-filled leaders who claim to uphold Islamic values and interests can only be persuaded by a successful programme of poverty reduction and education.

But it would be a grave mistake to assume that the modernisation of Islamic states simply means their adoption of Western culture and values. Modernisation does not mean westernisation. It is equally fatal to support authoritarian regimes just because they are secular and not Islamic.

4. Role of Islam in Black Africa

(a) increasing influence of Islam

In Black Africa there are several Islamic movements running against the moderate mainstream. For decades the dominant groups were the so-called brotherhoods of the Tijaniyya, Murridiyya or Qadiriyya or other groups influenced by North Africa or the Gulf region. At this level there were links with Arab Muslims and the organs of state. Since the 1970s African society, discouraged by economic crisis, the slide of broad groups of the population into poverty and the failure of Western-style state power, has become more receptive to Islam as preached by Muslims in the Gulf region, Pakistan and Afghanistan. In Nigeria there has been an increasing trend towards radicalisation.

Fundamentalist movements such as Ibadu Rahman and other Muslim brotherhoods have attracted considerable support, not least because they accuse the moderates of kowtowing to the West, of betraying 'true' Islam and its values and of neglecting the poor. A factor in the equation here is the financial and logistical support provided by the Iranian mullahs which enables the brotherhooods to provide generous social programmes for the poor. But the Arab Gulf rulers too would do well to keep a critical eye on these fundamentalists whom they are funding and who might well one day turn on them too. But for the time being the traditional Muslim communities have remained in control, thanks to their influential religious leaders.

Fundamentalism appears to many Muslims as a welcome weapon against the corrupt state and the excessive foreign cultural influence which goes with it. To many Africans who have to deal day in day out with an undemocratic, corrupt and violent machinery of state which has no respect for fundamental civil rights, fails in its duty to provide for the population and tolerates social injustice, the events of 9-11 seemed like fair retaliation against a superpower concerned only with its own self-interest.

African governments allow the fundamentalists a free hand out of concern for the people who benefit from the work of Muslim charities (mosques, schools), where the state fails to provide, but also because other charitable bodies such as Christian organisations are allowed considerable freedom to operate. This is true in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. Increasing numbers of African students are also going to Pakistan, where they receive an Islamic education.

(b) Situation in some African countries

After condemning the attacks almost unanimously, on 17 October 2001 30 or so African heads of state and government, at a summit organised by the Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade, formed an 'African Pact against Terrorism', partly as a way of bringing the continent out of its isolation.

But public opinion is by no means unanimous, especially in view of the US military response in Afghanistan: the mainly Muslim population in Nigeria, Niger, Senegal (95% Muslim), Sudan and the Ivory Coast side with their co-religionists and even Bin Laden himself, and gave vent to their anti-American protests in public demonstrations. But Islamic activists in Senegal are confined to a few specific organisations. In the early 1980s Gaddafi's creeping influence in Senegal (and in The Gambia too) led to diplomatic relations being broken off.

In Niger there were strong Islamic movements especially in the southern provinces bordering on Nigeria, which exerts a powerful influence. There Bin Laden is fêted as a hero. Iranians and Pakistanis are opening free Koranic schools and clinics. Islamists have opposed the government's family planning policy. Most people in Niger are anti-American because of the war in Afghanistan.

Guinea-Bissau expelled five Pakistanis in mid-October 2001 for constituting a danger to the state. They were members of the Hamadiyya brotherhood, a Pakistani sect based in London. This sect has already built 40 mosques and 20 Koran schools and has trained 60 teachers.

Mali expelled 40 Pakistanis for 'suspect' activities at the end of October 2001.

In Nigeria, Africa's most populous state, Bin Laden was publicly celebrated. In the wake of the bombings in Afghanistan, pronounced hostilities between Christians and Muslims on 12 and 13 October 2001 erupted into street battles in Kano between Islamists and the army and a witch-hunt against Christians. Some 100 people died. But these clashes are ethnically and religiously motivated, in that several tribes are jockeying for power. Christians are from the southern tribes of the Ibo and Yoruba, whilst the Muslims belong to the northern tribe of the Hausa. In 12 of the 33 Nigerian provinces Shari'ah has been introduced in violation of the constitution. Since 1999 thousands have been killed in religious quarrels.

In Cameroon a slight majority of the population is Christian. There have been clashes between adherents of Tijaniyya and Wahhabi fundamentalists from Saudi Arabia, keen to impose their view of Islam.

Up to 1996 Bin Laden, after losing his Saudi citizenship, had found refuge in Khartoum and expanded his network from Sudan by financing trade bodies and Muslim organisations (including involvement in the diamond trade with Sierra Leone). Sudan is emerging from isolation following the detention of Al-Turabi and the introduction of a multi-party system and press freedom. Sudan has renounced terrorism. On 27 September 2001 sanctions against Sudan were lifted in UN Security Council Resolution No 1372.

Gaddafi is moving in the same direction. As far back as 1994 he had already asked Interpol to arrest Bin Laden for funding Libyan fundamentalists.

The attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were allegedly masterminded by Bin Laden from Somalia, where he was helped by the lack of organised state structures.

5. Conclusions to be drawn from the attacks

The attacks of 9-11 are the fruit of years of preparation by Muslim fundamentalists who intended their acts mainly as a confession of faith but in reality sought to deliver politically motivated strikes against the USA as the world superpower and representative of Western culture. The lengthy preparation period and meticulous planning reflect a deep level of hatred and contempt, and this is shared by a considerable proportion of the population in the Muslim world.

The attacks highlighted the vulnerability of our societies, which is in marked contrast to the military superiority of the USA in particular, but they also revealed the mutual dependencies which inform international problems and interests, particularly in North-South relations, and should prompt us to undertake a critical review of our own responsibilities. The leaders of both industrialised and developing countries must address this.

If we are to fight terror effectively we must have a clear understanding of its real causes and the irrational and rational motives behind it. The role of the Middle East conflict and the attitudes of friendly powers on both sides must be considered here. We must also appreciate the link between the geostrategic interests (power and trade) of the leading world players in the Gulf region, Western and Central Asia and the reawakened aspirations for nationhood and autonomy of countries which no longer want to be mere pawns on the world chessboard.

The tensions thus engendered can only be eased through honest, self-critical and serious dialogue in which the political and religious leaders of the parties play an active part. It will be a long-drawn-out process of eradicating prejudice and achieving rapprochement, which must involve the whole of society and in which the media will have a decisive role

to play. In our desire to resolve long-term problems we must not overlook the present danger which requires instant action.

Terrorism cannot be tolerated and, if necessary, it calls for powerful deployment of the state security apparatus and armed forces. But more can be expected in the long term from a policy of prevention geared towards consensus rather than confrontation and from support for moderate forces rather than the exclusion of immoderate ones. The *leitmotif* must be a fair balancing of interests within societies and between nations. We need a policy for the long term, not one dictated by the interests of the moment.

6. The EU response to terrorism: development policy versus military force?

(a) Criteria for a military response

The EU needs to realise that conflicts of this kind (which will not necessarily originate in the Muslim world) also impact directly on seemingly uninvolved industrialised countries and may even threaten world peace. Globalisation is not confined to economic ties alone, but can also be a factor in the genesis and spread of conflicts. The declaration that terrorism will be stamped out by every means possible is wishful thinking. It may be seen as a provocation and may actually encourage terrorist attacks. If a military response is the only way, this must be explained in order to preserve credibility in the eyes of the world. The objectives must be clearly defined and the means used must be proportionate to the objective pursued. If possible a multilateral approach must be used, consistent with international law and the rules of the United Nations. A pre-emptive strike against the Iraqi regime without UN backing will, given the predictable reaction of Arab solidarity, carry the very risk which needs to be avoided – that of a war between cultures. The West could then fall into Bin Laden's trap, if his aim in carrying out the attacks of 9-11 was to trigger a war of this kind.

(b) Limits of EU solidarity with the USA

The EU cannot escape the question of how far it is prepared, being itself a terrorist target, to go along with the American policy of a predominantly military response to terrorism in its objectives and the means it employs. The issue is thrown into relief by the fact that US military spending is USD 1 000 million a day compared to development spending of 0.1% of GNP, whilst the ratio for expenditure by the EU Member States is the other way round. The Americans rely on their strength and reject willingness to compromise as weakness and capitulation to blackmail. They are suspicious of European 'appeasement', which was disastrous for the Europeans in the last century. Inside the USA too there was a passionate debate, with an open letter by 58 intellectuals on a just war being published in March 2001 and an answering letter in April 2002.

