Europeanization and Political Parties in Accession Countries: The Political Parties of Cyprus

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Abstract

The process of what has been labeled Europeanization has been considered by many scholars as one of the major challenges posed by the external environment on domestic politics. Political parties are forced to deal with it as one that constitutes a fundamental change to their operational context (Binnema, 2, 2002; Marks and Wilson, 433, 2000; Ladrech, 1, 2001; Luther and Rommel, 4, 2002). Duverger sees the development of the EU as a factor that pushes parties at the national level to undertake a genuine revolution similar to the one that “…transformed clubs of notables into mass organizations at the turn of the century” (cited in Ladrech, 178, 1997).

There is a wide shared view among scholars that the significance of parties in the political process has diminished or at least misplaced (Gaffney, 3; 1996) over the years. Even though most suggest that they are still there and they constitute a fundamental element of Western type democracy, the challenges posed to political parties are many: alterations in organization patterns, declining membership, loosening of ideologies and the left-right axis importance, challenges posed by other political actors like interest groups, elites, technocrats, bureaucrats etc (Gaffney, 20, 1996; Binnema, 6, 2002).

The purpose of this paper is to present some insights into how the Europeanization process has influenced the four main political parties of Cyprus. The first part of this paper looks at patterns of change between continuity and innovation regarding the effect on programmatic policies and organizational structures. The second part addresses the cohesive impact that the process has had on the parties. It should be emphasized from the beginning that the appropriate bibliography on Cyprus political parties is very limited (or rather should I say non-existent) and refers mainly to the elections. Bibliography on Cyprus-EU related issues and possible implications of accession is negligent, therefore forcing us to turn to primary sources of information: mainly parties’ manifestos, statements by party officials and Congresses proceedings.
Introduction

Europeanization is a term that has become increasingly employed to label or describe a process of transformation both at the national level and the EU level. The literature is mainly concerned though with the transformation fostered on domestic political structures. Radaelli argues that the concept of Europeanization refers to “a set of processes through which the EU political, social and economic dynamics become part of the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies” (cited in Ladrech, 4, 2001). The central insight of this definition is the focus on the adaptive response by actors to a changed or changing environment.

De Winter (3, 2001) emphasizes the dual, gradual and interactive character of the process and as far as the adaptation from the national perspective is concerned, he points out that it will differ between parties and countries depending on the nature of existing national cleavages structures, the political and administrative cultures and institutions, party organizational structures etc. Binnema (2, 2002) emphasizes that the challenge of Europeanization implies on the one hand a reduction of the policy areas in which national parties have a say (a view that is shared by others too; Ladrech, 5, 2001; De Winter, 3, 2001; Mokre and Pollak, 1, 2001), and on the other hand the rather limited role of political parties in EU decision making since the powers of the European Parliament are not like those of the national ones.

Klaus Goetz (6-7, 2003) makes a distinction of Europeanization Western-style and Eastern-style. Europeanization Eastern-style is linked to patterns of coercive adaptation, which follows consequentialist logic of short-term tactical calculations rather than domestic appropriateness. This is explained by the hierarchical top-down relationship between EU and the applicant states, which reflects the fundamental power asymmetry between EU and current member states, on the one hand, and applicant states on the other. This asymmetry is enforced through conditionalities and enlargement negotiations. The applicant states are “downloaders of EU institutions and policies but their capacity to upload preferences is very weak” (Goetz, 2, 2003). This view is also shared by Gabriel Lataianu (2-3&9, 2002) who also stresses the limited room for maneuver on behalf of applicant states due to fixed deadlines and permanent monitoring. This is the case that fits most the Cyprus accession course as well, due to its small size and the burden of the political problem that it carries with it.

Before addressing the implications of Europeanization on the political parties it would be useful to make a short reference to Cyprus’s historical relations with the EU. Cyprus’s journey to the European Union officially started in 1972 when signing the Association Agreement with the then European Economic Community (EEC). The Turkish invasion and occupation of the 37% of Cyprus in 1974 led to the delay of the signing of Customs Union Agreement, which was finally signed in 1987. In July 1990 Cyprus submitted the application for full membership and the hitherto trading relations were upgraded and were set in a new framework, thus making Cyprus’s accession course a fundamental political choice. In 1998 the Accession Negotiations started, resulting to the Helsinki decision in 1999 that distinguished Cyprus accession from the solution of its political problem, and the Copenhagen decision in December 2002 for accepting Cyprus as a full member. On April 9th 2003 the European Parliament gave its assent and on the 16th Cyprus signed the Accession Treaty in Athens.

It must be stated from the beginning that the whole political spectrum of Cyprus saw the accession course as a) a vision to belong to the wider European family where the rule of law and respect of human rights prevail and b) as a way of securing the island
against any further military advances of Turkey and as a lever of solving the long lasting division of the island by putting pressure on Turkey\(^1\). Kokosalakis and Psimenos (5, 2002) express a similar security argument regarding Greece’s rationale for entering the EU.

We turn now to the main implications of this process to the political parties of Cyprus.

**Part I: Patterns of change between continuity and change**

Cyprus’s political priorities were essentially altered after the submission of its application in 1990. After the collapsing of the Soviet block “…the European Union has developed into a new center of power towards which most outside states on the continent are socializing” (R. Vayrynen, 363, 1995). This had a serious effect on Cyprus political parties and especially the powerful Communist party AKEL (See Appendix on page 24). Under conditions of international bipolarity many internal choices were made according to the convergence towards the models provided by the two superpowers. This goes to tandem with Simon Hix’s (1999) argument that ideological, social and economic predispositions influence parties’ position for or against the EU.

