Intercultural policies and intergroup relations

Case study: Copenhagen, Denmark
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In 2006, the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe, the city of Stuttgart and the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound) established a ‘European network of cities for local integration policies for migrants’, henceforth known as CLIP. The network comprises a steering committee, a group of expert European research centres and a number of European cities. In the following two years, the cities of Vienna and Amsterdam joined the CLIP Steering Committee. The network is also supported by the Committee of the Regions (CoR) and the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR), and has formed a partnership with the European Network Against Racism (ENAR).

Through the medium of separate city reports (case studies) and workshops, the network enables local authorities to learn from each other and to deliver a more effective integration policy. The unique character of the CLIP network is that it organises a shared learning process between the participating cities, between the cities and a group of expert European research centres, as well as between policymakers at local and European level.

The CLIP network currently brings together more than 30 large and medium-sized cities from all regions of Europe: Amsterdam (NL), Antwerp (BE), Arnsberg (DE), Athens (EL), Barcelona (ES), Bologna (IT), Breda (NL), Budapest (HU), Copenhagen (DK), Dublin (IE), Frankfurt (DE), Helsinki (FI), Istanbul (TR), İzmir (TR), Kirklees (UK), Liège (BE), Lisbon (PT), Luxembourg (LU), L’Hospitalet (ES), Malmö (SE), Mataró (ES), Newport (UK), Prague (CZ), Strasbourg (FR), Stuttgart (DE), Sundsvall (SE), Tallinn (EE), Terrassa (ES), Turin (IT), Turku (FI), Valencia (ES), Vienna (AT), Wolverhampton (UK), Wrocław (PL), Zagreb (HR), Zeytinburnu (TR) and Zürich (CH).

The cities in the network are supported in their shared learning by a group of expert European research centres in:

- Bamberg, Germany (european forum for migration studies, efms);
- Vienna (Institute for Urban and Regional Research, ISR);
- Amsterdam (Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies, IMES);
- Turin (International and European Forum on Migration Research, FIERI);
- Wrocław (Institute of International Studies);
- Swansea, Wales (Centre for Migration Policy Research, CMPR).

There are four research modules in total. The first module was on housing – segregation, access to, quality and affordability for migrants – which has been identified as a major issue impacting on migrants’ integration into their host society. The second module examined equality and diversity policies in relation to employment within city administrations and in the provision of services. The focus of the third module is intercultural policies and intergroup relations. The final module (2009–2010) will look at ethnic entrepreneurship.

The case studies on intercultural policies were carried out in 2009.

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1 See also http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/populationandsociety/clip.htm.
Acknowledgements

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Introduction

As usual within CLIP, this study on intergroup relations and cultural and religious diversity was prepared by a preliminary report (Heckmann, 2008) that outlines what the scientific literature has to offer, defines the basic concepts to be used and proposes an approach for the study. On this basis, a questionnaire has been developed for the cities, through which they supply detailed answers on their policies and deliver data related to the area of intercultural relations in general and their policies in particular.

In the case of Copenhagen, however, the gap between the official definition of this area of policy and the approach (and questionnaire) proposed by the researchers turned out to be difficult to bridge. The answers of the city to the questionnaire gave a clear picture of official policies, but not of policy practice. In addition, the supplementary material – such as that related to civil society in general, immigrant organisations and specifically religious organisations – was essentially lacking, due to the fact that official policies do not include these as relevant fields.

This initial finding obliged the researchers to take a different approach, both in terms of data collection and reporting. With regard to data collection, a number of interviews have been conducted with politicians, policymakers and policy practitioners in the city on the official framing of this area of the city’s integration policy on the one hand, and the field practice of policies on the other. Furthermore, systematic data have been collected on relevant topics such as the practice of church–state relations, civil society in the city, as well as immigrant and religious organisations, by using existing research on these topics and carrying out a number of interviews with researchers and actors in these fields.

The structure of the report reflects the data collection. The first chapter outlines some general background information on Denmark, including a paragraph on church–state relations. This is followed by a chapter explaining the city background of Copenhagen, including its integration policy. Subsequently, the report explores the development of official policy in relation to intergroup relations and cultural activities. At this point, the study departs from the standard structure of the other CLIP case studies, as the research identifies the lack of policy in this regard. The following chapter presents a deeper analysis of the ‘framing’ of policies in Copenhagen through interviews with two policymakers. The actual practice of such policies and relations of civil servants with civil society is the topic of the next chapter. This is followed by a consideration of different types of immigrant organisations in Copenhagen and their relations with the city. The report then looks at interfaith relations in the city. Finally, the report draws together important conclusions.
Background

Brief history of migration to Denmark

Denmark has known substantial immigration since as early as the 16th and 17th centuries, including Dutch farmers and Jews. It also witnessed a continuous inflow of German people between the mid 17th and 19th centuries. In the second half of the 19th century, many workers arrived in Denmark from Germany, Poland and Sweden. In 1885, the foreign population of Copenhagen amounted to 8% of the total population of the city. The two World Wars furthermore brought many eastern Europeans, Jews and Germans to the country (Hedetoft, 2006, p. 2).

Notwithstanding these past experiences, Denmark did not regard itself – and still does not want to be – an immigration country in the period after the Second World War. In fact, in the early post-war period, more people emigrated from Denmark (predominantly to North and South America, as well as Australia and New Zealand) than settled as newcomers. Moreover, those people who migrated to Denmark came mostly from the Nordic and western countries. Denmark’s post-war immigration started, like most of its neighbouring countries, with the recruitment of ‘guest workers’ in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Compared with its southern neighbours, however, such recruitment was relatively late and of small proportion. Workers came mainly from Turkey, Pakistan, the former Yugoslavia and Morocco. At the time of the first oil crisis (and curtailment of recruitment) in 1973, the total number of foreign workers amounted to only about 15,000 persons.

After 1973, migration to Denmark was predominantly supply driven. At first, refugees came from Chile and Vietnam in the 1970s, followed by refugee and asylum migration from Afghanistan, Bosnia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and Somalia since the 1990s. Secondly, family members and spouses of migrant workers and refugees came to Denmark in significant numbers. More recently, migrants have arrived in Denmark from the new European Union Member States, particularly from Poland and the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. According to a recent estimate, more than 15,000 migrants have come from Poland alone. In 2008, Denmark issued more study and work permits than ever before (see the Official Portal for Foreigners and Integration, available at: http://www.nyidanmark.dk).

These inflows of migrants have led to a significant growth in the migrant population in the country, with those arriving since the beginning of the 1990s coming predominantly from non-western countries. Publications by the United Nations (UN) provide the following key data on residents with a migration background, based on the criterion of place of birth outside Denmark (Table 1).

Table 1: Total population and migrant stock in Denmark, 1985–2005

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>5,114,000</td>
<td>5,140,000</td>
<td>5,228,000</td>
<td>5,320,000</td>
<td>5,431,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant stock (people born outside the country)</td>
<td>190,000</td>
<td>220,000</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>304,000</td>
<td>389,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrants as % of total population</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


2 According to Statistics Denmark (Danmarks Statistik), the number of resident persons from non-western countries increased by 520% between 1980 and 2005, forming 90% of the total increase in resident foreigners in that period.
The proportion of migrants in the total population was only 3.7% in the mid 1980s. In the space of 20 years, this percentage almost doubled: in 2005, 7.2% of the total population of Denmark were migrants – that is, they were born outside Denmark.

Alternative definitions of origins\(^3\) indicate different percentages: as at 1 January 2007, the number of registered foreigners, according to the nationality criterion\(^4\), in Denmark was 278,096 (5.1% of the total population). The number of migrants at that time amounted to 360,902 persons, and the number of descendants (second generation migrants) was 116,798 persons, totalling 477,700 persons or 8.8% of the total population. Of this total, 330,525 people (6.1% of the population of Denmark) originate from a non-western country. Muslims from Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Turkey and Syria number around 200,000 persons and account for almost half of all non-western foreign residents in Denmark.\(^5\)

The latest data from Statistics Denmark indicate that, as at 1 January 2009, a total of 526,000 ‘migrants and descendants’ were living in Denmark; this constituted 9.5% of the total population, with 7.3% of the total being migrants and 2.3% being descendants (Statistisk Årbog 2009, p. 26). Of these 526,000 persons, 54% have a non-western origin. The largest migrant groups at the beginning of 2009 were of Turkish origin (58,191 persons), as well as those of German, Iraqi, Pakistani, Polish and Lebanese origin (with populations between 20,000 and 30,000 persons).

In terms of geographic distribution within Denmark, the highest proportions of migrants and descendants are found in the three largest cities: in 2007, they represented 19.8% of the population in Copenhagen, 12.9% in Århus and 12.4% in Odense, compared with 8.5% of the population for the country as a whole. Non-western migrants and descendants in these three cities represented 13.9%, 9.6% and 9.4% of the respective populations in 2007.

**National integration policy**

As a general background, it is important to realise that, since the Second World War, Denmark has developed a welfare state based on high levels of public provisions in areas such as public health, education, unemployment benefits and old-age pensions, accessible to all residents in the country. Policies relating to immigration and integration developed relatively late. From the mid 1980s, there were policy efforts to restrict immigration to Denmark. The Aliens Act of 1986 was devised to be able to restrict immigration and applications for asylum in Denmark. In 1992, the law regulating family reunification removed the automatic right to reunification and tightened the possibilities for entry for this category of migrants – for example, by imposing a ‘breadwinner condition’ on resident spouses.

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\(^3\) Statistics Denmark has introduced two novel sets of definitions that are frequently used: the first set is that of Dane (at least one of the person’s parents is a Danish national and was born in Denmark), immigrant (person is born abroad) and descendant (child of an immigrant born in Denmark). The second set is to distinguish immigrants and descendants according to whether their background is western (nationals of all EU Member States plus Iceland, Norway, the United States (US), Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino, Switzerland and the Vatican State) or non-western (nationals of all other countries). See Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs (2006, pp. 18–19).

\(^4\) Between 1995 and 2005, more than 54,000 foreigners acquired Danish citizenship (Hedetoft, 2006, p. 2).

\(^5\) The website of the Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs sets the estimate somewhat higher, at 210,000 Muslims (as at 17 August 2007). Estimates in Hussain (2007, p. 5) arrive at 175,000–200,000 Muslims. He remarks that ‘reliable figures are not available, as Danish law prohibits the registration of citizens on the basis of their religion and ethnicity’.
In the 1990s, immigration and integration developed into a controversial and politicised issue, particularly after the establishment of the Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti, DF) in 1995, which mobilised electoral support on the immigrant issue in particular. DF repeated this success in the electoral campaigns of 1998, 2001 and 2005. Although DF was never part of the government coalition, its influence on policies has been and still is significant. According to Hedetoft (2006, p. 5):

'It is particularly DF, supported by the media, which has managed to keep the debate alive over the past 10 years and has been successful in placing it squarely at the centre of political attention. The strong support for DF’s articulate anti-immigrant policies has meant that, by and large, all other parties in the Danish parliament have chosen to mobilise on this issue and have prioritised migration and integration policy area in their policy statements and legislative proposals.'