Europe is now required to show solidarity with the Americans, not least because of the debt of gratitude it owes for the US sacrifices in liberating Europe from the Nazi terror. Solidarity is vital to the European interest at present because the European defence capability is so limited. But that solidarity has to end at the point where US values

fundamentally depart from those of Europe. Notwithstanding our respect for a superpower which uses all its sovereign might to defend its interests and above all to keep its people safe, when it comes to European participation in military action what counts is the EU's concept of itself as a free alliance of states which are committed to the idea of peaceful international cooperation, with due respect for human rights and ethnic and cultural differences, and which regard the observance of international law as paramount.

The USA and the EU cannot do without each other: US efforts for a worldwide coalition against terror were a convincing proof of the need for international consensus and joint action. The EU should make it clear that in the current world situation unilateralism based on a sense of mission and military superiority is no longer acceptable. It will prove ineffective in the long term, because it is increasingly important to secure international legitimacy, which is not the same thing as sympathy. Public opinion is attentive to stated values and credibility. Leadership which persuades using these criteria will be more likely to receive international support. For the rest, the EU is well able to play an independent and complementary role through its international ties, contacts and channels of influence. It must be emphasised that US and European security interests are tied up with the political, economic and social developments in the Middle East.

(c) Role and weight of EU development policy in conflict prevention

European development policy is geared to the notion of peaceful international cooperation and the balancing of interests. The close and multilayered contacts maintained in various strata of society mean that the EU's specific development policy instruments are particularly well placed to identify mistakes and conflicts and take action against the causes. Top of the list are poverty alleviation and better educational opportunities, though it must be stressed that poverty is not the cause of terrorism. But extreme poverty can breed despair and radical attitudes in people who have nothing more to lose. It enables radical religious leaders to exert significant influence on poor sections of the population who are reliant on social institutions. Ignorance due to a lack of education and information, plus misinformation in the media and tirades of hatred of the kind which have been heard in Islamic houses of prayer in Europe, are also reasons for extremism.

Successful policies must be long-term, coherent and true to established principles, and they must not be dictated solely by a 'friend or foe' type of thinking and by the advantages of the moment. Otherwise it will be hard to use development to remedy the damage done by foreign policy mistakes, especially those committed using military means.

(d) Need for coherent policies

It is a contradiction and thus counterproductive when, for example, the American decision to increase development aid by USD 10 000 million over three years and the approval of a special programme for Africa of about USD 3 400 million are followed by a decision to subsidise agriculture over the next ten years to the tune of USD 180 000

million, which significantly reduces the export chances of the developing countries. This happened against the background of a massive increase in defence spending and the opening up of markets to boost world trade, so vociferously advocated by the industrialised countries in the WTO. The American stance on the Kyoto protocol and the International Criminal Court also fail to reflect the level of international solidarity which a world power might be expected to show. On the other hand, only a few of the EU Member States (the Netherlands, Sweden, Luxembourg and Denmark) have so far achieved the target of spending 0.7% of GNP on development. The results of the UN Conference on Financing for Development, held from 18 to 22 March 2002 in Monterrey, Mexico, reflect only a very slow rate of progress.

The USA is a superpower in military terms only. In economic terms, and this will matter more in the long run, the EU carries more weight. As by far the biggest world player in development cooperation the EU can play a leading role in preventing future crisis situations by improving living conditions and at the same time acting as a moderating influence to defuse international tensions. For example, especially in view of Palestinian suspicions, it cannot serve the cause of a just and lasting peace if negotiations in the Middle Eastern conflict are left almost exclusively to the Americans. The EU should bring its own political weight to bear in addition to funding support measures. The fact that Israel looks to the USA whilst the Arabs prefer to look to the EU, or some of its Member States, demonstrates the need for a moderating role.

(e) Development policy outside and beyond conflict prevention

In the whole debate on action against terrorism and the justification of wars or pre-emptive strikes we need constantly to remind ourselves that it is the freedom of us all which is at stake here. This means freedom not only for the affluent but also freedom and justice for the poor of this earth. For them their living conditions are a permanent deprivation of liberty and a constant challenge to the industrialised nations: not without reason, the poor and those without rights resent the wealthy industrialised countries which have it within their power to improve their lot. The West perceives extreme poverty in the developing world rather as an uncomfortable glitch in an existence which is mostly free of the struggle to survive and it sits up and takes notice only when sudden upheavals occur rather than drawing conclusions for the longer term. So the response to the attacks must be more than just a tough military counter-strike; it must equally emphatically take the form of cultural dialogue and resolute development policy.

The attacks can actually be seen as symptomatic of the popular despair in many developing countries which demands greater effort in development cooperation even in the absence of any specific threat. The emerging solidarity of broad sections of the population with the perpetrators in some developing countries is proof of this. The potential is there for a whole raft of measures of technical, financial and cultural cooperation. Attitudes, especially willingness for dialogue and respect for other cultures, will be crucial here for lasting success.

There are a number of routes to this success:

- Poverty reduction by improving basic services, including education;

- Insistence on human rights and democracy, creation of fairer conditions by a better international balance of interests;

- Stepping up political and interfaith dialogue, overcoming mutual prejudices and bringing positions closer together so that the different faiths can coexist peacefully. The thread running through all this must be the preservation of human dignity.

(f) Respect for other cultures as a sine qua non *of cooperation*

Policies with these objectives can only work with the cooperation of governments, religious leaders and thinkers and the population in general. These policies must not constitute unacceptable interference in the internal affairs of a country. This requires acceptance of and respect for other faiths and forms of civilisation, together with more diffidence and humility in passing on our own Western achievements in technology and culture. The Western social and economic model expects world acceptance almost as of right, as witness the ill-chosen words of one European head of government on the supposed cultural superiority of the West. This remark rightly triggered absolute outrage in the Arab/Islamic world. It is a mistake to apply one's own standards when assessing other forms of civilisation. All the more so since leading scientific and political opinion is voicing considerable doubt about many areas of policy pursued by the Western countries. The extent to which Western science in all its glory can be divorced from reality is apparent from Fukuyama's argument in 'The End of History' that liberal democracy and the market economy effectively mark the end of social evolution. This view could not prevail. Apart from anything else it would mean that the Islamic countries (and others) currently had no chance of making their own positive contribution to development.

(g) Need for self-critical analysis and reconsideration

When European development policy is applied, one must bear in mind the picture which Western civilisation presents to traditional societies, with its consumerism, materialism, uninhibited commercialism and decadence. Although the technology so prized by the Islamic world too is based on research which knows virtually no bounds, the *hubris* of it, in searching out and manipulating the very last mysteries of life, particularly in genetics, is nevertheless morally offensive even to non-religious people and destroys their confidence in the value system of the West. The breaking of taboos, largely tolerated in Western societies, is seen by traditional societies as a provocation and leads to a loss of credibility. This creates irreconcilable differences more serious than the gulf between rich and poor. The fatwa against Salman Rushdie is materially unacceptable, but it should be seen as a reaction to the breaking of certain religious taboos and marking a point at which the level of tolerance was exceeded. What right, finally, do the industrialised countries have to insist that the developing countries must respect universal rights, when every

seven seconds a child starves to death in the developing world and the industrialised countries could prevent this?

The attacks of 9-11 and the many situations of conflict existing at present should thus be the starting point for reflection and self-critical analysis by all parties concerned and for an intensive spiritual and cultural examination of the substance and practice of the leading world faiths and other forms of civilisation. Freedom is beyond price and yet so little is made in the West of the fact that freedom entails obligations. The bases of a universally valid ethic to go beyond existing international agreements should be worked out. The moment has come to define the essence of good and evil, when President George W. Bush talks of the axis of evil. Evil could prove easier to identify than good and it could also transpire that not everything that is good for the USA is also good for the rest of the world. This is probably a better way of solving the problems than dividing other countries into 'good guys and bad guys' and just letting weapons do the talking.

It must also be remembered that Muslims living amongst us send their impressions home and so help to shape the picture which their co-religionists have of how we live and how we treat our fellow-men, i.e. of our system of values. There are 5.2 million Muslim immigrants living in France. In Germany there are 2.5 million, and the United Kingdom has 1.5 million. A total of almost 11 million Muslims live in the EU. This fact necessarily has implications for the domestic policy of the EU Member States and their policy on asylum and immigration. A Eurobarometer survey of April 2002 showed that 83% of the population regarded better relations with the Muslims as essential or at least necessary.

