

Elusive Solidarity in an Enlarged European Union



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Abstract

As the EU enlarges it faces a dilemma. As it grows larger and more diverse it will need to strengthen solidarity between Member States. However, solidarity is an expression of kinship. As such, it depends on shared beliefs and acceptance of the political nature of the process of European integration. The growing diversity of the EU will make it more difficult to develop a perception of commonality. In this article we argue that the EU can build solidarity by providing more European “merit” goods and other means of mutual support. In addition, there is a need for an explicit discussion of what may unite EU citizens beyond abstract values.

Why should we be concerned about solidarity?

Accession of the new Member States will make the European Union larger and more diverse. A larger market will offer more opportunities. Diversity will also be a source of economic prosperity. Countries trade and invest in each other because they have different resources and technological endowments.

However, a larger and more diverse Union is also less homogeneous. That could fuel scepticism about the political and more indirect gains to be derived from membership. For one thing, the significance and influence of any single Member State will decline. Perhaps more importantly, the feeling of kinship between the peoples of the Union may wither. As the Union expands it may become necessary to strengthen the bonds between the Member States and do it in a way that is visible to their citizens.

One of the essential elements that creates and deepens bonds among people and between people and countries is solidarity. Solidarity is also seen as a “corollary of the mutual trust between Member States”.¹

The problem is that it is not obvious what solidarity could mean in the context of the EU. It is clear that solidarity is not only expressed through the cohesion principle and its instruments; i.e. the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund. Solidarity has also been evoked with view to sharing costs; e.g. of asylum seekers and of external border controls. Solidarity of the EU with the US was expressed in the aftermath of the events of 11 September 2001. The floods in central Europe about a year ago prompted repeated calls for solidarity between the existing and prospective members of the Union. In the context of the Convention on the Future of Europe, the Convention President Giscard d’Estaing and Commission President Romano Prodi called for greater solidarity.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the different dimensions of solidarity and the ways through which solidarity may be put into practice in the EU. We begin

with a review of the various definitions of solidarity and then identify the possible options and dilemmas of the EU in strengthening solidarity.

Concepts of solidarity in the European Union:

Many generalities, few specifics

The European integration process is based on a set of core values. Solidarity is one of these values along with democracy and the rule of law.² The presidency conclusions of the Laeken European Council place solidarity on centre stage. “The European Union is a success story. For over half a century now, Europe has been at peace. As a result of mutual solidarity and fair distribution of the benefits of economic development, moreover, the standard of living in the Union’s weaker regions has increased enormously and they have made good much of the disadvantage they were at”. Not only is solidarity perceived as a guiding principle for the integration process, it is also a principle which distinguishes the EU and its members from other parts of the world and international organisations. The Laeken European Council considered Europe to be a “the continent of solidarity”.

Despite the significance attributed to solidarity, it is surprising that the Treaties do not shed much light on the concept of this principle. The Treaty on the European Union confers to the Union the task to “organise, in a manner demonstrating consistency and solidarity, relations between the Member States and between their peoples” [Article 1 TEU]. However, the TEU only mentions solidarity once in passing in Article 23 which refers to the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Within the European Community, solidarity is given a more prominent role. “Promoting economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States” is defined as one of the fundamental tasks of the EC [Article 2 TEC]. Although economic and social cohesion is also identified as one of the policies and activities of the Community [Article 3(k)] and a separate title is

devoted to it [Title XVII, Articles 158-162], solidarity is never mentioned again in the Community Treaty.

This silence on solidarity was supposed to come to an end with the Convention on the future of Europe which intended to spell out its meaning.

Expressions of solidarity in the Convention and in the Draft Constitution

The mandate given to the Convention by the Laeken European Council refers to solidarity in the context of equality between the Member States. Adjusting the division of competencies between the Union and the Member States “can lead both to restoring tasks to the Member States and to assigning new missions to the Union, or to the extension of existing powers. It should however not endanger the equality of the Member States and their mutual solidarity”.