Gaffney (3, 1996) refers to the parties as the “…organized expression of some of the cleavages within society… In more or less historical order, the main politically expressed cleavages in European society have been those of religion, nationalism and social class”. The importance of this cleavage theory is considered to be a powerful set of conceptual and theoretical tools for understanding the party positions against the European Union (Marks and Wilson, 433, 2000; Hix, 1999). This is surely the case as far as the political parties in Cyprus are concerned. The four major parties (AKEL, DHSY, DHKO and KISOS\(^2\)) have configured their choices and position towards European integration under the pressures of the bipolarity system of cold war and the resulting cleavages of class and nationalism. Whether sited left or right on the ideology axis accordingly were their positions articulated. This was the case until 1990. In effect even parties with a negative stance against EU in the past (e.g. AKEL) may be realizing -from the top down- that there is no realistic alternative to being pro-EU (Aylott, 4, 2001). Up to date though there is still a significant difference in parties’ position towards the EU but on a different level now. The present discussion concerns issues such as the extent of liberalization, the introduction of social policies and the way integration is emerging. This is by no means suggestive that the cleavage approach or ideologies have been left in the drawers of history as Fukuyama suggested after the collapse of the countries of existing socialism. A more thorough presentation of each party’s position on the EU issue is found in Appendix (page 24).

As already noted above the Europeanization process poses a very serious challenge to political parties, one that erodes functions performed by them for a long time. That is because the wider agenda setting and the policy initiatives have to a considerable extent been shifted to the supranational level. One of the sectors affected significantly is the capacity of parties to design national economic strategies regarding issues like national taxes, wage and labour market policies (Mokre and Pollak, 2, 2001). Luther and Rommel (7-11, 2002) present six clusters of change faced by political parties due to the process of European integration: socio-economic change (growth of population,

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1 According to public opinion polls 85% of the population believes that the accession will have a positive effect in the efforts of finding a solution to the Cyprus problem (Source: Cyprobarometer 2002).
2 KISOS: previously EDEK.
occupational structures etc), alterations to political values and national political culture (e.g. weakening social basis of left-right conflicts, emergence of new social movements), radical transformation in the structure of political communication (e.g. internet, increased costs), change in the political issues and policy agendas that shape the political discourse (e.g. inclined attention to defense and security issues), the economic problems posed by the growing interdependence between European states and from globalization and the reforms in their constitutional systems undertaken (e.g. decentralization of authority). According to Cortell and Peterson (cited in Mokre and Pollak, 6, 2001) “…change occurs at specific instances called punctuated equilibrium, a situation that there is a mismatch between the challenges the organization faces and its traditional way of solving problems. This mismatch may result in a restructuring of the organization, a redefinition of its goals, an adoption of new means or inclusion of new participants”.

Ladrech (8, 2001) identified five areas of parties’ activities influenced by Europeanization: policy/programmatic content, organizational structures, patterns of party competition, party-government relations and relations beyond the national party system. Our search will look for evidence of party adaptation to this changed environment, be it policy change, organizational change and patterns of party competition. Their response can be identified in new and sometimes innovative relationships, policies or structures as Ladrech (7, 2001) points out.

Continuity

Continuity in patterns of party behaviour can be looked in two ways. Firstly, patterns that exhibit behaviours not altered even though someone would expect them to change and secondly, patterns that point to assimilation and exploitation of new issues in existing schemas (Marks and Wilson, 434, 2000).

Luther and Rommel (5, 2002) refer to four key dimensions of political parties that concern the empirical political science. One of them is their desire to exercise political power through office seeking in order to realize their policy preferences. Drawing from this we can look at two similar examples of this dimension.

The last elections for the local authorities (municipal and communal councils) taking place in 2001 saw the Cypriots voting ³ for 2630 seats among 6095 candidates⁴. Those candidates were mostly selected through parties’ procedures and very few chose to defy party leadership. Given the locals’ aspiration and the parties’ need to penetrate in the local communities acquiring a local form of power (Luther and Rommel, 11, 2002) the selection was based primarily on the ability to attract voters through local notables regardless of education, age, and ability to place the community in this changing environment caused by the European integration process. The result was that many of the candidates and in return many of the elected communal officials were people of some age who their only benefit and ability was the local networks they established in villages and small communities over the years. The picture was slightly different in the big municipalities where attributes such as education and networks on a higher level play an important role. But this was only a small fraction of the whole (6 out of 388).

Most of the people selected and eventually elected were people that do not fit the new challenges posed by Europeanization (many of them do not even speak a second language other than their native Greek). De Winter (10, 2001) mentions the EU requirement to have solid partners at the regional level, and therefore regions are

³ Voting in Cyprus is obligatory according to legislation put forward in 1981 (Xatzikiriakos and Christoforou, 72, 1996).
⁴ Interview with Mr. Demetris Demetriou in the Ministry of Interior (Elections Service, 3/05/2003).
forced to constitute themselves as competent actors through multiple channels of access to EU decision-making. Parties did not consider this aspect as crucial having in mind what they conceived as the biggest stake involved, which was the need to form coalitions for the coming presidential elections the following year. A recent research commissioned by the European Union revealed that an amount of $60m was lost in the last years because of the inability and lack of information of Cypriots officials of all levels to absorb them from community funds, to consider only an aspect of the loss. Many of these funds were related to community and environmental projects from which the direct beneficiary would be the people living in these communities. Discussions in the Parliament stressed the urging need to change the existing schemas of communication with EU authorities for these benefits to be profitable to Cyprus too.

A second example of this form relates again to the electoral field but this time to the presidential elections. The practice in all Western European countries is for the leaders of the parties and especially the big ones, to present their leaders’ candidacy before the voters. This was not always the case in Cyprus. In the last presidential elections the leaders of the two biggest parties (AKEL and DHSY) did not present themselves before the people. This had to do, on the one hand with the gallops acceptance (DHSY case), and on the other hand with the class cleavage (AKEL case) that still blocks the leader of the left wing party to acquire authority through the highest office.