This means of course not only that the perceived image of the EU must improve but also that we must rethink our political objectives and how we have sought to achieve them. But we should also place greater emphasis on our spiritual achievements and understanding, on the revival of interest in spiritual matters and our young people's search for ideals. Does not the selfless action of the 300 fire fighters who did their duty and sacrificed their lives to save others not deserve to be emphasised more strongly? Should we not contrast this attitude with the purely destructive attitude of the terrorists? We should also look for what we have in common with other cultures instead of emphasising differences. This is particularly true of media reporting, which should concentrate more on informing and educating people instead of dealing in sensation and cliché. Nor is it a question of the 'global projection of European values', to which the Commission refers in its communication on the European Community's development policy[7]. Those holding different views from ours should not be reviled and we should not create stereotypical bogeymen. This is what happens when the titles of TV programmes equate the fight against terror with war against Islam.

7. Relationship between the CFSP and development policy

This study is concerned chiefly with development policy. It is obvious, however, that not only the EU's common foreign and security policy – particularly its military dimension and alliances – but also its external economic policy may be far more influential in our relations with non-Member States, especially where there is conflict. The systematic destruction of infrastructure in the Palestinian territories, partly built with EU money, is eloquent testimony to that. Effectiveness in development policy would thus seem to depend on having the right foreign and security policy.

Traditionally, the objectives of the two policies are different and conflicting signals are sent, as was very apparent when the Americans were dropping bombs on Afghanistan and at the same time sending it humanitarian aid. In addition to this one case, recent events seem to have made everyone aware that incoherent and inadequately coordinated policies can result in a contradictory image being projected to the rest of the world, which is damaging to development policy, and that the security situation can deteriorate when development is neglected. Thus we need to adopt a broader view of security which takes account of the socioeconomic realities in potential areas of unrest.

In its opinion on the Gemelli report[8] the Foreign Affairs Committee pointed to the need for the two policies to be more closely integrated, stressing the importance of the interrelation between development aid, conflict prevention and human rights and thus the need for greater coherence. To this extent it was right to open talks on closer economic cooperation with Iran. Similar moves should be made towards Pakistan, India, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.

The decision of the Seville European Council of 21 and 22 June 2002 on the structure and functioning of the Council must also be considered in this light. It established a Council body for general affairs and external relations which will, in separate meetings, address administrative, institutional and cross-cutting issues and separately from these the whole spectrum of the EU's external relations, i.e. the CFSP, European security and defence, external trade, development and humanitarian aid. Similar moves are also under way in the European Parliament. This is not just a matter of procedure, as various governments have tried to suggest. After all, Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union gives development policy an independent role as part of foreign policy. Any merging of responsibilities within a single body creates a risk of development considerations being seen as less important and even ignored. There is a danger that the developing countries may, so to speak, lose their spokesman in the most important forum of European decision-making. In terms of transparency, specifically, it may no longer be clear whether and to what extent development has been considered by the Council in any foreign policy measures it takes. Recent events have shown very clearly how important it is to have an independent, permanent and long-term development policy. The attacks of 9-11 prove that the real war is to be fought against underdevelopment, poverty and poor education and training.

8. Conclusions for the EU's development policy

Whether one sees the attacks as the latest in a series and thus as part of a specifically Islamic threat or as heralding a generally increasing tendency towards violence and radicalisation prompted by the gulf opening up between North and South, greater efforts in the area of development cooperation may help to defuse tensions, even if there is no realistic expectation that acts of terrorism can be prevented. But poverty, despair and ignorance are a fertile breeding ground for dictators and terrorists. This is why we must give people the chance of a decent life so that terrorist networks worldwide have less to work with in potentially unstable countries and are denied any legitimacy and a following. This undertaking is admittedly made difficult by people's ignorance, poverty and susceptibility to corruption in the face of the huge sums of money available to the terrorists from drugs, the arms trade, extortion and money laundering.

As regards countering a specifically Islamic threat, progress towards democracy, on human rights, press freedom and education is what counts. Naturally, the EU can only play a supporting role here as and when the countries concerned open up as part of their modernisation process. In any event, efforts should be made at the same time on more than one 'front'.

The EU must of course take its specific conflict prevention measures, with an eye to UN resolutions and particularly those of the Security Council, and it must implement its development policy generally in partnership and alignment with the international organisations and principal donors[9]. The EU must make its mark and speak with one voice in these forums.

As to how successful the UN conferences have been – announced with a great fanfare and held at great expense – it has to be said that they have come nowhere near to delivering on the promises made by the member nations (especially promises of money) or yielded any of the results which the developing countries had reasonably expected. The action plans approved in recent years take decades to complete and give false hope to those who are suffering here and now.

(a) The Mediterranean states

Relations with the Mediterranean states and their predominantly **Muslim populations** are shaped by closer EU cooperation with 12 Mediterranean countries[10] which began in 1995 with the 'Barcelona Process' and, pursuant to the Barcelona Declaration of 27 and 28 November 1995, created the framework for a comprehensive partnership in political, economic and cultural matters with the aim of peace and stability, prosperity and closer ties between nations. The objective is to have a free trade area by 2010 at the latest, with a common market in goods, capital and services.

The basic and most important financing instrument of the Barcelona Process is the MEDA programme which has a financial envelope of EUR 5 550 000 million for the period 2000-2006. The programme itself is an excellent way of securing respect for

human rights, democracy and conflict prevention. By and large the opinion of the Foreign Affairs Committee on the Valdivielso de Cué report[11] complains that the cultural and social aspects of the MEDA programme have so far received too little attention (e.g. exchanges and meetings between representatives of civil society in the southern Mediterranean states and EU and promotion of networks). Intercultural dialogue in particular needs to be intensified[12].

The Euro-Mediterranean conference in Valencia on 22 and 23 April 2002 adopted an Action Plan which takes due account of the events of 9-11 and the Middle Eastern conflict. It passed resolutions on the following topics:

- Reinforcement of political dialogue, to include defence matters and human rights issues;

- Firm political commitment to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law;

- Participation of all governments and civil society to promote the social, cultural and human dimension of partnership;

- Importance of promoting dialogue and cooperation between cultures and civilisations;

- Rejection of any military solution to the Middle Eastern Conflict; an end to the occupation of the territories annexed by Israel in 1967 and establishment of an independent democratic Palestinian state.

(b) Preservation of cultural and traditional differences

The Barcelona Declaration sets out a programme – it is not a legally binding text. The right of each country to choose its own political, social and cultural, economic and legal system is expressly acknowledged. EU initiatives have not so far secured any great improvements in domestic politics as regards democracy and human rights, let alone the serious internal situation in Algeria and above all the Middle Eastern conflict. But the relevant political and religious leaders and sections of population do not view a political or socioeconomic change of system on the model of the industrialised countries as opportune at present. Efforts towards reform have gone as far as they can, in the teeth of powerful resistance from the Islamic fundamentalists. What counts here is how the Islamic states see themselves. In some countries political power is legitimised by religion. This is especially clear in Iran, where Seyed Ali Khamenei as spiritual leader has supreme power and responsibility for policy-making. Islamic beliefs and ideas permeate the whole of public and private life. Any radically different approach to basic Islamic issues, particularly the application of Shari'ah and the possible separation of the political from the religious, moral and transcendental, in other words secularisation which current teaching holds to be irreconcilable with the Koran, has to be left to the process of modernisation within the country itself. This does not mean, however, that it cannot be cautiously encouraged, e.g. through the strengthening of civil society under EU aid

programmes. Reforms are more likely to come about from within, as a result of interaction between social forces. And endogenous pressure for modernisation is especially strong amongst young people in Iran. There are encouraging developments in Turkey, a secular though Muslim state, where capital punishment in peacetime was recently taken off the statute book. Minority rights and the right to freedom of expression were also recognised and the right of assembly and association was reformed. Insistence on these things as prerequisites of Turkish membership of the EU was probably decisive here. It remains to be seen what further action will be taken by the moderate Islamic forces in power since the most recent parliamentary elections and whether the laws are actually implemented. But reform of the laws marks a historic democratisation of major areas of public life. It might be a model for reform in other Islamic countries. Turkey's history shows clearly how stubbornly old religious traditions and ideas can hold out against the secular state (as proclaimed in the 1924 constitution inspired by Atatürk).