While the issue of equality between Member States was discussed in the context of institutional and procedural reforms, there was no attempt to elaborate the principle of solidarity. Even more puzzling, although solidarity figured prominently in the pronouncements of virtually all working groups and the plenary, no group had any special responsibility for it. By May 2003 the Convention had produced more than 200 documents, speeches and contributions which included the word solidarity (taking into account all EU languages).³ The

draft constitution presented by the Convention on 17 July mentions the world solidarity twenty times: once in the preamble, nine times in the first part, twice in the charter on fundamental rights, and eight times in the third part.⁴

When we look at the speeches that have a reference to solidarity, it is perhaps revealing that the vast majority comes from acceding or candidate countries. A smaller number of contributions comes from representatives of cohesion countries, from Commissioners, and Giscard d’Estaing. Only a handful of speeches mentioning the word solidarity come from the other EU Member States. Therefore, it seems to us that solidarity was used for the purpose of supporting other aims. But, what aims?

By examining the context in which solidarity was mentioned, three main aims or intentions can be identified. The first refers to solidarity as a fundamental value overarching and guiding the integration process. In particular at the beginning of the Convention process, between March and May 2002, speakers often referred to solidarity as “one of the most important [principles] for the process of our continent’s unification” (Edmund Wittbrodt, 15/4/2002). At that early stage of the Convention, the principle was not linked to concrete policy options or instruments. Solidarity was used as a moral

objective and normative guide for the reform process. This understanding of solidarity continued to be the reference point throughout the remainder of the Convention, although not as explicitly as at the beginning.

From mid 2002 onwards, solidarity was being mentioned in the working group results mainly in relation to two other policy aims: security and crisis intervention. As regards the security dimension, solidarity seemed to be closely linked to the perception of shared problems and interests. Most Convention members favoured this type of solidarity as an expression of Member States’ “intention to support each other in times of crisis”. (Peter Hain, 20/12/2002). Solidarity also appeared as mutual support in the event of natural or humanitarian disasters or with view to burden sharing. Since these kinds of crises are reasonably broad, every Member State would expect to be in need of solidarity or mutual support, sooner or later. This type of solidarity is strongly motivated by the feeling of reciprocity. In the longer run, solidarity generates a win-win situation for all Member States. Therefore, the broad support for this understanding of solidarity is not surprising. It was eventually expressed in Articles 42 and 231 of the Draft

Constitution [their text is reproduced in the Annex at the end of this paper].

The third dimension of solidarity as discussed in the Convention refers to economic disparities at national, regional, and local level and at the level of individual

citizens. In his speech opening the Convention, Giscard d’Estaing clearly underlined this dimension: “So let us dream of Europe! ... A space clearly identified by the way in which it successfully distils the dynamism of creation, the need for solidarity and protection of the poorest and the weakest.” Also Commission President Romano Prodi at the opening of the Convention refers to the economic dimension of solidarity. “As Europeans, we must also defend a balanced model of society able to reconcile economic prosperity and solidarity.” This understanding of solidarity was, however, much more contested among Convention members than the security dimension.

The discussion on the economic dimension of solidarity also revealed that Member States clearly distinguished between economic prosperity on the one hand and security and stability on the other. This has not always been the case. The Schuman declaration of 9 May 1950 refers to solidarity as a core element of the cooperation between the then six states. “Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity.... The solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable,

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but materially impossible.” Economic solidarity did not form an independent pillar of the integration process next to security. But economic solidarity was a precondition for ensuring stability and security. In the Convention, this link between economic and security issues remained unnoticed.

The draft Constitution reflects the consensus expressed in the Convention on the different understandings of solidarity. Out of its twenty references to solidarity, the draft Constitution explicitly mentions economic solidarity only once.⁵ Three references concern solidarity as a fundamental value of the EU.⁶ The remaining sixteen references to the term solidarity relate to security and stability.⁷ This prevalence of solidarity in security issues may hint at a perceived imminent threat after the September 11 events and the Iraq war. Even though this preoccupation with security is understandable, it is still puzzling that the economic dimension is the dimension which is the least defined in the draft Constitution. This is even more surprising in the light of the fact that many calls for more solidarity implicitly refer to the economic dimension.

Since the Convention members have left the task of defining economic solidarity after enlargement to the EU institutions when adopting individual legislative acts, there is a risk of ad-hoc solutions which are being determined by the short-term objectives and bargaining powers of different Member States.

In order to identify possible understanding of economic solidarity in the EU the next section explores the evolution of the concept of economic solidarity.

Towards a broader understanding of solidarity and its foundations

The emergence of solidarity in modern times can be traced back to the call of the French revolution for liberty, equality and fraternity. Solidarity is generally understood to signify an interdependent relationship between individuals and a certain group. Solidarity claims a commitment of an individual to an association, group, community, polity or humanity as a whole.⁸ Solidarity evokes sacrifices and is thus directly opposed to the sense of disengagement or individualism that is unconcerned about the members of the group or community who suffer (think of the Polish Solidarity that was founded in September 1980).

