Intercultural policies and intergroup relations

Case study: Tallinn, Estonia
In 2006, the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe, the city of Stuttgart and the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound) established a ‘European network of cities for local integration policies for migrants’, henceforth known as CLIP. The network comprises a steering committee, a group of expert European research centres and a number of European cities. In the following two years, the cities of Vienna and Amsterdam joined the CLIP Steering Committee. The network is also supported by the Committee of the Regions (CoR) and the Council of European Municipalities and Regions (CEMR), and has formed a partnership with the European Network Against Racism (ENAR).

Through the medium of separate city reports (case studies) and workshops, the network enables local authorities to learn from each other and to deliver a more effective integration policy. The unique character of the CLIP network is that it organises a shared learning process between the participating cities, between the cities and a group of expert European research centres, as well as between policymakers at local and European level.

The CLIP network currently brings together more than 30 large and medium-sized cities from all regions of Europe: Amsterdam (NL), Antwerp (BE), Arnsberg (DE), Athens (EL), Barcelona (ES), Bologna (IT), Breda (NL), Budapest (HU), Copenhagen (DK), Dublin (IE), Frankfurt (DE), Helsinki (FI), Istanbul (TR), İzmir (TR), Kirklees (UK), Liège (BE), Lisbon (PT), Luxembourg (LU), L’Hospitalet (ES), Malmö (SE), Mataró (ES), Newport (UK), Prague (CZ), Strasbourg (FR), Stuttgart (DE), Sundsvall (SE), Tallinn (EE), Terrassa (ES), Turin (IT), Turku (FI), Valencia (ES), Vienna (AT), Wolverhampton (UK), Wrocław (PL), Zagreb (HR), Zeytinburnu (TR) and Zürich (CH).

The cities in the network are supported in their shared learning by a group of expert European research centres in:

- Bamberg, Germany (European Forum for Migration Studies, EFMS);
- Vienna (Institute for Urban and Regional Research, ISR);
- Amsterdam (Institute for Migration and Ethnic Studies, IMES);
- Turin (International and European Forum on Migration Research, FIERI);
- Wrocław (Institute of International Studies);
- Swansea, Wales (Centre for Migration Policy Research, CMPR).

There are four research modules in total. The first module was on housing – segregation, access to, quality and affordability for migrants – which has been identified as a major issue impacting on migrants’ integration into their host society. The second module examined equality and diversity policies in relation to employment within city administrations and in the provision of services. The focus of the third module is intercultural policies and intergroup relations. The final module (2009–2010) will look at ethnic entrepreneurship.

The case studies on intercultural policies were carried out in 2009.

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1 See also http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/populationandsociety/clip.htm.
Acknowledgements

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Introduction

The third module of the CLIP project is concerned with intergroup relations and intercultural policies in two dimensions – the relations between different groups living in a city and the local authority policy towards these groups. Since the CLIP network is based on cities of a different population structure, ‘group’ in this project is defined broadly as an ethnic, religious, immigrant or national minority group. This definition is important, particularly for eastern European countries where the presence of immigrant groups is still marginal. In place of ‘immigrants’, this report talks about national minorities with different cultural, religious and linguistic heritage who are included within the state’s territory as a result of conflicts, wars or border changes. As Heckmann (2008) points out in his concept paper for the third CLIP module:

In intergroup relations, we have to do with both meanings (of a group): for example, relations between a migrant association and a local branch of a political party or between a religious community and a department of the city administration. When, however, a mayor in a city, for example, wants to improve relations between natives and immigrants, between Christians and Muslims, between natives and a national minority present in the city, he is referring to categories and images of ‘groups’, often to relations of stereotypes that exist in the communication of the urban public.

There are many actors involved in the process of an intercultural dialogue. The CLIP project encompasses the city administration, the city council, political parties, churches, trade unions, welfare organisations and local media. In many western European cities, particular attention is paid to the Muslim community and its relations with the local community. Where Muslims are not the most relevant group, the researchers are interested in other faith-based communities.

Because a lack of knowledge of one another might be influential in provoking conflicts, another important aspect of the CLIP project is to understand the radicalisation process in urban populations and analyse intercultural policies that strive to avoid or resolve group conflicts at a local level.

The city case studies are based on two sources of information:

- input from the city to the Common Reporting Scheme (CRS);
- a field visit to the city by the researchers.

A CRS document was sent to all cities in the network in order to collect the basic information relevant to the module. This was an important tool for those cities with a long tradition of intercultural policies. But in some cities, particularly those in eastern Europe, the field visit by the research team and interviews with the actors involved proved vital in learning about informal practices and actions.

The analysis of existing documents focused on the programmes and activities undertaken by the city within the context of national policy. For eastern European cities, it is not only necessary to take existing practices in the field of intercultural dialogue into consideration but also why there are ‘no policies’ or how influential are informal activities.