It was in this political climate that the Social Democratic–Radical coalition introduced the 1999 Integration Act. One important feature of the act was that it put the main responsibility for integration in the hands of municipalities in order to improve the management and coordination of formerly disparate governmental and private bodies, such as the Danish Refugee Council (Dansk Flygtningehjælp). The act also extended the integration period for refugees to 18 months. In this period, they are required to learn Danish, familiarise themselves with Danish history, culture and society, as well as acquire skills and competences to find employment. During these 18 months, refugees would receive a monthly integration allowance (in the original proposal, this amount was lower than regular welfare benefits; however, after strong protest, it was changed to the regular level). Family dependants, EU and Nordic citizens, as well as immigrants coming to Denmark on the so-called ‘Job Card Scheme’ (that is, recruited workers), were not obliged to follow the introduction programme but were allowed to join it.

Under the Liberal–Conservative government that took over from the Social Democratic–Radical coalition in November 2001, tougher governmental policies brought an end to what was termed the ‘lenient immigration policies and practices’ of the former coalition. A new Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs (Ministeriet for Flygtninge, Indvandrere og Integration) was formed, taking over the former tasks of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. This new ministry prepared a legislative proposal on immigration and integration, which it submitted to parliament, the principal purpose of which was ‘to restrict the number of immigrants and refugees, to introduce tougher requirements on access to permanent residence and citizenship, to ensure the loyalty of newcomers to “Danish values”, and to speed up the

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6 In a recent article, Karpantschof and Mikkelsen (forthcoming) show that in the late 1980s and early 1990s ‘the Danish racist right evolved from minor xenophobic subcultures into an effective racist movement consisting of right-wing nationalists, militant skinheads and neo-Nazi’s’, leading to a high level of violent action against immigrants in 1992–1993. From the middle of the 1990s, DF offered an alternative political platform for this movement, leading to the isolation of these xenophobic cultures and the decline of violence on the one hand, but also to the continuation of ‘nationalist propaganda, attacks on human rights and racist rhetoric’ on the other.

7 Although few discard the substantial influence of DF on the immigrant question, it is also indicated that other factors have made that influence possible, and that other parties obviously have bought into the content of the discourse. The phrase of ‘a firm and fair integration/immigration policy’ can be found in almost all party programmes. See also Frølund Thomson, 2006. For an empirical analysis of the complicated relationship between immigration, politics and the welfare state, see Goul Andersen, 2006.

8 The group of immigrants for which the municipalities have these obligations are ‘persons who 1) got a residence permit after 1 January 1999, 2) were 16–64 years of age when they got their residence permit, 3) are from non-EU and non-Nordic countries, and 4) are refugees or family reunified’ (Skifter Andersen, Heinesen and Husted, 2005, p. 1).

9 See: http://www.nyidanmark.dk.
integration of immigrants, particularly of women and young, second generation males, into the labour market’ (Hedetoft, 2006, p. 9). The lower monthly integration allowance that was rejected in 1999 was reintroduced. These proposals were passed in parliament in the summer of 2002 with the support of DF.

A number of concrete measures followed. In 2003, the minimum age for marriage migration was increased to 24 years, in addition to other requirements like ‘affiliation’ or ties with Denmark, economic independence and suitable housing. Conditions for naturalisation, which were already strict because of the dominance of the *ius sanguinis* principle (by which nationality or citizenship is determined by having an ancestor who is a national or citizen of the country), were further tightened: for instance, requirements of nine years’ continuous residence, fluency in the Danish language, suitable housing conditions and economic self-sufficiency were set. Similar requirements were introduced for acquiring a permanent residence permit. On the other hand, anti-discrimination instruments were introduced. In 2003, the Act on Ethnic Equal Treatment was adopted, followed by an amendment in 2004 to the Act on Unequal Treatment in the Labour Market. In 2003, the Danish Institute for Human Rights (*Institut for Menneskerettigheder*) became the National Equality Body and established the Complaints Committee for Ethnic Equal Treatment to review individual complaints (Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs, 2006, pp. 70–71).

On 1 January 2004, a new Integration Act and a new Act on Danish Courses for Adult Aliens and Others entered into force. These were based on an agreement with the social partners and local authorities on promoting integration in the labour market and they fitted the general policy of the government of getting ‘more people in work’. The purpose of the new laws was to secure flexibility and personal development for newcomers in relation to the labour market. The public sector had to redirect its efforts towards three areas: mentoring and upgrading of skills; on-the-job training in private and public companies; and employment with a wage supplement. The duration of the formerly three-year individual integration contract was extended until the immigrant receives a permanent residence permit, which is normally after seven years, and its form changed in order ‘to underline the responsibility of the individual foreigner for his or her integration into Danish society’ (Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs, 2006, p. 61).

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10 Interestingly, it was (re)introduced as a general rule regarding ‘all persons who have not lived in Denmark for the last seven years’. In practice, few Danish citizens fall into this category, while most immigrants do. In 2006, the allowances corresponded to about 50%–70% of the normal allowances. ‘The incentive to take work is considerably enhanced by the new rates’ (Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs, 2006, p. 65). By 2006, the qualifying period was extended from three years to a maximum of seven years.

11 For an overview of the categories of entry and the conditions attached to each category, see Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs, 2006, pp. 37–56.

12 The website of the Department of Family Affairs of the Ministry of Justice ([http://www.familiestyrelsen.dk](http://www.familiestyrelsen.dk)) specifies this as follows: ‘Unless the spouse living in Denmark is a Danish national and has been so for 28 years, or was born and raised in Denmark, or came to Denmark as a young child and was raised in this country, and has stayed lawfully in Denmark for – in all essentials a consecutive period of – at least 28 years, the spouses’ aggregate ties with Denmark must be stronger than their aggregate ties with any other country, cf. section 9(7), first sentence, of the Aliens Act.’ See also Jørgensen, 2009.

13 This had consequences both for native Danish and foreign residents in Denmark who want to bring a spouse from abroad. Conversations in the city of Malmö, in the south of Sweden very near to Copenhagen since a new bridge connects the two cities, indicated that many Danes use Malmö and the more lenient Swedish rules to evade the new Danish restrictions. The bridge is therefore nicknamed the ‘love bridge’. Swedish authorities estimated that there were more than 1,000 Danish couples living in Malmö in 2004 as a consequence of the 24-year rule. Copenhagen city sources, however, suggest that the number is more like 100 Danish couples. See also Hedetoft, 2006, p. 5 and Jørgensen, 2009.

14 It was indicated that access to and the competence of this committee are limited. For example, the committee can only accept complaints from trade union members if the complainant does not get help from the union. The committee may advise complainants to go to court, but cannot itself take cases to court.
In May 2005, a new Integration Plan, entitled ‘A new chance for everyone’, was launched by the Danish government, after approval by the parliament. According to the Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs (2005), the aim of this plan is ‘to enhance the ministry’s current integration efforts through several new initiatives intended to boost education and employment among immigrants and their descendants, counter ghettoisation in vulnerable neighbourhoods and prevent and combat crime.’ The text is again framed generically – ‘for everyone’ – but it primarily affects people with an immigrant background. In terms of education and employment, new and more compulsory measures are proposed, such as:

- providing more pre-school training;
- creating more vocational courses and apprenticeship schemes for young people;
- obliging young people aged 18–25 years who receive social benefits to commence a job-qualifying course;
- stimulating parents’ responsibility by adjusting the family allowance scheme ‘so that only young people aged 15–17 years who have started a qualifying or training course or have a job with an educational perspective will be eligible for the allowance’;
- replacing the social benefit received by one spouse – where both spouses receive benefits – with a lower allowance if that spouse has not had ordinary paid work for 300 hours in the preceding two-year period;
- obliging the local authorities in future to provide job offers to all recipients of social benefits – including people who have passively received assistance for several years.

The summary text of the new Integration Plan makes no reference to religion (nor specifically Islam) at all. Therefore, religion is obviously not part of the integration concept. The text does include a reference to ‘extremism and crime’ that should be combated, but it is not specified as religion-based extremism.

Hedetoft (2006, p. 7) characterises the integration policies of Denmark as follows:

‘The official Danish position has been that ethnic minorities should be treated on an equal footing and that the ambition should be to have as few specially designed laws as possible (...) there is little sympathy for multicultural policies or positive discrimination (...) nor are there formalised rules for how institutions may adapt to cultural diversity. The ground rule is that minorities must learn how to come to terms with living in Denmark – not vice versa.’

Consequently, there is also little room for collective organisation of migrant interests. The plan stipulates freedom to organise. However, such organisation is not given much influence. The Council for Ethnic Minorities (Rådet for Etniske Minoriteter) at national level and the integration councils at local level are meant to act as sounding boards for governmental agencies.

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Jørgensen (2008, p. 6) adds an interesting strategic element of the policy to this analysis: the ‘quid pro quo’ principle. This means that ‘extra efforts of migrants should be rewarded and the opposite punished’.
The general picture of national immigration policies of the last two decades is thus one of consistent efforts to restrict further immigration. The only exception in this regard has been the Job Card Scheme of 2003, which made it easier for highly skilled migrants to enter Denmark. Integration policies are based on a specific approach:

- generic policies of equality in the domains of education and labour, which have become increasingly mandatory for newcomers in order for them to adapt more easily into Danish society;
- policies to be implemented at local level.

Acquiring Danish citizenship has become more difficult since 2005 and more dependent on integration criteria. General anti-discrimination policies are an important pillar of such a generic policy. Cultural and religious factors are in a formal sense not part of the integration concept, and if they appear in policy documents it is in a more negative form of undermining social cohesion—with references to crime, ghettoisation and problems of new religions, the values and practices of which may counteract integration.

State–church relations and their consequences for immigrants

Like all liberal democratic European societies, Denmark allows its citizens the freedom of religion. An information sheet of the Danish Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs (Kirkeministeriet) (2006, p. 1) reads as follows:

'Denmark enjoys freedom of religion. This means that people are allowed to form congregations of worship of God in a manner according to their convictions. It is a condition, however, that nothing is taught or done that is contrary to good morals or public order; see section 67 of the Danish Constitution.'

The form that church–state relations have historically taken, however, is remarkably different from most European countries. The Danish system recognises a National Church of Denmark (Den Danske Folkekirke), namely the Evangelical Lutheran Church. The preferential status of the National Church has substantial implications both for (followers of) other churches and congregations, but also for church–state relations. Two features of this privileged status stand out.

The first is that the National Church has the right to collect church tax from all inhabitants of Denmark who are registered as members of the church. According to the dean of the Evangelical Lutheran Cathedral of Copenhagen, about 82% of all inhabitants are registered as members of the National Church and the church tax payable corresponds to around 1% of their annual income.17

The comparatively high percentage of membership of the National Church relates to a second feature: the National Church – that is, its church offices – is mandated by the state to handle the registration of individual residents in the state. This tradition dates back to times when church registers were the only ones in existence. In practice, it means that every...

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16 Data seem to confirm that, on the one hand, the government is successful in restricting unsolicited immigration but that, on the other hand, demand-driven immigration increased in recent years. The Copenhagen Post (9–15 February 2007, p. 7) reported that 46,500 migrants were given a temporary residence permit in Denmark in 2006, with ‘nearly 30,000 of those coming either for work or study. In 2001, that number was a mere 13,000, making up only one third of all residence permits issued.’

