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Annual Report
Horn of Africa Regional Action Plan
2015/2016

INTRODUCTION

The EU Horn of Africa Regional Action Plan (RAP) 2015-2020 was adopted on 26 October 2015 by the Foreign Affairs Council. It outlined the EU's comprehensive approach to addressing the key security, political and development issues in the region, building on the EU's 2011 Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa.

The **Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy for the European Union**¹, launched after the adoption of the Action Plan, provided an overarching political framework for the EU's external policy actions to tackle the nexus between security and development and the development-migration nexus. The Global Strategy goes hand in hand with the transformative ambition of the Sustainable Development Goals and the proposed **European Consensus on Development**² that guide the EU's development engagement. The November 2015 **Valletta Political Declaration**, the Joint Action Plan³ and the **Khartoum and Rabat processes** raised awareness of the consequences of unmanaged migration, including trafficking in human beings, providing a framework for cooperation on migration between Europe and Africa and the basis for the Partnership Framework. The need to increase efforts in addressing trafficking in human beings and smuggling of migrants has been highlighted in the Joint Conclusions adopted during the February 2017 Summit on Migration in Valletta.

One year on, the objectives of the Action Plan remain valid. Appraising short term results of the EU's actions is difficult, given the longer engagements required to bring about political and developmental achievements. It can however be said that the Valletta Summit enhanced the dialogue with African partners on migration management. The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF)⁴, an important tool in taking forward the Partnership Framework, has helped to accelerate the EU's support to the most vulnerable groups and enhance resilience, as well as address trafficking in human beings for all forms of exploitation and smuggling of migrants and improve migration management.

The present report covers the period since the adoption of the RAP in October 2015 until December 2016. It is a joint document by the Commission Services, the European External Action Service and the EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa. The purpose of the report is to describe the EU's major engagement with partner countries and regional partner organizations in the implementation of the Regional Action Plan.

I PROGRESS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EU ACTIONS OF THE FIVE PRIORITIES

In much of the Horn region, there has been a significant deterioration in political stability during the reporting period. Instability was sparked by domestic developments in several countries, including Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan and Ethiopia. Somalia concluded its electoral process successfully, notwithstanding persistent security threats. The eruption of substantial violence in South Sudan since the summer of 2016 undermined efforts to achieve peace and stability in Africa's youngest state.

¹ http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf.

² https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/communication-proposal-new-consensus-development-20161122_en.pdf.

³ <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/11/12-valletta-final-docs/>.

⁴ http://www.eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf.

Ethiopia's most serious social and ethnic unrest for 25 years sparked a state of emergency in October 2016. Whilst the underlying causes of instability were mostly country-specific, they had transboundary effects across the region, extending to Europe. Large-scale displacements of populations and migration, coupled with large numbers of disenfranchised jobless youths with no perspectives provided a breeding ground for radicalization.

The full range of instruments and measures - diplomacy, Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and development co-operation – were put to use in response to these challenges and in the pursuit of the RAP's objectives. The EU intensified its diplomatic and political engagement at all levels, mainly through the good offices of the EU's Special Representative for the Horn, bilateral meetings between the High Representative/ Vice President (HRVP) and her African counterparts and Art. 8 political dialogues under the Cotonou Agreement. Outreach activities had a strong focus on protracted crisis situations in South Sudan and Sudan but embraced also Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) country partners. The EU maintains its engagement through CSDP missions and operation as a contribution to addressing security challenges and promoting stability in the region. It also engaged regionally with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and pursued co-operation with the African Union (AU). Political efforts went hand in hand with substantive development measures funded by different external financing instruments, such as the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP)⁵, the humanitarian aid Regulation⁶ and the European Development Fund⁷ as well as the implementation through the EU Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa (EUTF)⁸, the latter also including pledges from Member States and other donors.

1. REGIONAL SECURITY AND STABILITY

IGAD remained an active regional player in the peace building processes of South Sudan and Somalia. The EU remained the principal donor to the regional body with EUR 80 million implemented through the EU Trust Fund for Africa, of which EUR 40 million earmarked to measures dedicated to support IGAD's role on sustainable peace, security and stability. Measures include support to IGAD's conflict early warning and response system; strengthening the region's ability to address transnational security threats, including violent extremism and organised crime; enhancing the engagement of IGAD and governments in the region in preventive diplomacy, through training and the strengthening of the IGAD Mediation Support Unit. In addition, IGAD received two separate EU grants for peacebuilding work of its Somalia facilitation office operations of the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangement Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM).

IGAD will also be closely involved in a EUR 63.9 million Trust Fund project on collaboration in four cross-border areas of the region, specifically through activities that promote peace and prevent conflict, and support greater economic development and resilience, particularly among vulnerable groups.

⁵ Regulation (EU) No 230/2014, OJ L77, 15.3.2014, p. 1.

⁶ Council Regulation (EC) No 1257/96, OJ L163, 2.7.1996, p. 1.

⁷ [Insert reference to 11th EDF Internal Agreement]

⁸ Commission Decision C(2015)7293.