Each report is organised in the same manner to facilitate comparison of individual cases and the research is subject to quality assurance to ensure high quality. An important objective is to open discussions and facilitate frequent contact with the different actors involved, which might lead to new projects in the future.
Location of Estonia

The Republic of Estonia (Eesti or Eesti Vabariik) is one of the Baltic States. It is located in the northeastern part of the Baltic Sea on the coast of the Gulf of Finland (Figure 1). The territory of Estonia covers 45,227 square kilometres and is inhabited by 1,342,000 people. The Estonian language is similar to Finnish – both come from the Ugro-Finnic group of languages.

Figure 1: Republic of Estonia and its neighbours

Source: United Nations (Cartographic Section)

History of migration and composition of migrant populations

During its long history, Estonia has been subjected to Danish, Teutonic, Swedish and Russian rule. There were two very important moments in the history of Estonia in the 20th century. The first was the Estonian Declaration of Independence of 1918 followed by the Estonian War of Independence (1918–1920). Twenty years later, Estonia lost its independence and was occupied by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) from 1940 to 1991, when the state was restored on the basis of the legal continuity of statehood. The Russian occupation deprived Estonia of its sovereignty and changed its population structure due to the migration of Russian citizens into its territory. Many of the Russian immigrants came with the Soviet military. The other main group was formed by economic immigrants from the cities of Novogrod or Leningrad destroyed during the Second World War. The occupation influenced political, social and cultural internal and external relations – an issue discussed later in this report.
Estonia is a diverse society in terms of ethnicity and comprises more than a hundred different ethnic groups. According to data obtained from the Statistical Office of Estonia and the Estonian Ministry of Interior (Siseministeerium), the total registered population of Estonia in October 2008 was 1,346,456 of whom 1,144,601 were Estonian citizens. In addition, there were 50,839 Estonians living abroad. The number of residents of undetermined citizenship was 108,383 and the number of residents with the citizenship of another state amounted to 111,475 (including 92,600 citizens of the Russian Federation, 4,921 Ukrainians, 2,647 Finns, 1,832 Latvians, 1,510 Lithuanians and 1,386 Belarusians). Table 1 examines in more detail the changing dynamics in the population structure due to the Russian occupation and the inflow of Russian citizens into Estonia.

Table 1: Numbers of ethnic minorities living in Estonia, 1934–2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>1934</th>
<th>1989</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estonian</td>
<td>993,000 (88%)</td>
<td>963,000 (61%)</td>
<td>930,000 (68%)</td>
<td>921,900 (69%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>93,000 (8%)</td>
<td>475,000 (30%)</td>
<td>351,000 (26%)</td>
<td>345,200 (26%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>16,000 (2%)</td>
<td>3,000 (0.2%)</td>
<td>2,000 (0.1%)</td>
<td>1,900 (0.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swedish</td>
<td>8,000 (0.7%)</td>
<td>300 (0.02%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>4,000 (0.4%)</td>
<td>500 (0.3%)</td>
<td>2,000 (0.1%)</td>
<td>1,900 (0.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finnish</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17,000 (1%)</td>
<td>12,000 (1%)</td>
<td>11,200 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>48,000 (3%)</td>
<td>29,000 (2%)</td>
<td>28,300 (2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byelorussian/Belarusian</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28,000 (2%)</td>
<td>17,000 (1%)</td>
<td>16,300 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>13,000 (1%)</td>
<td>30,000 (2%)</td>
<td>27,000 (2%)</td>
<td>18,000 (1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,127,000 (100%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,564,800 (100%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,370,000 (100%)</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,344,700 (100%)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistical Office of Estonia

In 2006, 31% of the citizens of Estonia were not ethnic Estonians by origin. A vast majority of these were Russian speakers (mainly Russians but also representatives of other former republics of the USSR).

During the Russian occupation, many Russians migrated into Estonia as a result of economic growth and political decisions. After the re-establishment of Estonia’s independence in 1991, all the settlers from the time of the occupation were legally regarded as immigrants. This decision meant that a large proportion of these former citizens of Estonia changed status, becoming citizens of another country or stateless persons. Some became naturalised or took out the citizenship of another country.

According to available statistics, 6.3% of Estonia’s population are Russian citizens, 0.7% are nationals of other countries and 12.4% remain stateless. These stateless people are those who were born in Estonia of parents of non-Estonian origin who lost their country due to political changes. They lost their identity and their history. They are now living where they belong under the new political power system in the region. Most of the non-citizens are holders of long-term residence permits which give them the same socioeconomic rights. However, their political rights are limited to a passive vote at a municipal level and they are not allowed to hold certain public offices.