17 In 2009, it was expected that the members of the National Church would pay collectively around DKK 5.5 billion (about €700 million as at 16 February 2010) in church tax. Of this amount, DKK 4.7 billion (€600 million) is allocated to local expenses of parishes. Individual members would pay an average of 0.88% of their annual income to the church.
inhabitant, regardless of religious background, has to go to the church offices of the National Church to register themselves and their newborn children. In addition, applications for official documents such as birth certificates also have to be submitted to these offices.\(^\text{18}\)

These two particular features have consequences: on the one hand, the National Church is, through its tax receipts, a powerful actor in civil society; on the other hand, it is through its monopoly position on registration an almost unavoidable institution for all residents to encounter at some point.

For religious communities other than the National Church, there are actually two regimes. The first is for ‘Recognised and approved religious communities’.\(^\text{19}\) The most important rights attached to this status are the right to:

- perform marriage ceremonies with recognised legal effect under the Danish Marriage Act, just as the National Church can;
- residence permits for foreign preachers under the Aliens Act;
- tax deductions for members who make financial contributions to the church (not church tax)\(^\text{20}\);
- establish their own cemeteries under the Danish Cemetery Act\(^\text{21}\) (Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs, 2006; Dassetto et al, 2007).

According to Dassetto et al (2007, p. 99), 18 Islamic communities had been approved in Denmark by 2007. The Department of Family Affairs of the Ministry of Justice (Justitsministeriet) currently has 22 registrations under the heading of Islamic organisations. One of these – the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı) – has registered 28 different establishments in Denmark. The Department of Family Affairs also has registrations from the Alevi religious community with six establishments under the heading ‘Other’.\(^\text{22}\)

\(^{18}\) The dean of the Evangelical Lutheran Cathedral of Copenhagen reported that this traditional procedure has been contested in recent times, both by native non-believers and by immigrants of different religious backgrounds. He stated that this has led municipalities in the South Jutland region to carry out these registrations themselves. In other places, municipalities have created possibilities for residents who want to avoid registration with the National Church to register directly with the municipality. Nevertheless, these recent changes seem to be the exception to the still-existing rule of registration through the National Church.

\(^{19}\) Until 1970, such religious communities were recognised by royal decree. Since 1970, religious communities have been approved on the basis of the provisions of the Marriage Act, according to which other religious communities may perform religious marriage ceremonies. In practice, after such approval for the religious community, the individual ministers also have to be approved before they can legally perform a marriage.

\(^{20}\) ‘In March 2006, the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs checked whether the recognised and approved religious communities make use of the possibility of obtaining approval under the rules of the Tax Assessment Act. Apparently, relatively few Islamic communities seem to make use of the tax deduction possibility, while Christian religious communities and societies make far greater use of the possibility.’ (Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs, 2006, p. 3).

\(^{21}\) ‘In September 2006, a Muslim cemetery was opened in Brøndby municipality near Copenhagen. This cemetery is owned and managed by the Danish Islamic Funeral Foundation (Dansk Islamisk Begravelsesfond). Membership of this foundation includes about 25 Muslim communities and organisations. All Muslims in Denmark have the right to be buried at this cemetery.’ (Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs, 2006, p. 4). According to the same source, there were also 10 special areas for Muslims in cemeteries managed by the Evangelical Lutheran Church and five areas in cemeteries managed by local governments.

\(^{22}\) See http://www.familiestyrelsen.dk. As at 17 July 2009, registrations have been made for 73 Christian communities (including some with an immigrant background indicated by a country of origin – for example, Armenian, Korean, Macedonian, Romanian Orthodox and Russian), as well as eight Buddhist, eight Hindu and three Jewish communities.
The second regime is for ‘religious communities and societies of a religious character’ that did not seek approval or are not eligible for approval. According to the Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs, ‘such communities and societies exist under the general freedoms of religion and association without any requirement of public registration, but they do not enjoy any of the rights mentioned above’ (2006, p. 2).

To manage and implement this specific policy on religion, the state instituted the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs. It describes itself as:

‘the governing body of the Danish National Evangelical Lutheran Church ... [which] administrates grants and appropriations to that part of the Danish National Church funded out of the National Budget. The most important task of the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs is to administrate the Danish National Evangelical Lutheran Church in conformity with current legislation.’

The ministry draws up the budget for the joint fund from which the joint expenses of the Danish National Church are defrayed. In order to meet the joint fund’s deficit, the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs decides how much National Church tax is to be paid and distributes this equally as a percentage of each member of the Danish National Church’s taxable income. The ministry prepares draft legislation and establishes general regulations within the area of church administration through the issuing of ministerial orders and circulars. In addition, the ministry is responsible for settling matters pertaining to salaries and conditions of employment of the clergy and church officers, who are employed as public servants. The ministry must also approve the laying out of cemeteries for religious followers of other congregations and faiths.

Jørgensen (2009, p. 135) evaluates the relevance of this particular historical legacy of church–state relations for Islam in Denmark as follows:

‘...we find a bit enigmatic that religious minority groups in Denmark have substantial rights in order to practise their religion. Practices such as Halal butchering for Muslims and Jews have been allowed since 1808. The citizens’ religious affiliation has not been registered since 1921, which indirectly points to a substantial freedom of religion. However, although the right to belief in a belief system is equal for all, the rights of religious systems are not equal. The Lutheran Christian Church has a special status in Denmark as the official state church; furthermore, the head of state must belong to the church (The Danish Constitution, paragraphs 4 and 6). Other belief systems can seek to become “officially recognised belief systems” that involve the right to marry and tax deduction among other things, but so far the only non-Christian belief system granted such status is the Mosaic belief system in Denmark. The reason is not direct discrimination but that the applicant belief system must conform to specific criteria involving a hierarchical structure, etc. This has created problems for many denominations, e.g. Muslims and Hindus, who could not meet such criteria. In 1999, the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs created a new set of guidelines making it possible to apply for a special status as a recognised belief system with a limited set of rights, among these the right to perform marriages and establish burial grounds. Both Muslim and Hindu religions have now acquired this status.’
Profile of Copenhagen

Brief description of the city

Copenhagen – which literally means Merchants’ Harbour – is situated on the eastern shore of the Øresund, the strait of water between Denmark and Sweden that connects the North Sea with the Baltic Sea. The city, founded in 1167, developed into an important trade city. During the Napoleonic wars, Copenhagen was severely damaged in 1807, but recovery took place in the second half of the 19th century based on industrialisation, new crafts, trade and banking (Skifter Anderson et al, 2000).

Today, Copenhagen is the capital of Denmark and the country’s political and financial centre, with 518,574 inhabitants as at 1 January 2009. The limited physical size of the city – 91 square kilometres – leads to a high population density of some 5,800 people per square kilometre. The economic profile of the city has changed significantly in recent decades, moving towards an international service-based economy: around the turn of the 21st century, about 307,000 people were employed in the city, 48,000 of them in trade and tourism, 28,000 in manufacturing industries, and 191,000 in other services (Skifter Andersen et al, 2000, p. 15). Around 15% of the country’s gross national product (GNP) is produced in the city of Copenhagen. Among the larger and well-known companies are the Carlsberg breweries, the pharmaceuticals manufacturer Novo Nordisk, the Maersk shipping conglomerate, the Danisco food production conglomerate and the engineering group FLS Industries.

Figure 1: Map of the city of Copenhagen and adjacent region

Together with the enclave municipality of Frederiksberg and 18 suburban municipalities, the city of Copenhagen used to form the Wider Territorial Unit for the Urban Audit, with a population of about 1.2 million inhabitants (23% of the country’s population). The Copenhagen metropolitan region, comprising the Wider Territorial Unit and the counties of Frederiksberg and Roskilde, constituted a still larger infrastructural and geographical entity, with around one third of the country’s population. This administrative structure changed on 1 January 2007 (Figure 2). Since 2000, the Øresund
(railway and road) bridge connects Copenhagen with the south of Sweden, particularly Malmö, thereby creating a transnational economic Øresund zone, facilitating cooperation and exchange on all levels.

Figure 2: New administrative division, as of 1 January 2007

Table 2: Facts about Denmark and Copenhagen plus the surrounding region 2004–2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Area km²</th>
<th>Number of municipalities*</th>
<th>Dwellings 1,000s</th>
<th>Population 1,000s</th>
<th>Jobs 1,000s</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Municipality of Copenhagen</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copenhagen Region</td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>1,830</td>
<td>980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Øresund Region</td>
<td>21,200</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>1,750</td>
<td>3,600</td>
<td>1,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Danish part</strong></td>
<td>9,800</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>2,440</td>
<td>1,230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Swedish part</strong></td>
<td>11,400</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>1,160</td>
<td>490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>43,100</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>2,630</td>
<td>5,410</td>
<td>2,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * as at 1 January 2007

**Migrant population**

The growth of the national immigrant population as described is already reflected in the statistics of the city of Copenhagen, but at a significantly higher proportional level. Copenhagen has always been the main city of attraction for immigrants in Denmark. On 1 January 2009, 67,548 (13%) of the city’s 518,574 inhabitants were non-Danish citizens. However, on 1 January 2008, 103,907 (20.4%) of the 509,861 inhabitants of Copenhagen had a migration background — they or their parents had immigrated. Of all inhabitants, 77,114 (15.1%) are immigrants in the narrow sense — that is, they were born outside Denmark. In total, 26,793 (5.3%) of migrants are children born to immigrants. The figures given in any recent policy documents, however, do not relate to immigrants as defined above, but to the target groups of policies: ‘immigrants, the descendants of immigrants and refugees from non-western countries’ (Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs, 2005, p. 5), excluding immigrants from western countries and their children. This
category counted 72,063 persons or 14.1% of migrants in Denmark as at 1 January 1 2008 (see http://www.sk.kk.dk: Koncernservice).

Copenhagen’s integration policy has not escaped the general development and politicisation in the country, as described earlier. Nonetheless, the latest general municipal policy document entitled ‘Integration Policy’ (City of Copenhagen, 2006) differs somewhat from the national documents in its framing and tone, thereby reflecting the different political orientation of the capital city. Copenhagen’s vision in that document (p. 5) is summarised as follows:

‘Copenhagen will be an integrated city in which citizens are able to live together safely and securely, sharing a respect for diversity and common basic values such as freedom of speech, democracy and gender equality. Integration is a mutual process in which all citizens, irrespective of ethnic origin, create and form their society. Integration policy is designed to promote equal opportunities for all.’

References to ‘diversity’ and ‘the mutual process’ indicate the specific Copenhagen flavour of the policy, compared with national policies. It is also more comprehensive than the national documents, including – in addition to the usual topics of labour, education and housing – the domains of security, culture and leisure, as well as health and care.

The three main principles of the city policy underline the following:

- integration is a joint responsibility;
- integration requires diversity;
- integration must be attractive.