This expression of unity or fraternity is founded on moral precepts. It is a principle of communities governed by similar values and norms.⁹ It has a moral object and is affirmed on moral grounds. In this view solidarity is based on a feeling of “natural” kinship between members of a community.¹⁰

Historically, this perception of solidarity has sometimes included the notion of obligation where the beneficiary of public assistance has to do something in exchange or has to deserve what he or she receives.¹¹ This conception carries the risk of discrimination. To avoid that risk, liberal political philosophy has complemented solidarity with the idea of fairness which rests on a notion of reciprocity.¹² “All who are engaged

in cooperation and who do their part as the rules and procedures require, are to benefit in an appropriate way as assessed by a suitable benchmark of comparison.”¹³ Yet, John Rawls does not reduce solidarity to mutual advantage. Rather he bases it on an overlapping consensus which is predicated “not merely on accepting certain authorities or on complying with certain institutional arrangements, founded on a convergence of self- or group interests. All those who affirm the political conception start from within their own comprehensive view and draw on the religious, philosophical and moral grounds it provides.”¹⁴

Against this morally-based reasoning, a rational understanding of solidarity emerged in the workers movement. Friedrich Engels based the principle of solidarity on the existence of shared interests. He claims that “the simple feeling of solidarity based on the understanding of the identity of class position suffices to create and to hold together one and the same great party of the proletariat among the workers of all countries and tongues.”¹⁵ Solidarity does not only stem from the perception of shared interests. It can also be motivated by the perception of shared problems. In this view, solidarity is predominantly a feeling of relatedness based on a “latent reciprocity”.¹⁶ Although solidarity has thus rational motives it also needs a moral ground and a certain level of commitment and sacrifices of the group members.¹⁷ It rests in particular on a shared understanding of fairness.

Although these conceptions of solidarity are very different, they nevertheless share certain fundamental features. First, solidarity imposes certain responsibilities on the members of the community. A community based on solidarity means providing support in particular – but not only – in times of need or crises.¹⁸ Second, solidarity is contextual and limited.¹⁹ This means that it has boundaries in terms of material support as well as geographical scope. Third, solidarity is based on the perception of a “we-perspective” – a commonality – among the members of a community.²⁰

If indeed the existence of a “we-feeling” is an essential prerequisite for solidarity to evolve, then it poses an uncomfortable question for the enlarged and enlarging EU. How can it foster this feeling? After all, the EU aims to create “... an ever closer union between the peoples of Europe” [Article 1 EU].

Unlike nation states, the EU cannot draw upon a common heritage such as glorious historical events, masterpieces of literature or even sporting achievements in order to nurture commonality. And, it is questionable whether European elites, let alone European peoples, share a common understanding of values relating to kinship or fairness. In such a heterogeneous system as the EU, fairness cannot simply be equated with equality.²¹ Is it possible, therefore, to follow Juergen Habermas’s line of thought and try to engender the “we-perspective” without having a pre-existing consensus on its constituent elements? Can an institutionalised process arrive at a common understanding and definition of solidarity.²² Some scholars have suggested that

strengthening social and structural policy instruments would contribute to achieving this “we-perspective”.²³ However, no definite answers have been given to these questions.

We are now at an impasse. If solidarity presupposes the existence of certain common values, and if such values are not well-developed at the European level, is there any chance of developing solidarity on the basis of mutuality of narrower interests? In other words, is there an evolutionary path that will eventually lead from economic solidarity to political solidarity? After all, the EU has its roots in steel, coal and the Economic Community. To answer that question we need to explore in more detail the meaning of economic solidarity and whether it has the potential to lay the foundations for a consensus on a broader understanding of solidarity.

Towards economic solidarity?

We begin by investigating national systems of solidarity because we want to consider, first, whether the EU can adopt similar arrangements and, second, to determine whether they can develop into a political or broader form of solidarity.