**National policy context**

The population of Estonia is very diverse and the existence of different minority groups requires careful implementation of laws enforcing European Union and international regulations. Discussions on cultural policy and relations between the majority and minorities within the population went through various stages after 1991. It is understandable that, after the ending of the Soviet regime and the regaining of independence, Estonia faced the problem that citizens of Russian
origin made up a significant group in society. Studies carried out by numerous organisations identified certain opinions among Estonians, who expected Russian speakers who had lived for years in their country to be assimilated rapidly. An example of such opinion from research carried out by Amnesty International (2006) is presented below:

*I don’t mind them, they have a right to live here as well, but they have to understand that this is Estonia now. If they want to live here, be Estonian citizens and work here, they should learn Estonian and learn about Estonian culture. For so long, we had been under Russian influence, forced to learn Russian. It is important that we assert our national identity now in order for our culture and our language, to survive and develop.*

Johannes – an ethnic Estonian in his mid 20s living in Tallinn

This statement was typical of the discussion in Estonia, especially in the mid 1990s. It shows how emotional the question of nationality, identity and language for both sides was. After the long Soviet occupation, Estonians who had gained their independence wish to return to their language and culture as the symbols of the state and nation. For Russian speakers who had lived in Estonia for years or were born in the country, the Russian language was part of their identity and, with the political change, they were confronted with questions about their identity.

The debate focused primarily on issues such as the status of non-Estonians, citizenship policy, integration of minorities, and language and cultural policy. All the solutions in this field were obscured by the memory of the Russian occupation, Stalin’s deportations and the process of the Russification of Estonia still living in the elderly and middle-aged.

It is also important to consider the law on which the minority issues are based. The definition of a minority group in Estonia is contained in the Law on the Cultural Autonomy of National Minorities. To be a part of a minority, its members must:

- be citizens of Estonia;
- reside in Estonia;
- have long-term, stable and strong links with Estonia;
- differ from ethnic Estonians on the basis of their ethnic affiliation, cultural, religious traditions or linguistic characteristics;
- be guided by the desire to conserve, by joint efforts, their cultural traditions, religion and language, underlying their common identity.

The law allows the minority groups to constitute themselves as autonomous communities but limits the rights of groups such as Finns or Danes who are living in Estonia and do not have Estonian citizenship. It has been possible to form cultural or religious communities such as Jewish communities since the beginning of the 1990s.

There are a number of important documents concerned with intergroup relations and minority policies in Estonia. The Estonian Ministry of Culture (Kultuuriministeerium) is one of the main institutions dealing with minority issues. The ministry has numerous duties, one of them being ‘to support the cultural autonomy of ethnic minorities living in Estonia’. In Estonia’s Development Plan for 2009–2012, priority is also given to promoting the diversity of Estonian culture. On the basis of this and other documents, Estonians and other cultural institutions, organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and clubs are funded from public sources.
The main goals for the integration policy in the future are set out in the *State Integration Programme 2008–2013*. A consortium of academics and practitioners commissioned by the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Estonia (*Rahandusministeerium*) to identify needs and carry out feasibility research defined six main fields for the Integration Programme (Lauristin et al., 2008):

- education (including teaching the language to adults and pupils, teaching history and social studies, citizenship education);
- tolerance and intercultural dialogue, media;
- naturalisation, political identity;
- social risk groups;
- labour market;
- study of local governments.

The new State Integration Programme replaced the previous one which covered the years 2000 to 2007.

Among the many symbolic and practical issues connected with the relations between Estonians and non-Estonians, there are two aspects that continue to be debated:

- the sense of citizenship;
- education and language.

The number of naturalised people has increased over the last 15 years, but the question remains as to whether naturalisation and Estonian citizenship translate automatically into complete integration.

The knowledge and use of the Estonian language among non-Estonians is still a ‘hot’ issue in the country. Although Estonian is the official language, the state and local governments provide some information in Russian. In places where the majority of inhabitants are Russian (in the eastern part of the country close to the Russian border but also in the city of Tallinn), local authorities are obliged to offer services in both languages. The proportions of Russian speakers in three major cities are given in Table 2.

**Table 2: Minority percentages in three Estonian cities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Minority percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tallinn</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narva</td>
<td>95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kohtla-Järve</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Statistical Office of Estonia, 2007*

Knowledge of the Estonian language is seen as helpful in intergroup relations and, to the majority of Estonians, it is a symbol of the willingness to integrate. At the same time, there is still a Russian-language education system running parallel to the Estonian system. Under a law implemented in 2007, Russian language secondary schools are required to adopt the Estonian language for instruction in at least 60% of lessons.
In conclusion, three institutions that support the integration process should be mentioned.

- The Integration and Migration Foundation is a quasi-governmental institution established in 1998. It is responsible for the state programme, ‘Integration in Estonian society’, which is based on two principles – the social harmonisation of society and the opportunity to maintain ethnic differences.

- The Estonian Union of National Minorities was also founded in 1988 and is a non-governmental, non-profit organisation representing about 50 various organisations nationwide.

- The Presidential Roundtable on National Minorities was founded in 1993 by President Lennart Meri as a consultative organ to which representatives of the important groups were invited.

All three institutions are working to integrate the different ethnic, cultural, religious and language groups living in Estonia.
Profile of Tallinn

Brief description of the city

Tallinn is the capital and the largest city of the Republic of Estonia. It is located in the northeastern part of the country, covers an area of 159 square kilometres and, in 2006, had 399,096 inhabitants (Table 3). For local government’s purposes, Tallinn is subdivided into eight administrative districts (linnaosad or linnaosa). The district governments fulfil within their territory the functions assigned to them by Tallinn legislation and statutes. Each district government is managed by an elder (linnaosavanem).