(c) Influence of the Middle Eastern conflict

Another obstacle prevents the MEDA programme from fulfilling its full potential: the Israel-Palestinian conflict overshadows regional cooperation with the 12 partner countries. Economic development in the Middle East is very much hampered by the insistence on arms spending, and the tension creates a feeling of threat in the region, the effects of which are directly felt in Europe too and are exacerbated by 'Muslim' demonstrations of solidarity in the form of anti-Israeli protests, especially in France. Also, the EU's position on the Middle Eastern conflict is seen as ambiguous by most Arab partners, especially in comparison with the position of individual Member States. Until the conflict is resolved the programme cannot be fully effective in its pursuit of the economic and political objectives outlined in the Barcelona Declaration. Leading figures in the Arab world even maintain that until such time as the Middle Eastern conflict is resolved the West can have very little influence on public opinion in the Arab countries. Because of the prevailing suspicion and political uncertainties, even purely cultural objectives and a rapprochement between nations are unlikely to succeed. It is all the more regrettable that no official initiatives at all have been taken to bring the Israeli and Palestinian peoples closer together, despite the existence of programmes through which this could be done. The period immediately after the Oslo peace process would have been the ideal time for this and would have contributed towards better mutual understanding and an easing of the situation.

(d) Other regions and countries

Other developing countries are covered by the Cotonou Agreement of 23 June 2000 and other agreements on development cooperation with countries in Asia and Latin America. The Cotonou Agreement lays down comprehensive objectives and opportunities for cooperation with 77 countries in Africa, the Caribbean and Asia. Some countries in sub-Saharan Africa and parts of Asia have sizeable Muslim populations, and religion is a factor in dealings with these.

9. Individual policy areas

(a) Democracy, respect for human and civil rights, the rule of law and good governance

Attention has already been drawn to the fact that democracy and respect for human rights are essential for peace, stability and decent social and economic conditions as the basis of a decent human existence. Only a sucessful democracy can prevent the social exclusion of disadvantaged population groups, and in the developing countries where the effects of globalisation are particularly keenly felt this is especially important. It is worrying to see opposition already from some African governments to the good governance clauses in NEPAD, the New Partnership for Africa's Development, which they claim are inconsistent with African traditions. One would assume that a culture of corruption and profligate spending is not specific to Africa. But in matters of development we have to remember that the aim of justice which underpins democracy applies to relations between states just as much as relations within states. However, it is worth bearing in mind a letter of protest distributed by representatives of civil society on 19 July 2002 against the basic thrust of NEPAD, which was felt to be organised too much from the 'top down', relying on external donors and ignoring the development work done so far by Africans themselves.

To emphasise the importance of this subject for EU relations with non-Member States, a separate budget title 'European initiative for democracy and human rights' (B7-70), was created for 2002 with MEUR 104 appropriations for commitment.

Parliament also proposes in the Diéz González report[13] that an interinstitutional code of conduct be drawn up for the Union's external relations in the field of human rights. Quite a lot of Africans, incidentally, as well as people in other regions of the world, are somewhat bemused by this European insistence on universal acceptance of their ideas on democracy and human rights. It was, after all, the Europeans who oppressed, enslaved and exploited people all over the world during the colonial era. We should also bear in mind that values may well be the same in areas of the world far distant from ours, but socioeconomic considerations mean that priorities are different.

The Commission, in its communication of 8 May 2001 on the role of the European Union in promoting human rights and democratisation in third countries[14], placed this objective at the heart of the EU's overall external relations strategy, as part of its efforts to make its individual policies more effective and more coherent. At the same time it makes good governance an integral part of the new development policy. This requirement too is an essential feature in all association agreements with e.g. the MEDA countries.

In all meetings with those responsible for policy the EU should, pursuant to the agreements it has signed, raise the issues of democracy and human rights and insist that they are observed. This should take precedence over economic and trade interests. Ambivalence and double standards damage EU credibility. In the Diéz González report[15] the European Parliament calls, in the context of the proposed interinstitutional code of

conduct, for the immediate suspension of relations (apart from humanitarian aid) with any states seen to support or sponsor terrorism. Close cooperation with the various bodies and agencies of the United Nations (Security Council, Commission on Human Rights) is advocated.

Special attention should be paid to

- Building institutions which guarantee the rule of law;

- The outlawing of inhumane punishments such as stoning and amputation (application of Shari'ah law);

- Gender equality in the family and public life; most of the Islamic countries have women's movements. The consequences of women's rights being suppressed, and the desperate need to promote them, was most clearly apparent in Afghanistan.

- Promotion of civil society, especially statutory safeguards for political associations as the driving force behind moves toward democracy;

- Encouraging awareness of the need to live peacefully together in society, measures against racism. This is also part of conflict prevention.

(b) Conflict prevention

Conflict prevention is crucially important, as it ensures peace and is essential for development work to be sustainable. Bloody conflicts are currently in progress in no fewer than 17 ACP countries. Armed extremists are at work in 13 Islamic countries or regions[16].

Prevention is a matter for foreign and security policy and for development policy. In short: the best conflict prevention is a successful development policy. Commissioner Christopher Patten, in a speech on 4 December 2001 to the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, rightly said that 'the idea that a rich world and a poor world can co-exist without dramatic implications collapsed along with the twin towers on September 11th. And nowhere is this more evident than in relation to the failed state. By failed state I mean countries where the institutions, coercive power and basic services of national government have simply crumbled away. In some cases we are not talking about state-backed terrorism but of terrorist-backed states… we cannot afford to ignore these long-running political, economic and humanitarian calamities.'

Following the resolutions adopted by the Göteborg European Council of 15 and 16 June 2001, Parliament gave its views in the Lagendijk report[17]. Conflict prevention should be mainstreamed as a cross-cutting issue in all common policies of the EU, so all important Community decisions, especially in regard to trade policy, should be examined beforehand for their potential to engender conflict. The programmes of the IMF and World Bank had a destabilising effect here, since they often implemented structural

adjustment measures too abruptly and without thought for their social repercussions. Early involvement of the IMF would mean that budgetary and financial policy did not have to be quite so rigorous. The Commission was urged to encourage action to make conflict prevention an integral component of analysis and planning by these international financial institutions. In the light of the attacks in the USA, the Committee on Development and Cooperation advocated a more thorough analysis of the root causes of terrorism.

A wide range of different events and situations are relevant to conflict prevention, most of them due to poorly developed democratic and constitutional structures: for example latent ethnic/religious tensions or militant cross-border nationalist tendencies, massive electoral fraud, the violent suppression of minorities, social injustice, destruction of the environment and people's basis for subsistence, quarrels over natural resources and minerals (diamonds), plus organised crime and arms- and drugs-trafficking. Lasting stability depends very much on disarming erstwhile rebels and integrating them into society and rehabilitating infrastructures and basic economic services. Once conflicts are over, a final, lasting and fair system is needed to prevent new flare-ups. Development policy should also seek closer cooperation with Member States, non-Member States and the international community with a view to preventing conflicts. Domestic capabilities for crisis prevention in the developing countries, that is to say national forces of law and order, should be strengthened in order to safeguard human rights and the rule of law. NGOs and other players in civil society have an important part to play here, particularly women's movements[18] and peace groups. Parliament stressed not only the importance of the CFSP in conflict prevention but also the role of development policy, humanitarian aid, the maintenance of internal law and order and government and inter-ethnic dialogue. Security and solidarity with the developing countries, i.e. poverty reduction and the establishment of democracy are thus indissolubly linked. Not least, a better balance between military and defence spending would greatly reduce the need for the former. In 2001 the USA's defence spending totalled USD 310 000 million, whilst that of the EU was less than half that at 144 000 million. The Islamic world spent about USD 74 000 million.

In the Lagendijk report Parliament again called for a European Civil Peace Corps to undertake tasks such as arbitration and mediation, distribution of non-partisan information, confidence-building, and monitoring and improving the human rights situation.

In this context mention must also be made of the stabilising effect of humanitarian aid in case of disaster and emergency[19]. This aid can take on the appearance of conflict prevention when it is necessary to stop the struggle for resources between displaced population groups. One topical example is the work currently being done in Afghanistan by ECHO, the European Humanitarian Aid Office, which after the USA is the second biggest provider of humanitarian aid to that country (more than EUR 500 million since 1991). ECHO can make a valuable contribution here which, given the increasing number of disasters and their ever-increasing scale, is essential. ECHO's remit and role are

focused on the direct saving of human life, distinguishing it from other foreign policy instruments of the Community.

(c) Poverty reduction

The prime objective of EU development policy is to alleviate poverty[20]. Any advances the EU makes in reducing poverty in the developing countries will enhance its reputation and credibility as regards world conflicts and the need for a fair balance of interests, and will thus confirm the EU's right to have a voice in conflict resolution.