Looking at this behaviour from another perspective verifies that the parties in Cyprus remain unquestionably the major (if not dominant) actor in the political process of the island. The former President Glafkos Clerides was shown in the gallops to enjoy trust of the 82% of the population and was supported by a big party (DHSY) and a very small one accounting to 36.6% of the electoral base. His adversary Tassos Papadopoulos (38% in gallops) was supported by 4 parties accumulating 58% of the electoral base and won the elections. This seems to reject (at least to a point) the way of doing things in the rest of Europe and the argument presented by Farrell and Webb (20, 1999) regarding the catalytic role of leaders in national elections in terms of being the heavy arsenal of their parties.

A very serious aspect of parties functioning that has not yet been addressed is that of their financing. The issue requires a framework of rules and regulations (Pujas and Rhodes, 4, 1998) matched with the political will on behalf of the parties to find a workable and transparent system of finance. Pujas and Rhodes (14, 1998) suggest that regulation can only be effective if well-designed and backed by effective sanctions and a parallel diffusion of appropriate ethics and norms. Dedication on behalf of the key political actors is essential for the health and legitimacy of democratic systems. Up to date political parties have not demonstrated the necessary willingness to search into the issue and bring forward a financing framework.

Marks and Wilson (434, 2000) refer to the “bounded rationality” that shapes the way in which parties come to terms with new challenges and uncertainties. “…The ability of parties to assimilate and exploit new issues in existing schemas …is a product of their ideologies, the endogenous constraints of party organization, constituency ties, and reputation”. The new challenges posed by the process of Europeanization

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5 Phileleptheros newspaper 20/05/03. The results were published in all daily newspapers. See also the European’s Union Delegation in Cyprus web page-www.delcyp.cec.eu.int.
6 Proceedings of the parliamentary committee for environmental issues (20/05/2003).
presented the parties with the opportunity of verifying themselves before their audience in some important issues of their traditional programmatic declarations. In a peculiar way all parties identified those issues of *acquis communautaire* that suited best their purposes and incorporated them in their political practice and vocabulary. Marks and Wilson (435, 2000) make a note of the dual character of European integration process; that is political and economic. For parties on the left of the ideology axis such as AKEL and KISOS the process of political integration presented them with a chance of regulating aspects of economic integration, especially issues relating to workers’ rights and social subsidies. Kreppel (18, 1999) emphasizes the importance of workers rights and conditions in the workplace for the left wing parties in forming coalitions in the European Parliament, while Marks and Wilson (435, 2000) note the need to regulate them because of the pressures of employers for labour flexibility and economic inequality fostered by economic integration. AKEL has declared emphatically that the harmonization process with acquis communautaire has been one sided and stressed the importance of coming to terms with all aspects of it. Special reference is of course made to the social subsidies field and the workers rights both at work and in crisis situations (e.g. unemployment and dismissals). Through this indirect process left wing parties find the chance of regulating the markets effectively by enhancing this capacity through the EU.

The same logic in reverse applies for DHSY as well. For right wing parties’ economic integration is beneficial because it constrains the economic intervention of national governments. Similarly to AKEL, DHSY hides behind the harmonization obligation to pursue its own goals; liberalization and privatization, for which it could carry a significant political cost. Nevertheless the Europeanization process is seen by DHSY as a confirmation of their visionary policy since its foundation in 1976 and especially to issues relating to the modernization of public service and the liberalization of private initiative. The modernizing aspect of the Europeanization process on the public service structures and quality of service is one of the main arguments of Gabriel Lataianu (5-7, 2002) and one expressed by almost all Cypriot parties but surely not in the same way.

**Innovation**

Programmatic changes were one of the most explicit types of evidence of Europeanization on political parties, expressed mainly through modifications in party programmes. This change can be measured either quantitatively or qualitatively Ladrech (8, 2001). Quantitatively through increased mentioning of the EU in terms of European policy per se and in reference to other policy areas, and qualitatively as an additional factor in the pursuit of policies traditionally considered domestic, e.g. employment, immigration, and asylum. This reflects an agreement to integrate the European dimension into references to domestic policy.

The impact that exogenous changes such as the Europeanization process has had on parties’ programmatic or ideological dimensions is also pointed by Luther and Rommel (15, 2002). The fact that many parties adapt to changes imposed by their

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*Party’s manifesto for the change of position towards the EU (November, 1995) and party’s declaration for the modernization of Cyprus society (December, 2000).*

*The Cyprobobarometer of 2001 (Public Opinion Survey conducted by RAI Consultants Company) indicated that 60% of the public object to the privatisation of public owned companies.*

*Party’s founding declaration (July 1976).*
external environment is a function attributed to them by many scholars. Parties are viewed from this perspective as institutions subject to constant change.

Examples of changes to parties’ programmatic or ideological manifestos in the direction of innovation are presented below:

- A distinct change in the qualitatively direction was the way in which EU is mentioned in AKEL Congress declaration in 1990\(^{11}\) (before the party changed its position against the EU) compared to the 1995 document which changed the party’s position towards the EU. The document and all documents since, make explicit and positive references to the EU as a factor of stability and security, and administrative modernization of the country’s structures and as a helpful tool in its effort to increase the workers rights.

- DHSY adapted a new ideological platform in 1998 called Eurodemocracy\(^{12}\), which is a result of the party’s contacts and influences from the European field. The declaration is of a liberal conservative form according to the classification of Marks and Wilson (441, 2000).