Table 3: Facts about Tallinn, 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>399,096</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>159.2 square kilometres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density</td>
<td>2,507 per square kilometre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural increase of people</td>
<td>659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate (relation between unemployed and the labour force)</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average monthly gross wage</td>
<td>€703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average monthly retirement pension</td>
<td>€194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet users</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education institutions</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistical Office of Estonia

According to Eurostat, the statistical agency of the European Union, Tallinn has the largest number of non-EU nationals of all the capital cities of EU Member States: 27.8% of its population are non-EU citizens. This is because the Soviet occupation (1940–1991) brought large numbers of non-Estonians, mostly Russians, to Tallinn and other areas of northern Estonia. While these people and their descendants have been steadily becoming naturalised, many (by some estimates around half of Tallinn’s current ethnic Russian population) have still not taken the route to citizenship. Figure 2 shows the changes in the percentage of the people with different citizenship in Estonia from 1992 to 2007. It is clear from these figures that the number of people with underdetermined citizenship fell significantly during this period.

Figure 2: Percentage of people with different citizenship in Estonia

Source: Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Välisministeerium)
Tallinn’s economic situation has changed over the last years as a result of direct foreign investment and the growth of new industrial sectors. In addition to its long-time function as a port, Tallinn has seen the development of an information technology sector in recent years. According to information published by the Bank of Estonia (Eesti Pank) in 2008, the economic growth has resulted from direct foreign investment mainly in the fields of finance (31.3%), real estate and business services (29.2%) and manufacturing (14.4%). Table 4 lists the main socioeconomic indicators for Tallinn in 2007.

Due to its convenient geographical location and proximity to Scandinavia and Russia, Tallinn has also attracted many tourists and tourism has become an important branch of the Estonian economy. Since 1997, Tallinn’s Old Town has been on the UNESCO World Heritage List – a major ‘pull’ factor for tourists.

Table 4: Socioeconomic indicators in Tallinn, 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Monthly amount (€)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average gross wage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average net household wage per person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average old-age pension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsistence level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsistence minimum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum expenditure on foodstuffs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum wage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistical Office of Estonia

City’s migrant population and its characteristics/main groups

As explained above, political and historical changes mean that the population of Estonia is very diverse in terms of ethnicity. For example, at the end of 2007, Estonians made up 54.9% of Tallinn’s population, followed by Russians (36.5%) and other Russian speakers from other former republics of the Soviet Union (Table 5).

Table 5: Composition of population of Tallinn by nationality, 2 January 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estonian</td>
<td>54.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarusian</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finnish</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Tallinn: Facts and figures 2008 (http://www.tallinn.ee/est/g2606s49603)

Most members of the Russian-speaking community were already living in Estonia when it gained independence in 1991 so had either arrived in Estonia during the Soviet occupation or were born there. In 1991, the Estonian government decided that only those people who had been Estonian citizens up to 1940 and their descendants would automatically be recognised as citizens of Estonia. This meant that people who had migrated there internally within the USSR or their descendants who had been born in Estonia were, from this moment on, perceived as stateless.
The question of citizenship was discussed in broad terms during the 1990s and the pre-EU accession period, and Estonia was obliged by the European Union to regulate the rights of its Russian speakers. Those without Estonian citizenship can live in Estonia under the terms of Council Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents. This laid down the principle of a ‘long-term resident’; such status gives people the right to live and work in EU countries.

When looking at the situation of the minority groups in Tallinn, it should be stressed that the picture of minorities drawn so far is simplified in terms of policy and dialogue. Although the biggest group is formed by Russian speakers, the structure of this group is diverse in terms of its members’ socioeconomic position and status; the latter might be Russian-speaking citizens of Estonia, citizens of another country such as Russia, Belarus (Byelorussia) or Ukraine, or stateless. The Russian speakers are organised in the city in different organisations based on common interest. The main groups are:

- Russkij Dom;
- Integratio;
- OMOS;
- KPD;
- LICHR;
- International Association of National and Cultural Societies (LÜÜRA);
- Slavic Education Society;
- Slavic Cultural Society.

The city of Tallinn has supported activities undertaken by minority organisations that contribute to the development of national culture or cooperation between different groups living in the city. An outstanding example of the financial support obtained by the Russian-speaking community is the renovation of the Russian House and sponsorship of its activities (Figure 3). This prestigious building is located in the centre of the city and since its restoration has become a renowned concert hall. According to the city authorities, this is the only Russian culture centre outside Russia entirely sponsored by local authorities. The centre hosts a variety of events such as concerts, theatrical performances and workshops for children.