These principles should be applied in five priority areas of policy for which concrete targets should be attained by 2010: employment, education and training, housing, safety and health, and care services. However, the diversity requirement remains quite vague. The policy statement at the beginning of the document (p. 6) reads:

‘Ethnic diversity has the potential to improve Copenhagen’s status as a large city in a constantly changing, diversified world. The interaction of Copenhageners with different ethnic, cultural and religious backgrounds makes the city a more rewarding place, and boosts the linguistic and cultural skills needed to face the challenge posed by globalisation.’

Throughout the remainder of the document, there is no interpretation of diversity as a positive contributor to integration or as part of policies. The ‘bilingual’ concept is used for children whose first language is not Danish; the policy is to teach Danish as early and as much as possible. The concept of culture is translated in the document as ‘greater participation in sports, and available culture and leisure activities’. Religion is not mentioned in the 46-page document (apart from the reference to ‘religious backgrounds’ as mentioned above) – either in a positive or in a negative sense. It is obviously not part of the integration concept.23

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23 There has been no new official policy document since 2006. When asked, the city administration reported three new policy programmes that signal the main direction of policy development. The first is the Hotspot programme: ‘Inspired by Amsterdam, Copenhagen has implemented a pilot area-based approach to crime prevention in 2009. It [...] aims at coordinating, evaluating and initiating projects addressing safety and crime prevention issues in a local area. A manager of Hotspot and five employees have been hired and are since 1 February 2009 working to coordinate local problems’. The second programme is the Safety Index, ‘...measuring the safety of citizens in Copenhagen in a triangular way by asking about reported crimes, exposure to crime and what crimes are judged most important in the neighbourhoods.’ The index was due to be implemented in the summer of 2009. The third is an anti-radicalisation programme: ‘The city has decided to launch a targeted inclusion programme to prevent radicalisation and extremism by competence building of the frontline staff. It will consist of a coordinating unit that will offer phone counselling and advice as to the different methods possible and others available and a group of mentors who can help and support the frontline staff in their work; it offers courses to help the frontline staff in handling the challenge and organising debates for the citizens about relevant issues.’ The programme was due to commence in the summer of 2009.
Organisation of integration policies in Copenhagen

The highest political authority within the city of Copenhagen is the city council, comprising 55 members appointed for four years. The number of elected representatives with a migrant background is significant: based on the list of photographs and names of chosen representatives in the 2002–2006 council (City of Copenhagen, 2002, pp. 6–7), it may be concluded that at least nine of the 55 representatives probably have a migration background. They represent several political parties. The mayor of the Employment and Integration Administration of the city of Copenhagen, Jakob Hougaard, reports in an interview that in the present council, eight of 55 elected members have a migrant background, five of whom represent the Social Democrats (Socialdemokraterne). It is remarkable, however, that these elected representatives with a migrant background were never mentioned by any interviewees. They do not seem to play a significant role in discussions on integration.

The city council has a long tradition of being more liberal than the country as a whole. Since the 2005 elections, the Social Democrats have 21 seats in government, followed by Venstre – the Liberal Party (Danmarks Liberale Parti) – with eight seats and the Socialist People’s Party (Socialistisk Folkeparti, SF) and the Danish Social-Liberal Party (Det Radikale Venstre) each with seven seats. The Danish People’s Party (DF), which started in 1997 with seven seats on the council, is now one of the smaller parties, holding only two seats, along with three other small parties.

There are seven committees within the council. The first and most important one, chaired by the Lord Mayor, is the finance committee, followed by six executive administrative departments, each having responsibility for a specific field:

- children and youth;
- culture and leisure;
- employment and integration;
- health and care;
- social services;
- technical and environmental issues.

Before 2005, integration policies for immigrants had to be coordinated across these departments. After the government elections of 2005, a special Office for Integration was formed, within the new Department of Employment and Integration, in order to strengthen the coordination and implementation of policies. The Office for Integration monitors the implementation of the integration policy and cooperates with experts from other departments.

Copenhagen has had an Integration Council since 1998. The remit of the council is to ‘attend to the interests of the ethnic minorities and act as their mouthpiece’, as well as to ‘guide the politicians, the standing committees and the administration of the city on how to secure an efficient and coherent integration policy’. It is thus a consultative body with a specific domain. It provides advice directly to the city council, the highest decision-making body of the city.

24 The one exception in this case was that civil servants employed by the Integration Office mentioned that one councillor, Hamid el Mousti, has been the driving force behind the now established International Day, which has been observed in Copenhagen for the past six years and will be described in a later chapter.
The Integration Council used to consist of nominated representatives of ethnic organisations, in addition to experts and representatives of the social partners, housing corporations and educational institutions. The current council differs from previous ones in that it consists of 23 members. Fifteen of them were directly elected from the population of residents with (non-western) immigrant origin in officially organised elections in November 2006. The other eight members comprise:

- nominations from the social partner organisations – the Confederation of Danish Industries (Dansk Industri, DI) and the Danish Confederation of Trade Unions (Landsorganisationen i Danmark, LO);
- nominations from civil society, including schools and society, the Federation of Non-Profit Housing Associations and the Danish Gymnastics and Sports Associations (Danske Gymnastik- og Idrætsforeninger, DGI);
- three ‘experts’.

Immigrant organisations as such are not involved.

Two elected members of the Integration Council who were interviewed – both of whom had chaired the council on previous occasions – reported that the functioning of the council has been problematic in their opinion. Among the members, there is the feeling of not being taken seriously. The council’s membership turnover is reportedly high: of the 21 members who joined the council in 2006, 10 have left in the meantime, five of whom were elected members. Moreover, the internal functioning of the council is unstable: its first chairperson after the elections stepped down and left the council out of dissatisfaction shortly after being interviewed for this study in February 2007. The chair was taken over by a Somali/Turkish duo. The duo, in turn, resigned and the trade union representative currently acts as the council chair.

In 2007, the council discussed and accepted a new model for implementing its work in 2008. It aimed to take a more proactive approach, working as a think-tank. However, this change did not seem to solve problems, at least not in the opinion of many council members. The council is now being evaluated by an external bureau. A decision on whether the council would continue to exist after 2009 was expected to be taken in June 2009.

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25 Notwithstanding a great investment of the city in the electoral procedure (such as compiling the lists of (non-western) voters under conditions of protection of privacy and making different ways of voting possible), only 11.5% of potential voters actually voted. There have been complaints about the provision of too little information to the public and confusing messages and requirements in relation to election procedures. Immigrants furthermore report that the council is not broadly accepted, partly because many do not feel represented by the council and partly because it is not seen as influential. The definition of who could vote was also a problem, since citizens with at least one parent with a migrant background could vote. This meant that many citizens who already felt represented by the city council did not want to take part in the elections. Other sources suggest that the low level of participation is also due to the fact that some local politicians have suggested abolishing the council. Since January 2004, such a local council has become optional, whereas formerly it was an obligation – according to paragraph 42 of the 1999 Integration Act – if more than 50 adults of immigrant origin requested its establishment.

26 One of the ways that chosen members voice their concerns that the Integration Council has a more symbolic than real function in local politics is to refer to the unbalanced financial aspects. The city, they say, spent DKK 3.5 million (€470,000) on the election of the council and was spending another DKK 250,000 (€33,580) on an external evaluation, while the annual budget that the council has to work with is only DKK 150,000 (€20,150).
Official approach to intergroup relations

As it transpires from the general description of integration policies, the city of Copenhagen does not have an explicit policy on intergroup relations and cultural and religious diversity. The city’s policy strongly focuses on socioeconomic integration and participation in existing culture and leisure. It is also directed towards individuals – collective groups and organisations are not mentioned in policies, as exemplified by the elections of members of the Integration Council. Moreover, culture and religion of immigrants are not even mentioned in policy documents, let alone defined as part of integration policies.

On the other hand, the city emphasises that all citizens should be able to live together securely with respect for diversity and common fundamental values such as freedom of expression, democracy and equality. Therefore, combating discrimination and working to provide all Copenhagen residents with opportunities for participation in society’s political, economic, business, social and cultural life are important elements of the integration policy. These are anchored in an anti-discrimination agenda. Important actions in this agenda are to monitor and uncover discrimination, combat discrimination in municipal services and promote equality in employment. This anti-discrimination agenda is implemented in cooperation with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as the Danish Institute for Human Rights (Institut for Menneskerettigheder, DIHR). The organisation of these policies has been described in detail in an earlier city case study for Copenhagen on Diversity policy in employment and service provision (Penninx, 2009).

In view of this specific official framing of integration policies both at national and city level, it is not surprising that the formal answers received from the city of Copenhagen to the detailed questionnaire for this study did not provide the information that it was expected to deliver. A number of key questions on immigrant organisations and their official answers reflect this outcome.

Some of the basic questions and answers relating to immigrant organisations from the questionnaire include those listed below.

**Question:** What is the city’s general attitude towards ethnic or migrant organisations?
**Answer:** There is no general pattern or attitude towards ethnic or migrant organisations.

**Question:** What are the objectives of your city’s policy towards the organisations named?
**Answer:** There are no clear objectives in the city’s policy towards these organisations.

**Question:** Are there activities by ethnic and religious (migrant) organisations which the city considers as a relevant support for the welfare of local migrant communities?
**Answer:** In the Danish context, the state provides welfare and it is not left to the ethnic/religious organisations.

**Question:** What are the major issues, demands and interests of (immigrant) groups?
**Answer:** Most ethnic/religious organisations are preoccupied with cultural or religious issues, as the Danish welfare model takes care of social needs and education. There are occasionally initiatives to gather development aid. Sports are being taken care of on a voluntary basis, not related to ethnicity or religion.

**Question:** What are the major demands and interests of ethnic and religious groups in your city?
**Answer:** There are very few actual demands that are not related to the traditionally festive events. The three demands that appear to be made on a regular basis are: 1) a mosque for Muslim worship, 2) influence on foreign policy and 3) separation of state and church.

**Question:** Is there a specific position or policy of the city towards such demands?
**Answer:** There are no policies towards these demands, but the ‘We Copenhageners’ (VI KBH’R’) campaign supports many of the festive and cultural events.
Case study: Copenhagen, Denmark

**Question:** Does the city have any formal or informal regular and institutional contact with ethnic and religious organisations?

*Answer:* No.

**Question:** Does the city have an explicit policy aimed at improving intercultural relations?

*Answer:* No – not a policy but a campaign – ‘We Copenhageners’ – which has an intercultural approach to its goal to increase Copenhageners’ sense of belonging to the city. The intercultural approach encompasses a joint working process together with different groups and associations when developing, organising and implementing activities within the framework of the campaign. The collaboration is from project to project and is not institutionalised in relation to the campaign.

Key questions on policies in relation to intergroup relations with religious-based communities also received answers that fit the secular character of immigrant policies. Some of the basic questions and answers on this topic from the questionnaire include those listed below.

**Question:** From the perspective of local integration policies, what migrant or minority religion is important?

*Answer:* Jewish. This is mentioned as there are hate crimes and conflicts between certain citizens belonging to the Jewish society and citizens with a Muslim background, which are important to resolve for social cohesion to take place through integration policies.

**Question:** What is the relative and absolute size of the population adhering to that religion?

*Answer:* There is no registration of this information. It would be illegal according to the anti-discrimination law.