The three **CSDP missions /operation** deployed in the region, concentrated on Somalia, constituted a central part of the EU and Member States measures to address security. In the first quarter of 2016 a holistic and coordinated Strategic Review of CSDP engagement in Somalia and the Horn of Africa was carried out. As a result, the mandates of the three missions/operation were extended until December 2018 and adapted as required. The **EU Training Mission Somalia** (EUTM Somalia)⁹ completed its fourth mandate at the end of the reporting period during which the mission's training pillar focused mainly on the provision of individual and specialised training to Somali National Army (SNA) soldiers. Several constraints affected the mission's ability to measure its effects, including the lack of an agreed Somali national security architecture, missing structures and basic human resources management functions within the SNA and the lack of a commonly established training doctrine and policy. The mission's advisory and mentoring pillar provided strategic level advice to Somalia's Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the General Staff. Slow political decision-making, limited Somali absorption capacities and security related access constraints appeared to the disadvantage of the mission's effectiveness. Within its fifth mandate from 2017 onwards, the EUTM Somalia contributes to operationalize Somali integrated SNA units, with a priority of delivering effective and sustainable security in Somalia.

The **Operation ATALANTA**¹⁰ contributed to the suppression of piracy off the coast of Somalia, with a 100% success rate in protecting World Food Programme (WFP) shipping to Somalia. No successful pirate attacks took place against merchant vessels since May 2012. This was thanks to the presence of international naval forces, the adoption of Best Management Practices by most merchant vessels and the embarkation of privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel on merchant vessels. As a consequence, pirate networks and leaders have been diverted to other legal and illegal activities. It is clear however that root causes of piracy remain and the threat continues to exist. Hence the Council's decision was taken to extend the operation by two years, keeping its focus on counter-piracy.

Since 2015, EUCAP Nestor has transitioned to a Somalia only (including Somaliland) mission and been rebranded as **EUCAP Somalia**¹¹. In December 2016 the Council extended the mission's mandate to end 2018 and redefined its statement in reflection of current Somali priorities and challenges in tackling a wide set of maritime security threats beyond piracy. The Mission assists Somalia in developing its maritime civilian law enforcement and coast guard capabilities necessary to improve maritime security. The Mission operates primarily with the Federal Government of Somalia and the Puntland and Somaliland authorities, with headquarters in Mogadishu, field offices in Hargeisa (Somaliland) and Garowe (Puntland) and a back office in Nairobi. The Mission's desired end state is that policy and legal frameworks for maritime civilian law enforcement are in place and that Somali federal and regional capacities are sufficiently robust to cover the range of coast guard functions, including counter piracy and policing of the coastal zone, and to deliver security to enable the economic development of the maritime sector.

⁹ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32011D0483&qid=1493392832008&from=EN>.

¹⁰ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014D0827&from=EN>.

¹¹ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32016D2240>.

The African Union also contributed to maritime security in the Horn, with the adoption of the 2016 Lomé Agreement which gave a new impetus to regional strategies on maritime security. Maintaining security of territorial waters, waterways and coasts is also a challenge for the sub-regional bodies.

Country to country activities

Despite continuous security challenges and delays, **Somalia** embarked upon an electoral process in October 2016. The EU repeatedly emphasized the importance of finding an acceptable balance between maintaining the electoral timetable and ensuring a transparent and accountable process, in line with the EU Council Conclusions of July 2016¹². The EU deployed an Election Expert Mission that assessed the regulatory electoral framework and provided recommendations for the 2020 universal elections. With the formation of the HirShabelle Administration in October 2016, the federal map was almost completed. It remained to be fully implemented with the development of local administrations and capacities. The Commission supported an inclusive and transparent state formation process with a EUR 4.58 million IcSP funded project building confidence between the Federal Government of Somalia and Somaliland and re-establishing local administrations at district level¹³. The National Leadership Forum comprising Presidents of the federal entities and the Federal President gained traction in 2015/2016 with the help of international partners. It evolved into an efficient consensus building platform and was instrumental in the preparation of the electoral process as well as agreement on security related matters like the adoption of the National Security Policy and the New Policing Model.

Al Shabaab remained a significant threat to the country's security throughout 2015/2016, in particular during the electoral process. The African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) played a critical role in providing security to the political process in Somalia; its presence remains essential. AMISOM's Concept of Operations, revised in June 2016, reflects efforts to enhance co-operation with Somali National Armed Forces in view of the transfer of security responsibilities to the Somali authorities in 2018. The EU maintained its support and commitment to the AUC's AMISOM operation through the African Peace Facility, with over EUR 200 million from the European Development Fund (EDF) in 2016. Together with Somali authorities and Somalia's main donors on security, the EU worked on the development of Somalia's security sector to enable AMISOM's eventual withdrawal.

Efforts in Prevent/ Counter Violent Extremism gained increased attention in 2016 with the launch of the **'Somali National Strategy and Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism'** in September 2016. The Commission provided technical assistance supporting the establishment of the plan. Furthermore, the EU was appointed CVE-lead within the S-6, i.e. the six main security supporters in Somalia.

The EU was also a lead partner and supporter of Somalia's recovery and stabilisation efforts, including through the 'New Deal Compact', with EUR 286 million from the 11th European Development Fund (EDF). The funds from the 2016 Annual Action Programme were fully committed. A EUR 5.5 million IcSP project focused on the stability in South-Central Somalia supporting the Federal Government of Somalia to deliver social, economic, and political stability and community driven peace dividends. In the context of migration, support to the migration and security sector

¹² <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11355-2016-INIT/en/pdf>.