Figure 3: The Russian House – centre of Russian culture in Tallinn
City’s Muslim population and its characteristics

There is no Muslim community active at present in Tallinn. There are members of the Tatar community who belong to the Islam faith and are mainly Russian speakers, but they do not have any organisation as a religious community. Because the Tatars living in Estonia are not organised as a community, they are not considered an actor within the public sphere. The situation of the Tatar community in Tallinn is comparable with that in other eastern European countries where they live. They are mainly well-assimilated within society, knowing the language and culture. In some countries, such as Poland, they cultivate their religious and cultural life. In the process of integration in Estonia, two sides are involved, namely non-Estonians and Estonians. Non-Estonian Tatars are understood to speak Russian and this group was the target group for the purposes of this research.
Local intercultural policies in general

General approach and responsibility for relations with ethnic and religious organisations

The city of Tallinn is governed by the City Mayor, the City Council (*Linnavoulikogu*) and the City Government (*Linnavalitsus*). The City Council is directly elected by the citizens and has 63 members. The City Council, its 11 committees and the separate district councils are affiliated to the City Council due to the administrative division of Tallinn into eight districts (Haabersti, Centre, Krisinne, Lasnamäe, Mustamäe, Nõmme, Pirita and Northern Tallinn).

The City Government is the executive body and is composed of the City Mayor and six Deputy Mayors who are each responsible for up to three of the 12 municipal departments. The Department of Cultural Affairs and the Department of Development are in charge of intergroup relations and intercultural relations, though all other units are interconnected over different issues affecting the city population.

The City Mayor of Tallinn is the leader of the Council of Minorities, the platform for discussions and the consultative body for the decisions on minority issues. The City Office of Tallinn is responsible for the diversity policy. The main person responsible in this field is the City Secretary who is appointed by the City Mayor. In the City Council, 20 out of the 61 seats belong to representatives from national minorities who are active in the committees in the areas of culture, education and social affairs, and present the point of view of the Russian-speaking minority.

What seems to be crucial for intergroup relations and the dialogue within the City Council is the fact that all the representatives use both languages (Russian and Estonian) and are able to take part in the activities of both communities.

Issues, demands and interests

The state integration policy in Estonia, initiated in the late 1990s, has primarily addressed the non-Estonian Russian-speaking population, which was defined as the main target group for the process of integration. In some programmes, Russian speakers were divided into different target groups (for example, in the educational programme or in activities orientated at the labour market) but, in general, the non-Estonian community has been perceived as a homogeneous body.

In the initial phase of the integration policy, activities were implemented nationwide. An Estonian model of integration assumed that minorities would gain the same equal opportunities as Estonians and simultaneously they would preserve their ethnic heritage. This assumption places this programme in the multicultural model category. On the other hand, the minority groups were expected from the very beginning to acquire the Estonian language and to accept the rules in the new Estonian state.

Many difficulties confront the integration process in Estonia where historical experiences are still very recent and where the society is built up of two different communities in terms of language and culture. According to research by the Estonian Open Society Institute in 2007, three-quarters of the residents of Tallinn considered the integration process unsuccessful. These results were a stimulus for the city of Tallinn to develop its own integration activities. The local policy is based on the State Integration Programme and addresses all minorities living in Tallinn. On the basis of the data from the city of Tallinn, the activities should ensure equal opportunities for the minority groups.

The Tallinn programme, *Kodurahu* (‘Peace in the community’), was developed with the aim of improving the relations between Estonians and non-Estonians living in the city. According to its leaders, its objective ‘is peaceful co-existence in the community’. But having analysed the programme’s structure, it appears to concentrate more on the development of intergroup relations and interactions between both communities. In all their activities, the authorities strive to reach
out to the common interests of the two groups in order to bring them closer and to reduce the division between them. The city programme covers the following activities:

- a working group of 15 leaders of minority organisations (five groups: media, education, culture, politics and economics);
- home peace forums;
- training trips for NGO leaders;
- media scholarships for journalists writing about the integration process;
- an information centre for minorities;
- a mentor programme;
- an unemployment club;
- funds for entrepreneurs;
- a training programme for non-Estonians (Kodurahu).

All the activities introduced by Tallinn’s authorities seek to build up the dialogue platform through different forms of communication within the local area. The City Council strongly supports all the activities of NGOs of Estonians as well as non-Estonians, in various spheres of the city’s social life.

But according to representatives of the NGOs, there is no cooperation between the organisations of the two communities. The Russian organisations are more distrustful of contacts with the officials; they appear less prone to participate in local community programmes and activities and more closed in their own interest groups. This is also the case with Estonian organisations which do not seek contacts with ‘Russian’ organisations. The situation of NGOs and other Estonian organisations appears to be more favourable, however, due to their obvious knowledge of the language or, for example, the regulations on fund-raising for their activities.