**Question:** What is the position of the city regarding the issues and interests (of both majority and minority population)?

*Answer:* No position.

**Question:** Does the city have an explicit policy aimed at improving intercultural relations with religious groups?

*Answer:* No.

**Question:** Does the city have any formal or informal regular and institutionalised contact with these minority religion organisations?

*Answer:* No, but they are part of the resource group in the We Copenhageners campaign.

**Question:** Does the city give support to the group (for example, financial support, moral support, other resources, public space for religious symbols)?

*Answer:* All organisations can apply for city support for events or other projects.

**Question:** Are there activities by the religious group to improve intergroup relations in the city? Is the city encouraging or supporting such activities?

*Answer:* If the organisations apply for support, they may get it and this is done regularly. However, there are no indications of results or measurements of success.
In the group of questions on intergroup relations and radicalisation, many questions remained simply unanswered, obviously because any form of official policy of the city is lacking. The questions that were answered reflect some awareness of problems, but little indication of policy intentions. Some of the basic questions and answers on intergroup relations and radicalisation from the questionnaire include those listed below.

**Question:** In the eyes of the city, are there any relevant forms of radicalisation in the local population that resent religious and/or ethnic minorities?  
**Answer:** There are certain right-wing movements that dislike immigrants and particularly Islam.

**Question:** Is it mainly attitudes without being organised? Does it exist as informal networks, as political parties or formal organisations?  
**Answer:** There is little knowledge, but it is believed that such movements mostly take the form of informal networks and criminal gangs, although the right wing does have formal organisations and (some would claim) established political parties.

**Question:** Is there radicalisation among migrants or minorities in your city? Is it mainly attitudes without being organised?  
**Answer:** It is informal, although the pan-Islamist political party Hizb ut-Tahrir is formally present.

**Question:** Does it affect integration and the social climate in the city?  
**Answer:** It affects the city in the sense that people are scared of this group and see them everywhere. This causes conflicts in itself and the group causes conflict by the use of slogans and rallies, hate speech and pressure or discrimination.

**Question:** Are there organisations and groups in local civil society that are active against radicalisation among migrants?  
**Answer:** Certain consultancies offer courses targeting this group, but no organisations or groups as such are active against radicalisation.

**Question:** Does the city cooperate with groups that address issues raised by radical groups among migrants?  
**Answer:** Not at present. However, should a relevant project arise, the city would cooperate.

**Question:** Are there groups among migrants and minorities that actively mobilise against radicalisation among migrants or minorities?  
**Answer:** Yes, certain – especially Muslim – groups are active in this regard. They offer religious studies and arrange events debating the issue.

The official answers to the questionnaire, as illustrated above, signal that the questions did not fit well into the Copenhagen framing of integration policies. In turn, because the questions are answered from an official perspective, they strongly reflect the official framing of policies.

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27 Even the ‘Anti-radicalisation project of Copenhagen’ that is being prepared at present is not mentioned in any of the answers, possibly because it is not yet policy. However, it could also be because it is seen as a project focused on individuals, in which organisations do not have a place.
These preliminary conclusions provoked a change in the research strategy in this module of the study for Copenhagen. In order to get a picture of the relevant factors for (potential) policies of the city with regard to intergroup relations, it was decided to collect additional material through interviews and available research sources. The focus of this effort was to:

- check the first analysis of the ‘framing’ of the city’s policies by using sources other than formal policy documents, particularly by interviewing the mayor responsible for these policies and the leader of DF in the Copenhagen Council;
- interview a number of city civil servants involved in special projects that inevitably lead to contacts with immigrant groups and organisations to find out what relations exist between civil servants and immigrant organisations – religious or otherwise;
- try to get an impression of civil society in Copenhagen in general, and religious and immigrant organisations within civil society in particular. The study aimed to learn how civil society actors perceive the city government and its policies, and what initiatives in the field of intergroup relations are taken by these actors. To answer such questions, interviews with religious leaders such as the Chief Rabbi of Copenhagen, the dean of the Evangelical Lutheran Cathedral in Copenhagen, and the most prominent Islamic leader, Imam Pedersen, are important sources.
Framing of integration policies and intergroup relations in politics

To understand better the framing of integration policies in Copenhagen, two important actors in policymaking were interviewed. The first was Carl Christian Ebbesen, elected representative for DF in the Copenhagen Council since 2001, and collaborator of the parliamentary bureau of DF. The second was Jakob Hougaard, Mayor of the Employment and Integration Administration of the city of Copenhagen, who is responsible for the coordination of integration policies and is a member of the Social Democrats. The essential elements of their views on immigrants and related policies are outlined below.

Ebbesen’s and DF’s views on immigrants and integration

Mr Ebbesen believes that immigrants in Denmark, including Copenhagen, form parallel societies; they do not live an independent life, as the Danish welfare state pays them. Since 2001, the central focus of DF has been ‘to break down these parallel societies’. The dominant argument that the party uses is: ‘if you want to get payment from the Danish state, you need to learn Danish, get educated and get a job.’

This general problem of immigrants is even bigger within Muslim groups: women stay at home, do not go outside and do not participate in society. According to Mr Ebbesen, ‘we need to break that circle by obliging them to learn Danish and to work outside the home.’ He explains this further by stating that:

‘Denmark has the highest participation rate in the labour market in Europe, a development that has occurred since the late 1960s. Women’s participation is high. That is why we have this discussion right now on making kindergarten and preschool teaching an obligation for immigrant children. The reason why we have so much trouble with immigrants is their lack of education. We have a system in which it is common to send children to kindergarten from the age of three years. We want that to be obligatory for immigrants. If we do that, we still have one problem left: families that do not enjoy state benefits, because we cannot force them.’

Mr Ebbesen finds the 2006 Copenhagen Integration Policy document ‘not good enough’. He believes that ‘we need stronger mandatory measures, particularly for learning Danish as early as possible.’

In Mr Ebbesen’s view, immigrant organisations are essentially part of parallel societies. This is why he does not believe that giving money to them solves the problem. Rather, he believes the contrary. It is not groups or civil society that will solve the problem. His preference is to work with initiatives such as Hotspot (a project embedded within the safety and security section of policies that tries to identify and resolve conflicting situations and make people feel secure through the cooperation of several city government departments): ‘which makes several departments of the city, such as education and welfare, work together to resolve problems.’

Mr Ebbesen considers that integration policies are essentially a political fight: ‘when immigrants come to Denmark, we should try to make them accept Danish culture and combat those elements that do not fit into Danish culture.’ In that sense, ‘we are not in dialogue’, although it is necessary to respect the standard rights and freedoms. When asked about specific issues that should be combated, he identified the need to defend ‘the status of women and the free choice of women’.

It is notable that Mr Ebbesen did not refer to religion or Islam directly during the entire interview. He referred to religion only indirectly, for example when referring to specific treatment of women that can be frequently found in Islamic communities.
Mayor Hougaard’s views on immigrants and integration

When asked what the most important general goal of integration policies is, Mayor Hougaard answered: ‘People should have opportunities to meet each other.’ In implementing that goal, the policy should focus on possibilities for meeting in everyday life. He highlighted:

‘This leads to a strong focus on housing and the place where people live: segregation is then a worry for us. People who share a low class status live together. But it also affects schools and the educational situation. More mixing of cultures and desegregation are important policy goals. The policy of promoting the mixing of cultures by “placement” of certain pupils in certain schools has not been successful yet.’

On considering the question ‘Where does civil society come into integration policies?’, the mayor answered that Copenhagen has a rich mosaic of civil society. However, the mayor explained immediately that the city mobilises civil society in a specific way:

‘Each of the 10 districts of Copenhagen has a local committee to organise cultural meetings locally. There is a budget of DKK 5 million [€671,762] for this purpose. Each committee has nominated representatives from seven political parties and 17 local organisations. In these committees, dialogue takes place on local problems, for example the local library.’

These committees organise debates locally. The mayor does ‘not see these committees as representing the district, but as a local mobilising force. They do not have administrative functions.’ No mention is made of immigrant organisations within the committees.

Regarding the representation of immigrants, Mayor Hougaard’s view is that the elected Integration Council is in principle meant to represent this group. However, in reality, he has found that the council carries out the wrong tasks, creates a detour rather than a stepping stone for immigrants and has no real representative justification. In the latter case, the mayor concludes that the council election itself has not been a success and participation in the election was low: only 13% of the non-western population participated. On the basis of experience to date, the mayor sees a need to change the council. In his view, the function of the council should be to help in formulating and implementing integration policies. He stated:

‘The council should be a knowledge-driven advisor to the city. Apart from that, on a different level, the council should contribute to building trust. In the first phase, this did not happen: it looked like a formalistic, ritualised body that had some formal involvement. But it should actually generate a general feeling among immigrants to be involved.’

In relation to the coordinating role of his department, the mayor stated that it is ‘difficult to coordinate seven mayors of different departments. What we mainly do is make things visible by monitoring, through the ‘integration barometer’ and developing initiatives. The Integration Office has limited funding: we need other mayors for cross-department initiatives.’ Nevertheless, the mayor finds that ‘a coordinating department for integration is the best solution rather than the administrative coordination we have now – at least if we cannot have a parliamentary structure with cabinet responsibility which is based on a political agenda and political control.’
The mayor states that the city of Copenhagen has found inspiration for new approaches in integration policies from the city of Amsterdam. For example, the We Copenhageners project was inspired by the We Amsterdammers campaign. In addition, the new policy on combating radicalisation is inspired by Amsterdam.

**Common features of views on immigrants and integration**

Although the two interviewees have a very different perception of what the integration problem is, it is notable that their practical implementation ideas have some basic features in common. Firstly, integration policies are supposed to be directed towards (a category of) individuals. In the strongly area-based policy of the mayor, individuals should be able to meet others; in Mr Ebbesen’s view, individuals should become independent from the state by obliging them to learn the Danish way of doing things.

Secondly, immigrant organisations are thus not seen as potential partners in integration processes; they are either neglected (Hougaard) or seen as a threat because they reinforce parallel societies (Ebbesen). ‘Representation’ is supposed to take place through elected individuals.

Thirdly, integration policies should be implemented primarily through the city’s departments and their institutionalised implementation units; civil society is not perceived as an important or necessary partner.

Fourthly, religion is not supposed to play any role in the city’s policy, and religious organisations are not seen as relevant for policies.

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28 Later in this report, it will be possible to see that both programmes have been adapted somewhat to fit into the overall Copenhagen integration policy.
City policy practitioners and civil society

Interviewed civil servants of the city – within and outside the Integration Office – agree in general that the city is ‘weak in its relations with civil society’. When asked why, they explain that an important reason is that the city has numerous formal rules on involving civil society actors in policy implementation. Weak relations also have to do with the fact that the city institutions are held primarily responsible – and hold themselves responsible – for policies and services. This was also expressed in one of the official answers to the questionnaire: ‘In the Danish context, the state provides welfare and it is not left to the ethnic/religious organisations.’