Within countries economic solidarity may be broadly defined as “mutual support” and can be expressed in different ways. Above all, it is a form of “insurance”. Society usually undertakes to support those who become unemployed, fall ill, are incapacitated or for some other reason

cannot work. In most European countries, retirement benefits and pensions are also a form of “social insurance”, as those currently in work pay for those who have retired. These benefits are contingency-based, in the sense that special conditions must hold, and are universal in that they are available to anyone who qualifies. Nonetheless, they go beyond normal forms of cooperation whereby anyone who participates obtains benefits at the same time. With solidarity as a form of insurance, benefits are restricted only to those who satisfy the criteria of eligibility.

Solidarity is also expressed in terms of public provision of “merit goods”. Merit goods are different from public goods which are supplied on a collective basis because their consumption cannot be restricted to those who pay [e.g. “clean air”]. Merit goods are those goods whose consumption is regarded to be a “right” or to be beneficial for society [e.g. education, affordable access to telecommunications and postal services]. Merit goods are supplied at standard terms and prices, irrespective of how much one “consumes” of them. They are often subsidised by tax payers.

The financing of social insurance, public goods and

merit goods also includes elements of solidarity. To the extent that a proportion of their costs is covered by transfers from public funds, then it is taxpayers who are the ultimate source of that financing. But in all European countries, taxes are levied according to the “ability to pay”. There are elements of solidarity, therefore, in “progressive” tax systems.

We can, then, attach three specific meanings to the economic definition of solidarity as mutual support: it is contingent assistance to those in need, it is the provision of “social” goods that all members of society deserve or have the right to have, and it is contribution to the common finances according to the ability to pay.

What options for the EU?

Which of these three kinds of economic solidarity should the EU adopt? Just because modern societies promote economic solidarity between their citizens, it does not necessarily follow that the EU should do the same. Countries do not have the same needs as persons. Conversely, countries are not as vulnerable as individuals. Sovereign countries can impose taxes, mobilise

resources, changes policies, borrow against the income of future generations and, as a last resort, print money²⁴ and default on their debts. Nonetheless, while countries do not retire or lose their jobs, they can still suffer from man-made and natural calamities, as the events of the past year have shown. At suffi-

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ciently large scale, these calamities can overwhelm the capacity of any modern state to respond. Since it is a form of insurance, the EU should indeed promote solidarity to mitigate the economic and social dislocation from such natural catastrophes and unforeseen economic events that can defeat the defences of any single country.

The cost of providing insurance cover against unforeseen events declines as it is spread over a large number of persons. This is because not all persons are exposed to the same risks at the same time. Similarly, the growing number and diversity of the members of the EU should make Community actions to deal with this kind of events relatively cheaper and more beneficial for all. Solidarity makes more sense as the EU enlarges.

Should the EU promote the consumption of merit goods? Again, care must be taken not to generalise on false premises from the actions of nation states. The needs of persons are not the same as the needs of states. In theory, merit goods address basic needs and make those who consume them better persons and better members of society. What, then, are those goods whose consumption would make the members of the EU “better”? And, “better” in what sense?

In contrast to contingent action where it is obvious that the EU has a significant role to play to support Member States, since Member States are unable to act effectively, in the case of merit goods it is not at all obvious why the EU should act instead of the Member States. It has long been advocated in the literature on European integration that the EU should confine itself to providing and funding European public goods which generate Community-wide externalities.²⁵ The list of such goods would include the functioning of EU institutions, actions to guarantee the openness of the internal market, policies with strong cross-border spillovers such as research and environmental protection and common external actions ranging from the management of trade policy to coordinated foreign aid. If existence of externalities is the guiding criterion, then that list would exclude such "holy cows" as agriculture, but would include actions to strengthen, for example, controls at the external borders of the Community. Even though measures to stem the flow of illegal migrants and drugs would be undertaken primarily by national administrations, a case can be made for their funding by the EU budget on the grounds that they benefit all Member States, and especially the richer ones who attract economic migrants.

In relation to merit goods, it follows that, apart from information about the EU and what services it can offer to European citizens, it is difficult to think of other goods which the EU can provide more efficiently or effectively than the Member States. So the case for European merit goods remains to be proven.

Solidarity, in the meaning of fairness, is also expressed in terms of financing common activities according to each member's ability to pay. This is already done in the way that Member States' contributions to the EU budget are calculated. The "traditional" own resources of the EU include sources of funding that have either little to do with ability to pay [e.g. customs duties] or are "regressive" in nature [i.e. depend on consumption rather than income, such as VAT receipts]. However, the share of the "GNP-related" resource has been steadily increasing and now accounts for about 50% of the EU's budgetary receipts. Also the VAT-related contributions have been capped, so their regressive element has been removed. While it can be argued that customs duties rightfully belong to the EU [customs policy is completely harmonised and is one of the very few policies that belongs exclusively to the Community], the same cannot be said about VAT receipts. Complete reliance on GNP would make the system more transparent and fairer in principle.