- Almost all parties addressed the increasing importance of environmental issues either by making long and explicit references in their documents (DHSY, KISOS, DHKO) or by issuing special documents exclusively dealing with environmental issues (AKEL). Some parties (e.g. AKEL and DHSY) made even further steps by establishing, within the party, committees to deal exclusively with environmental issues and profiting from the EU’s legislation and actions towards the protection of the environment. A development that is mainly attributed to the Europeanization process and exerted pressures on all parties to deal effectively with the environmental issues is considered to be the creation of the Green party of Cyprus in 1996. The emergence of new political issues has in a number of countries led to the emergence of new parties, which in turn has frequently confronted existing ones to adapt their internal organization in order to respond more effectively to these new challenges (Luther and Rommel, 13, 2002).

- Another issue incorporated in all parties’ manifestos was that of immigrants\(^{13}\); mainly with reference to the need to protect their rights. Again this issue is attributed to a large degree to the course of Cyprus towards the EU. The special attention given by the EU institutions to immigrants’ rights has forced all parties of Cyprus to address it and find ways of protecting them. The immigrant issue used to be a field of dominance on behalf of the left AKEL due to its ideological stance. At the present the issue concerns all parties and many locally created NGO’s.

A second broad type of change that Europeanization has brought to parties is that of organizational structures (Luther and Rommel, 13, 2002; Ladrech, 9, 2001). Ladrech (9, 2001) points, furthermore, that though explicit statutory change in parties may not be readily evident, change in practices and power relations do occur. Instances of this

\(^{11}\) AKEL’s Congress declaration (November 1990) and the document for the changing of party’s position against the EU (November, 1995). It should be also stressed though that the party’s documents still refer to the EU as a form of capitalism integration and emphasize along with the positives a lot of negative references for the EU (e.g. the democratic deficit).


change can be traced to organizational links with actors outside the national territory, communication patterns with society, electoral strategies etc.

One of the fundamental changes posed to parties during the last years and noted by scholars is the decline in party membership which was undermined by the reduced cohesiveness and organizational density of the social segments hitherto mobilized by political parties and the reduced partisan allegiance (Luther and Rommel, 13, 2002; Gaffney, 20, 1996). Despite the fact that Cypriot political parties still demonstrate a substantial ability to organize members (mainly the two big ones, AKEL and DHSY\textsuperscript{14}) the need to address the problem became apparent recently and expressed in their manifestos. The need to establish liaisons with interest groups and segments of the society that were out of reach to them drove parties to invent new organizational patterns. These organizational patterns were also aiming to fill the gap of expertise shortage in some areas of EU activity. These actions took several forms: think tanks for specific issues, electoral patterns of addressing the voters, the employment of accepted and worthtrusted notables. Specific examples of this form of action were:

- The designation of notables in the ballot papers of DHSY since the parliamentary elections of 1996. These notables were mainly drawn form specific interest groups, social sectors (as the public service\textsuperscript{15}), and the academic field.
- The creation of a new electoral platform by AKEL in 1990\textsuperscript{16} to accommodate personalities outside the party in order to appeal to a broader audience other than the traditional one. This platform is used whenever elections are held that involve party participation (e.g. parliamentary elections) and proved to be very successful so far.
- KISOS created think tanks over the last few years in order to take advantage of a good acceptance of the party in the academic community. These think tanks take the form of advisory forums to the official leadership of the party; they perform researches and seminar activities.

Mokre and Pollak (10, 2001) in their study of the transformation of Austrian political parties through the European integration process identified an aspect of the influence that Europeanisation has had on them: that of the educative role they can perform. One aspect of this educative role is the education of citizens in order to make them aware of European issues and another is that of the training of political elites within parties in order to face the more intense and complicated issues of the European arena. In Cyprus all parties performed this role to varying degrees.

All parties created internally the structures to perform this task under different labels. AKEL has created the office of European affairs, DHSY and DHKO the respective secretariats of EU issues and KISOS the thematic of EU affairs\textsuperscript{17}. Those structures reflect the need to inform party members and citizens in general about the current European situation and the effects that it may have on Cyprus. Usually the way in

\textsuperscript{14} The Secretary General of AKEL revealed in the last party Congress (December 2000) that the party membership accounted to 15000 (there is an indeterminate big number of members in other affiliated organisations) while DHSY has 31000 members (Party Congress announcement, April 2003).

\textsuperscript{15} Two of the elected MP’s of DHSY in 2001 elections were former public administration officials (Parliament edition for the MP’s, 2002).

\textsuperscript{16} The creation of this platform was also a response to the new challenges faced by the party after the collapse of the Soviet block and the internal conflict that was created as a consequence. (Party’s Congress document, Nicosia, November 1990).

\textsuperscript{17} Information drawn from the parties’ statutes and Congresses’ documents.
which parties address the issue is through the implications of EU membership on the efforts to finding a solution to the Cyprus problem and the effect on the social and economic situation of the island. The same role was carried out by the parties’ youth organizations regarding mainly issues related to the implications of the EU to youth through lectures and seminars.

As far as the party elites is concerned the method of seminars with the participation of European Parliament members is employed in order to make them familiar with the EU reality in specific issues. All parliamentary parties also took advantage of the opportunity provided to them by the fixed meetings of the joint EU-Cyprus parliamentary committee.

A positive side effect of this activity was the potential to be informed about, and exploit EU projects that could benefit parties both economically and politically by being involved in them.

Another innovative relationship developed gradually as a result of the process of Europeanization was the organizational links with actors outside the national territory, mainly the European Parliament. References to cooperation with transnational organizations such as party federations, and European level institutions became more explicit in parties documents. “National parties unlike government bureaucracies, individual politicians, and interest groups, do not have the ability or opportunity to develop privileged or intimate relationships with authoritative EU actors” (Ladrech, 7, 2001). This state of affairs was addressed by the cooperation with the party groups of the European Parliament. The EP party groups provide a point of contact between national parties and EU developments, facilitating the flow of information to national parties, thus providing a structured network environment for the increased transnational contacts among national parties (Ladrech, 180, 1997).