In practice, the consequence is ambivalence. On the one hand, there are many possibilities for civil society organisations to apply for subsidies for projects that fit into policies of the different departments of the city administration. Any organisation may apply and get subsidies for such initiatives. The content of the project is decisive, not the characteristics of the organisation that applies. Furthermore, the city is ‘passive’, in the sense that it simply awaits applications and evaluates them in a non-discriminatory way, but does not solicit such applications.

On the other hand, there seem to be specific consequences for integration policies and immigrant organisations. Firstly, this system of subsidising projects is applied in specific ways in different departments – such as education or sports and leisure. Through the Integration Office, the city is increasingly making an effort to keep track of integration projects across the city, and it has recently been decided that uniform funding and evaluation criteria should be applied across the different departments. However, not all integration projects are registered in the database or project bank of the Integration Office, and differences in funding procedures certainly exist between departments.

Secondly, from the perspective of immigrant organisations, this situation implies a rather long process of learning the skill of applying for and getting subsidies under the right headings and in the right format. This was confirmed by interviews with two entrepreneurial immigrants in Copenhagen – Nasib Farah and Abdul Wahid Pedersen – whose activities for immigrant groups are to a large extent financed by national or city subsidies, and sometimes by private foundations. Both interviewees were aware that there are several possibilities to get funding for certain activities – in some cases in the sphere of the social function of religion – from national and local government. However, they are also aware that it takes considerable knowledge to be able to do this successfully and that the funding is always of a temporary nature. Several informants – civil servants, civil society organisations and researchers – estimate that the system allows immigrants and their representative organisations to profit less from it (see also Jørgensen, 2009, p. 137).

The Integration Office has obviously become aware of these specific relations – or the absence of them – with the immigrant part of civil society. The office created a special taskforce in 2007, comprising four civil servants, two of them anthropologists. According to two of the taskforce members, it should act as a ‘link between the central administration and the field of integration’. The taskforce’s mission is to identify what barriers exist in the relations between the target group and the administration, to find out what works successfully and to help immigrants and their organisations as well as administrative departments to implement practical solutions. The taskforce sometimes acts directly on behalf of the Integration Office, when relations ‘in the field’ are important, such as organising expressions of diversity in the city. Members of the taskforce emphasised that their work is typically ‘low key work’. They carry out fieldwork – as distinct from civil servants who work at their desks – and report back to the Integration Office.

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29 Some of the interviewees signal a trend of ‘privatisation’ of specific tasks by the city. They add that this takes place primarily among private companies, professional institutions and sometimes NGOs. The case of language training is given as an example. Immigrant organisations, however, are not seen as candidates for such privatisation.
One of the great advantages that the members of the taskforce see in their job is that they may develop projects that fit in well within their specific task. Two of these projects in which their linking role is important are briefly discussed below.

‘We Copenhageners’ project

The We Copenhageners campaign, or the "VI KBH'R'" campaign as it is originally known in Danish, is a three-year project that aims 'to show the diversity in the city and make more Copenhageners feel accepted as equal citizens'. Under the slogan ‘We are all a part of a unity. We are all Copenhageners’, the campaign started in 2008 and has two main goals:

- to strengthen inclusion and dialogue between citizens of the city;
- to highlight and celebrate the city’s diversity.

The key words or indicators of the campaign are: trust building, solidarity and participation. A resource group of 13 persons has been set up\(^\text{30}\) and a number of publicity activities have been organised. Concrete projects within the campaign are International Day, dialogue benches (sponsored by companies), an Eid reception (a Muslim holiday that marks the end of Ramadan), a poetry competition and a photography competition.

One of the most important instruments of the campaign ('to ensure ownership and local embeddedness') is a fund called the "VI KBH'R'-pool, which makes subsidies available – for example, DKK 1 million (€134,352) in 2008 – for events that demonstrate the city’s diversity and are open to all citizens. Cultural and religious events that already take place can also receive sponsorship, if the groups responsible for such events present them in such a way that would encourage more Copenhageners to participate. The larger projects – requiring a subsidy of more than DKK 30,000 (€4,030) – should fulfil four conditions:

- they must highlight the fact that Copenhagen is a diverse city;
- they must be based on cross-cultural cooperation;
- the activity must be locally anchored by including other local associations than the applicant;
- the activity must be open to all citizens.

The ‘We Copenhageners’ campaign seems to have a rather ambivalent place in integration policies of the city as described earlier. On the one hand, the city refers to contributions that the city makes towards celebrating cultural diversity and cultural heritage, such as the well-established International Day – in which 52 associations participated in 2008, according to one interviewee. It refers to support for ‘exhibitions displaying the history and life of minority groups both in classical museum institutions and within the framework of the We Copenhageners campaign’ and even to interreligious dialogue through a specific project within the We Copenhageners campaign called ‘Open roofs’. This sub-project has the objective of ‘creating a better understanding between religious and non-religious groups by inviting each other to visit and displaying the commonalities and differences in the rituals connected to life and death’ in the Jewish, Muslim and Christian religions.

\(^\text{30}\) According to the city administration, this resource group represents the stakeholders in society: ‘young people, the principal of a school, the Institute of Human Rights, the police, an ex-rabbi, a Christian priest, the Muslim Council, a social scientist, a business association representative, an ethnic employers’ association, a director of a theatre and a social street worker.’
On the other hand, the city is engaged in such activities in a very specific way and with particular goals (as noted from the quotations above). It emphasises that the campaign is not an integral part of policies:

‘No, (Copenhagen does not have an intercultural) policy but a campaign (We Copenhageners) that has an intercultural approach to its goal to increase Copenhageners’ sense of belonging to the city. The intercultural approach encompasses a joint working process together with different groups and associations when developing, organising and implementing activities within the framework of the campaign. The collaboration is from project to project and is not institutionalised in relation to the campaign.’

Anti-radicalisation project in preparation

Within the Integration Office, plans have been developed for an anti-radicalisation project in Copenhagen. The ideas for such a project are generated within the section of the Integration Office that primarily deals with the issue of ‘safety’.  

The leader of this planned project has the official title of ‘coordinator of targeted inclusion and prevention of radicalisation and extremism’.

The project, as it has been developed so far, is targeted at locations where the problem of radicalisation is found and at those who handle groups – teachers, social workers and local police. It takes a strongly area-based approach that fits in with that outlined by Mayor Hougaard in the previous chapter. A major part of the planned activities falls under the heading of ‘awareness raising’: phone counselling, awareness courses for civil servants and debates. It is envisaged that a group of mentors will be set up, who will guide discussion on this issue or will act as contact and support persons. Furthermore, special courses for city personnel will be organised to teach them how to recognise signs of radicalisation and address the issue. Plans for the project were expected to be decided on by the City Council in June 2009.

In comparison with policies and plans in Amsterdam in this same field, the Copenhagen plans focus strongly on the civil servant representatives mentioned above. Whether expertise from and links to immigrant communities and organisations will be part of the project is not mentioned.

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31 One civil servant commented in an interview: ‘Crime has become an integration issue here, especially immigrant crime. Politics have defined it that way. And it attracts funding...’.
Immigrant organisations in Copenhagen

Outline of immigrant organisations

Immigrants in Denmark started to found their own organisations in significant numbers at the beginning of the 1970s. However, a real increase – in terms of new organisations established each year – took place between 1980 and 1995. Most of these organisations were ethno-national associations, often having the word ‘culture’ in their name. In the early 1990s, they were diversified into women’s and youth organisations, sports clubs and other specific groups. As a result, nearly 500 immigrant organisations could be counted in the period 1995–2000, of which some 65% were based in the city of Copenhagen. The strong increase in immigrant organisations in the 1980s and early 1990s was clearly related to the positive attitude of the national and local governments to these organisations and the availability of subsidies.

Mikkelsen’s historical research shows that in these peak periods of immigrant organisation, the state and municipalities financed 40% of the total budget of these associations. Until 2001, the city of Copenhagen had a clearly supportive policy towards immigrant organisations. This approach changed, however, after 2001.

The result of these developments is that, on the one hand, there is still a rich mosaic of immigrant organisations in Denmark and Copenhagen. On the other hand, the total number of immigrant organisations has stabilised at a level that is somewhat lower than in the late 1990s. The number of newly established associations has fallen and the level of activity in this area has declined.

From the beginning of the 1980s, several umbrella organisations have also functioned as counterparts for the government: IND-Sam was the first such organisation to be set up in 1982. The early 1990s saw the creation of various organisations in which young people were the dominant force; for example, POEM was established in 1993–1994. These organisations both had a clear voice, their influence being dependent on the composition of the government. The change of policy by the liberal government since 2001 had severe consequences: financial support at national level was practically abolished. Only project subsidies for certain activities have remained. The old umbrella organisations, IND-Sam and POEM, closed down in 2003 and 2004 respectively. In the meantime, two new competing Islamic umbrella organisations emerged in 2006 and 2007 (see next section).

Mikkelsen states that, as a consequence of the support received in earlier times and probably also as a result of strong public discourse, some 60% of the organisations call themselves ‘cultural organisations’. However, this does not mean that they may not also have political or religious goals and activities. As a dominant trend throughout the years, Mikkelsen highlights a continuity of religious organisations and an increase in organisations associated with specific categories of people, such as women and young people. He estimates that the support that organisations receive from ‘the lowest levels of policy’ – that is, departments of the city – ‘is important for the survival of organisations’. He also perceives tension between official policies and implementation. Mikkelsen states: ‘So you can easily find situations in which subsidies for religious organisations are made available, the compromise being, for example, that for a rent subsidy certain square metres are subtracted from the subsidy as being for religious activities.’

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32 This section is mainly based on an interview with Flemming Mikkelsen and his publication on immigrant organisations in Denmark (Mikkelsen, 2008, Chapter 7, pp. 110–127).

33 Mikkelsen’s research is based on the comprehensive archives of the Ministry of Interior and Health (Indenrigs- og Sundhedsministeriet), which kept all of the information relating to applications of immigrant organisations on file. In the period 1965–2005, 800 organisations were included in Mikkelsen’s database.

34 Jørgensen additionally observes that, in recent years, a new type of migrant organisation has emerged that seeks independence from public funding and follows a discourse that emphasises labour market participation and the benefits of diversity management. The Danish-Turkish Exchange of Experience Networking Association (Organisation-Netværk-Erfaringsudveksling, Foreningen O.N.E.) is one example of this type of organisation.
Religious organisations in Copenhagen

The general picture of religious organisations in Denmark provided earlier is more or less applicable throughout Copenhagen. The Evangelical Lutheran Church is the most important religious organisation: out of 518,574 inhabitants of the city on 1 January 2009, 317,525 or 61.2% were registered as Lutheran. The National Church has 78 churches in Copenhagen.

According to an interview with Chief Rabbi of Copenhagen, Bent Lexner, on 16 March 2009, there are some 6,000 people of Jewish descent (having a Jewish parent) in Denmark, with 95% of them living in Copenhagen. Three streams can be identified within Judaism in Denmark. The largest is the Mosaic Faith Society, having some 2,200 members. In addition, there is the small progressive Shir Hatzafon Association with 100 members and a small Orthodox Machsike Hadass Association with 200 members.

The development of Muslim organisations is rather recent in Denmark. In the earliest phase, before 1980, Muslims organised themselves as one group representing all of their nationalities. In the period 1980–1985, however, they started to split up into national groups, establishing their own mosques and schools.