At the UN Conference on Financing for Development held from 18 to 22 March 2002 in Monterrey, Mexico, the Community pledged (in the 'Monterrey Consensus') more generous payments of at least an additional USD 20 billion in government development aid up to the year 2006 as part of efforts to reduce poverty and achieve sustainable development and the development goals set out in the United Nations Millennium Declaration of 8 September 2000[21]. The minimum average government development aid for all individual Member States in 2002 is to be the Community average of 0.33% of GNP, rising to 0.39% from 2006 onwards. But the EP's resolution of 25 April 2002 on the funding of development aid urges the EU to go further and set a binding deadline by which the target of 0.7% must be reached.

Notwithstanding undeniable achievements of development cooperation in terms of life expectancy, reduced infant mortality and poverty, numerous factors such as wars, environmental destruction and the squandering of resources mean that most of the world's population still do not enjoy a minimally acceptable quality of life: 1 500 million people subsist on less than one dollar a day; 800 million are permanently undernourished or malnourished, 40% of the world's population suffers from malaria and in Africa alone 2 million people die of Aids every year. The income of the world's 20% richest is almost 90 times that of the 20% poorest. In addition there is the threat to water supply, which in about 20 years' time will affect two thirds of the world's population. The rate of population growth, which is faster than the rate of economic growth, is a serious problem. The leaders of the developing world can help here by encouraging family planning. In Islamic states, however, where the average population growth is 4.2% as against 1.3% in the industrialised countries, it will take time for popular attitudes to change.

Extreme poverty violates the fundamental human right to a decent existence and is irreconcilable with true democracy. Poverty and social injustice can also lead to radicalisation and lend 'legitimacy' to extremist forces. Thus the broader view of security means that security policy must also seek to improve socioeconomic conditions.

There are many causes and manifestations of poverty. Poverty is more than a lack of money. Food security is of paramount importance. The broader view of poverty also includes a lack of proper access to education, workable land and soil, credit, services and infrastructure, and also the lack of a political voice.

On 9 July 2002, the date of the launch of the African Union, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) came into being. This is an initiative by a number of African heads of state (Republic of South Africa, Nigeria and Algeria) aimed at furthering social and economic development in the African continent with due observance, amongst other things, of the principles of democracy, good governance and human rights. Its founders were guided by the realisation that - todate - Africa had had no vision of its own to offer as an alternative to the development proposals of external aid donors, so that development projects were doomed to failure because the populations concerned had no immediate responsibility for them and thus did not 'own' them. It is encouraging to see that in 2001 17 African countries recorded growth rates of more than 5%.

People in the developing countries have hitherto felt themselves to be the losers in the globalisation process: fierce competition on the one hand and protectionist measures on the other prevent them, especially in times of falling demand for raw materials and commodities, from benefiting from a process which ought to benefit the developing countries too, since in principle it means faster movement of goods, services and capital.

A range of instruments are available:

- Political dialogue to provide the developing countries with advice and help in channelling their own efforts; technical and financial development cooperation. Greater attention must be paid to ensuring that projects fit the local social and economic context and above all that they take account of cultural traditions, so that they will be broadly accepted by the population, as the NEPAD programme intends.

- Another instrument is trade, which plays a far bigger part in development than one would imagine. In the Deva report[22] the Committee on Development and Cooperation intensified its call for a trading system to promote 'pro-poor economic growth, employment and sustainable development'[23]. Above all it criticised existing trade barriers, trade-distorting subsidies and poor access to markets, things which the industrialised countries use to their own advantage and to the disadvantage of the developing countries. At the same time it pointed to the EU's leading role in world trade and the opportunities for influence which this created.

The industrialised countries still take more from the developing countries through protectionist measures than they give them in development aid. It is the same with the treatment of indebtedness: many countries are so in debt that the flow of money is outward rather than inward. Poverty reduction has been declared an essential criterion for countries to be eligible under the HIPC Initiative on debt reduction, but the debtor countries are still having to pay back in debt service too much of the capital they desperately need to spend on development.

One gratifying achievement is the sizeable reduction in the indebtedness of the Arab countries over the 5 years to 2000: from USD 160 000 million to USD 144 000 million, i.e. 50% of GNP. In 2001 the external debt of the African countries fell from USD 310 000 million the year before to USD 215 000 million!

- Health care is an essential basic service, together with food security and access to education. The Commission highlighted the close connection between these factors in its communication of 22 March 2002[24] on health and poverty reduction in developing countries.

(d) Education and training

Investment in human resources is a key factor in development. To neglect this is invariably counterproductive, leading to socioeconomic stagnation, a brain drain and isolation in international competition. Education and training are fundamental to the development of human personality and dignity and people's building of a basis for subsistence. This makes them essential to any reduction of poverty[25]. But education is also specifically relevant for conflict prevention and reducing people's susceptibility to extremist influences, because it sharpens the critical faculty. We know from experience that a lack of democracy, poverty and ignorance together form a highly explosive mix. Nevertheless militant leaders are usually extremely intelligent and well educated, manipulating the uneducated and gullible and cynically and contemptuously using them. In a video, Bin Laden made the chilling revelation that by no means all those involved in the attacks knew that the real plan was to hit the WTC, so they too were victims of his murderous plot. Without a relatively large number of eveildoers who were both willing and ignorant, he could not have carried it out.

The amount of development work still to be done in education and training is huge but also rewarding. In many developing countries a fair amount has also been achieved in this sector. But the United Nations human development reports show that efforts to date are not enough. This is partly because of the population explosion in Arab/Islamic countries and in sub-Saharan Africa. The number of children who do not receive schooling in sub-Saharan Africa continues to increase and will reach more than 50 million by 2005.

On the other hand the UNDP's Arab Human Development Report 2000 compiled by Arab scientists shows that the Arab countries (22 countries from the Maghreb to the Gulf region, totalling about 280 million people) have made progress on adult literacy, which has doubled in men and trebled in women over the last 15 years. Overall, however, average adult literacy in the Arab countries in December 1998 was barely 60%, the levels in Egypt and Iraq being around 54%, in Algeria 66%, but in Morocco only 47%. Bottom of the class is Mauretania with just 41%. No figures are known for the Occupied Territories. In Saudi Arabia foreign workers account for the relatively low figure of 75%.

So there is still much to be done before everyone is able to play a full part in political, social, economic and working life. Breadth has often been achieved at the expense of depth. When it comes to the **production** of advanced technology and technological innovation, the OECD countries are almost on their own. Only a few Muslim countries, e.g. Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, Tunisia, Iran, Syria, Egypt, Algeria and Indonesia make any **sizeable use** of advanced technology. The UN Report on Human Development 2001 ranks Malaysia as the potential leader here and the El Ghazala Communications Technology Park in Tunisia scores low on the list. In 2000, 83% of the population in the OECD countries were Internet users, whilst in the Arab countries the figure was only 0.6% and in southern Africa just 0.4%.

One has to wonder whether certain Arab rulers actually want their citizens to be educated and capable, or whether they do not feel more confident of holding on to power if the people are kept in ignorance. Are the countless Koran schools which they finance best qualified to equip people for a world which is modernising fast? Are they afraid of the emancipating effect of education? Would it not be better for the long-term stability of the regime if the foundations for a democratic society were laid in a school which taught all areas of knowledge? There must be objective education. The Community's contribution to the very valuable UNRWA education programme for 2001 was EUR 36 million[26].

10. Intercultural dialogue

(a) Need for intercultural dialogue

The World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, held in Durban from 29 August to 8 September 2001, had barely ended (albeit with a last-minute row over Israel) when the events of 9-11 shocked the world into realising just how powerfully the tensions between parts of the Islamic world and Western civilisation, which had been building for a long time, fanned by the work of violent Arab/Muslim extremists, can erupt not only in those Arab countries which come into contact with Western civilisation, but in the very heart of Western society.

The hatred and destruction unleashed here is prompted partly by objective factors, though these are no excuse, but largely by different perceptions born of a lack of information and understanding of the other culture. This underlines the need for a more intensive intercultural dialogue which, through long-term contact, enables misconceptions to be corrected. This also accords with the EU's understanding of its role. By virtue of its history and cultural diversity as well as the large Muslim population in some Member States, the EU can make a valuable contribution to the equation through its subtlety and varying approach, its empathy with other cultures and its view of and approach to history and civilisation.

(b) Role of the EU

In his declaration of 9 May 1950 Robert Schuman already talked about material and spiritual solidarity. The EU should remember this when it considers the balance of the world and different cultures. Europe cannot tolerate a division of the world along cultural fault lines any more than it can allow a 'culture conflict' at home – and is not the EU an example of how different cultures can be successfully combined? If the EU pursues intercultural dialogue and a pluralist world order, in which human rights and democracy are not subordinated to economic or short-term political interest, it can overcome its present crisis of purpose and can, in addition to its economic weight, gain political weight and influence vis-à-vis the USA and thus greater international credibility. The question is whether the EU acquiesces totally in a globalisation process led by the USA or whether it can offer its own pluralist model of society as an alternative. This is a question of the utmost cultural importance, far more important than purely social and economic considerations.