Ladrech (175, 1997) also points out that “…interparliamentary benefits, including committee chairs and rapporteurs, accrue from membership in one of the groups-especially the largest ones. Moreover alignment with a larger related group increases a party’s chances of influencing EU policy from within”. The former reference may not apply fully for the Cyprus case-especially to the direct benefits (e.g. committee chairs)- but surely provides a framework that the political parties of Cyprus have used in order to advance the country’s course to the EU and achieve positive references regarding the solution of the Cyprus problem. The democratic deficit ascribed to the EU puts a bar on the European Parliament ability and intention to be more actively involved in the community’s every day life but the process of legitimizing the EU institutions goes through the European Parliament, something that provides parties with a great future potential to become one of the major actors of the game. Kreppel (6, 1999) asserts that the European Parliament should be conceived as a legislature in the process of evolving from a chamber of debate into a legislative body.

The relationships developed over the years on the basis of ideological connotations. The importance of ideology is stressed by Ladrech (179, 1997): “The ideological dimension is an important aspect of transnational party activity, for it can help construct a European Party Identity, something identifiable not only for those involved in the policy making but for citizens as well”. Marks and Wilson (436, 2000) refer to their expectation that party families cohere on the issue of European integration, and further, that membership in a party family is significantly associated with position on European integration. Variation on the issue tends to be much lower within party families than within individual countries. Kreppel also points out (7, 1999) that the cases of disagreements in the EP are due to the parties’ ideological differences.
All Cypriot parties are affiliated with the party groups in the EP (See Appendix page 24). The development of this kind of linkage acts as a factor of European-level legitimation for all parties and especially for those that were against EU for many years (e.g. AKEL). It was also a point for national exploitation for electoral purposes, especially by KISOS, which has always emphasized during election campaigns, that the party’s access and networks in the Party of European Socialists would be supportive of Cyprus’ effort to join the EU and promote a justifiable solution to the division of the island. The only party experiencing problems over the years in affiliating with one of the party families of EP was DHKO who only recently became affiliated to the Liberal democrats. The inability to connect was attributed to the party’s crisis of ideological identity; something that still troubles the party.

A new schema that appeared to the parties functioning in the last decade and can be attributed to a large extent to the Europeanization process is that of the campaign organization and execution. The parties in Cyprus used (and still do) to employ all traditional ways of communicating with their constituencies: door-to-door calls, distribution of their manifestos hand-to-hand, mass meetings in towns and villages etc.

The most obvious impact in this field of activity, which of course cannot be entirely attributed on the Europeanization process, was that of the professionalization in the design and organization of parties’ campaign strategies. It would be fair though to say that Europeanization served as an accelerator of this professionalization process. Professionalization has affected the technical means used, the themes employed and the resources mobilized (Farrell and Webb, 8, 1999). The advancement of the Internet, the usage of television, the resort to professional political consultants, the increased budgets, the formation of ad hoc campaign bodies, the catalytic use of gallops, are only but a few changes that took place. All these have altered the nature of the campaign performed, which has shifted the focus from the essence to the wrapper. Image and style increasingly push policies and the substance aside (Farrell and Webb, 20, 1999). It should be also noted that all political parties have adjusted their election campaigns under the influence and help from their European counterparts.

Examples of this effect on Cypriot political parties’ campaigns include:

- The increased participation of European MP’s during party campaigns in seminars, political gatherings, and lectures. KISOS is the party that makes particular use of this kind of strategy.
- The raising of single-issue campaigns such as environmental and education (e.g. AKEL).¹⁸
- The targeting of specific groups of the population like the public servants (e.g. DHSY in the 2001 parliamentary elections).
- The use of logos and symbols used by European parties as a means of promoting their European identity (e.g. KISOS uses the red rose which is the emblem of the Party of European Socialists).
- The hiring of political consultants that work alongside the party leadership and help them design their campaign. No party exempts itself from this rule.

Agapiou-Josephides K. (144-145, 1998) refers to three types of geographical models regarding the representation of women in active politics. One of them is the Mediterranean one which is characterized by the very low percentage of women’s

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participation in political activity (usually below 10%). Cyprus is definitely an example of this model. In 36 years of independency (1960-1996) Cyprus has dramatically low figures to present: only two women were appointed ministers and only 8 women elected MP’s (Agapiou-Josephides K., 145, 1998). Another very interesting figure is the number of women candidacies for the last municipal elections held in 2001. Out of the 79 candidacies submitted for the mayoral office only two were women, and out of the 1678 candidates for the Municipal Councils only 323 were women\(^\text{19}\). What is clearly evident in the last few years is a change both in numbers but mainly in the way political parties view women’s participation. 

As far as numbers are concerned, in the last seven years (since 1996) there were 6 women elected MP’s and another one appointed minister indicating a shift in the arithmetic of representation. Furthermore, in Cyprus delegation in the convention for the future of Europe of the four members, two were women. The most important aspect of change though is the way in which the parties deal with this issue internally. There is a distinct shift towards a more powerful participation through the incorporation of representation based on percentage (e.g. DHSY adapted a statutory provision of proportionate representation of 30% for all party offices to be held by women\(^\text{20}\)) or through internally promoting women by pointing out the necessity of having more women involved (AKEL\(^\text{21}\)).

This new approach represents a deliberate action on behalf of the parties and is mainly attributed to the experiences gained in the European field where there is a high percentage of female participation in political activities. The demand for increased female participation was accelerated by the Europeanization process, which acted additively to the National Machinery for Women’s Rights organization efforts in recent years. We have to acknowledge though that Cyprus still lacks in comparison to its most European counterparts but the picture is changing gradually and steadily.