After 1985, there were several attempts to establish an umbrella association of Muslim organisations as an interest group; however, this association never really got off the ground. It was only following the so-called cartoon crisis in 2005–2006 that awareness of the necessity for such an umbrella association increased and a select group of organisations (currently 13 Muslim groups) established the Muslim Council of Denmark. This organisation has been recognised in several ways, according to Imam Pedersen. It has also received project subsidies from the city of Copenhagen and from the Danish government. One of the subsidised projects is a campaign, currently being implemented, against discrimination of Jews and Muslims.

A year later, in 2007, a second umbrella organisation – the Islamic Union of Denmark – was set up, but it has not really consolidated itself yet, according to Imam Pedersen. The two competing umbrella organisations seem to be based on rivalling streams of Islam, sometimes even forms of Islam originating from various countries. The Turkish state-oriented Diyanet, for example, is a member of the Muslim Council of Denmark, while the Turkish Milli Görüş organisation is a member of the Islamic Union of Denmark.

According to Imam Pedersen, there are currently ‘at least 40 mosques ([prayer] rooms for Muslims) in the greater Copenhagen area. Some of them are officially registered [which needs to be done to receive subsidies], others are not’.

Few Hindu and Buddhist organisations have been formed in Denmark and there is a lack of information about them. Eight organisations have been registered in the country for each of these religions, most of which are presumably located in Copenhagen.

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35 This section is based on interviews with the Imam Abdul Wahid Pedersen and Flemming Mikkelsen (see also Mikkelsen, 2008, Chapter 7, pp. 110–127).

36 Imam Pedersen emphasises that, in the Danish context, Muslims began early to organise themselves around schools. In Denmark, the government subsidises 85% of the budget of schools that comply with state rules. Such schools are not Islamic schools in the formal sense, ‘but private schools with Muslim pupils’. These schools have to report directly to the Ministry of Education. The first of these schools was established in 1982–1983. Imam Pedersen stated: ‘I have been involved in the establishment of three primary schools in Copenhagen: a Pakistani one that still exists, a Turkish one (currently a Milli Görüş school) and a Somali school (which was closed after it was taken over by Salafis)’. Because they pay for their child’s schooling, according to Imam Pedersen, parents have high expectations from the school. However, the Danish environment has become very hostile towards these schools.

37 The so-called ‘cartoon crisis’ refers to the controversial publication in a Danish newspaper in September 2005 of 12 caricatures depicting Islam, including some of the prophet Muhammed – a forbidden act according to some branches of Islam.
Relations between groups and with the city

This chapter explores how religious organisations perceive policies of the city of Copenhagen and how they consider relations between faith groups in the city and what activities are actually undertaken. It presents the outcomes of interviews with three religious leaders on 16–18 March 2009: Chief Rabbi Bent Lexner, Vice-Bishop and Dean at the Cathedral of the Lutheran Church in Copenhagen, Anders Gadegård, and Imam Abdul Wahid Pedersen.

Views of Chief Rabbi Lexner

Chief Rabbi Lexner explains that the Jewish community in Copenhagen is relatively small but well established. It has a rich variety of organisations in all kinds of fields: for example, special clubs for women, young and older people, as well as sports and craft associations. Some of these organisations represent special groups of origin, such as the Polish–Jewish clubs for elderly and young people.

When asked about relations with the city, the Chief Rabbi first answered that there are no relations between the Jewish community and the city. When asked whether Jewish organisations are financially supported by the city, however, it appeared that many of the organisations mentioned do get some support from the city for their activities. Chief Rabbi Lexner commented: ‘That is the normal support that any organisation may get; it is not based on ethnicity or being Jewish. The general requirements are applicable.’ He gives an example of how such support for Jewish activities may lead to interesting negotiations and contacts with the executive departments of the city:

‘The Jewish community has taken the initiative to build a special Jewish home for elderly people in Copenhagen. In the negotiations with the [Social] Welfare Department of the city, responsible for elderly care, an interesting solution was found for the financing of the home: the city would pay for the general costs of the building, but the Jewish community would bear the extra costs such as those for creating a kosher kitchen and other facilities that related to typical Jewish requirements.

We have a long tradition of deliberations and compromises with the city, about provisions in hospitals, among other things. These are informal contacts. At executive level, the city is keen to avoid precedents. However, at political level, we have good contacts and close connections. If necessary, I can call upon the mayor for such things. In that sense, we are privileged.’

With regard to relations between different faith groups in Copenhagen, the chief rabbi reports that few formal contacts have been established with the Lutheran Church or with Muslim groups, but that there are incidental contacts and sometimes even cooperation with these religious groups. Some time ago, the Jewish community explored an initiative to establish ‘dialogue meetings’, but this move has not been very successful. One of the more interesting forms of cooperation has been a project involving schools in the Nørrebro district in the northwest of the city, which has already been in operation for five years: ‘Jews, Muslims and Christians meet together and discuss interfaith questions and relations. The Palestinian question, for example, had raised all kinds of matters that have to be dealt with. In working together, more awareness is raised, also within the Jewish community. Schools really open up through this activity.’

Chief Rabbi Lexner also refers to a discussion that took place ‘in the framework of the We Copenhageners campaign that focused on combating anti-Semitism and anti-Islamism’.

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38 The research for this study uncovered a good example of such close, but informal political connections. The first thing that the Chief Rabbi told the interviewer before the interview commenced was: ‘that we had only an hour for our conversation, because the Minister for Integration would come to pay him an unexpected visit on an urgent matter within an hour’.

39 The project is implemented by volunteers, so there are only organisational costs. Part of these costs is financed by the government.
On an informal level, the Jewish community also maintains frequent contact with the Lutheran Church, particularly regarding invitations from the Lutheran Church to give lectures on Judaism. The Chief Rabbi knows the Lutheran bishop on a personal level.

**Views of Dean Gadegard of the Lutheran Cathedral**

The Lutheran Church is aware of its unique position in Denmark and Copenhagen, and the question on how ‘new religions’ fit into Danish society has been a topic of discussion over time. The Dean of the Lutheran Cathedral, Anders Gadegård, has a clear philosophy on this:

‘We hope to support the Muslims in establishing Danish Islam. Just like Lutheranism has become Danish. It would be important to establish a Danish Imam Education. Nowadays, imams are brought in from other countries, which may also bring in more radical streams of Islam. However, at the moment, there is no political will in Danish politics to do this. The Faculty of Theology at the University in Copenhagen is ready for it. Professor Nielsen, a specialist in Islam, has prepared for it all.’

Dean Gadegård also highlights concrete forms of action based on that principle. He is Chair of the National Council of Churches in Denmark. The council has set up a contact committee to liaise with the Muslim community, namely with its two umbrella organisations – the Muslim Council of Denmark and the Islamic Union of Denmark. According to Dean Gadegård, ‘two basic issues are discussed there. The first is how to ensure that other religions acquire a legal position in Denmark, and the second is how to improve opportunities to establish meetings with each other.’ One of the main goals is also ‘to respond together to crises situations’.

The National Council of Churches has also set up a committee aiming to ensure equality between churches. Particular issues to address include tax deductions and church tax. According to Dean Gadegård, the committee is ‘close to finding a solution’ in relation to this matter: for instance, if new churches wish, they may also use the church tax system, but this right is counterbalanced by requirements and obligations. The dean is optimistic about this new development.

In terms of relations with the city of Copenhagen, he explains that the Lutheran Church has various organisations that are active in all areas of social work, such as kindergartens, working with homeless people, drug addicts, as well as elderly and young people. He states that ‘much of this work cannot exist without the support of the city’. Nonetheless, in principle, support from the city is acquired under the same conditions as for other groups.

Interestingly, according to Dean Gadegård, the Lutheran Church plays a significant role in resisting the restrictive policy practice of immigration. There has been a long and ongoing debate on asylum seekers and illegal immigrants, in which some pastors and parishes have taken explicit positions by organising their reception and providing facilities for them, and sometimes even hiding them. One of the pastors has been sentenced in court for hiding illegal immigrants in the past. However, such action is not strictly encouraged by the Lutheran Church; for instance, the church itself has no official opinion on these matters.\(^{40}\) The decentralised character of the Lutheran Church allows some followers to take such positions.

\(^{40}\) An outside observer reported two opposite movements within the Lutheran Church: a conservative one that takes more explicit stances, including in religious debates, and one that is more engaged in immigrant and refugee questions (supporting clandestine immigrants and asylum seekers).
Dean Gadegård remarks that ‘we do not have a Religion Council in Copenhagen’. However, within the We Copenhageners campaign, a committee of religious leaders was formed, comprising the former Chief Rabbi Lexner, Dean Gadegård and imams. This committee would help, in particular, some projects in the campaign explicitly involving religions, such as the ‘Open roofs’ project in which churches and prayer facilities of all religions were opened up to receive visitors. Therefore, Dean Gadegård concludes that ‘the city of Copenhagen is trying seriously to mobilise the religious part of civil society, particularly last year. The number of initiatives and their effect is still modest however.’ In terms of expectations for the future, he stated:

‘I have not looked to the city in these matters so far, but I would like to. It is good that we all promote that groups are brought together, not excluding groups in advance. We should be courageous. But I do not expect the Mayor for Integration to take the initiative. Except for the field of safety and security, to combat radicalisation one should try to unite the Muslims and work with them.’

Regarding contacts between different religions, the dean also reports earlier initiatives on interreligious dialogue in Copenhagen than the recent ones mentioned above. For example, the Lutheran Church responded to one initiative of the Study and Research Centre in Nørrebro. The project aimed to explore commonalities between Christians and Muslims.

**Views of Imam Pedersen**

Imam Abdul Wahid Pedersen is a native Danish Muslim who has been involved for decades in the fight for recognition of Islam in Denmark, on the one hand, and in organising the complicated field of Islamic organisations in Denmark, on the other. He is an imam (recognised by the state) and manages a prayer room and small shop in which he sells spiritual literature. He clearly represents a form of mainstream Islam that should fit into a modern western world and that should also be attractive for young people.

The first point that Imam Pedersen made is that he is doing this work in an environment that has become very hostile in Denmark. This is reflected in political circles in which some politicians and political parties take stances that are hostile towards Islam. The public image of Islam and the debates on it are also very much dominated by Danish media that play the anti-Muslim card. Nevertheless, there are also good examples of a positive environment, even in the media, such as a programme on Radio 1 that has nuanced debates on religious matters. In general, he sees that the negative image of Islam created in the media is only one part of Danish reality: ‘I am a high profile target in these matters. But I am happy to live here in this ghetto (Nørrebro). I feel safe here and I have good relations with the police.’

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41 Dean Gadegård suggests that Mayor Hougaard has been criticised by political representatives such as the former Minister of Social Welfare and Venstre party member Karen Jespersen, because he would include ‘radical organisations’. This is why he would have cancelled the process of formally bringing religious leaders together.

42 The former Chief Rabbi, Bent Melchior, has a reputation for taking strong stances on discrimination. Reportedly, he said publicly that anti-Semitism exists, but at a low level. However, he highlights that the real problem at present is discrimination against Muslims. ‘His mission is all dialogue’, according to one interviewee.