¹³ Commission decision C(2016)1361.

could contribute to the positive implementation of the Valletta Plan of Action, including by more effective targeting of the organised criminal gangs and networks facilitating the migration routes.¹⁴

After the 2016 electoral process, the EU's priority will shift towards encouraging the political commitment and implementation of the national security architecture, linked with stabilisation efforts, notably in the regions. In the course of 2016 the EU started the reflection on improved support to the security sector in Somalia. A EUR 2.1 million IcSP funded project was designed to assist the Somali Ministry of Defence to exercise civilian control of the Somali National Armed Forces.¹⁵ In the spirit of the comprehensive approach, the IcSP support complemented the European Union Training Mission Somalia (EUTM) with a focus on civilian personnel' and parliamentary committee's capacity to fulfil their responsibilities in this area.

Sudan's 'National Dialogue' was launched by President Bashir in October 2015. Bashir called on the non-signatories, opposition and the rebel movements to sign the national document and join in implementation of the recommendations. The consistent message was passed to the opposition that the National Dialogue represented their best chance of entering a meaningful political dialogue with the government, despite their understandable misgivings. In August 2016, most of the constituent members of the opposition umbrella grouping "Sudan Call" signed the Roadmap Agreement for talks, presented by the AU High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP). The government extended the ceasefire unilaterally for another three months until the end of 2016. Throughout the process, the EU maintained close contact with the AUHIP chairman, former President Mbeki. The Dialogue was officially closed in October 2016 by a National Conference, which produced more than 900 recommendations. A cessation of hostilities agreement and an agreement on humanitarian access still need to be reached in the two areas.

The AUHIP remains a critical partner in achieving progress in Sudan; the EU is working to ensure ongoing EU financial support for its efforts. In April 2016, the European Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development, Neven Mimica, visited Khartoum, the first Commissioner to visit the country since 2011. The visit took place in the context of the High Level Dialogue on migration as Sudan is a major hub for migration. The dialogue is an opportunity to encourage measures tackling root causes of migration, cooperation on readmission and reducing the migrant smuggling/trafficking routes linking the Horn/East Africa to Egypt and Libya. The Commissioner announced the 'Special Measure for Sudan' worth €100 million from the reserve of the 11th EDF. The main objective of this EUR 100 million support package implemented through the EUTF is to help those in need in East Sudan, Darfur and the Transitional Areas of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, through increasing access of vulnerable people, including internally displaced people, refugees and returnees, to jobs, education and health. It is planned also to contribute to tackling the root causes of instability, irregular migration and displacement. The EU took a decision to support peacebuilding and stabilisation in Sudan, in particular at the border with South Sudan with an IcSP funded project (EUR 13.5 million) notably by supporting peace talks focussing particularly on Abyei, Darfur and Blue Nile states and mitigating tense cross-border relations among pastoralist and sedentary communities.

¹⁴ Commission decision C(2014)9580.

¹⁵ Commission decision C(2016)1361.

The situation in **South Sudan** remained extremely volatile. The formation of a Transitional Government of National Unity in April 2016 was followed by an outbreak of severe fighting in July; although calm returned to Juba, fighting continues in many regions. The humanitarian situation remained extremely grave, with about six million people in need of humanitarian assistance. The Commission adopted in December 2016 an IcSP decision (EUR 5 million) to address the grievances of mixed communities (Internally Displaced People, refugees, host communities and returnees).¹⁶

The EU underlined its grave concern at the situation in conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Council of 23 May¹⁷, 18 July¹⁸, and 12 December 2016¹⁹ and in a statement of the High Representative on behalf of the EU on 20 September 2016. The EU stressed the need for the parties to implement all aspects of the 2015 peace agreement, for the economic resources of South Sudan to be used responsibly, for all parties to allow unimpeded humanitarian access to those in need and for perpetrators of gross human rights violations to be held accountable. The statements and Council Conclusions were complemented by a EUR 10 million decision to support peacebuilding and stabilization including with peace-dialogue and rehabilitation activities in communities affected by the conflicts. The EU worked closely with the peace monitoring bodies established under the peace agreement. In particular, the Commission provided a grant of EUR 2.6 million to support the activities and core operations of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) as well as a grant of EUR 9.16 million to support the operations of the CTSAMM. The EU also encouraged the African Union to move forward rapidly with the establishment of the Hybrid Court for South Sudan. Moreover, the Commission provided financial support of EUR 763,000 to the mediation and shuttle diplomacy activities of the AU High Representative for South Sudan and the AU High Level ad hoc Committee of Heads of State and Government on South Sudan. The Commission also supported with EUR 2 million the South Sudan Council of Churches (SSCC) in the implementation of its Action Plan for Peace. The EU and a number of associated countries continued to implement an arms embargo against South Sudan. These measures went hand in hand with the delivery of EU development assistance to the South Sudanese population in the fields of rural development, health and education. Within the EUTF, three actions on local public finance management, health and education were approved in December 2015 for a total value of EUR 77.6 million.²⁰

Concerning Eritrea, the signature of the EUR 200 million National Indicative Programme (NIP) in January 2016 was a sign of commitment on both sides to take forward economic development and governance reforms. Hence the NIP strikes a balance between measures to improve the livelihoods of the Eritrean population and addressing governance and human rights issues. The EEAS continued to engage in dialogue with the Government of the State of Eritrea in a quest for reforms, in particular on the national service, which represented a key cause of migration. But little if any progress on national reforms, governance and the economy could be claimed.