(c) Situations which beget violence

It is no secret that violence against the industrialised West and Islamic governments perceived as sympathetic to the West is preached not only in establishments such as madrassahs in Pakistan or elsewhere in Central Asia but in the EU countries too, as witness recent tape recordings made in a Dutch mosque. The fact that huge numbers of people can very quickly be mobilised for demonstrations in Islamic countries shows the scale of the influence wielded by their leaders, who are mostly clerics, and how easily they can manipulate sections of the people. These leaders are prominent individuals to whom the poorly educated and inadequately informed look for advice and guidance. There is also the fact, mentioned earlier, that people are economically dependent on the social networks controlled by religious leaders, which force the masses to mobilise, seeing them as their salvation in the face of the failure of corrupt and incompetent organs of state. Such forms of social life are particularly likely to evolve where a lack of education and objective information means that simple people have only a rudimentary critical understanding, and where democracy and the expression of political aspirations by political parties is poorly developed (again because there is no secular state) and the state also fails in its duty to provide adequately for the basic needs of the population. Situations of this kind drive the masses, particularly young people with no prospects, into the arms of the agitators. It is true that only a few of the Islamic militants actually use violence. But their power is considerable. Many leaders were imprisoned by their governments on grounds of state security when hundreds of thousands of Muslims, especially in Pakistan, were gripped by anti-American, anti-government hostility following the attacks of 9-11, and particularly when the campaign against the Taliban started.

In Pakistan the religious party Jamiat-i-Islam, led by Maulana Fazlur Rehman and with close links to the Taliban, runs 830 of the country's 5000 or so Koranic schools. Another party, Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan, runs about 70 Koranic schools. These schools have

20 000 foreign students from Afghanistan, Africa and the Central Asian republics. In Somalia 90% of children have access to religious schools only.

(d) Starting points for dialogue

As regards the feasibility of dialogue, most of those prepared to use violence are unlikely by definition to be dissuaded from their destructive intent, because they deliberately use the desperate economic and social position of a large section of the population as a means of underpinning their power, their shared religion serving as substance and justification. The militant extremists themselves cannot be persuaded by dialogue alone. The only hope is to diminish their resonance in society and thus their potential following. This can be done only by rendering the arguments of the agitators invalid and decisively improving general living conditions – words ring hollow unless backed up by deeds – in particular by creating prospects for young people who lack proper education and training. Moderate forces can be the intermediaries here, and close and permanent contact must be maintained with them. But a dialogue of this kind is made difficult if not impossible by ill-advised and insensitive remarks by Western political leaders: e.g. calls for crusades against Islamic countries or a campaign of 'infinite justice', something which Muslims (and not only Muslims) believe is God's alone and which also shows intolerable arrogance and self-righteousness. The treatment of those held in Guantánamo Bay as suspected agents of the criminal Taliban regime in Afghanistan is dubious in terms of human rights and the international conventions, and does nothing to increase confidence in the values and supposedly exemplary virtues of Western culture. The position of the US Government on the International Criminal Court is also seen, not without reason, as a superpower's wish to impose its own punishments and enjoy a special status.

(e) Obstacles to be overcome

Intercultural dialogue faces numerous obstacles:

- Differing interpretations of history and past wars and religious quarrels, together with the unresolved and intensifying Middle Eastern conflict, in which the militarily stronger power knows it has the backing of the American superpower whilst the Arabs are neither united nor strong and the EU has no decisive influence.

- A different approach to life, whereby Islam holds that religion matters most and encompasses those areas of social life which we consider to be fundamentally *non*-religious and which ought to be shaped by pluralism, pragmatism, efficiency and exclusively secular thinking.

- As a result of this, and of delusion and arrogance induced by the achievements of Western culture, there is an unwillingness by the non-Islamic world to recognise the true value of Islamic civilisation. Part of the reason for this is that the dialogue takes place between unequal partners in terms of power and affluence.

- The absolutism of Islamic belief and consequent incapacity for self-criticism and logical argument, partly because Islamic teaching based on the Koran has not evolved further and adapted to the modern era.

- The feeling of being totally invaded and swamped by modern information and telecommunications technology, which knows no national and cultural bounds, together with the fascination of everything which is alien, forbidden and 'progressive'.

(f) Benefits and principles of intercultural dialogue

Understanding of other cultures and their values, and mutual respect, are a *sine qua non* of peace in an increasingly cohesive world of ever-greater interdependence.

We need first of all to improve understanding between Islam and the West and remove the distrust, without missionary zeal and without questioning the validity of other forms of culture. This will also be an opportunity for rethinking our own position and system of values. The importance of intercultural dialogue is matched by that of dealing with extremists *within* a given religion. It is the job of the moderates here to influence the fundamentalists and men of violence. Intellectuals in the Arab world should make their voices heard more and not leave the discussion of Islam amongst the Muslims to the spiritual leaders.

Even before 9-11, intercultural dialogue was already established at international level. From 31 July to 3 August 2001 Tokyo and Kyoto hosted an International Conference on Dialogue between Civilisations as part of the United Nations University (UNU) project of the same name. The value of this dialogue in preventing conflicts was expressly emphasised, in that it reduced misunderstanding and distrust and laid the basis for the peaceful resolution of disputes.

On 20 and 21 March 2002 the Commission held a symposium in Brussels on closer (intercultural) dialogue between the EU and its partners in the southern Mediterranean. Its conclusions included the following:

- An ongoing intercultural dialogue conducted in a spirit of tolerance, openness, understanding and mutual respect is, together with economic and diplomatic ties, a significant factor in preventing conflicts, promoting peace, democracy and human rights and should be seen as every bit as important as economic and political negotiations. Equality between cultures means nothing if there is not at the same time acceptance of the individual's right to respect for his humanity.

- The EU has a shared responsibility with its partners in the southern Mediterranean for preserving peace and safeguarding human rights. The Mediterranean region is to some extent a fault line between North and South, which both sides must bridge through cooperation and understanding, in an effort to overcome shared problems.

- Far too little importance is attached in the industrialised West to interfaith dialogue. Many Muslims find that religion lends meaning to their lives, since the yearning for transcendence is part of human nature. This explains why in the islamic world religion matters so much in the social structure and is collective in nature, in contrast to wide areas of the West where religion is more of a private thing and a matter of personal belief. A shared platform for dialogue can be created, provided the state remains neutral, and this could facilitate secularisation, an aspect of modernisation: laity is not a denial of religion, but simply an expression of freedom of conscience. It should also be remembered that the world's three great monotheist religions have a common origin: both Islam and Christianity have shared roots in the Jewish religion.

- If dialogue is to be fruitful it must be conducted free of prejudice and any claim to a monopoly on truth, morality and the 'correct' social model and must recognize the value of rich cultural diversity and, as a result, does not constitute interference in the internal affairs of any country.

- Dialogue between faiths must not mean that dialogue within faiths and cultures is neglected, or extremist and militant views may gain the upper hand: the contrasts between moderates and radicals are particularly acute in Islam.

- Intercultural debate must take account of the contribution which each culture has made to the common fund of knowledge and history; the central role of religious belief in society must be acknowledged here.

- The dialogue must not be a forum simply for the political or intellectual elite, but must involve as many sections of society as possible, especially young people and the media, who are target groups and who also pass on their thinking and experience to others.

- Intercultural dialogue must seek common ground in our approach to issues, values and priorities and to problem-solving, following the principle of international solidarity which is born of our shared history in the Mediterranean region and the current challenges which face us.

- Our search for common values should be based on agreement that civilisation means the principle of democracy, respect for human rights and human dignity, personal freedom, (religious) tolerance and the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes: the UN Millennium Declaration of 8 September 2000 is exemplary here: freedom, equality, solidarity, tolerance and respect for nature. The ideal should be a peaceful and more equitable world order based on respect for human dignity. The EU should ensure that the human rights clauses in its various agreements are complied with.

Europe needs, then, to identify what it has in common with the culture of the Islamic countries, even if this distances it from the USA. The important task which the EU must face in dealing with Islam and its extremists cannot be addressed solely through the policy of confrontation which the US Government has followed so far. Although consultation with the USA is necessary and military measures may be required in certain cases, the EU must as far as possible act through development policy and the desire for consensus and peaceful dialogue, but it must act more energetically.