Those working for NGOs interviewed by the author of this report emphasised the fact that, in the programmes addressed at both groups, the cultural differences are clearly seen in their work as well as in methods of expression (Estonian Amateur Theatre Association, Children’s Organisation). Madli Parts, leader of a programme called ‘The Capital of Culture 2011’ stressed that:

*It is hard to get through to the Russian-speaking community and include it in the programme, even though it is so comprehensive and multidimensional. It took a year to get to know one another.*

All statements concerning the cooperation between Estonians and non-Estonians, as well as the research referred to above about the limited effectiveness of the national integration programme, indicate that the emphasis in local programmes should be on cooperation and getting to know each other. This could prevent tensions and a lack of understanding, and promote one Estonian society instead of two parallel societies. The elements hindering this process are not only cultural differences, but above all the language.
Forms of relations and dialogue

The City Office and one of the deputy mayors are directly responsible for integration activities in Tallinn, including diversity policy and intercultural policy. For example:

- the city authority has used its formal and informal contacts to learn more about minority issues;
- the minority organisations and their leaders have been invited to participate in a consultative body as part of the Kodurahu programme;
- representatives of minority groups are members of the Minority Council and are frequently invited to debates on integration issues;
- the city authority publishes a free newspaper as a tool in the communication process with the Russian-speaking community.

The development of the local integration policy by the city of Tallinn is a good example of the attempts to create better intergroup relations in a society where the term ‘two Estonias’ is still used in the public debate.

Relationship between different ethnic groups in the city

There is no evidence of close cooperation by different ethnic groups co-existing in Tallinn, but at the same time, there are neither conflicts nor competition in fund-raising. As mentioned previously, both communities (Estonians and Russian speakers) live in two separate worlds using different educational systems, media and obviously different languages.

All those interviewed by the author stress that both communities are not cooperating mutually of their own free will and that the project leaders have faced a challenge to get these groups together. However, according to Madli Parts (leader of The Capital of Culture 2011 programme):

> there are some fields where mostly young people are able to cooperate with each other, for example: hip-hop culture, jazz music, modern art, etc.

The role of the city authority is not only to support both communities separately but to pay more attention to common projects as a means of better communication and integration.

Public communication

The authorities in the city of Tallinn are aware of the existence of two main languages in its territory and have been trying to get through to the two communities with important information about city life. The city publishes a free newspaper, Capital, in both Estonian and Russian. This newspaper is a means of communication with both communities and is significant, particularly in relation to communications with the Russian community. Its contents include current information about all spheres of public life, decisions taken by the authorities, cultural events and the like. Both language versions vary in terms of content and are not merely translations of one newspaper. Such perception of the two communities by the city authorities reflects the opinion put forward by both parties that the groups differ considerably. But providing information in the Russian language is undoubtedly a good gesture on the part of the city authorities.
This is not the only example of communicating information by the authorities to the Russian minority in their language. In the district of Mustamäe, a local newspaper has been prepared in two language versions so that, as Nikolai Degtjarenko, Deputy Mayor of Mustamäe, put it:

... information was conveyed to the Russian-speaking inhabitants accounting for a substantial part of the district population.

Russian speakers make use of both local media and Russian media in the Russian language. A survey carried out in Tallinn by the Legal Information Centre for Human Rights (Hallik et al, 2006) found that:

... practically all Russian-speaking citizens of the city watch constantly the programmes of Russian TV stations. Regarding the Estonian and Russian printed press, the reciprocal negative assessment shows rather that Estonians do not read the local Russian language dailies and magazines, nor do Russians read the same in Estonian.

These results show that both groups are influenced by different media. For non-Estonians, the situation is even more complex because they are influenced by the media system of another country in which the media serve as a tool in its political system.

**Summary and lessons learnt**

At the local level for intergroup relations and intercultural policy, the City Council is trying to develop its own strategy for the integration of all citizens of Tallinn. This strategy is based on the principles of the State Integration Programme but modified in a local way.

The biggest challenge to those developing the programme (at both national and local levels) is to bring Estonians and non-Estonians closer together and to build mutual communication, thus creating one combined, although extremely ethnically diverse, Estonian society out of two parallel ones. According to the Legal Information Centre for Human Rights survey (Hallik et al, 2006), getting through to both groups is even more difficult because as many as 63.1% of Estonians and 59.2% of non-Estonians believe that the two ethnic groups are isolated from each other. The survey also found that the minorities are poorly informed about the activities of the official institutions working in the field of integration.
In the case of Tallinn, it is not possible to talk about radicalisation of attitudes towards minorities living in the city. There is rather a kind of incomprehension – the process of parallel communities living in one territory. The use of two different languages and divided education, but overall the different assessment of the history of Estonia, can lead to tension between Estonians and non-Estonians. The relations between the two groups should be perceived in a broader perspective including the geopolitical context, and the relations between the EU and Russia.

It is important to add that the Russian-speaking community in Estonia is influenced by the Kremlin’s point of view through the Russian media. Russians speakers in Estonia feel attached to the territory and history of the place but not to the state of Estonia; using the Russian language and living in its culture makes them seem to be close to Russia as well.

Radicalisation within the majority population

Radicalisation tendencies: who and what
The public discussion about integration in Estonia and relations between Estonians and non-Estonians has appeared on the front pages of newspapers many times in the last years, but undoubtedly the year 2007 opened a new chapter in this debate.