¹⁶ Commission decision C(2016)8401.

¹⁷ <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2016/05/23/>.

¹⁸ <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2016/07/18/>.

¹⁹ <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2016/12/12/>.

²⁰ The funding for South Sudan originates from de-committed funds from the 9th and previous EDFs made available to South Sudan under Council Decisions 2011/315/EU of 23 May 2011 and 2010/406 of 12 July 2010.

The energy sector features prominently in the NIP under the 11th EDF to assist in establishing a reliable, affordable and sustainable energy service so as to remove one of the most critical constraints to poverty alleviation. The EU will further support the government's capacity to manage and plan macro-economic and public financial issues so as to help improve productivity and employment. The governance and Public Financial Management (PFM) programme will go hand in hand with a regular EU-Eritrea political dialogue under Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement.

Ethiopia continued to be a crucial partner for the EU in upholding regional peace and security through its active role in Somalia and South Sudan. The country maintained its open door policy towards refugees, hosting the largest refugee community in Africa with close to 780,000 refugees as of November 2016. In support of Ethiopia's welcoming refugee policy, the Commission provides substantial support to resilience, refugees and job creation implemented through the EUTF (EUR 119.5 million), making Ethiopia the largest beneficiary of the EUTF's Horn of Africa window.

At the UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants in 2016, Ethiopia committed to improving livelihood opportunities for refugees in the country, including by reserving 30% of 100,000 jobs in two planned industrial parks for refugees. The EU expressed its willingness to provide financial support for these parks, in addition to the EUR 30 million Regional Development and Protection Programme for Ethiopia under implementation. Finally, Ethiopia took over the chairmanship of the Khartoum process on 15 December 2016, which was expected to help build synergies with the AU Horn of Africa Initiative on Trafficking and Smuggling where Ethiopia is also an active participant.

Given this essential regional role, in June 2016 the EU reinforced its dialogue with Ethiopia with the signature of a Joint Declaration entitled '*Towards an EU-Ethiopia Strategic Engagement*', committing both sides to an annual Ministerial and six sectoral dialogues.²¹

However, the internal situation in Ethiopia deteriorated since November 2015, with peaceful protests met by a strong security response from the Government. Violent unrest in different parts of the country in early October 2016 led to the imposition of a State of Emergency, limiting freedom of expression, association, and movement. Violence is prone to erupt again if the socio-economic and political grievances are not met with strong and swift political reforms.

Uganda, a stable anchor in a complex and troubled region, remained an important partner on peace and security in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region. Uganda contributed substantially to regional stability by providing troops to AMISOM and to the AU Regional Task Force against the Lord's Resistance Army. Furthermore, President Museveni is the mediator of the East African Community (EAC) in the inter-Burundian dialogue. The EU's political dialogue with Uganda also extends to regional matters. To underpin Uganda's regional efforts, the EU supported Uganda's immediate and mid-term stability by helping the country to boost development in the still fragile Northern regions. Further measures aim at strengthening the government's capacity to host huge numbers of refugees, enhancing the State's capacity to deliver good governance, democracy and rule of law, and supporting job creation through support to clean, green, competitive and low-carbon businesses and value chains. Programmes have undergone thorough gender-mainstreaming in the

²¹ http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2175_en.htm.

framework of an innovative trilateral cooperation between UN Women, the National Authorizing Officer and the EU Delegation.

With **Kenya**, the EU reinforced its dialogue and co-operation in 2016, with the launch of the Cotonou Article 8 Political Dialogue in February and over a dozen high level meetings, including with the Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs Amina Mohamed. The EU's support for transparent, credible and peaceful elections in 2017 was a prominent point of bilateral discussions. Given that Kenya has been a target of violent extremism, CVE is an important topic of exchange. Kenya remained an important regional actor on security and migration with the provision of troops to the UN Peacekeeping Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). Some 500,000 refugees from the region were accommodated across several refugee camps. The possibility of the Dadaab refugee camp closure in May 2017 will without any doubt adversely affect security and stability in the region.

Despite a controversial presidential election, **Djibouti** remains an anchor of stability in the Horn not only due to its strategic geographical position and as host to IGAD's headquarters, but also due to its important role in countering terrorism. Djibouti is a key contributor to AMISOM and as a consequence has suffered terrorist attacks. Djibouti hosts the EU CSDP mission Atalanta.

In recent years, Djibouti has seen large flows of refugees and migrants transiting through the country, mainly from Yemen and Ethiopia. To support Djibouti tackle this situation, a EUR 10 million EUTF project was approved in 2016 in order to support job creation and social integration, particularly amongst youth ('Professionnaliser les jeunes et les entreprises dans la filière transport-logistique-portuaire'). In parallel, projects related to resilience and sanitation are being developed.

2. COUNTER -RADICALISATION AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Countering Terrorism (CT) and the Prevention and Countering of violent extremism (P/CVE) is a topic that has increased in importance over the year. The EU institutions pursued a two pronged approach. At the global level, the EU assumed a proactive role as Co-chair of the **Global Counter Terrorism Forum (GCTF) Working Group for the Horn of Africa**, alongside Turkey. The 2016 annual plenary meeting in Djibouti allowed an exchange of information on the latest developments regarding CT and P/CVE efforts as well as identification of areas of mutual co-operation and support. The plenary meeting was preceded by a Symposium on the topic of 'CVE and Youth', organised by the European Commission) on behalf of the Turkish and EU Co-Chairs and with the help of 'CT Morse' project. A local GCTF Horn of Africa working group co-ordination mechanism was established with a view to keeping the momentum created with local actors and ensuring pertinent local actions and follow up in the inter-sessional period.