The other side of payments into the budget is that of receipts from the budget. Solidarity can operate here as well according to need. The EC Treaty stipulates "economic and social cohesion" to be a task of the Community. The Treaty says that the purpose of structural funds is to promote "overall harmonious development", strengthen "economic and social cohesion", "reduce disparities" and "improve opportunities". Since these policy objectives reflect economic and social needs,

structural funds can indeed be rationalised as the main expression of solidarity on the expenditure side of the EU budget.

What else? We have argued that the analogy between intra-country solidarity and intra-Community solidarity does not provide a foolproof means of determining what the EU should do to strengthen economic solidarity between its members because countries do not have the same needs as persons. So we have to ask whether there may be other reasons for which a Community concept of economic solidarity should be developed?

The primary candidate is the argument that the EU should compensate those members who suffer from Community measures. Although seemingly simple and self-obvious, this is a dangerous argument. Intra-EU integration has progressed to such depth and breadth that it is not simple at all to unravel the effects of any single measure on any single country or region. Moreover, it would be a recipe for disaster because Member States would demand compensation for those measures they do not like, while ignoring that previous agreements and deals were made possible precisely because they were made in the form of packages containing both positive and negative elements. And who would provide such compensation? All countries would find something which they would claim is bad for them. How would the EU treat candidate countries which have undertaken massive and costly reform in order to qualify for membership? Member States would not strengthen solidarity in view of enlargement, they would simply abandon both of them. The EU has been built on the fundamental tenet that voluntary agreements are generally beneficial for all members and that tenet should be retained. It is therefore doubtful that disadvantages caused by the process of integration process can justify economic solidarity.

In conclusion, even though the motive of mutual assistance can certainly give rise to the realisation of economic solidarity at the European level, it cannot in itself provide much justification for other forms of solidarity.

Conclusions:

The European dilemma

As the EU enlarges, it needs to consider how to promote solidarity between its members. On the one hand, it makes sense for it to strengthen solidarity because it will grow larger and more diverse and will, consequently, have to galvanise support for its system, principles and policies. This does not mean that the EU should duplicate national solidarity measures. The needs of nation states are different from those of persons. Yet, countries can still benefit by extending mutual support to each other.

On the other hand, solidarity is an expression of kinship. As such, it depends on shared beliefs and acceptance of the political nature of the process of European integration. The growing diversity of the EU will make it more difficult for it to develop a perception of commonality and "we-feeling". Consequently, strengthened solidarity at EU-level entails the

development or reform of policies or instruments which are either based on an already existing “we-feeling” or which are likely to create the “we-feeling”. European merit goods are a case in point.

So far and although the EU has been discussing reform of policies, including economic and social cohesion, it is still not taking up the challenge of defining EU solidarity and what may unite EU citizens beyond abstract values.

Annex:

Solidarity in the Draft Constitution

Article 42: Solidarity clause

1. The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the victim of terrorist attack or natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States, to:
 - (a). - prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States;
- protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack;
- assist a Member State in its territory at the request of its political authorities in the event of a terrorist attack;
 - (b). assist a Member State in its territory at the request of its political authorities in the event

- of a disaster.
2. The detailed arrangements for implementing this provision are at Article III-231.

Implementation of the solidarity clause:

Article III-231

1. Acting on a joint proposal by the Commission and the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Council of Ministers shall adopt a European decision defining the arrangements for the implementation of the solidarity clause referred to in Article I-42. The European Parliament shall be informed.
2. Should a Member State fall victim to a terrorist attack or a natural or man-made disaster, the other Member States shall assist it at the request of its political authorities. To that end, the Member States shall coordinate between themselves in the Council of Ministers.
3. For the purposes of this Article, the Council of Ministers shall be assisted by the Political and Security Committee, with the support of the structures developed in the context of the common security and defence policy, and by the Committee provided for in Article III-162, which shall, if necessary, submit joint opinions.
4. The European Council shall regularly assess the threats facing the Union in order to enable the Union to take effective action.