Monuments and memorial sites are the subject of much controversy in Estonia as, to Estonians, they were/are the symbol of Russian occupation, but to Russian speakers in Estonia, they constitute a part of community history. In April 2007 and based on a government decision, the Soviet war memorial was relocated from the centre of Tallinn to the Military Cemetery. This relocation led to large-scale demonstrations and riots in the city.

This event was interpreted differently by both parties involved; although the Bronze Soldier (Pronkssõdur) is a symbol of history to the older generation of Russian speakers in Estonia, its relocation was interpreted by all Russians as an act against them as a minority group.

But despite this mixed interpretation there have been achievements, namely the public debate about integration and the media interest in the issue. According to research carried out prior to the drawing up of the State Integration Programme, the majority of the Estonian respondents (59%) and a large proportion of the non-Estonian respondents (40%) believed the integration policy should be continued and should be made more effective (Lauristin et al, 2008).

General approach, policies and measures towards these groups
There is no special, explicitly defined policy or strategy against radicalisation or radical attitudes towards any group constituting a part of Estonian society. However, the Estonian government has been putting emphasis on the issues connected with intergroup relations and integration in Estonian society. Research such as that carried out by the Integration and Migration Foundation is in-depth and interdisciplinary, touching all spheres of social life. The State Integration Programme pays attention to the development of equal opportunities for all citizens living in Estonia and the improvement of the situation of Russian speakers in education, the labour market and public life.

As a member of the European Union and other international organisations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Estonia is responsible for prevention of any kind of violence and radicalisation in order to guarantee international security.

Relations between groups
In the case of the city of Tallinn, the discussion is about relations between two groups – Estonians and non-Estonians understood to be Russian speakers. At the beginning of the report is a quote from a young Estonian about the position of the Russian speakers in Estonian society. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the debate has been extremely emotional.
Yet, from all the interviews in connection with this research as well as informal conversations during the author’s visit to Tallinn, there emerges a picture of acceptance of the existence of a large group of Russian speakers in Estonian society. In addition, it was clear to the author that the issues pertaining to integration are treated very seriously. The authorities are aware of the potential discrimination of Russian speakers and are trying to make relations as good as possible.

Among all the opinions given by Estonians and Russians, one view recurs: ‘We are so different’. This difference comes down to language and cultural issues. Estonian culture is much closer to Scandinavia, whereas Russian culture is more Slavic. In personal relations, Estonians are much more close and reserved, while the Russians are very emotional, open to new people, and much more attached to their families. All these differences manifested themselves in the interviews and awareness of them hinders the development of common relations.

The existence of two parallel communities living in one society can be observed in Tallinn. Such division is strengthened by the divided system of education, and the habit of watching different TV stations and reading different newspapers. Even when considering the example of the Capital newspaper published by the City Council in two language versions, they are not identical but they cover different information, as both the city as well as the editorial staff treat both groups in a different manner.

The number of mixed marriages can be used as an indicator for intergroup relations. It seems clear that the communities exist next to each other and that interactions occur but are limited, as only 3% of all marriages are interethnic between Estonians and non-Estonians.

Radicalisation within the migrant and/or minority population

Radicalisation tendencies: who and what

In such an ethnically varied society as Estonia some kind of tension between different communities is difficult to avoid. The Bronze Soldier incident has been the most radical confrontation recently between Estonians and non-Estonians, and was based on differences in the perception of historical memory. In everyday life in Estonia, however, the tensions between the two groups are not perceptible – the non-Estonian community is too large, too homogeneous and too diverse in socioeconomic and political terms. But according to research carried out in Estonia by one sociologist, a new term has been coined, namely ‘Estonian Russians’ as opposed to the criticised ‘Russian speakers’ or ‘non-Estonians’.

The new phrase is justified by the findings of the survey carried out by the Legal Information Centre for Human Rights (Hallik et al, 2006). Estonian Russians do not identify themselves with Russia; the majority claim that Estonian Russians and Russian Russians differ significantly. Estonian Russians have a territorial identification, a sense of belonging to the place where they live; they do not show tendencies of defiance or a lack of acceptance of the institutions of the Estonian state and, at the same time, they are aware of their ‘otherness’. To the question, ‘Who do you think you are in the first place?’ the most popular answer for non-Estonians was ‘Russian’ (31%), followed by ‘Estonian resident’ (25%), ‘Tallinn resident’ (23%) and ‘Estonian citizen’ (16%), respectively. It is important to remember that more than half of non-Estonians could not select the last option because formally they are not Estonian citizens.

There is some evidence to suggest that there are no radical tendencies among the non-Estonian community against Estonians or the state. Members of the non-Estonian community are part of the state and its institutions. They accept the right of Estonians to organise the state and they would like to solve Estonia’s problems together with Estonians. But on the other hand, they want to preserve their language and culture.
General approach, policies and measures towards these groups
Radical attitudes within the minority group towards the majority or other groups seem to be absent and there is no evidence for acts of violence for ethnic reasons. The city of Tallinn has not developed any special policy or measures against radicalisation.