The EU's multilateral actions were reinforced by a large number of regional and country specific projects funded under different EU instruments with the aim of strengthening and equipping partner countries to analyse the causes of CVE and to regulate, formulate and implement CVE effective policies. In addition to specific CVE projects carried out with IcSP funds, a total of EUR 21.3 million was committed under the EUTF during the reporting period with direct relevance to the implementation of the priority of counter radicalisation and violent extremism.

With the EU's support to the 'Blueprint'-project funded under the IcSP (EUR 1.5 million), Somalia launched its 'Somali National Strategy and Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent

Extremism' in September 2016.²² The Strategy was developed under the leadership of the Somali government appointed CVE co-ordinator through an inclusive process involving federal government and regional administrations, youth, CSOs, women and religious leaders. Ahead of the finalisation of the CVE Strategy, a EUR 5 million project was implemented from April under the EU Trust Fund to promote tolerance and dialogue in Somalia as well as to support implementation of the strategy. The EU was further entrusted with the lead of CVE issues within the S-6 (core supporters of the Somali security sector, EU, Turkey, UK, United Arab Emirates, UN, USA)

In November 2016, the Commission adopted a EUR 1.7 million IcSP funded regional project to mitigate violent extremism in the Horn of Africa through tailor-made advisory services by a network of primarily African experts to identify drivers of violent extremism and assess the effectiveness of current responses.²³ The aim is to develop, operationalise and improve national strategies in preventing and countering violent extremism.

The 'STRIVE Horn of Africa' project (EUR 2 million under the IcSP) entered its final stage of implementation in autumn 2016, strengthening resilience to violent extremism in Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia. The aim of the project was to develop best practices around CVE programming in the Horn of Africa based on short pilot activities and provide recommendations to increase the impact and focus of interventions. On that basis a lessons learned conference took place in Brussels on 24 November 2016. A conflict prevention and peace building project for Kenya for EUR 12 million implemented under the EUTF was launched on 1 October 2016, which builds on results and lessons learned from the first STRIVE project.

In February 2016, the Commission launched the project 'Law Enforcement capacity on counterterrorism in the Greater Horn of Africa and Yemen'. The EUR 11 million IcSP project aimed at enhancing law enforcement capacity on counterterrorism in the Greater Horn of Africa Region and Yemen, in line with human rights and the rule of law. Activities primarily focused on the development of counterterrorism information facility in Somalia, improving criminal intelligence capabilities and strengthening the capacity of law enforcement and relevant officials to investigate and prosecute terrorism-related cases.

The IcSP-funded project 'Countering the financing of terrorism in the Horn of Africa' (EUR 6 million) implemented in 2016 focuses on building the capacity of the financial sector to meet international standards on Countering the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) and Anti-Money Laundering (AML).

In October 2016, the Commission launched a EUTF project in Kampala to strengthen social cohesion and stability in slum populations, benefitting 1,000 young people in four slums of Kampala over 3.5 years. The EUR 4.3 million project focuses on preventing radicalisation and violence within slum communities, enhancing co-operation between communities, local police and authorities, and creating job opportunities for youth.

²² Commission decision C(2014)9580.

²³ Commission decision C(2016)7559.

In November 2016, the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO) and the European External Action Service (EEAS) held a three-day training workshop on Regional Eastern Africa P/CVE Training in Dar es Salaam bringing together officials and civil society. With a tailored focus on the East Africa region, the aim of the training was to increase participants' understanding of CVE concepts and to provide methods, tools and approaches to design and implement P/CVE programming.

In the wider context of conflict prevention and with the aim of introducing a conflict sensitive approach to addressing the issue of violent extremism EEAS and Commission services supported the organization of a Civil Society Dialogue Network meeting by the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO) in Brussels on 9 June 2016. On the basis of inputs from civil society experts recommendations were drafted on how the EU could apply an increased conflict-sensitive approach to all of its actions aimed at (i) countering/preventing violent extremism (CVE/PVE) and (ii) tackling the root causes of forced migration in the region. As a follow up from this initiative, options for action will be taken forward by the EU institutions and suggested for further consideration by the EU Member States.

3. HUMAN RIGHTS, RULE OF LAW AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

The EU brought to bear a diverse set of instruments to promote and engage with the partner countries on human rights, rule of law and democratic governance issues. The EU engaged in a human rights dialogue with Eritrea and Uganda in the context of the Article 8 dialogues, issued several statements in reaction to the death penalty and freedom of expression and launched 2016-2020 EU Human Rights strategies for each of the Horn countries. The EU fielded Election Observation Missions in Uganda and Tanzania and deployed an Election Expert Mission in Somalia.

The Article 8 dialogue with **Eritrea** (April 2016) focused on the implementation of UN Human Rights Council's Universal Periodic Review recommendations and improved co-operation with the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), notably concerning reform of the judiciary. The dialogue with **Uganda** (June 2016) looked *inter alia* at the implementation of electoral reforms, media freedom and the death penalty.