43 During the long interview session, a couple entered the spiritual literature shop managed by Imam Pedersen to register their official divorce of a marriage that he had previously performed.

44 He also referred to a special website that has collected public statements that can be characterised as discriminatory and even as hate speech: [http://www.humanisme.dk](http://www.humanisme.dk).
Imam Pedersen’s work in trying to organise Islam in Denmark has involved his participation in several initiatives to establish Islamic schools in Copenhagen. For the most part, however, he has been engaged in bringing the different Islamic organisations together. This initiative started in 1982 when the first Danish Organisation of Muslims was established, which disbanded around 1990. In the late 1990s, Imam Pedersen was again involved in a movement that tried to bring imams together to establish ‘an Islamic practice that was based in a Danish context, in the Danish language (for prayer and preaching) and with people who consider themselves Danes. We wanted to define what Islam in Denmark should look like’. In 1987, he was also involved in the establishment of the Islamic Relief Organisation, which was engaged in a project to support orphan homes, schools and development in countries of origin. At present, the most successful umbrella organisation in which Imam Pedersen is involved is the Muslim Council of Denmark, which was established in 2006, shortly after the so-called cartoon crisis. As noted earlier, the council currently brings together 13 Islamic organisations – some of which are umbrella organisations, such as the Diyanet.

In Imam Pedersen’s view, the Muslim Council has been recognised by both the state and the city of Copenhagen in several ways: it receives subsidies from the state and the city for certain projects. One such project is a joint initiative with other religions against the discrimination of Jews and Muslims. According to Imam Pedersen, ‘the Muslim Council is also consulted in many ways by many partners.’ This latter statement, however, was not confirmed in any of the contacts with city policymakers, as noted above. Such recognition and contacts with the city are indirect and informal, mostly taking place at the lowest level of policy implementation.

Regarding contacts and cooperation with other religions, Imam Pedersen reported that discussions have taken place with the Lutheran Church on a number of practical issues, among them the issue of registration through the Lutheran Church offices. These were unofficial discussions, at least in the sense that the government was not involved. In terms of common public action, relations with the Jewish community have been fostered in recent times, particularly around the topic of combating anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. Imam Pedersen stated: ‘At the moment, we are establishing a platform for Jews and Muslims.’

**Conclusion**

The general picture from these interviews is that formal and institutionalised contacts and cooperation between the city and religious organisations is systematically avoided (by the city). Nevertheless, at the level of implementation, cooperation exists: strongly with the Jewish and Lutheran communities, and to a lesser degree with Muslim communities.

Although there is no institutionalised form of dialogue or cooperation, a number of initiatives and common activities of religious organisations and their leaders have been undertaken and are still ongoing. The city is not an active partner or even a promoter of these activities although it does sometimes partly finance them.

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45 The Islamic Relief organisation was closed in 2005 after false allegations made against it, according to Imam Pedersen; it was subsequently re-established as Danish Muslim Aid.

46 It has been recognised in the formal and legal sense, because the organisation is registered as a religious association. What is meant here is the factual recognition as a partner in civil society.
Key challenges and lessons for CLIP

To understand relations between culturally and religiously different groups in Denmark and policies in this field, three basic features of Danish society should be kept in mind.

Firstly, Denmark is a country that understands itself primarily as culturally and religiously homogeneous. This perception is confirmed by Danish researchers in this field (Goul Andersen, 2006; Hedetoft, 2006; Jørgensen, 2009; Mikkelsen, 2008). It is also underlined by the strength of political mobilisation around the topics of immigration and integration, with tight entry restrictions – particularly regarding immigrants perceived as culturally and religiously different – and a strong insistence on compliance with what are regarded as important ‘Danish values’ in both integration and naturalisation policies. The Danish People’s Party (DF), has played an important role in this mobilisation since the mid 1990s in two ways: on the one hand, by channelling and mainstreaming claims of earlier, more extremist groups in Denmark – thereby reducing their significance (see Karpantschof and Mikkelsen (forthcoming)) – and, on the other hand, by having a strong influence on most other political parties in Denmark in the areas of immigration and integration of immigrants.

Secondly, institutional legacies of the past in the field of religion seem to reinforce this idea of homogeneity. The country has a National Church of Denmark, namely the Evangelical Lutheran Church. A large majority of Danes are formal members of this church. Although there is freedom of religion in the country both in terms of individual choice and the opportunity to form congregations for the worship of God, the actual arrangement of relations between the National Church and state gives the Evangelical Lutheran Church a very privileged position, particularly by enabling it to collect church tax and conduct the population registration for the state. This church is – historically and as a consequence of its privileged position – also a dominant actor in Danish civil society.

Thirdly, Denmark is a welfare state in a rather pronounced form. It has inclusive policies not only for its citizens but also for all legal residents. The key fields of activity of the welfare state are defined as labour and income, housing, education, health and welfare. Culture and religion are not included as relevant fields of activity in integration policies. Equality and equal treatment of individuals are key words in the political discourse and policies. Combating unequal treatment and discrimination – again at individual level – is thus also a logical priority.

Based on these three features, Danish immigration and integration policies have developed a specific flavour in a European comparative perspective. Immigration, particularly from non-western countries, is predominantly seen as a possible threat to the welfare state. In recent years, it is also seen as a threat to Danish identity and values – a view that is reflected in the discussions on ‘parallel societies’. Immigrants of the Islamic faith are often singled out in public discourse as being difficult to integrate. Nonetheless, official documents – on the principle of non-discrimination and on a particular conception of the (non-)place of religion in state policies – will never do this explicitly. Immigration policies are thus very restrictive, particularly for categories of immigrants who are perceived as embodying such threats.

Official integration policies are based on a particular combination of three principles:

- they are targeted at specific, problematic individuals, identified and named by general socioeconomic criteria, not by ethnic, cultural or religious characteristics;
- they are formulated on general principles of equality;
- they are strongly oriented towards specific domains of work, education and housing.
The combination of these principles leads to ambivalence – from the perspective of immigrant integration policies – regarding the target groups. Immigrant is not the defining characteristic, but is related to the problematic characteristics of some of these groups; this is translated into the statistical category of non-western immigrants. The combination of principles also leads to a specific vision in the domains of culture, language and religion. These are not defined as policy domains in themselves, but appear predominantly as negative elements for integration. The Danish ‘model’ of integration of immigrants is targeted at individuals and is based on generic principles as opposed to models that explicitly define ethnic or immigrant target groups and develop specific strategies along these lines.47

A comparison of the national policy document on integration (Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs, 2005) and the policy document for the city of Copenhagen (City of Copenhagen, 2006) shows that Copenhagen’s approach deviates from the national model in framing the integration process as a mutual process and naming diversity as a potential asset (Penninx, 2009). The city approach also differs in that it focuses less on the mandatory nature of measures and more on the engagement of various actors in society. Nevertheless, it follows national policies generally in its priority of domains of activity and the absence of culture and religion as domains, in its focus on individuals in policy programmes and in its hesitancy to involve immigrant organisations. This latter element is expressed in the way that consultancy on city policies is organised: the Integration Council consists of elected individuals with a migration background (15 members), as well as nominated representatives of Danish civil society. It also came to light during a previous CLIP study of diversity policies (Penninx, 2009) when focusing on what ‘engagement of various actors in society’ actually meant. These actors come from the established Danish civil society – trade unions, employer organisations and other Danish organisations – and not from that part of civil society organised by immigrants: immigrant organisations, including religious ones.

Interviews with high-level policymakers in Copenhagen indicate that, although their diagnoses of the integration problem differ significantly, views regarding the practical implementation of their ideas have some basic features in common and correspond to the principles mentioned above. Firstly, integration policies are meant to be directed towards individuals, in the Copenhagen case in a strongly area-based form. Secondly, immigrant organisations are not seen as potential partners in integration policies, and are even seen as a threat by some people. ‘Representation’ is meant to take place through elected individuals, although recently there have been examples of formal cooperation with religious-based organisations – for example, with the Muslim Council and the Mosaic Faith Association in connection with the Islamophobia and anti-Semitism campaign. Thirdly, integration policies should be implemented primarily through the city’s departments and their institutionalised implementation units; civil society is not perceived as a main partner. Fourthly, religion is not supposed to play any role in the city’s policy, and religious organisations are not seen as relevant for policies.

The formal answers received from the city of Copenhagen in the elaborate questionnaire for this study reflected this specific official framing of integration policies. However, when examining policy practice of the city and when exploring civil society and its initiatives, a much more nuanced picture of ‘policies in practice’ emerges. Firstly, many

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47 For an elaboration of such models and their internal logic, see Penninx and Martiniello, 2004.

48 In the report on housing of immigrants in Copenhagen (Penninx, 2007), it appears that housing corporations play an important role in that specific domain. In view of the history of these institutions and their continuing strong links with local and national government, they could be referred to as quasi-non-governmental organisations (QUANGOs) than as NGOs.
contacts exist between the immigrant and religious parts of civil society through a decentralised and uncoordinated system of project subsidies. A generic system of financial support exists through such project subsidies for civil society organisations in general; these are also available for immigrant and religious organisations if they fulfil specific requirements. Immigrant organisations use these opportunities, although it seems that lack of knowledge of the system and of established contacts within the system put them at a disadvantage in relation to the established part of civil society.

Secondly, the Integration Office seems to try to compensate for the absence of formal relations with immigrant and religious organisations. For example, the taskforce of the Integration Office acts as a low-key link between the city – meaning its departments and civil servants – and these organisations. In at least one of the new policy programmes, the We Copenhageners campaign, religious leaders are explicitly asked to participate, although the city avoids suggesting formal or institutionalised contacts.

Regarding the development of immigrant organisations in Copenhagen, it has become clear that a broad and varied field of organisations has been built up in the past, partly due to a supportive national and local policy before 2001. The lack of formal support since 2001 led to a stabilisation of the field. For many of the existing organisations, however, the indirect support through project subsidies is still very important to them.

The attitudes and expectations of faith-based civil society actors seem to correspond to the policies described above. Although they have strong informal contacts, particularly the established organisations from the Lutheran and Jewish communities, they do not expect that the city will invite or encourage them to work on intergroup and interfaith relations. Instead, these actors take initiatives themselves, although there is not yet much institutionalised cooperation or dialogue.
Bibliography


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List of persons and organisations interviewed

Khalid Alsubeihi, Former chair of the Integration Council of Copenhagen
Annette T. Bülow, School Social Services Police (SSP)
Carl Christian Ebbesen, elected councillor of Copenhagen for the Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti, DF)
Nasib H. Farah, elected member and former co-chair of the Integration Council of Copenhagen
Eline Feldman, Integration taskforce of the Office for Integration, Employment and Integration Administration, City of Copenhagen
Anders Gadegård, Vice-Bishop and Dean of the Lutheran Church in Copenhagen
Jakob Hougaard, Mayor of the Employment and Integration Administration, City of Copenhagen
Mustafa Hussain, researcher, Roskilde University
Karima Isert, International Coordinator, Office for Integration, Employment and Integration Administration, City of Copenhagen
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