Relations between groups
Tallinn should not be associated with the existence of many groups in its society; instead, the integration process and intergroup relations are narrowed to two ethnically different groups – Estonians and non-Estonians (mainly Russian speakers). The relations between the two groups are analysed earlier in this report.

Communication strategy concerning radicalisation
It is not possible to identify a special communication strategy pertaining to radicalisation in Tallinn; radicalisation, an attitude or behaviour of minority groups or the majority of society against each other, is not observed in the city. The only exception has been the unrest connected with the relocation of the Bronze Soldier, which triggered a public debate on the effectiveness of the state’s integration policy. As a result of a survey on public feelings, changes have been introduced in the new State Integration Programme for 2008–2013.

Radicalisation: summary and lessons learnt
Estonian society appears to be diverse and the structure of minorities in the city of Tallinn is complex. However, as various studies show, the communities are separate and interethnic contacts did not improve over the past year despite the pursuit of an integration policy. It is remarkable that, in spite of limited contacts and the isolation of both groups, there is no evidence of radical attitudes towards each other. However, the Russian speakers feel discriminated in their access to some institutional or political positions due to their ethnic background.

There is space for potential conflicts given the differences in the perception of history, the aims of the integration process as well as limited interethnic contacts leading to mistrust and stereotypes. Such a threat was seen by the authorities in connection with the events associated with the Bronze Soldier. Even though no tendencies towards defiance by the minorities in relation to the state or its institutions, or the majority of citizens of parallel societies, are perceptible, the absence of contacts between them and their lack of knowledge about each other seems quite worrying. Such phenomena as a result of provocation, changes in the geopolitical situation (relations between the EU and Russia, Estonia and Russia) or even a crisis might lead to exacerbation of radical national views, which extreme right-wing parties or organisations might take advantage of.
The issue of interethnic relations and integration of immigrants was widely debated in Estonia at the time of restoration of Estonia’s independence at the beginning of the 1990s. The problems were related to the issues of citizenship, identity and the feeling among the minorities of belonging to the new state. Some of the problems remained unsolved and discussions were revived following occasional tensions. Lately, the Bronze Soldier event triggered off a public debate about the results of the State Integration Programme.

Public opinion surveys show that the process of integration is perceived by Estonian inhabitants as unsatisfactory. Estonian society is divided in two communities (Estonians and non-Estonians, mainly Russian speakers) and the term ‘two Estonias’ is present in public life.

The State Integration Programme has focused on two processes:

- equalising socioeconomic opportunities for minority groups;
- providing minority groups with equal opportunities and education in the Estonian language and the basic values of the Estonian culture and state.

The field of culture was understood to be a private sphere and the minority groups were given the right to preserve their own language and culture.

Not much attention has been paid to cooperation between the two communities and the process of creating an interethnic dialogue.

The city of Tallinn, where ethnic minority groups constitute almost half the population, has initiated its own activities in the field of diversity and intergroup relations. Since the city programme is quite new, it is difficult to present any concrete evaluation. In the Kodurahu programme, the city authorities have been striving to organise activities based on common interests and values that could bring the two communities together. The mistrust and difficulties in communication seem to make this very complicated, but the two communities coming together may hopefully be made feasible by the fact that the younger generation focus more on their future and living their life in Tallinn.

The activation of both groups for their mutual cooperation is the most challenging task for the local integration policy. Dialogue between both groups in the case of Tallinn is crucial for the avoidance of potential tension or conflict in the future.
Bibliography


List of persons and organisations interviewed

Valeria Jakobson, NGO OMOS, University of Tartu
Alla Jakobson, Chair of the Jewish Community of Estonia
Yuka Samogina, Administrative assistant, Jewish Community of Estonia
Jaan Urvet, Coordinator of ‘Peace in the community’, and advisor to the Deputy Mayor of Tallinn responsible for diversity and integration
Sergei Semjonov, Project leader ONLINE EXPO, sergei@dypos.ee
Kristiina Oomer, President of the Estonian Amateur Theatre Association
Raivo Vetik, Director of the Institute of International and Social Studies, Tallinn University
Oksana Ovtšinnik, Department of Foreign Affairs in the city government
Yana Toom, Co-editor of Capital magazine, in Russian and Estonian
Nikolai Degtjarenko, Deputy Mayor of Mustamäe (city region of Tallinn)
Madli Parts, Leader of the programme ‘The Capital of Culture 2011’

Other national cultural societies consulted were mostly members of the following associations and alliances:

- LÜÜRA International Association of National and Cultural Societies (31 societies);
- Alliance of Nationalities of Estonia (20 societies);
- Association of Slavic Educational and Charitable Societies in Estonia (42 societies and 33 groups);
- Ida-Viru County Round Table of National Culture Societies, an umbrella organisation of national culture societies operating in Ida-Viru County (18 societies);
- Alliance of Russian National Culture Organisations in Estonia (30 societies);
- Congress of Ukrainians in Estonia (10 societies);
- Association of Ukrainian Organisations in Estonia (nine societies).

Patrycja Matusz Protasiewicz, University of Wrocław