In the light of the forceful suppression of protests in **Ethiopia** and the declaration of a state of emergency, the EU expressed concerns, in particular at restrictions on political space and on the use of force against peaceful protesters, during its regular meetings with the Ethiopian authorities, including at the highest levels, and in a series of statements.

The EU considered that the gravity of the human rights situation in **Sudan** and **South Sudan** required continued attention from the UN Human Rights Council. Accordingly, the EU supported the extension of the mandate of the Independent Expert on Sudan and the creation of a Commission on Human Rights for South Sudan. In Sudan, the EU issued several statements calling on the government to respect freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and the media, to release detainees and give them an opportunity for fair trial, and to conduct a credible investigation into a number of killings. The EU monitored court cases against several political figures and human rights defenders. Under the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) thematic programme, the EU supported several projects on civic and human rights education, as well as press freedom. The EU repeatedly expressed its profound concern at grave human rights violations in South Sudan in several

conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Council and statements. The EU raised in particular concerns regarding new legislation that impedes the functioning of civil society.

An EU Observation Mission (EOM) observed the October 2015 General Elections in **Tanzania** and broadly endorsed the voting process. Between the annulment of the elections in **Zanzibar** and the re-run of elections in March 2016, the EU, together with other international partners, was involved in intense advocacy with a view to encouraging an inclusive and negotiated political solution. The EU supported mediation with political and religious leaders and the media in Zanzibar. In a statement on 29 October 2015, the EU regretted that the annulment of the results of the October elections in Zanzibar was not convincingly justified and that a unilaterally enforced re-run, boycotted by the opposition, led to the discontinuation of the Government of National Unity. As a participatory and credible process had not been put in place, the EU EOM did not return to Zanzibar for the March re-run.

The report of the EU EOM to the **Ugandan** Presidential and Parliamentary elections in February 2016 expressed concern at the intimidation of voters and candidates by law enforcement agencies, the extensive monetization of politics, the late distribution of electoral material in many areas considered opposition strongholds, violations of freedom of expression and of assembly, and the lack of transparency and independence of the Uganda Electoral Commission. In a statement of 20 February 2016, the EU noted that the closing down of social media on Election Day and the repeated detentions of the main opposition candidate, Kizza Besigye, were contrary to basic democratic principles. On 31 March 2016, the EU recalled the concerns expressed by both domestic and international observers about serious shortcomings in the election process and noted that it stood ready, in line with the final recommendations of the EOM report and the judgment of the Ugandan Supreme Court concerning the elections, to continue dialogue with Uganda on how to foster democracy.

In **Kenya**, the EU provided financial support to the Uwiano platform (EUR 1 million IcSP fund) for peace, organised by UNDP, which focused *inter alia* on co-ordinating national partners to support the processes of peaceful, credible and transparent elections and prevent electoral violence.²⁴ The EU urged the **Somali** authorities to take steps to ensure a credible and inclusive federal electoral process in 2016, which should in particular include a quota of 30% of seats reserved for women. The EU played a central role in supporting efforts to increase the effectiveness and accountability of state institutions in Somaliland; in particular, the EU provided financial support for voter registration and technical support for the Somaliland elections planned for March 2017.

In response to a number of executions carried out in **Somalia** at the beginning of 2016, the EU issued several statements calling on the authorities to halt executions and introduce a moratorium on the death penalty. In **Kenya**, the EU raised concerns regarding a number of extra-judicial killings. In **Tanzania**, the EU continued its advocacy for the protection of people with albinism and against the **death penalty**, while in Uganda the EU continued to lobby for abolition of the death penalty. An encouraging development in Kenya was President Kenyatta's decision in October 2016 to commute death sentences to life imprisonment.

²⁴ Commission decision C(2016) 8440.

In **Tanzania**, the EU raised its concern that the **Cyber Crimes Act** could restrict freedom of expression, as well as concerns regarding restrictions placed on civil society organisations and human rights defenders. The EU intervened on behalf of the Somaliland human rights activist Guled Jama who had been imprisoned for his activism against the death penalty; following Mr Jama's release, the EU facilitated his evacuation from Somaliland through the EIDHR Emergency Fund. In **Somalia**, the EU started implementation of actions through the EIDHR intended to connect human rights activists and organisations to the police and the judiciary with a view to providing safety and security services for victims of sexual and gender-based violence.

In order to address the widespread killing of civilians in the conflict in Somalia, the EU provided political support and funding for the creation of a Civilian Casualty Tracking, Analysis and Response Cell within AMISOM in the course of 2015. Although Somalia ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child in 2015, children remained victims of the armed conflict. The EU supported the Somali government's action plans on ending the recruitment and use of child soldiers and the killing and maiming of children, as well as efforts to prevent child trafficking.

4. MIGRATION AND FORCED DISPLACEMENT

The Valletta Summit on Migration of November 2015 provided the political framework for the EU's co-operation and engagement with countries of the Khartoum and Rabat processes on migration. European and African leaders agreed in Valletta that the Khartoum and Rabat process and the EU-AU Migration and Mobility Dialogue would serve to monitor the implementation of the Joint Valletta Action Plan (JVAP).

The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa launched at the Valletta Summit was designed as the prime implementing tool for the joint endeavour of addressing the challenges and opportunities of migration flows, as well as to address trafficking in human beings, a grave human rights violation and a serious form of organised crime. The Commission committed a total of EUR 606 million in 2015 and 2016 for projects with direct relevance to addressing irregular migration, trafficking in human beings, and forced displacement or in support of peacebuilding and conflict prevention, including a package in response to the El Niño and food security crisis in the Horn of Africa, with actions in Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan.