**Europeanzation as a cohesion factor**

Aylott (2001) in his article about the parties’ responses to the European integration process in Scandinavian countries makes an emphasis to the divisive role it had, both within parties and the societies of that countries, resulting to party divisions and rejections of the EU membership (Norwegian case). Cyprus can be presented as the exact opposite of this course of things.

Despite the fact that one of the major parties of the country (AKEL\(^\text{22}\)) was strongly opposing the country’s EU membership until 1990, and this attitude was also shared by the overwhelming majority of the party’s constituency, the behaviour against the EU has never been hostile or extreme. This pattern has changed dramatically after the party’s change of position that officially took place in 1995 but was implicit since 1991. Despite the long and sometimes harsh discussion within the party, after the decision was reached in the Congress of 1995 almost the whole of the electoral base followed.

All parties looked at Europe not only as a factor that could help them pursue their own goals but also as a factor that could promote the reunification of the island and solve the security problem facing the country since the Turkish invasion of 1974. This

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\(^{19}\) Interview with Mr. Demetris Demetriou in the Ministry of Interior (Elections Service 3/05/2003).

\(^{20}\) DHSY statute.

\(^{21}\) Proceedings from the party Congress (December 2000).

\(^{22}\) AKEL constitutes steadily over the years one third of the electoral base. At the time of reference AKEL has achieved in the 1991 elections 31% (Xadjikiriakos and Christoforou, 1996).
assessment had a huge implication on the way they looked at the EU integration process and EU as a concept but also on certain aspects of their political behaviour. We look some of them below.

**Cross party cooperation**

The EU issue had been for many years—even now sporadically—a major issue of parties’ confrontation. For the conservative right wing DHSY it was a rather technocratic procedure and should be considered ideologically neutral while for the communist AKEL it was considered as part of capitalism integration\(^\text{23}\), as many other sister parties looked at it at the time (Bell, 220-234, 1996). The issue of EU has been assimilated to their existing ideologies and their position was expressed given this long-standing ideological commitment.

In Western European countries though the exact opposite was happening—the ideological axis was employed in discussions only recently (Ladrech, 171, 1997) with the exception of the communist parties— in Cyprus it was a basic ideological issue of confrontation. This has changed since 1990 when the Soviet block collapsed and AKEL started shifting its position favourably to the EU. An earlier shift was marked also in KISOS attitude after the Greek Socialist party (PASOK) came to power in 1981 (a party with great influence over KISOS) and gradually altered its negative stance against the EU to a clearly favourable one (Susannah Verney, 170-188, 1996).

The dual character of European integration creates tension for parties that compete on the class cleavage (Marks and Wilson, 435, 2000). Left wing parties see the political integration as an opportunity to regulate markets; something they cannot perform at the national level, while economic integration is seen as increasing the substitutability of labour across countries, fosters economic inequality, and pressures employers to demand labour flexibility. Parties on the right face the same logic in reverse.

Mair (cited in Ladrech, 5, 2001) makes a significant qualification when addressing the potential indirect impact of Europeanization: “In the first place European integration increasingly operates to constrain the freedom of movement of national governments, and hence encourages a hollowing out of competition among parties with a governing aspiration. As such it promotes a degree of consensus across the mainstream and an inevitable reduction in the range of policy alternatives available to voters”. This is coupled by Ladrech’s observation (4, 2001) that the institutional arrangement of the EU decision and policy-making system has little outlet for partisan mobilization. This was the case in Cyprus political arena regarding the EU issue. All parties demonstrated a large degree of consensus regarding Cyprus accession course and the urgent need to harmonize as quickly as possible. An astonishing example of this effect was the voting of the harmonization legislation in the parliament. Out of the 620 bills concerning harmonization 614 passed unanimously\(^\text{24}\). Another interesting aspect of this procedure was that the communist party (AKEL) only voted against 2 of them compared to the strongly pro-EU DHSY which voted against 4 of these bills. This behaviour on the part of the political parties could be attributed to what Kreppel (2, 1999) refers to as a “sign of institutional maturity” because they realized the need to make compromises over the greater benefit. The fear of being accused as anti-European acted as a constrain mechanism against the expression of different positions during the discussions in the Parliament. Special attention should be paid to the very

\(^\text{23}\) The party still considers EU, as a form of capitalism integration but prefers to “give the battle” from within especially since the collapse of the Soviet block provides no alternative (Party’s Congress declaration, November 1995).

\(^\text{24}\) Source: Proceedings from the Parliamentary discussions regarding the state’s budgets (8-10 January 2003).
limited space provided for negotiations on specific issues given the simultaneous pressures for the solution of the Cyprus problem as well.

Attitudes of the public towards EU

The above-mentioned consensus of political parties coupled by an amazing, almost totalitarian, acceptance of the EU by other major actors and interest groups (media, trade unions, NGO’s, employers associations etc), was reflected to the public’s stance on the issue. Especially after AKEL became pro-EU all data collected in opinion polls demonstrated a high degree of affiliation to the EU by the people. The table presented below indicates this affiliation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>13%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The question asked was: “Do you agree with the decision to pursue membership to the EU”?

The Candidates Countries Eurobarometer also indicates this affiliation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2001 (%)</th>
<th>2002 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Support for EU membership</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vote for EU membership in case of referendum</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust in the EU</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It could be said that this acceptance by the people also acted as a consensus force from the bottom-up on the political parties to promote the accession course as rapidly as possible. Cypriots were anticipating that they would benefit from the EU membership in a variety of ways (in order of importance): economic development, security, human rights, worker’s rights, and an improvement in the operation of the civil service.