Common positions must be worked out jointly with representatives of Islam in the EU and in Islamic countries on the major material, political and cultural issues of the moment: population growth, poverty, the environment, natural resources, the role of religion in public life and its reconcilability with democracy and power-sharing. Frank and honest debate is needed, not just an exchange of polite diplomatic clichés.

(g) Programmes to intensify intercultural dialogue

The MEDA programme offers a sound basis for cooperation with the Mediterranean countries in the area of culture.

The Barcelona Declaration of November 1995 already emphasises the central importance of

(1) intercultural and interfaith dialogue;
(2) the media, for conveying information on and an understanding of other cultures;
(3) promoting education and intercultural exchange.

In the conclusions of the Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Valencia on 23 April 2002 the Council of Foreign Ministers referred to the events of 9-11 and the crisis in the Middle East and called for greater efforts to be made, in cultural cooperation too, as part of the Barcelona Process. The phenomenon of terrorism should continue being addressed using a global and multidisciplinary approach, and in a spirit of partnership and solidarity.

Approval was expressed of the principle of creating a Euro-Mediterranean Foundation to promote further dialogue between cultures and civilisations. A programme of action for intercultural dialogue was also agreed. This should involve broad sections of the population, especially young people and representatives of the media, to promote mutual understanding and reduce stereotyping. The TEMPUS programme for cooperation between universities was extended to the Mediterranean countries and Netd@ys and *e*Learning activities such as school twinning were extended to more countries in the Mediterranean.

To date numerous projects have been aided as part of regional programmes on cultural heritage, audiovisual cooperation and a programme of youth exchanges. The Community also funds cultural activities organised by the Commission delegations in the 12

Mediterranean partner states, various conferences for representatives of civil society, press fact-finding visits to the EU institutions in Brussels and journalist training.

Educational programmes should encourage school and university teaching to give greater emphasis to the different cultures, civilisations and religions, as a way of acknowledging cultural diversity. Areas of focus should include building awareness of the benefits of peace, democracy and religion, relations with the secular state, human rights, gender equality, solidarity, foreign languages, art and literature (exhibitions of painting and sculpture, film, theatre, musical events).

The most immediate need is to train the teachers. They above all must be motivated and trained. As far as possible both sides should be involved in the planning of events. The Jean Monnet Project is ideally suited to handle these, as it can act in the EU's name. It should be given the necessary resources.

Possible activities include exchange programmes, bursaries, meetings, training seminars, conferences, congresses for the wider public, development projects, meetings between members of different religious communities to identify and explore shared common values, scientific cooperation, exchanges and training for journalists, seminars for professors, artists, businessmen and representatives of civil society on cultural and social issues of the moment.

Meetings between leaders of different faiths are held worldwide. A good example of multifaith cooperation of this kind is the United Religions Initiative, which groups representatives of all the main world faiths and seeks to promote discussion and tolerance. Its network spans the world. This movement has produced a charter outlining principles of mutual understanding. Differing views ought not to result in conflict. Everyone is entitled to 'his own' form of spirituality. In March 2002 this movement was welcomed as a guest of the European Parliament.

Public meetings of the kind described should be the vehicle for an active policy of information. Partnerships between representatives of civil society must be encouraged to reduce inequalities and promote employment, for women and young people in particular. Representatives of the social partners should be targeted here. Chairs in history and the social sciences could be endowed to conduct appropriate research on both shores of the Mediterranean. Politicians and leading figures in civil society should be encouraged to take part because of their influence on public opinion.

One area of focus should be youth exchanges. Young people tend to be more open to new ways of thinking and will one day determine their countries' destinies. The Commission has drawn up a programme for this (EUROMED-Youth). EU aid projects carried out jointly by European and Arab young people in Islamic countries have proved very beneficial. Private initiatives should also be encouraged (networks, voyages of cultural discovery and exploration) to familiarise young people in the West with the rich cultural heritage of North Africa. There are the many archaeological sites, places where people

can come together and share a broad range of scientific knowledge. The Commission has plans for a Euromed heritage programme.

From the EU point of view, this kind of dialogue can only hope to be successful if it is serious and credible and shows respect for the other culture. A measure of our credibility abroad will be the way in which we treat Muslims in Europe. They should be encouraged to play an active part in shaping social and political life, beyond the boundaries of their own culture. This requires a willingness on both sides to exchange ideas and work together.

11. Role of the media

The role of the media in international cooperation and in bringing different cultures together is a decisive one and a heavy responsibility.

On 3 June 2002 the Austrian Foreign Ministry held a specialist seminar on the role of the media in intercultural dialogue between the EU and Mediterranean states, as part of the Action Plan agreed in Valencia in April 2002 under the Barcelona Process. It was attended by journalists from radio and television, the press, and writers and scientists of varying disciplines and persuasions (philosophy, politics, sociology). Journalists from Al-Jazeera and CNN did not take up the invitation.

The results (conclusions and recommendations) may be summarised as follows:

- The pictures portrayed in the media, the way in which they are selected, presented and commented on, have a very powerful influence in shaping public opinion. The resulting public perceptions can influence or justify government action, so it is important that reporting should be as independent, objective and balanced as possible.

- The media should present difference as something that enriches, not threatens. Since news reporting has to provide a 'quick fix', it is far too one-sided, usually focusing only on the sensational and brutal. Attention should also be paid to things which are not spectacular, such as the many private organisations which work to forge understanding and give help in e.g. the Middle Eastern conflict, well beyond their national and cultural boundaries. For the most part the media talk up conflicts rather than point to ways of overcoming them. The factor of religion is also very neglected (or misrepresented) because it is less significant in the industrialised countries. Efforts should be made to strengthen moderate forces rather than emphasising differences.

- Inappropriate stereotypes and generalisations should be avoided, in the interests of critical analysis and a wide range of views. Often, it was claimed, world opinion was dominated by a country which was unfit for the role, because of its bias and frequently observed superficiality. This was a cause of concern especially to the Arab world. The EU ought to impose its own values more, even

if this opened up a distance between itself and the USA. The southern press should be more widely available in the North. The choice of interlocutors in the Arab countries was very one-sided, which meant that the same old clichés kept on being repeated. The uncertainties on both sides were more important than the cultural differences between them. The conflicting parties were demonised (for the most part by one side) and dehumanised. Conclusions were overhasty, and proper analysis suffered as a result. The presentation on screen and on paper (TV and newspapers) of the background to events, the history, causes and effects, was totally inadequate. The causes were rooted more in social and humanitarian issues and nationalism than in cultural differences. In the Middle East conflict, for example, the problem of the occupation was played down too much. There was too much reporting on Islam but not enough quality reporting. Many journalists lacked the necessary sound historical knowledge. The EU ought to fund training on both sides (colleges of journalism). The Lorenzo Natali prize awarded to journalists for services to peace was welcome and beneficial. There was praise for the reporting of Al-Jazeera and its contribution towards democracy. More frequent programmes in English would be welcomed.

- The interdependence of North and South should be correctly represented, allowing people to appreciate the pressures which the EU cannot ultimately escape – demographic trends in the North mean that immigration is necessary if living standards are to be maintained. In some Arab countries there is 50% youth unemployment.

- Recognition of the other culture must also take the form of learning its language. This must not be a one-way traffic: the dominance of English means that Anglo-American culture also gains ground. More books in Arabic should be translated. The balance between the dissemination of Arab literature in Europe and that of European literature in the Arab world is skewed very much in one direction. This imbalance must be corrected by book fairs and by money for translations.

- Given the dominant role of the media, especially television, in shaping and spreading opinions, it should be used more to publicise programmes of cultural exchange and the kind of events listed earlier. Exchanges of views and 'public' debates on issues of common interest can also be conducted via the Internet, where a web site could be set up for contributions which anyone interested could then access.

The wide publication of measures such as these ensures that they have a broader impact.

CONCLUSIONS

- The attacks of 9-11 2001 impacted indirectly on the developing countries by making the economic situation even worse and so pushing down demand for goods and services still further in the industrialised countries. They also had the direct effect of causing wholesale collapse in the tourism and transport sectors. Effects are likely to be long-term since, whilst the threat persists, confidence in normal economic processes, chiefly trade with certain supplier countries and direct investment, will continue to be shaky.

- The attacks were the culmination of a long series of attacks by Muslim extremists on Western, chiefly American, interests. The threat has altered radically since the Al-Qaeda organisation began operating, as this organisation, unlike earlier isolated terrorist groups, has built up a well-funded worldwide network training thousands of fighters in camps in Afghanistan.