The **Khartoum process** picked up a fast pace in 2015 and 2016, **with regular meetings at different levels**: informal working group meetings in Paris (March 2016) and Rome (July 2016); thematic meetings on smuggling and trafficking (May 2016), on returns, readmission and reintegration in Addis Ababa (October 2016) and on visa facilitation in Cape Verde, jointly with the Rabat process (December 2016); and finally, steering committee and senior officials' meetings in London (November 2015) and Addis (December 2016). The main programme backing the Khartoum Process is the **EUTF Better Migration Management (BMM)**. It aims at building capacities to improve migration management within the region. Building on a regional approach, the programme will develop tailor-made national packages. A EUR 10 million EUTF programme was also agreed to support the process of adoption of the **IGAD Protocols on Free Movement of Persons and on Transhumance**, along with complementary measures to implement them and to improve opportunities for regulated labour mobility.

The EU pursues two main objectives in managing migration and forced displacement from the Horn of Africa: (1) to protect the migrants and refugees who try to reach European shores in the hope for a better future, including victims of trafficking in human beings²⁵ as well as (2) to disrupt the business model of the smugglers. In this context, the **EU NAVFOR operation Sophia** directly saved over 35,000 persons (by May 2017) in the Mediterranean since its launch in mid-2015.

The EU further deepened its engagement to protect and support refugees within the Horn of Africa. The most worrying development remained the continuing conflict in South Sudan, as the total number of South Sudanese refugees in neighbouring countries reached one and a half million. In addition to humanitarian assistance, a Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP) for the Horn of Africa was set up to address the long term needs of refugees and host communities in the Horn of Africa. The RDPP is financed with bilateral assistance from EU Member States and other contributing donor countries (Switzerland and Norway), as well as with EU instruments and tools, such as the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) and the EUTF. Under the latter, five projects have been approved in support of the RDPP for a total amount of EUR 130 million with funding implemented by the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa and the European Refugee Fund. They support protection and livelihoods of refugees and host communities in Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda, as well as the safe, voluntary and dignified return of Somali refugees in Kenya to stable areas of Somalia, and their sustainable integration in return communities.

Kenya's announcement of the closure of the Dadaab refugee camp in May 2017, added to the risk factors compromising stability in the region. In view of the destabilizing effect of a possible closure, the EU adopted an IcSP decision focusing on the Dadaab and Kakuma Refugee Complexes' in October 2016.²⁶ The EUR 6.3 million project looked at improving the security in the refugee camps as well as the peaceful co-existence of host communities and refugees, notably through prevention of radicalisation and youth inclusion activities. The EU continued efforts to increase the refugee hosting capacity in Kenya, to create conditions in Somalia for the return of refugees and to encourage regional co-operation between concerned countries – Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia and Kenya. In parallel, close monitoring of the situation on the ground took place in the framework of the Tripartite Kenya-Somalia-UNHCR agreement, which, as a result of mediation by the EU and other international partners, was prolonged by six months until the end of May 2017. Voluntary returns to Somalia intensified but were still minor compared to the camp population of around 300,000.

In complementarity to the Valletta process, the Commission adopted a new **EU Migration Partnership Framework** in June 2016²⁷, selecting five priority countries of origin, transit and destination with which further to deepen co-operation on migration. Ethiopia, one of the priority countries, is the largest refugee hosting country in Africa, with almost 800,000 refugees and

²⁵ For information on identified trends of trafficking in human beings in the context of migration and asylum, please see: Report on the progress made in the fight against trafficking in human beings (2016) as required under Article 20 of Directive 2011/36/EU on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its victims (Brussels, 19.5.2016 COM(2016) 267 final) https://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/sites/antitrafficking/files/report_on_the_progress_made_in_the_fight_against_trafficking_in_human_beings_2016.pdf

²⁶ Commission decision C(2016)6589.

²⁷ http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-2072_en.htm.

concluded a **Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility (CAMM)** in the margins of the Valletta Summit in November 2015.²⁸ The EU-Ethiopia strategic engagement signed in June 2016 provides for a sectoral dialogue on migration. The main focus so far has been on returns and support to refugees. The EU will continue to encourage the dialogue to achieve results in these areas.

According to UNHCR, by providing freedom of movement, the right to work and land for refugee settlement, Uganda has one of the most favourable refugee protection environments in the world. In December, EUTF EUR 10 million were committed to the existing EUR 10 million project "Support South Sudanese Refugees in Northern Uganda", targeting both host and refugees communities and contributing to the implementation of the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework for Uganda, which UNHCR was tasked to implement in a series of pilot countries as an outcome of the UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants held in New York on 19 September 2016.

Ethiopia experienced one of the worst droughts in decades due to El Niño. Productive capacity and resilience to shocks of communities were affected. In order to rebuild an autonomous and peaceful co-existence and to prevent forced displacement, the EU adopted a EUR 18 million action under the IcSP to stabilise severely drought affected communities.