EU as a catalyst for bringing together Greekcypriots and Turkishcypriots

By all means the most significant political development attributed to the process of Europeanization was the one that brought the two communities of the island working together towards a common vision and purpose; that of EU membership. One of the major arguments in AKEL decision for changing its attitude was the strongly favourable stance of the overwhelming majority of the Turkishcypriot community towards the EU, something that could act as cohesion factor for the

25 The survey was carried out on behalf of the office of the Chief Negotiator for Cyprus accession to the European Union between 16-29 of July 2002 with personal interviews, covering the whole of the population over the age of 18.

26 Source: Candidate Countries Eurobarometer 2001 and 2002. It should be noted though that the relatively low scores of EU support during these years where attributed to the particular circumstances of the period the field work took place. Eurobarometer 2001 was carried out during October 2001 just after the terrorists attacks in the USA and the preparations for the war against Afghanistan, a war that the majority of Cypriots were against; a war that the EU was actively involved. Eurobarometer 2002 was carried out in a period (Sept 2nd-Oct 16th) when the preparations for the war in Iraq were taking place and rumours for problems in Cyprus’ accession course from some European countries were evolving.

reunification of the island. Indeed, the prospect of Cyprus’ accession to the EU has acted both as a leverage of promoting the talks to solving the division of the country but also as a means of the two communities coming together after 30 years of separation. Under the auspices of the then Czechoslovakian embassy of Cyprus the first round-table talks between the leaders of the parties on both communities in 198928 started. This initiative has been carried forward until today by the Slovakian embassy. Gradually the people of the two communities came close to each other following common events organized by many hosts, mainly AKEL and its youth organization EDON. All other parties find themselves in the process of establishing contacts through bilateral meetings where all aspects of the reunification are discussed.

The Turkish Cypriots saw in the EU a way of escaping from the isolation imposed to them after the Turkish invasion in 1974 and thus increasing their living standards, reduce unemployment and enjoy all the benefits of being a European citizen29. This is also explicit in many references of Turkish Cypriot politicians30 and was demonstrated during the last days of 2002, when half of the Turkish Cypriot population demonstrated very intensely their desire to find a solution to the problem and thus enter the EU along with the Greek Cypriots. The huge influence of the EU and Cyprus’s accession course on the possibility of reuniting the island and finding ways of communicating with the Turkish Cypriots was also stressed by all political leaders of the Greek Cypriot political parties during the discussions in the Parliament for the approval of the State’s budget for 200331.

The EU has also promoted the bicomunal cooperation and exercised pressures for the solution of the problem so that a unified country enters the community. Not only political pressures were exercised through the political decisions of the Union regarding the courses of both Cyprus and Turkey to the community32, but it was also made clear that in case of settlement the occupied north part will be assisted to catch up with the developed South from EU funds. An assistance of 208 million euros was announced by Mr. Verheugen the EU’s Commissioner for enlargement and another 80 to 90 million euros for bicomunal projects. The surpassing of territorial disparities through the substantial economic support that candidate countries could receive from EU’s funds in order to bridge the development gap between regions within the country is stressed by de Winter (5 & 10, 2001) as a lever of pursuing further European integration in his study about ethnoregionalist parties stance against the EU.33

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28 Up to that time the only party maintaining relationships and contacts with the Turkish Cypriot community and its political parties was AKEL which still has Turkish Cypriot members in its lines. The reasons are both historical and ideological.
29 Public Opinion Survey 2002 (Northern Cyprus). The survey was conducted by KADEM Institute on behalf of the Cyprus Delegate of the European Commission. The survey indicated that 88% think that EU membership would be a good thing, 89% claim that Turkish Cypriots would benefit from it and 91% expect personal benefits from Cyprus’ accession to the EU.
30 See for example Mehmet Ali Talat’s (President of the Turkish Republican Party) statement (17/05/2003).
32 See the Presidency Conclusions in Helsinki 1999 and Copenhagen 2002 regarding Cyprus and Turkey.
33 The benefits of Cyprus membership for both communities of the island are explicitly expressed by the former Chief Negotiator for Cyprus accession to the EU in his contribution to Mediterranean Quarterly, April 2002.
The above-mentioned framework exercised pressure on all political forces of Cyprus even those with a reluctant (DHKO and KISO S) or even hostile sometimes (DHSY) attitude towards the Turkishcypriots. At present a lot of bilateral meetings and commonly organized events are taking place between parties of both communities whilst DHSY invited for a first time Turkishcypriot political parties to its Congress just a few days ago. All political parties established internally the structure to accommodate this development. Apart from AKEL who had an office for the rapprochement of the two communities ever since 1974 all other political parties (DHSY, DHKO and KISOS) established their internal secretariats to deal with the issue only recently thus accommodating to the cohesive pressures.

Quoting Monnet we can say that the EU acted as a cohesion mechanism by altering the framework of the problem and thus enabling the actors to perceive it under new dimensions and conditions. EU provided both the framework and the common vision towards a common goal that will benefit both communities. Despite the efforts of the past it was only during the 1990’s that the leaderships of the parties and gradually the people as well, came close to each other and started talking in a friendly atmosphere. If it wasn’t for the EU dimension to change the parameters of the problem none can assure us that the pre-existing situation wouldn’t prevail still. The dynamics of this approach are still under development but the actors are working more closely to each other than ever before.

Conclusion

The aim of this article is to provide some insights on how the political parties of Cyprus have responded to the many challenges posed to them by the process of Europeanization. The main aspects examined were the impact on policies and organizational structures.

It is obvious that the process of Europeanization has had both implicit and explicit effects on political parties. It has altered traditional ways of thinking and established methods of doing things but is an ongoing process and parties adapt to it gradually. The most interesting case is the left wing AKEL which is the only one initially opposing EU membership that changed its position favourably towards the EU and still maintaining a large section of the electoral base. It could be argued that the political parties of Cyprus viewed the Europeanization process both as a challenge and an opportunity to promote further their own goals and reunite the island. Changes in policies were evident especially with reference to new issues emerging as a result of the increased exposure to the European reality (e.g. environmental issues). Changes in organizational structures were evident both for electoral purposes and in relationships with their constituencies at home and with party families and groups in the European Parliament.