- The attacks appear to have been prompted by a desire to resist the Americans, who were resented as invaders of the holy places of Islam in Saudi Arabia and the military superpower, especially in the Gulf region. These motives are justified primarily by the exhortation in the Koran to destroy the Jews and Christians through *jihad* and thus also by the Palestinian liberation struggle. A further emotional motive is hatred and contempt for Western civilisation and decadence, as symbolised by the USA in the perpetrators' view.

- The attacks have deepened the ambivalence of US relations with rulers in the Gulf region, especially Saudi Arabia, who on the one hand (and so far) have reliably guaranteed oil supplies to Western countries but who on the other hand fund Islamic interests worldwide including those which increasingly threaten the West.

- The attacks ushered in a new era in international relations, in which a large number of states are working together worldwide in a more vigorous effort to defeat terrorism (the coalition against terror). The European Council and European Parliament have expressed firm solidarity with the USA.

- Whilst the US Government is sharply stepping up its military spending, contemplating a mainly military response to the terrorist attacks, has toppled the criminal Taliban regime in Afghanistan with the help of its allies and is advocating a pre-emptive strike to remove the regime in Iraq, an increasing number of the governments which make up the coalition against terror favour a carefully considered and peaceful approach to overcoming the root causes of terror.

- There is an increasing willingness worldwide to use force in pursuit of political aims, created by unbridled nationalistic aspirations or ethnic or religious conflicts taking place against a background of a socioeconomic struggle for resources.

Where there is a democratic deficit and a lack of proper internal crisis management these conflicts erupt and may even lead to the collapse of law and order.

- The terrorist attacks of 9-11 are certainly acts of Islamic terrorism, but Islam cannot be equated with terror. The faith of Islam and the majority of moderate Muslims cannot be held collectively responsible for the acts of a few extremists who misappropriate passages of the Koran to justify acts of violence.

- The Islamic world is currently in a critical phase of pressure to modernise, which is intensifying the traditional tensions between the various branches of the faith (though modernisation does not have to mean westernisation only). Extremists who are prepared to use force exploit these religious tensions to gain a leadership role. They are helped here by the twofold role of Islam as a secular and religious force and by the susceptibility of poor, uneducated and indoctrinated people to manipulation.

- As the leading world player in development aid the EU, through a coherent and long-term development policy which is coordinated with its foreign and external economic policy, can help to balance the interests of North and South, build democracy, enforce the observance of human rights and ensure solidly based institutions of state in the developing countries, as well as improving people's material living conditions and opportunities for education. To this extent a coherent and credible development policy helps to prevent conflict.

- Any scaling down of bodies within the EU Council of Ministers and merging of development with foreign policy creates a risk of development considerations being seen as less important in the decision-making process or even ignored altogether. The attacks of 9-11 prove that long-term coherent development cooperation is vital, and so the Council of Development Ministers must be retained as a separate body.

- The MEDA programme based on the Barcelona Declaration of 27 and 28 November 1995 and the resolutions adopted at the Valencia Euro-Mediterranean conference of 22 and 23 April 2002 are seen as an excellent framework for successful cooperation with the Arab/Muslim world of the southern Mediterranean states.

- There can, however, be no significant progress on this cooperation and on achieving a comprehensive balance with the Arab world until a fair and peaceful settlement of the Middle Eastern conflict is reached. The Palestinian liberation struggle (in view too of the continuing problem of refugees, especially in the neighbouring states) inevitably has an effect of strengthening solidarity amongst the Arab nations which overshadows all relations with the Arab world.

- The EU should throw its full political weight into seeking a swift resolution of the conflict. To that end it needs to speak with one voice and must not leave it to the Americans, whose bias in favour of Israel has hampered the search for a settlement.

- There is an urgent need for state establishments to provide basic services in a number of Arab/Muslim countries. Where the government has failed to do this, poor groups of the population become dependent on religious, charitable establishments headed by religious leaders, who can mobilise the people for their own ends and who by solving social problems seek popular support on their way to taking power. The picture is similar with centres of education, many of which – in Pakistan especially – are religious foundations under the control of powerful religious leaders.

- In view of the specific nature of the threat, measures to be considered thus include measures to alleviate poverty, improve education and training opportunities, introduce greater democracy and intensify intercultural dialogue.

- Intercultural dialogue with secular and spiritual leaders of the Islamic world will help to further understanding here, in pursuit of peaceful coexistence and the joint resolution of international problems, which requires an attitude of basic solidarity with other countries and cultures. This dialogue requires first of all that both sides should critically examine their own value systems and their own priorities. Fruitful dialogue also presupposes openness, tolerance and respect vis-à-vis the partner's culture, traditions and religious beliefs – which thus require no justification. Dialogue must not constitute interference in the internal affairs of other states. Meaningful dialogue must be aimed at achieving understanding and so must not exclude the discussion of fundamental issues such as democracy, the dignity of human life and human rights, gender equality and the fair and peaceful reconciliation of opposing interests. Civil society as well as the intellectual elite must have a voice in the dialogue, to be fostered through programmes.

- The media have an important responsibility in furthering understanding between cultures, and must be made aware of this. Governments often take decisions under pressure of public opinion, which is significantly influenced by the media. Conflicts are usually reported in a superficial and sensationalist way which does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the subject or serve the public's need to be informed. Content should be presented as objectively as possible, reflecting the opinions of the parties to the conflict and with an analysis of the causes and motives. Very often journalists are not sufficiently well briefed or educated in the historic and cultural background to events and so cannot evaluate them properly. Training seminars held in the context of intercultural dialogue would thus be a good thing.

ENDNOTES

[1] See ACP-EU Joint Assembly resolution of 1 November 2001, OJ C 78, 2.4.2002, p. 53.
[2] Cf. OECD, Economic Consequences of Terrorism, 2002.
[3] See also ACP-EU Joint Assembly resolution of 1 November 2001, OJ C 78, 2.4.2002, p. 81.
[4] Cf. also St Bernard's contribution to the 'Primitive Rule of Order' of the Knights Templar, in which he says that 'knights may kill the enemies of the cross without sinning'.
[5] States where Shari'ah is applied either fully or in part: Saudi Arabia, The United Arab Emirates, Oman, Iraq, Sudan, Yemen, Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Nigeria.
[6] Significantly, the ideas of Plato and Aristotle had no determining influence on the Islamic faith, even though it was the Arabs who introduced the writings of these two Greek philosophers to the West.
[7] COM(2000) 212.
[8] Of 1 March 2001, OJ C 277, 1.10.2001, p. 130.
[9] Cf. Commission communication of 2 May 2001 on building an effective partnership with the United Nations in the fields of development and humanitarian affairs, COM(2001) 231.
[10] Egypt, Algeria, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Palestinian Authority, Cyprus; Libya was granted observer status in the Barcelona Process on 16 April 1999.
[11] Of 27 November 2000, OJ C 135, 7.5.2001, p. 171.
[12] Cf. the Morillon/Cohn-Bendit report dated 11 June 2002.
[13] ABl. C284E of 21 November 2002, p. 108.
[14] COM(2001) 252; see also Commission report on the implementation of the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights in 2000 (SEC(2001) 801).
[15] *loc. cit.*
[16] Algeria, Egypt, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen, Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Palestine, Philippines, Pakistan, Chechnya, Indonesia and Bangladesh.
[17] Of 13 December 2001, OJ C 177E, 25.7.2002, p. 291; see also Commission communication COM(2001) 211.
[18] See also Art. 11 of the Cotonou Agreement.
[19] See the van den Berg report dated 5 February 2002 and report from the Commission (Humanitarian Aid Office - ECHO) - annual report 2001, 3 July 2002, COM (2002) 322.
[20] Cf. Commission communication of 24 April 2002 (COM(2002) 212, also the conclusions of the 1995 UN conference in Copenhagen and follow-up conference in 2000 and the Nirj Deva report on trade and development for poverty eradication and food security, adopted by the Committee on Development and Cooperation on 11 June 2002.
[21] Main development goals named in the Millennium Declaration are the halving of the number of poor people, access to primary schooling for all children and a two-thirds reduction in infant mortality.
[22] *loc. cit.*
[23] Cf. also ACP-EU Joint Assembly resolution of 1 November 2001, OJ C 78, 2.4.2002, p. 53.

[24] COM(2002) 129.
[25] Cf. Commission communication of 6 March 2002 on education and training in the context of poverty reduction in developing countries, COM(2002) 116.
[26] See also opinion of the Committee on Budgets on the L. Morgantini report concerning conclusion of the 10th EC-UNRWA Convention, A5-0010/1999, ABl. C054 of 25 February 2000, p. 106.