5. YOUTH, GENDER EQUALITY, EMPLOYMENT

Although the overall demographic trend in the Horn of Africa is one of decline, with average numbers of children per household steadily falling, the region has nonetheless experienced continued population growth, with populations expected to double from 2015 to 2050. This demographic transition has created threats and opportunities affecting the countries' development policies and reform processes. An expanding youth population lacking employment opportunities and a solid governance structure has created a situation in which the needs of a large section of society are not met. In this context, the IcSP-funded project 'Youth employment and peace building initiative in Kismayo' in Somalia (EUR 1.6 million) aims at improved social and economic participation for up to 1,460 young people at risk of exclusion.²⁹

The EU's activities in this field have concentrated on strengthening economic growth and social development, in building open, inclusive and prosperous societies, and encouraging effective policies where investment in technical and vocational training matches the demands of the labour market. A prominent feature of programmes has been an emphasis on social cohesion and stability, notably in Uganda, where a EUR 4.3 million programme funded by the EUTF is strengthening the social cohesion in Slum Populations in Kampala through the provision of economic opportunities and basic services to refugee and local communities. Similarly, a EUR 20 million programme in Northern and Central Ethiopia, also funded by the EUTF, is addressing the root causes of irregular migration by enhancing

²⁸ http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-6050_en.htm.

²⁹ 2014 IcSP Article 4 Annual Action Plan.

the living conditions of potential migrants and returnees in the regions of Tigray, Ahmara, SNNPR and Oromia.³⁰

Given the critical importance of youth employment for the stability and prosperity of the region, Youth in Africa and Europe has also been identified as the central theme of the next Africa-EU-summit in November 2017.

CONCLUSIONS

Looking into the future, the opportunities presented by a young and growing population and significant natural resources sit side by side with serious security threats, including trafficking in human beings, and persistent development problems. In view of the 2015-2020 Action Plan priorities for the Horn the EU should continue to robustly support its partner countries' endeavours to ensure peace and stability with a view to invigorating their economies, stimulating youth employment and ensuring adequate government services for the people and local communities of fragile states in the Horn.

The Joint Communication to the European Parliament and Council for a renewed impetus of the Africa-EU Partnership³¹ and the **EU's new External Investment Plan**³² would provide a framework for the **2017 Africa-EU Summit** to identify common actions and priorities as well as to explore new avenues for both African and European enterprises to be part of the EU's endeavour to enhance the economic and trade potential of the Horn countries. The pan-African and regional bodies – **AU, EAC, IGAD** – could be encouraged to take a more active role in shaping the development, security, governance and political landscape in the Horn, especially in specific conflict zones. IGAD (in South Sudan and Somalia) and the African Union (also in Sudan) should be encouraged to bring its influence to bear wherever possible.

In view of the increasing presence of **Gulf countries in the Horn**, the EU should also consider reinforcing interregional links with GCC countries on economic development and security issues. The EU could build on commonalities including economic opportunities, security and migration.

It would also be important to address **ideological threats in Horn countries**, to reduce the growing risk of conflicts along ethnic lines especially caused by insufficient political participation of youth and lack of employment opportunities. Ethiopia and Kenya are cases in point. The EU should continue to support efforts towards democratization, inclusive dialogue and job creation in these countries.

The path taken by the new **Somali** Federal Government and the Federal President will be key to the region's security and stability in 2017 and beyond. The new federal administration should commit to the establishment of national security architecture as a top priority of its domestic political and security agenda. The ongoing reflection on the improvement of EU's support to the security sector in Somalia, building on the existing **CSDP activities**, should provide the basis for a solid engagement

³⁰ Stemming Irregular Migration in Northern and Central Ethiopia (SINCE) Action Document available here: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/t05-eutf-hoa-et-02_-_since.pdf.

³¹ <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=JOIN:2017:17:FIN&from=EN>

³² Currently with co-legislators.

with the Somali authorities and with the international partners on co-ordinated support. The federal political model should be mirrored in the country's security structure and based on the consent of the federal and state levels. Options for an EU enhanced engagement in the security sector in Somalia are expected to be presented and discussed with Member States in the second half of 2017.

The EU should continue to build on the momentum and increased engagement in **P/CVE issues** in line with its two-pronged approach of strengthening multilateral fora in parallel to funding P/CVE-specific programmes. In Somalia, the EU should define its lead role on CVE in the S-6 format, notably in the wider context of its future security engagement and development effort.

In all its interventions, the EU should take full account of the wishes and needs of the ultimate beneficiaries, especially those who are most vulnerable or likely to be excluded or marginalised.

The EU should sustain its efforts to encourage **South Sudanese** leaders to observe the ceasefire established under the 2015 peace agreement and to participate in an inclusive political process. The EU should also urge all South Sudanese parties to work constructively with the UN, IGAD, the AU and peace-monitoring bodies established under the 2015 agreement in order to address the crisis in the country.

EU should remain a reliable partner for **Uganda, Ethiopia and Kenya** in coping with the economic burden of refugee flows, while enhancing the social and development opportunities provided by the presence of refugees. The potential closure of the Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya could have destabilizing consequences for the region and should be a focus of the EU's dialogue with the region.

The EU and its partners continue to steer the **Khartoum process** towards a platform for discussion and political dialogue, as agreed at the 2017 Malta Senior Officials' Meeting (SOM) and beyond.³³ Stronger emphasis should be placed on practical co-operation, notably through increased joint trainings and workshops and through the establishment of the Regional Operational Centre for the Khartoum Process.

³³ https://www.eu2017.mt/en/Press-Releases/Documents/PR170331_EN.pdf.