Cyprus’s course to the EU was and still is, influenced and predetermined to a large extent by the need to promote a solution to the Cyprus problem. Despite the economic and social benefits expected (even though there are voices pointing to the opposite direction) by the people of Cyprus the need to terminate the division of the island was the guiding principle behind the application. The confirmation of this way of thinking came when the support to EU membership became apparent and intense in 2003.

34 The Congress took place on the 25th of May 2003.
35 Public opinion polls indicate that: the difficulties for farmers will increase (62%), the crime and the use of drugs will increase (67%), the fear of replacing the pound with the Euro (72%), and the fear for increased unemployment (71%). Source: Cyprobarometer 2002.
the Turkishcypriot community creating a factor of coherence and consensus over the need to solve the problem and join the EU.

Cyprus is a unique case not only because of its political problem but also because of the lack of any organized voice against the EU membership within the country. The great majority of actors involved consider EU as a useful tool for utilizing their goals and purposes. What needs to be addressed is the opposition of that part of society that sees the EU as a threat to their interests (small businesses, self-employed, farmers, activists).

The parties’ response to the process of European integration could be characterized unilateral; that is because they mainly adapt to changes from the external environment fostered by the EU and have not contributed hitherto to the big issues that the project of integration poses to them. Many aspects of this process are accepted unquestionably due to the lack of alternatives. The pressure exerted by the simultaneous need to promote the solution of Cyprus problem in essence eliminates any room for maneuvering on behalf of the parties. The EU might in fact be an excellent opportunity for parties to re-invent themselves.

References


APPENDIX

To date there are eight parliamentary parties in Cyprus three of which are represented by only one MP. For the purposes of this paper I have decided to focus on the four main ones, which existed before the official application of Cyprus for EU membership. The table below presents the results from the last parliamentary elections taking into account all parties:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AKEL</td>
<td>34.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHSY</td>
<td>34.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHKO</td>
<td>14.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KISOS</td>
<td>6.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEO</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDH</td>
<td>2.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADHK</td>
<td>2.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENVIRONMENTALISTS</td>
<td>1.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VARIOUS</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**AKEL (Progressive Party of the Working People)**

AKEL definitely provides the best case study regarding the effect of Europeanization on political actors since it’s the only party that changed position towards the EU. The change in position cannot be entirely attributed to the EU challenge but it was one of the two major ones; the other being the collapse of the Soviet block. AKEL found itself in a very difficult position in the early 1990’s facing both the impact of the collapse on its ideology legitimacy and an internal crisis resulting from that. The party had a very clear negative position against the EU as all other sister parties in Europe did. The new world that emerged created the need for redefining the party’s strategy towards a favourable stance. The absence of any realistic alternatives and the overall acceptance of EU by the public of Cyprus (AKEL constituency not excluded) combined with the realization that it could act as a cohesive lever to reunite Cyprus, made AKEL to alter its position. The rationale for this was to give the fight from within in the direction of reforming the EU to a democratic union for the benefit of the people. Opposition within the party members was substantial (the voting in the Congress resulted 60% in favour of changing position and 40% against) but was not reflected to the wider constituency of the party. The change in position did not create any internal problems since all members and voters of the party accepted it. AKEL is now an affiliate member of the Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left and constitutes 34.7% of the electoral base.

**DHSY (Democratic Rally)**
DHSY’s (conservative right wing party) position towards the EU was strongly in favour ever since the party came to existence in 1976. EU membership represented an ideological and political target for the party; that is because its objectives for reforming the society in a liberal way and of belonging to the West were paramountly served by this option. The party saw the signing of the treaty in Athens two months ago as a confirmation of their visionary policy. DHSY is today affiliated with the Group of the European People’s Party and European Democrats, and constitutes 34% of the electoral base.

**DHKO (Democratic Party)**

Like DHSY, DHKO (a centre-right party) was strongly in favour of EU membership both for ideological and political reasons too. The fact that governments from this party were in office from 1977 to 1988 gave the party the opportunity to present itself as the “driver” and the one that should take the credit for the successful ending of this course. The fact that Cyprus has achieved after the backward slash caused by the Turkish invasion of 1974, to catch up with the rest of the developing countries and meet all the economic criteria of the Union was attributed to a large extent to DHKO. DHKO has been facing an identity crisis since the collapse of the Soviet block, which resulted, to the inability of affiliating to any party family in the European Parliament. The identity crisis is the outcome of the fact that it positions itself as the intermediary between the two poles (AKEL and DHSY), something very vague after the changes occurred to all other parties since 1990. This has changed only recently when the party became an affiliate member of the Group of European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party. DHKO constitutes 14.8% of the electoral base.

**KISOS (Socialdemocratic Movement)**

The party was established in 1969 as EDEK. In 1998 the party’s leadership undertook an unsuccessful campaign to unite all the political forces of the intermediary space between AKEL and DHSY under a new label, which was call KISOS. The effort was unsuccessful but the new name stayed. The party is still under the influence of its charismatic founder who guides the party’s policy ever since its foundation. KISOS is very strongly influenced by the Greek Socialist party PASOK and almost follows its strategic choices. One of them was the EU membership as a security mechanism against any Turkish advancement. KISOS is also the party that exploits more than any other (or at least is trying to), its European bonds with other Socialist parties. The big contradiction between KISOS and its affiliate members in Europe is the fact that while most of them are governing aspired parties with a large domestic support, KISOS has been stacked with a very narrow and small percentage that never went beyond 10%. Nevertheless the party is one of the strongest supporters of EU membership and is affiliated with the Party of European Socialists. KISOS constitutes 6.5% of the electoral base.