NOTES

¹ European Commission, *Communication on the development of a common policy on illegal immigration, smuggling, and trafficking of human beings, external borders and the return of illegal immigrants*, COM(2003)323 final, 3.6.2003, p. 17

² See for instance Speech of Romano Prodi at the second cohesion forum in May 2001. Speech of representative of the Dutch government Mr van Mierlo at the Convention on 16.4.02 at: <http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/speeches/345.pdf>. Contribution submitted by Mr Michael Frendo, “A solidarity clause in the European Constitution”, CONV 557/03, 17.2.2003.

³ The Convention members could submit their contributions in their mother language. Only official documents of the presidium were translated in all languages; individual contributions were not.

⁴ This is about twice as many times as mentioning another fundamental principle of the integration process, i.e. the subsidiarity principle. The latter one is only mentioned eleven times excluding the protocol on subsidiarity and nineteen times including the protocol.

⁵ See Article I-3 of the draft constitution.

⁶ See the preamble of part I and II, Article I-2,

⁷ Security includes external dimension in the EU’s common foreign and security policy as well as an internal dimension in the area of freedom, security and justice

⁸ H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., “Solidarity: Post-Modern Perspectives”, in: Giuseppe Orsi et.al. (eds.), *Solidarität*, Frankfurt/M. 1995, p. 52.

⁹ Adrian Reinert, “Solidarität als bedingter Altruismus”, in: Georgios Chatzimarkakis & Holger Hintze (eds.), *Brücken*

- zwischen Freiheit und Gemeinsinn, Bonn 1999, p. 48.
- ¹⁰ Markus Daniel Zürcher, *Solidarität, Anerkennung und Gemeinschaft: Zur Phänomenologie, Theorie und Kritik der Solidarität*, Tübingen 1998, p. 175.
- ¹¹ Karl H. Metz, "Solidarität und Geschichte", in: Giuseppe Orsi et.al. (eds.), *Solidarität*, Frankfurt/M. 1995, p. 27.
- ¹² John Rawls, *Justice as Fairness*, *The Journal of Philosophy*, 1957, pp. 653-662.
- ¹³ John Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, New York 1993, p. 16.
- ¹⁴ Ibid, p. 147.
- ¹⁵ Friedrich Engels, *Selected Works*, Vol. 3, Progress Publishers, Moscow 1970, p. 233.
- ¹⁶ Karl Otto Hondrich/Claudia Koch-Arzberger, *Solidarität in der modernen Gesellschaft*, Frankfurt/M. 1992, p. 14.
- ¹⁷ Andreas Wildt, Bemerkungen zur Begriffs- und Ideengeschichte von Solidarität und ein Definitionsvorschlag für diesen Begriff heute", in: Giuseppe Orsi et.al. (eds.), *Solidarität*, Frankfurt/M. 1995, p. 45.
- ¹⁸ John Kenneth Galbraith, *The Good Society*, Boston/New York 1996.
- ¹⁹ Gerhard Kleinhenz, "Subsidiarität und Solidarität bei der sozialen Integration in Europa", in: Gerhard Kleinhenz (ed), *Soziale Integration in Europa II*, Berlin 1996, p. 19.
- ²⁰ Juergen Habermas, "Reconciling through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls's Political Liberalism", *Journal of Philosophy*, March 1995.
- ²¹ Ewald Nowotny, "Perspektiven einer europäischen Finanzverfassung", in: Heiner Heseler et.al., *Gegen die Markt-Orthodoxie: Perspektiven einer demokratischen und solidarischen Wirtschaft*, Hamburg 2002, p. 143.
- ²² Juergen Habermas, "Gerechtigkeit und Solidarität", in: Gertrud Nummer-Winkler (ed.), *Weibliche Moral: Die Kontroverse um eine geschlechtsspezifische Ethik*, Frankfurt/M. 1991, p. 232.
- ²³ Gerhard Kleinhenz, "Subsidiarität und Solidarität bei der sozialen Integration in Europa", in: Gerhard Kleinhenz (ed), *Soziale Integration in Europa II*, Berlin 1996, p. 22.
- ²⁴ However, since 1999, this option is no longer open to those Member States which are also members of the Economic and Monetary Union.
- ²⁵ For a recent restatement of the theory, see Horst Siebert, "Europe - Quo Vadis? Reflections on the Future Institutional Framework of the EU", *World Economy*, 2002, vol. 25(1), pp. 1-32. □